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김광진 ( Kwang Jin Kim ) 연세대학교 통일연구원 2007 통일연구 Vol.11 No.2
Dollarization and dependence on hard currency for Kim Jong Il, north korean economy and the people is more than serious now. The world already experienced Kim Jong Il`s ``pertinacity`` to getting back frozen 25million dollars at BDA, Macau., even not hesitating to show up with failed atomic bomb test. With a new government in South Korea, the south-north relationship is passing through temporary adjustment period and hundreds of thousands of food aid is stopped for a few months, but the rumor is at rampant that a massive starvation is about to break out in North Korea. This is only a case showing North Korea`s dependence on outside. It makes quite anxious to know how the present economic situation and rehabilitation ability is for them and why they can not survive even several months without outside help. For correct diagnosis of this, it`s needed to look into economic structure, foreign dependence and serious dollarization. The main focus of discussion here is on dollarization. There are 2 kinds in dollarization of economy; one is by government`s active involvement through foreign exchange, monetary and foreign economic policy and the other is natural process by market itself as a result of economic downfall, steep devaluation of national currency, increased outside dependence and expanding black market economy. The situation in Peru in mid 90`s is for former case. As for North Korea, it was propelled by ``Royal Court Economy`` which was set up and expanded by Kim Jong Il and this case is not exactly by government policy. The devastated people`s economy run by cabinet, its increased outside dependence, deepening reliance of formal economy and citizens on market by its expansion, rapidly growing 2nd economy and steep fall of ``WON`` is another reason. Kim Jong Il himself and market affected both in a mixed way. Independence of munitions industry in 1972 from cabinet by setting up ``Committee of Economy No. 2`` and growing up economic sector at party with a start of ``Bureau 39`` in 1974 formed up ``Royal Court Economy`` which is military-industrial complex. It became the direct source of Kim Jong Il`s ruling finance and began to serve solely for munitions industry and system`s safeguard. Structured mainly for foreign trade and hard currency earning, it has eaten out people`s economy, becoming a group or conglomerate and now occupy 40-60% of the total national economy. Its expansion and running by Dollar kicked up more serious dollarization of economy. Now almost all the nation`s hard currency income is made and overtaken by this economic sector. Its current asset is 248 times more than people`s economy. This is the main obstacle to rehabilitation of people`s economy. The economic sector run by cabinet extracted to 45% scale in late 90`s, the peak of hardship, as compared with the level of late 80`s when steep fall began. This brought increased outside dependence, growing market and exploding 2nd economy. For survival, citizens were forced into the market rather than relying on state distribution. At the same time, value of ``WON`` fell 20 times for 5-6 years since it was devalued to market level in 2002 which was called ``7.1 measure.`` All these accelerated objection of national currency, increased possession of dollar and black market transactions which makes dollarization extreme. Now it is not too much to say that north korean economy is ``dollar economy,`` or ``hard currency economy``. Inflow of outside assistance and dollar at present economic structure means direct inflow into Royal Court Economy,`` the military-industrial complex. The rehabilitation of north korean economy is only possible when people`s economy, the key industries revive. At the moment, the monopoly of hard currency by ``Royal Court Economy`` and its priority in resource distribution blocks this way. This is the main reason why North Korea can not stand on itself even though a vast amount of aid was input into the state for past 10 years. Of course, food, fertilizer and heavy oil aid for consuming purpose might be another reason but this is only an excuse. Some say that on a condition one can not change the present system from outside, it can be a pretty smart way to make use of ``Royal Court Economy`` sector as motivating force in changing North Korea by letting them taste market economy, which has freer access to outside world. It is sure that the employees in this sector has better ability and skill, and in future they will play the major role in leading change, for they have more frequent contact with outside, better information and understanding of market mechanism. This imposes us another difficult task of choosing how to look at ``Royal Court Economy`` and how to handle them.
정은찬(Jeong, Eunchan) 통일과 북한법학회(구 북한법연구회) 2019 북한법연구 Vol.22 No.-
남북경제협력은 1988년 7월 7일 ‘민족자존과 통일번영을 위한 특별선언’(7.7선언)이 채택된 이후 경제외적 환경에 의한 제약에도 불구하고 꾸준히 발전하여 왔다. 우리 정부는 대북 식량차관과 비료지원을 중심으로 한 인도적 지원으로부터 시작하여, 금강산과 개성공단 같은 대북경제투자를 동반한 상업적 교역(일반교역·위탁가공무역) 등의 방법으로 북한과의 경제협력을 주도해왔다. 그러나 남북경제협력의 실효성을 둘러싼 논란은 지속되고 있다. 본 논문은 이러한 문제해결에 실증분석결과로 답할 수 있는 전제를 마련하고, 특히 북한과의 경제협력에서 어떤 산업부문을 특화시켜야 할지에 대한 해답을 찾는데 연구의 중점을 두었다. 본 연구에서는 사회계정행렬(Social Accounting Matrix, 이하 SAM) 승수분석을 활용하였다. SAM은 경제 전반의 회계계정을 행렬의 형태로 표현한 도구로, 산업부문으로부터 가계, 정부, 투자 및 해외부문 등을 연결하는 균형상태를 나타낸다. 분석절차는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 북한의 산업연관표를 추정하였다. 둘째, 추정된 북한의 산업연관표를 이용, 북한의 SAM을 구축했다. 북한의 SAM은 2007년에 연구된 선행연구 자료가 있으나, 변화한 북한경제 변화상황을 반영하여 2012년 북한의 SAM으로 새롭게 추정하였다. 셋째, 2012년 북한의 SAM을 활용하여 남북경제협력이 북한경제에 미치는 경제적 파급효과를 분석했다. 분석결과 투입금액이 4.3억 달러로 가장 큰 중공업 부문이 약 10.2억 달러의 효과가 나타나는 것으로 분석되었으며, 4억 달러가 투입된 경공업 부문이 약 8.1억 달러의 효과가 나타나는 것으로 분석되어 투입금액 대비 효과는 경공업(2.0)에 비해 중공업(2.4)이 큰 것으로 나타났다. 농림수산업과 광업은 각각 약 3.1억 달러와 2.2억 달러의 효과가 나타나는 것으로 분석되었다. 금액대비효과를 보면 농림수산업은 투입금액 대비 9.8배의 효과가, 광업은 6.1배의 효과가 나타나는 것으로 분석되어 농림수산업과 광업의 경제협력 대비 효과는 경공업과 중공업 보다 큰 것으로 나타났다. 또한 남북경제협력 실시에 따른 총 생산유발효과가 약 23억 달러가 되는 것으로 분석되었다. The inter-Korean economic cooperation has developed steadily in spite of the constraints of the non-economic environment since the July 7, 1988 Special Declaration on Residents and Prosperity for Reunification. Starting with humanitarian aid centered on food loans and fertilizer aid, the Korean government will begin economic cooperation with North Korea through commercial trade (general trade and entrusted processing trade) accompanied by economic investment to North Korea such as Mt. Has led. However, controversy continues over the effectiveness of inter-Korean economic cooperation. This paper focuses on research to find the answer to which industry sector should be specialized in economic cooperation with North Korea. In this study, the social accounting matrix (SAM) multiplier analysis was used. SAM is a tool that expresses the accounting accounts of the economy in matrix form and shows the balance between the industrial sector, household, government, investment and foreign sector. First, we estimated North Korea s industrial relations table. Second, North Korea s social accounting matrix was constructed using the estimated North Korean industrial relations table. North Korea s SAM had previous research data in 2007, but it was newly estimated as North Korea s SAM in 2012 to reflect the changing situation of the North Korean economy. Third, the economic ripple effect of inter-Korean economic cooperation on the North Korean economy was analyzed using the North Korean SAM in 2012. The analysis shows that the heavy industry sector has an effect of about $ 110 million with an input of $ 400 million, and the light industry sector with an investment of $ 400 million has an effect of about $ 800 million. The agriculture, forestry and fisheries industry and the mining industry were analyzed to be about $ 310 million and $ 220 million, respectively. The effect on the value of the agriculture, forestry and fisheries was 9.8 times that of the input, and the mining, 6.1 times. The effect of economic cooperation between agriculture, forestry and fisheries and mining was greater than that of the light and heavy industries. It was also analyzed that the total production induction effect of the inter-Korean economic cooperation would be about $ 2.3 billion.
김광진 연세대학교 통일연구원 2007 통일연구 Vol.11 No.2
Dollarization and dependence on hard currency for Kim Jong Il, north korean economy and the people is more than serious now. The world already experienced Kim Jong Il's 'pertinacity' to getting back frozen 25mi11ion dollars at BDA, Macau., even not hesitating to show up with failed atomic bomb test. With a new government in South Korea, the south-north relationship is passing through temporary adjustment period and hundreds of thousands of food aid is stopped for a few months, but the rumor is at rampant that a massive starvation is about to break out in North Korea. This is only a case showing North Korea's dependence on outside, It makes quite anxious to know how the present economic situation and rehabilitation ability is for them and why they can not survive even several months without outside help. For correct diagnosis of this, it's needed to look into economic structure, foreign dependence and serious dollarization. The main focus of discussion here is on dollarization. There are 2 kinds in dollarization of economy; one is by government's active involvement through foreign exchange, monetary and foreign economic policy and the other is natural process by market itself as a result of economic downfall, steep devaluation of national currency, increased outside dependence and expanding black market economy. The situation in Peru in mid 90's is for former case. As for North Korea, it was propelled by 'Royal Court Economy' which was set up and expanded by Kim Jong Il and this case is not exactly by government policy. The devastated people's economy run by cabinet, its increased outside dependence, deepening reliance of formal economy and citizens on market by its expansion, rapidly growing 2nd economy and steep fall of 'WON' is another reason. Kim Jong Il himself and market affected both in a mixed way. Independence of munitions industry in 1972 from cabinet by setting up 'Committee of Economy No. 2' and growing up economic sector at party with a start of 'Bureau 39' in 1974 formed up 'Royal Court Economy' which is military-industrial complex. It became the direct source of Kim Jong Il's ruling finance and began to serve solely for munitions industry and system's safeguard. Structured mainly for foreign trade and hard currency earning, it has eaten out people's economy, becoming a group or conglomerate and now occupy 40~60% of the total national economy. Its expansion and running by Dollar kicked up more serious dollarization of economy. Now almost all the nation's hard currency income is made and overtaken by this economic sector. Its current asset is 248 times more than people's economy. This is the main obstacle to rehabilitation of people's economy. The economic sector run by cabinet extracted to 45% scale in late 90's, the peak of hardship, as compared with the level of late 80's when steep fall began. This brought increased outside dependence, growing market and exploding 2nd economy. For survival, citizens were forced into the market rather than relying on state distribution. At the same time, value of 'WON' fell 20 times for 5-6 years since it was devalued to market level in 2002 which was called 7.1 measure.' All these accelerated objection of national currency, increased possession of dollar and black market transactions which makes dollarization extreme. Now it is not too much to say that north korean economy is 'dollar economy,' or 'hard currency economy'. Inflow of outside assistance and dollar at present economic structure means direct inflow into 'Royal Court Economy,' the military-industrial complex. The rehabilitation of north korean economy is only possible when people's economy, the key industries revive. At the moment, the monopoly of hard currency by 'Royal Court Economy' and its priority in resource distribution blocks this way. This is the main reason why North Korea can not stand on itself even though a vast amount of aid was input into the state for past 10 years. Of course, food, fertilizer and heavy oil aid for consuming purpose might be another reason but this is only an excuse. Some say that on a condition one can not change the present system from outside, it can be a pretty smart way to make use of 'Royal Court Economy' sector as motivating force in changing North Korea by letting them taste market economy, which has freer access to outside world. It is sure that the employees in this sector has better ability and skill, and in future they will play the major role in leading change, for they have more frequent contact with outside, better information and understanding of market mechanism. This imposes us another difficult task of choosing how to look at 'Royal Court Economy' and how to handle them.
고영은(Young-Eun Ko) 영남신학대학교 2015 신학과 목회 Vol.43 No.-
In this thesis, the development of the inter-Korean relationship for the reunification and peaceful stability was approached in the economic point of view. On the assumption of the reunification, this study analyzed the theological position of the jubilee economy for the jubilee economy approach to enhance the economic exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. For the analysis, this study looked into the understanding of Prof. Jeong-sun Noh who argued ‘jubilee economy’ and the theological arguments by John Howard Yoder, a member of the Mennonites, who argued economic sharing from the peaceful perspective, and Johan Galtung’s principles of peace. Under the theological premise, to investigate the feasibility of the ‘jubilee economy’ for the reunification and peace in the Korean peninsula, this researcher examined the possibilities of the jubilee economy in three aspects. The first one was to analyze the economic structure of the North and the feasibility of the jubilee economy. The North Korean economy has quickly deteriorated in the late 1990s, and since then the market economy has been spread in the North on a full scale. On one hand, the spread of the market economy threats the planned economy of the North, and on the other hand it features systematic supplementation. It means that the North advocates the planned economy as a socialist economy system in order to keep its regime, and at the same time adopts the market economy. In other words, the North has dual-economy structure. Such a fact is a definite key to increasing the possibility and necessity of inter-Korean economic cooperation in the dimension of jubilee economy. The second one was to analyze the North Korean economy system and the benefits and cost of the reunification. Such an analysis was required to understand the economic value and necessity of the ‘jubilee economy’ for the reunification. The necessity of the jubilee economy was found through the analysis of the benefits and cost of the reunification in the economic point of view. In terms of benefits, the jubilee economy can help improve the social and economic values of the reunification before the two Koreas are reunified, increase the peace and stability in the Korean peninsula, and prevent and save the cost of reunification after the South and the North are reunified. The third one was to analyze the utility possibility of the jubilee economy through the case of Gaeseong Industrial Complex.
The North Korean Economy : Current Situation, Crisis, and Possible Scenarios
Kim, Seok Hyang Institute for International Trade and Cooperation 2006 Asian International Studies Review Vol.7 No.1
For more than a half century, the international community largely ignored North Korea. Since 1990, however, the situation has changed dramatically and North Korea has begun to attract increasing international attention. Throughout the 1990s, scenarios of a North Korean collapse were in vogue. Yet, these estimations were proved to be wrong. It is now widely accepted that North Korea is relatively stable in the sense that it seems to have little trouble keeping its political system intact and functioning. By now, the most striking aspect of the North Korean political system is its extraordinary resilience. Why then has the North not yet collapsed, despite the chronic shortages of food, energy, and foreign currency? In this paper, I would like to raise two main questions. The first question is : "How serious are the difficulties of the North Korean economy?" And the second is "What actions has the North Korean regime taken to resolve these difficulties and how effective those actions have been?" The North Korean regime has been striving to readjust and improve its economic structure since the 1970s. The regime has sought foreign capital and technology. However, the regime has been attempting to reformulate its economic structure within the strict framework of the existing political system whose survival was its paramount concern, and therefore it has failed to link the domestic economy with the world economy. What the regime has been doing is, on the one hand, to map out policy measures designed to open up its doors, while on the other hand escalating its ideological and political campaigns to prevent the people from being "contaminated" by a capitalist culture which it anticipated would develop as a result of such measures. It is no wonder that, under these conditions, all attempts at reforming met with only limited success at best. The North Korean regime, however, has negotiated with its people the expansion of its second economy, despite its reluctance to do so. In fact, the regime explicitly defined farmers' markets as remnants of "backward" capitalism which would become extinct as socialism reached a higher stage of development. It is expected that the ruling hierarchy in North Korea will be able to survive for a considerable period of time, despite the threatening economic crisis. So far in North Korea, the need to safeguard the existing political regime has been given far greater priority than the need to bring about reform. However, the North Korean regime, if it intends to survive, will be compelled to carry out full-scale reforms sooner or later.
2017년 북한의 시장경제 규모 추정에 관한 연구: 비중과 함의를 중심으로
남성욱 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2019 평화학연구 Vol.20 No.3
Estimating the size of the market economy in North Korea in 2017 is meaningful in understanding the changes and evolution of the North Korean economy. In particular, understanding the form and proportion of informal transactions in North Korea's economy in 2017, when the UN sanctions are in full swing, is also linked to verifying the effectiveness of sanctions. As a result, in 2017, North Korea's market economy amounted to $ 79.9 billion, which account for 21.9% of the GNI(GNI: $ 32.4 billion). The implications are derived through comparative analysis with the 1998 market economy estimated in the same way. In 1998, North Korea's market economy totaled $ 34.2 billion, accounting for 27.1% of the GNI $ 12.6 billion in 1998. In short, compared to 20 years ago, North Korea's share of the market economy fell from 27.1% to 21.9%. In 1997, the growth rate was negative 6.5%, and in 1998, it was the worst time that the death occurred because the North Korean economy failed to solve the problem of eating for four consecutive years. North Korea's public distribution system collapsed, reaching a peak of 27.1%, as the proportion of people supplying goods through the market reached its highest. In 2017, however, although the North Korean economy recorded an economic growth rate of -3.5% due to UN sanctions on North Korea, the proportion of the market economy has declined, the planned economy overwhelmed the market economy sector compared with 20 years ago. Although the market economy partially solves the shortage of consumer goods, the planned economic mechanism still well operates and manage the North Korean economy. 2017년 북한의 시장경제 규모를 추정하는 것은 북한 경제의 변화와 진화를 파악하는데 의미가 있다. 특히 유엔의 대북제재가 본격화하는 2017년 북한 경제의 비공식 거래의 형태와 비중을 파악하는 것은 대북제재의 효과를 검증하는 작업과도 연계되어 있다. 추정 결과 2017년 북한의 시장경제 규모는 70.9억 달러로 북한 명목국민 총 소득(GNI; 324억 달러)의 21.9%에 해당한다. 동일한 방법으로 2000년에 추정한 1998년 시장경제와 비교 분석을 통해 함의를 도출한다. 1998년 북한의 시장경제 규모는 총 34.2억 달러로 1998년 북한 명목 국민총소득(GNI) 126억 달러의 27.1%를 차지하였다. 요컨대 20년 전과 비교하여 북한의 시장경제 비중이 27.1%에서 21.9%로 하락하였다. 1997년은 마이너스 6.5%의 성장률을 기록하였고 1998년은 북한 경제가 4년 연속 흉작으로 먹는 문제를 해결하지 못하여 아사자가 발생하여 마이너스 1.1%의 성장률을 보인 어려운 시기였다. 북한의 공공배급경제(Public Distribution System)가 붕괴되어 인민들이 시장을 통하여 물자를 조달하던 비중이 최고조에 달하였기 때문에 27.1%에 육박하였다. 하지만 2017년은 북한 경제가 유엔 대북 제재로 인하여 마이너스 3.5%의 경제성장률을 기록하기는 했지만 20년 전과 비교하여 계획경제가 안정을 유지함에 따라 시장경제의 비중은 낮아졌다. 시장경제가 인민들의 소비재 부족현상을 부분적으로 해결하고 있지만 여전히 계획경제 기제가 북한 경제를 지탱하고 있다.
박영민 ( Park Young Min ) 한국접경지역통일학회 2017 접경지역통일연구 Vol.1 No.2
The Moon Jae-in administration of South Korea has set the goal of the North Korea policy as “Building a Peaceful, Prosperous Korean Peninsula”. However, the present North Korean nuclear issue has been a serious obstacle to the successful implementation of its North Korea Policy. Under the circumstances, the Moon administration is emphasizing both the close cooperation with the international community(internationalism) and the improvement in inter-Korean relations(interventionism) to realize its North Korea policy. The key points of the government’s North Korea policy are “the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula” and “building the New Korean Peninsula Economic Map”. In particular, the “New Korean Peninsula Economic Map” sets two practical policy directions: “Three Great Economy-Peace Belts” and “Market Cooperation”. The “Three Great Economy-Peace Belts” aims to promote the balanced development of the Korean Peninsula by developing the East-Sea Rim region, the Pan- Yellow Sea region, and the border region, while seeking connections with the northern economic bloc including China and Russia. The “One Market” aims to encourage the free movement of products and production factors between North and South Korea, ultimately pursuing market integration between the North and the South, in consideration of the marketization trends emerging in North Korea. For the success of Moon’s North Korea policy, however, the following matters need to be reviewed. First, to successfully implement the “One Market,” it is necessary to examine how the controlled market of North Korea can be combined with the open, liberalistic market of South Korea. Second, in relation to “a peace regime on the Korean peninsula,” the counter-strategy to respond to the future direction of the North Korean nuclear issue should be established. The future direction of the North Korean nuclear issue will become one of the “persistence of the nuclear and missile development,” the “suspension(or discontinuance),” or the “disposal”. Therefore, it is required to come up with a detailed strategy considering the development aspect and conditions of the North Korean nuclear issue.
북중무역이 북한경제에 미치는 경제적 후생효과에 대한 정량분석과 북한 비핵화 전략 시사점
정혁,최창용 서울대학교 국제학연구소 2020 국제지역연구 Vol.29 No.3
North Korea’s international trade has expanded since mid-1990s and the import penetration ratio, the openness measure in relation to the increase of real income from international trade, reached to 24% during the Kim Jong-un regime, close to the openness levels of U.K. and France. This implies North Korea’s real income per capita increased by 2.7~5.3% from the international trade. Incorporating the trade of intermediate goods and the changes of production structure, North Korean gains from trade would more than double. This also implies that the North Korea’s opportunity cost of real income loss by switching to autarky is enormous. However, the Chinese shares of North Korean trades exceeded 90% for both exports and imports since 2016, and more than 80% of North Korean gains from trade have been due to its trades with China. That is, Chinese leverage on North Korean economy is deeply fundamental beyond the simple control of crude oil supply. Our study reveals that such excessive reliance on China was not a genuine feature of the North Korean economy. Such phenomenon emerged during the 2006~2009 period when North Korea started to substitute the diversified set of trade partners with China to overcome the trading difficulty in response to the UN sanctions due to the North Korea’s first and second nuclear experiments. These empirical findings suggest critical implications on the denuclearization negotiation which has been in a stalemate. The recent series of sanctions against North Korea due to the 4th to 6th nuclear experiments might be an effective tool for denuclearization. However, our findings suggest that the rigid maintenance of those tight sanctions are likely to end up strengthening the Chinese leverage and forcing North Korea to adopt the strategies of “rent-seeking by violence” or “reinforcing the excessive economic cooperation with China” which would lead to undesirable outcomes of security and economic development for both North Korea and international community. Gearing down North Korea’s excessive reliance on China regarding its openness via trade diversification as well as building capacity and environments to participate in international economic cooperation would induce North Korea to adopt the “development by peace and true openness” as the first-best strategy. Our analysis shows that this approach would be an effective anchor to revitalize the deadlock denuclearization negotiation. 북한의 대외무역은 1990년대 중반 이후 지속증가하여 김정은 정권 시기에는 실질소득 증가와관련된 대외개방척도인 수입진입률이 24%로 영국과 프랑스 수준으로 증가하였으며, 이는 국제무역을 통해 북한의 일인당 실질소득이 2.7~5.3% 증가했음을 의미한다. 중간재 교역과 생산구조 변화까지 고려하면 그 효과는 2배 이상으로 증폭할 것이다. 이는 북한경제가 자급자족 경제로 회귀할 경우 감당해야 할 소득 손실의 기회비용이 매우 큼을 나타낸다. 하지만 2016년 이후 북한 수출입의 중국 비중이 90%를 넘어 북한경제 ‘무역의 이익’의 80% 이상이 중국에 기인한다. 이는 중국의 북한경제에 대한 레버리지가 단순한 원유공급 통제 차원을 넘어선 근본적인 차원임을 보여준다. 본 연구는 이러한 북한 대외개방의 중국 과잉의존 현상이 북한경제의 본질적 특징이 아니었으며, 2006~2009년 1~2차 핵실험에 따른 UN 제재를 계기로 대외무역이 어려워지자 다변화됐던 교역 파트너를 중국으로 대체하기 시작하면서 나타난 이례적인 현상임을 밝혔다. 이는 현재 교착상태에 빠진 한반도 비핵화 협상에 중요한 함의를 가진다. 최근 4~6차 핵실험에 기인한 대북제재는 비핵화 협상에 중요한 역할을 하지만, 이에 대한 경직적인 유지는 중국의 레버리지를 강화할 뿐이며 북한이 ‘무력에 의한 지대추구’ 혹은 ‘대중국 경제협력 과잉의존 강화’ 전략을 선택할 가능성을 높인다. 본 연구는 북한의 무역 다변화를 통한 중국 과잉의존 해소와 국제경제협력 참여역량 및 환경조성으로 북한 스스로 ‘실질적 개방과 평화를 통한 발전추구’ 안을 선택하도록 유도하는 접근이 교착상태에 빠진 비핵화 협상을 활성화할 전략임을 시사한다.
강정모,박원규 한국비교경제학회 2004 비교경제연구 Vol.11 No.2
북한은 경제 활성화를 도모하기 위하여 시장기능을 부분적으로 수용하는 경제관리 개선조치와 병행하여 신의주 경제특구, 개성공단 경제특구, 금강산 관광특구 등을 설치하여 경제특구의 활용이 자신의 최우선적 정책적 선택이라는 것을 알리고 있으므로 남북한 경제협력의 활성화를 유도할 수 있는 것이 바로 경제특구의 활용이다. 본 논문은 경제특구의 이점, 경제특구의 의미, 경제특구의 활성화를 위한 유의사항을 경제이론에 입각하여 설명하고 북한의 경제특구의 활성화가 북한 경제의 회생과 남북간 긴밀한 협력관계의 성립을 위해 최선의 선택이며 최우선 순위를 갖는 선택이라는 것을 강조한다. 북한은 경제특구 활성화에 있어서 한국 정부가 관여하는 것에 대해 상당한 거부감을 갖고 있는 것으로 보이나 한국 정부의 적극적인 지원 없이는 북한경제특구의 활성화를 통해 남북한 간의 폭넓은 경제협력 체제를 확립하는 것이 한계를 갖는다는 점에서 북한의 이러한 태도에는 현화가 요구된다. 한국 정부도 남북한 경제협력 체제구축을 위한 선택과 집중적 정책선택이 바로 북한경제특구의 활성화 정책이라는 점을 인식하여야 한다. North Korea's newly declared economic policy(2002) showed one step further movement toward market-oriented approach in managing North Korean Economy. But it has limitation of its own in that prices are controlled by central authority. This limitation shows North Korea's concerns on and also may be its fear in that freely determined price may ruin their economy and its political regime. Abrupt change to market economy may not be the best choice for North Korea. So 'gradualism' sets in. Given the gradual approach which North Korea seems to have had set already as its choice, we assert that using 'special economic zone' approach has the first priority in establishing robust South/North economic cooperation system and also vitalizing North Korean Economy. This approach is not something new. China has been adopting this economic policy and has been experiencing very affirmative results. Also many other countries such as Ireland is enjoying fruits of 'special economic zone'. We emphasized positive aspects that successful 'special economic zone' can give for both North and South Economies. But establishing well functioning 'special economic zone' and getting its positive spillover effects is not something that only one side of two Koreas can solely achieve. Thus we assert that North and South Koreas should focus their attention on developing successful 'special economic zone' in North Korea. We emphasize strong cooperation between South and North governments focusing on development of 'special economic zone' in North Korea would be critical ingredient for the vitalization of North Korean Economy and revitalizing South Korean Economy.
정은찬,김재현 평화문제연구소 2020 통일문제연구 Vol.32 No.1
This study analyzed the effects of exchange rate changes on the North Korean economy. Since North Korea's currency reform in 2009, the value of the North Korean won has deteriorated, and foreign exchange has been used as a major payment method. Therefore, when the exchange rate changes, the value of the currency traded in North Korea will change. In consideration of this special environment in North Korea, an analysis was conducted on how exogenous exchange rate changes affect the North Korean economy. The analysis model used the CGE model reflecting North Korea's dual economic structure. As a result of the analysis, when the foreign exchange rate used for trade fell 10%, the trade balance deteriorated 2.1% and real GDP decreased about 0.06%. This is interpreted as an effect of deteriorating trade conditions. When the exchange rate of foreign currency, which is used only as a currency in North Korea, fell 10%, real GDP rose 0.8% and the demand for investment in the informal sector increased 18.9%. The increase in foreign exchange supply used as a means of trading in North Korea led to investment. Therefore, the expansion of the supply of dollars in North Korea is expected to have a positive impact on the North Korean economy. Therefore, it is expected that if South Korea implements policy support to stabilize the currency of North Korea, it will be expected to have a positive ripple effect on North Korea's economy. 본 연구는 환율 변화가 북한 경제에 미치는 영향을 분석한 연구이다. 북한은 2009년 화폐개혁 이후 북한 원화의 가치가 저하되어 외환이 주요 지불수단으로 활용되고 있다. 따라서 환율 변화 시 북한 내 거래되는 통화의 가치가 변화하게 된다. 이러한 북한의 특수한 환경을 고려하여 외생적 환율 변화가 북한 경제에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지에 대해 분석을 실시했다. 분석모형은 북한의 이중 경제구조가 반영된 CGE 모형을 활용했다. 분석 결과 교역에 사용되는 외화 환율이 10% 하락하면 무역수지가 2.1% 악화되고 실질 GDP는 약 0.06% 감소했다. 이는 교역조건 악화에 따른 효과로 풀이된다. 북한 내에서 통화로 사용되기만 하는 외화의 환율이 10% 하락하면 실질 GDP가 0.8% 상승하고, 비공식부문의 투자 수요가 18.9% 증가했다. 북한 내 거래수단으로 사용되는 외환 공급 증가가 투자재 수요로 이어진 것이다. 따라서 북한 내 달러화 공급 확대는 북한 경제에 긍정적 영향을 미칠 것으로 보이며, 북한 통화의 신뢰성이 높아져 통화 가치가 상승해도 유사하게 긍정적인 결과가 나타날 것으로 예상된다. 따라서 남북교류 활성화 시 남한이 북한의 통화안정화를 위한 정책 지원을 실시하면 북한 경제에 긍정적 파급효과가 나타날 것으로 예상되며, 북한의 충분한 외환 보유를 위한 정책 지원도 필요할 것으로 판단된다.