광역상수도 요금결정에 대한 게임이론적 접근

김종원,한동근 국토연구원 2010 국토연구 Vol.64 No.-

우리나라의 지방상수도와 광역상수도에 게임이론을 적용하여 본 결과 다음과 같은 이론적 결과를 도출하였다. 이론적 모형을 통하여 분석한 결과로서 비협조적인 게임에서는 지자체가 자체 수돗물 생산에 과잉투자를 함으로써 사회적인 낭비와 비효율이 초래된다. 또한 지자체의 생산설비 규모의 결정과 한국수자원공사의 광역상수도 가격설정에서 두 기관이 협력한다면, 지자체와 한국수자원공사 모두에게 더 나은 결과가 있음에도 그것을 실현하지 못하는 결과가 초래된다는 것이다. 두 기관이 협조하는 협조적인 게임의 결과는 지자체의 낭비적인 과대 시설을 없앨 수 있으며 비협조적인 경우보다 광역상수도의 가격을 낮출 수 있다는 점을 보여주고 있다. 본 연구의 모형이 시사하는 바는 중앙정부가 개입하여 비협조적인 Nash게임, 혹은 지자체가 선도자가 되는 순차게임의 성격을 극복하고 지자체와 한국수자원공사가 협조하는 분위기를 만들 필요가 있다는 것이다. 이러한 상황에서 두 기관 간의 신뢰와 협조적인 분위기를 이끌어 내려면 중앙정부의 개입이 필요한 실정이다. 예컨대 지자체 자체적인 상수도 생산시설의 증설에 대한 제약을 가하는 한편, 한국수자원공사의 광역상수도 가격설정에 지자체의 의견을 수렴하도록 하는 제도적 장치를 마련할 수 있을 것이다. This study examines strategic behaviors between local government and the Korea Water Resource Corporation(KWRC, hereafter) in making decisions about the investment on local government's own water-producing facilities, and in KWRC's setting price of the water that sells to the local government. Our theoretic model shows that in a non-cooperative game situation, social inefficiency could occur because the local government has incentives to invest too much on its own water-producing facilities. The model also demonstrates that mutually cooperative actions between the two parties could lead to a lower price of water, and at the same time. could avoid the socially wasteful over-investment in water-producing facilities by the local government. Moreover our extended model, a sequential game, shows that the social losses could worsen when local government takes the role of the first mover in the game. The results of the study suggest that central government needs to step in to promote coordination between the interests of the local government and KWRC, in order to improve social efficiency.

동아시아 해운시장의 컨테이서선사 선대 운항전략

박병인(Park, Byungin) 한국항만경제학회 2013 韓國港灣經濟學會誌 Vol.29 No.4

본 논문은 컨테이너 선사들의 선형, 항로 및 항차의 결정방법을 구축하기 위해 동아시아지역의 경쟁적인 해운시장을 분석하였다. 상하이항과 홍콩항으로부터 국내의 부산, 광양 및 인천항향 서비스 항로에 운송량, 운임, 원가, 그리고 시장점유율을 기반으로 한 모형에 비협조적게임이론에 기초한 순차진행게임을 적용하였다. 이러한 모형의 문제를 풀도록 제안된 하위게임 완전 내시균형해에 따르면, 경쟁환경에서 선사들의 의사결정은 운항거리, 운송수요, 그리고 운임수준에 따라 달라지는 것으로 분석되었다. 그러므로 선사들은 운송네트워크와 최적선대에 대한 전략을 구성할 때 최적균형해를 이용하고 이를 위해 다양한 의사결정 요인들을 동시에 고려해야만 한다. 추가적으로, 항만들은 다양한 요인들을 이용해 각 항만이 선사 운송네트워크의 최적 균형해를 제공하기 위한 경영전략을 구축해야만 할 것이다. This paper analyzes a competitive shipping market in East Asia in order to explore how container carriers make decisions on ship size, number of ships, service frequency, and service route. A sequential-move game based on non-cooperative game theory is applied to establish the models for the decision-makings involving the transportation volumes, freight rates, costs, and market shares of the service routes from Shanghai or Hong Kong to the ports in Busan, Gwangyang, and Incheon. According to the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium solutions proposed by these models, carriers" decisions in such a competitive environment vary depending on sailing distance, transport demand, and freight rates. Therefore, carriers are recommended to reflect the optimal equilibrium solutions and a variety of decision factors when formulating strategies for transportation networks and operating fleets. Furthermore, ports should establish management strategies for these factors to provide optimal equilibrium solutions for carriers" transportation networks.

Comparative study of game theoretic approaches to mitigate network layer attacks in VANETs

A. Ilavendhan,K. Saruladha 한국통신학회 2018 ICT Express Vol.4 No.1

For the past few years, number of accidents have occurred due to the rapid usage of vehicles in the road and the lack of emergency alerts provisioning to the vehicle user during natural disasters. VANETs provide an environment to communicate between vehicles to avoid such accidents. Vulnerabilities in the network layer of VANET delays timely traffic data dissemination to the vehicle user. Ensuring security in VANET is very essential for the construction of a robust network for transmission of data. In this paper the game theoretic approaches like co-operative and non-cooperative games for handling security issues in VANET are discussed.

GAME MODEL AND ITS SOLVING METHOD FOR OPTIMAL SCALE OF POWER PLANTS ENTERING GENERATION POWER MARKET

Tan, Zhongfu,Chen, Guangjuan,Li, Xiaojun 한국전산응용수학회 2008 Journal of applied mathematics & informatics Vol.26 No.1

Based on social welfare maximum theory, the optimal scale of power plants entering generation power market being is researched. A static non-cooperative game model for short-term optimization of power plants with different cost is presented. And the equilibrium solutions and the total social welfare are obtained. According to principle of maximum social welfare selection, the optimization model is solved, optimal number of power plants entering the market is determined. The optimization results can not only increase the customer surplus and improve power production efficiency, but also sustain normal profits of power plants and scale economy of power production, and the waste of resource can also be avoided. At last, case results show that the proposed model is efficient.

Game model and its solving method for optimal scale of powerplants entering generation power market

Zhongfu Tan,Guangjuan Chen,Xiaojun Li 한국전산응용수학회 2008 Journal of applied mathematics & informatics Vol.26 No.1

Based on social welfare maximum theory, the optimal scale of power plants entering generation power market being is researched. A static non-cooperative game model for short-term optimization of power plants with different cost is presented. And the equilibrium solutions and the total social welfare are obtained. According to principle of maximum social welfare selection, the optimization model is solved, optimal number of power plants entering the market is determined. The optimization results can not only increase the customer surplus and improve power production efficiency, but also sustain normal profits of power plants and scale economy of power production, and the waste of resource can also be avoided. At last, case results show that the proposed model is efficient. Based on social welfare maximum theory, the optimal scale of power plants entering generation power market being is researched. A static non-cooperative game model for short-term optimization of power plants with different cost is presented. And the equilibrium solutions and the total social welfare are obtained. According to principle of maximum social welfare selection, the optimization model is solved, optimal number of power plants entering the market is determined. The optimization results can not only increase the customer surplus and improve power production efficiency, but also sustain normal profits of power plants and scale economy of power production, and the waste of resource can also be avoided. At last, case results show that the proposed model is efficient.

A Non-cooperative Game Theoretic Approach to Energy-efficient Power Control in Wireless Sensor Networks

Guoyan Yang,Xin Guan 보안공학연구지원센터 2014 International Journal of Future Generation Communi Vol.7 No.1

비협조적 게임이론을 활용한 신재생발전사업 갈등 사례분석

박재현,김경국,김경석 대한토목학회 2024 대한토목학회논문집 Vol.44 No.2

The government is encouraging the expansion of renewable energy facilities through national renewable energy policy. However, the installation of renewable energy generation facilities has led to local resident complaints due to landscape degradation, electromagnetic wave emission, real estate devaluation, and environmental pollution. This creates conflicts between power project developers and residents, making the progress of projects more difficult. This study applies non-cooperative game theory to analyze eight cases of renewable energy projects where conflicts between developers and residents were resolved through resident’s investment participation. By accepting investments from local stakeholders, residents achieved returns ranging from a maximum of 25 % to a minimum of 4.1 %. It was found through game theory analysis that a dominant strategy involves residents agreeing to the development of the project and the developers sharing a portion of the profits with the residents. The analysis results show that the point where dominant strategy meet forms a Nash equilibrium, and at the same time becomes the Pareto optimal point, benefiting both power generation operators and residents.

이종 네트워크에서의 비협력 게임 기반 전력 할당 기법

배인산(Insan Bae),이진녕(Jinnyoung Lee),장성진(Sungjin Jang),김재명(Jaemoung Kim) 한국통신학회 2014 韓國通信學會論文誌 Vol.39 No.11(네트워크)

본 논문에서는 이종네트워크에서 펨토셀의 전력제어 기법을 게임이론을 이용해 정의한다. 저전력으로 고품질의 통신환경을 제공하는 펨토셀은 여러 장점으로 인해 최근 이슈화 되고 있지만 다수의 펨토셀 사용은 매크로셀과의 같은 채널을 사용함으로 인한 많은 량의 간섭으로 작용한다. 게임이론의 적용을 위해 셀룰러 네트워크의 기지국 및 사용자를 게임을 하는 플레이어로 설정하고 서로에게 미치는 간섭 영향을 전력 효용함수로 모델링 하였다. 또한 최적의 전력을 사용하여 시뮬레이션을 통한 저전력 사용, 간섭량 감소 그리고 시스템 전체 성능 향상을 확인하였다. We propose Femto-cell power control scheme in HeNet with Game Theory. The Femto-cell which provide high quality with low power is issued by many benefits, however there is a bunch of interferences when many Femto-cells use overlapped bandwidth with Macro-cell. We defined base station of cellular networks and mobile users as players of Game Theory, and configured interference effect among each other as power utility function. Futhermore, we showed enhanced overall system performance, lower power usage and interference decrease by using optimal power.

지방정부 간 중앙재정 유치경쟁의 사회후생 효과: 게임 이론적 접근

조철주 한국지역학회 2011 지역연구 Vol.27 No.1

This paper aims at analyzing the social welfare effects of inter-jurisdictional fiscal competition towards central government funds. The fierce competition to attract grants from the central government is equivalent to a Nash-type game under which each local government engages in strategic interactions. The game theory-implicit analytical model indicates that the uncoordinated fiscal competition causes a loss of social welfare arising from three sources of externality, i.e. fiscal externality, tax increase and crowding spillovers. Then, the externality-induced inefficiency could be removed if the distribution of central finance is performed in accordance with the principle of an assurance game. This transformation of fiscal regime can be realized through diverse policy tools, including the joint provision of public services among local governments,service contracts, selective area-wide single pot of grants, and so on. 본 연구는 중앙정부 재정지원을 놓고 지방정부 간에 벌어지는 치열한 경쟁이 야기하는 사회후생 효과를 분석하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 지방정부 간 재정경쟁은 경쟁관계에 있는각 지방정부가 타 지방정부의 선택에 따라 자신의 선택을 결정하는 전략적 상호작용이 지배하는일종의 내쉬형 게임에 해당된다. 모형분석의 결과는 내쉬형 게임에 의해 사회적 후생손실, 즉자원배분의 비효율이 초래됨을 보여준다. 이러한 결과는 재정적 외부효과, 중앙정부 세율증가,혼잡외부효과 등에 의한 후생손실을 방지하기 위해서는 중앙정부의 재정배분 방식이 확신적 게임으로 전환되어야 함을 의미한다. 이는 공공서비스 공동설치, 서비스 계약, 선택적 광역일괄보조금 등의 정책적 수단을 통하여 달성될 수 있다.

Application of Game Theory to Cognitive Radio Networks for Power Allocation : An Overview

Sonia Garg,Poonam Mittal,Dr. C.K. Nagpal 보안공학연구지원센터 2015 International Journal of Hybrid Information Techno Vol.8 No.5

Due to continuously increasing demand of wireless communication technology, the problem of spectrum shortage arises. Cognitive radio technology enables efficient utilization of the existing wireless spectrum resources. CRN utilizes spectrum band by allowing secondary users to use the spectrum opportunistically, by changing their transmission parameters. We need to analyze the performance of a wireless network. To analyze the performance of a wireless network, game theory is used due to its ability to model individual, independent decision makers. In this paper we model how game theory can be used to allocate power levels to different CR nodes in a CRN at physical layer to ensure a certain QoS.