국제법상 “Necessity” ― 일반국제법상 위법성조각사유로서의 “Necessity”와 국제통상법상 “Necessity test”의 관계 ―

심인혜 ( Sim In-hye ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2017 法學硏究 Vol.27 No.2

This article aims to analyze the meaning of the term“necessity”in different contexts of international law. In particular this article compares the concept of necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness stipulated in article 25 of the ARSIWA with the “necessity test” as one of the general exceptions in article XX of the GATT 1994, and with the one in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Necessity test in article XX of the GATT 1994 has been chosen because it has some common grounds with one in ARSIWA, for instance, it provides some justifications for domestic measures of a WTO member state. Moreover, some recent decisions from international investment disputes have adopted the standards set by the WTO Appellate Body in interpreting article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which shows the tendency of the international legal society to seek harmonization and systemic integration. Before focusing on the noticeable trend, however, we have to pay a keen attention to a number of implications that we can get by analyzing similarities and differences of the necessity tests in different and delicate contexts. For this purpose, this article researches various tests regarding necessity. In particular the author concentrates upon whether the necessity test in WTO system requires the condition of the existence of a grave and imminent peril. After thorough research, this article concludes with providing possible implication of necessity tests for the development of international legal theory, using the famous principle in article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. That is, the international trade agreements can be regarded as “relevant rules of international law”in interpreting investment treaties, promoting “systemic integration”of international law.

민법상 긴급피난과 그 피해자의 구제

윤일구 전남대학교 법학연구소 2011 법학논총 Vol.31 No.2

우리 민법은 긴급피난을 권리의 사적(私的)인 구제방법으로서 그리고 불법행위에 있어서 발생하는 손해배상책임을 배제하는 위법성조각사유의 하나로서 규정하고 있다. 그렇지만 긴급피난에 관한 민법 제761조 제2항은 규정의 불완전성으로 구체적인 요건이나 그 효력 면에서 문제점이 있다. 특히 불법행위에 있어서 위법성의 조각사유인 긴급피난은 자기 또는 제3자의 급박한 위난을 피하기 위하여 부득이 타인에게 손해를 가한 경우에 배상할 책임이 없다고 하여, 결국 피난행위로 발생한 손해를 그대로 피해자에게 남겨두게 되는데 이는 가해자에게 직접 손해배상을 가하는 정당방위와는 다른 각도에서 논의를 해야 할 필요성이 있다. 또한 가해자에 대한 처벌의 가능성의 판단에 중점을 두는 형법상의 긴급피난과는 다르게 손해배상과 관련하여 손해의 공평한 분담이라는 입장에서 민법상의 긴급피난은 다른 접근방법을 필요로 한다고 하겠다. 본 논문은 이러한 문제점을 바탕으로 민법상 긴급피난에 관한 논의를 진행하였다. 우선 긴급피난의 본질론을 법철학적인 관점에서 접근하였다. 즉 긴급피난이 과연 정당한 행위인가 아니면 위법한 행위인가는 민법상 긴급피난의 이론구성에 있어서 다른 결과를 도출할 수 있다. 왜냐하면 긴급피난행위가 정당한 행위라면 그 만큼 긴급피난으로 피해를 입은 피해자의 구제와는 거리가 멀어지게 되기 때문이다. 하지만 긴급피난은 일단 위법한 행위이며, 다만 법이 그러한 상황에서 기대가능성이 없기 때문에 위법성이 조각된다고 할 것이므로 결과적으로 위법성을 띠고 있는 긴급피난으로 피해자에게 발생한 손해를 적정하게 분배하는 것이 필요하다. 다음으로 현행법에 기초한 긴급피난에 대한 문제점과 요건의 재구성 및 입법론에 대한 논의를 하기 위하여 긴급피난에 대한 비교법적인 고찰을 하였다. 우리 현행법의 태도는 다른 나라의 입법에 비하여 긴급피난의 가능성을 폭넓게 인정하고 있다는 특색이 있다. 위와 같은 논의를 바탕으로 제4장에서는 현행 민법상 긴급피난의 일반론을 다루었는데, 그 중 핵심은 요건과 관련한 상당성(相當性)이라는 요소이다. 다양한 해석의 가능성이 존재하는 현행법에 있어서 상당성은 긴급피난을 구성하는데 중요한 위치를 차지한다고 할 것이다. 또한 제5장에서는 현행법에 기초하여 긴급피난의 유형별로 그에 적합한 피해자의 구제방법에 대하여 논하였다. 먼저 긴급피난의 원인에 타인의 행위가 개입한 경우, 그 타인에게 귀책사유가 있다면 현행 민법의 규정을 통하여 해결할 수 있다. 하지만 그 타인에게 귀책사유가 없거나 자연력에 의한 긴급피난의 경우에는 피난행위로 피해를 입은 피해자의 구제는 어렵게 되는데, 이 때 손해의 공평한 분담이라는 견지에서 피해자에게 일방적인 책임을 전가할 것이 아니라 위험원(危險源)을 지배하는 자라든지 긴급피난자에게 적절한 손해의 분담을 시켜야 할 것이다. 물론 이를 실현하기 위해서는 입법이 이루어져야 하는데, 입법론으로 법원의 적극적인 역할을 논하였다. 또한 현행법의 긴급피난으로 인하여 보호받는 이익은 너무 광범위하다고 할 것이며, 피해자의 보호를 위하여 피난자의 인격권에 기초한 이익만이 보호된다고 제한할 필요가 있다. 결국 긴급피난의 입법에 있어서는 핵심은 피난행위자와 그로 인한 피해자의 보호에 있어서 균형이라고 할 것이다. In Korean civil law, the private necessity is stipulated as a private relief means in terms of rights and also as one of justification and excuses where responsibility for damages are excluded. However, due to its incompleteness, the Article 761. 2stating the private necessity in the civil law is problematic in terms of specific incompleteness in rules and in effects. Especially in the private necessity as a justification and excuse in illegal acts, the damages caused by necessity is laid to the victim’s responsibility, as the Korean civil law states that the victimizer is held unaccountable for others when he or she unavoidably does damage to them. In this case, there is necessity to discuss such a problem from the angles different from those of the legal defense of directly claiming damages to the victimizer. In addition, unlike the private necessity in criminal laws focuses on the possibility of the punishment to the victimizer, the private necessity in civil laws needs different approaches in the light of impartially sharing damages in terms of compensation of damages. Based on these problems, this study intended to discuss the private necessity in the civil law. First, the view of philosophical law was applied to approach the essential theory of private necessity. In other words, the discussion on whether the private necessity is a justifiable act or a illegal act may derive different results in theory construction of the private necessity in civil law. The reason is that if the private necessity is deemed to be a justifiable act, such an act may be that much different from the victim’s relief. Next, this study made a comparative review on the private relief to discuss its problems based on the on the existing law, the reconstruction of requirements, and the legislation. The current laws in Korea are characterized by their wide range of acknowledgement on the possibility of the private necessity, compared with the legislation in other nations. On a basis of such a discussion, Chapter 4 dealt with the generalization of the private necessity. The key point hereof is suitableness related to the requirements. Under the current laws where a variety of possibilities exist, the suitableness plays an important role in constituting the private necessity. Accordingly, based on the existing laws, Chapter 5 discussed the victim relief,classified properly by type of the private necessity. First, in a situation where any of others’ acts intervenes in any cause of the private necessity, if the ratification is laid to the others, the settlement is available under the regulations in the existing civil law. However, in the event the ratification is not accountable for the said others or it corresponds to the private necessity caused by any natural agency, the victim’s relief may be difficult. In this case, the appropriate solution is not to shift the unilateral blame to the victim in aspects of equitably sharing the loss but to allow the ruler of risk sources or him or her under the private necessity to properly share the loss. Of course, to achieve this, the legislation needs to be preferentially done,so this study discussed the court’s active role under the legislation. In addition, it is pointed out that the profits protectable by the private necessity under the current laws are so wide in a range. Thus, it is necessary to restrict that the profits are protected only if based on doer’s rights of personality of them under private necessity. This eventfully suggests that the key point in the legislation of the private necessity is the balance in protecting an agent causing the private necessity and the victim thereof.

국제법상 위법성조각사유로서의 ‘necessity’

김석현(KIM Seokhyun) 대한국제법학회 2016 國際法學會論叢 Vol.61 No.3

한국에서는 국제법상 위법성조각사유 중의 하나인 ‘necessity를 ‘긴급피난’이라고 표현하는 것이 일반적인 경향인데, 이 글에서는 이러한 용어 사용이 과연 적절한가 하는 문제를 다룬다. 이 문제에 대한 검토는 necessity의 본질적 개념의 이해를 요구한다. 국제법에서의 necessity는 국내법상의 그것과 상이한 개념으로 이해되어야 한다. 아울러, 국가의 본질적 이익의 보호가 문제되는 necessity는 개인의 생명이 위태로운 상황을 의미하는 distress와 별개의 개념으로 존재하는 것이다. 따라서, necessity를 한국어로 표현함에 있어서는 그 고유의 개념을 정확하게 함축함과 아울러 이를 다른 개념 특히 distress와 구별할 수 있는 용어를 찾아야 할 것이며, 이러한 요구를 충족시킬 수 있는 적절한 용어가 특별히 없을 경우에는 원어를 그대로 직역하여 그 고유의 의미를 새기면 될 것이다. 이 글에서는 우선 국제법에서의 necessity 개념의 역사적 배경을 검토하면서 그 본래적 의미를 규명한다. 지난날 자기보존권(right of self-preservation)에 기초하였던 necessity는 오늘날에 와서 국제법상 위법성조각사유의 하나로 확립되는 한편 자위권 행사의 제한 요건 중 하나로서 인정되고 있으며, 위법성조각사유로서의 necessity는 자위권 행사에 있어서의 그것과 마찬가지로 극한적 위험 상황에서 국가의 생존을 확보하기 위하여 타국의 권익을 침해하는 것 이외에 다른 방법이 없다고 하는 ‘불가피성’의 의미로 이해되어야 한다. 아울러, necessity에서는 ‘국가의 본질적 이익’의 보호가 문제됨을 강조한다.(2) 다음으로, 국제법상의 necessity에 대한 주요 언어권별 용어 사용례를 검토한다. 이어서, 국제법상의 necessity, distress 그리고 국내법상의 necessity의 비교를 통하여, 국제법상의 distress와 necessity는 그 어느 것도 국내법상의 necessity와 동일시될 수 없음을 분명히 한다.(3) 이 글의 마지막 단계에서는, 국제법상의 necessity가 국내법상의 necessity와 상이할 뿐 아니라, ‘긴급피난’이라는 용어의 통상적 의미를 고려할 때 이는 distress와 necessity에서 공통적으로 요구됨을 지적하면서, 이 용어가 necessity의 독자적 개념을 표현하기에 부적절함을 강조한다. 이러한 입장에서, necessity라는 원어를 ‘필요성’으로 직역하여 그 고유의 의미를 새기는 것이 타당함을 강조한다.(4) There seems to be a general tendency in Korea to use the term ‘Kin-geup-pi-nan’ in order to indicate ‘necessity’ as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in international law. The question is whether it is adequate to use this term for that purpose. An examination of this question requires a comprehension of the intrinsic and original concept of ‘necessity.’ ‘Necessity’ in international law is to be understood as a concept different from that in domestic law. Furthermore, it is to be emphasized that, in international law, ‘necessity’ in which the protection of an essential interest of a State is in question is a cause distinguished from ‘distress’ which means a situation where the life of men is in peril. Therefore, in expressing ‘necessity’ in Korean, we should find out a word which can imply exactly its original meaning and distinguish it from other concepts, in particular, distress. Were it not for a word adequate for this purpose, it would be desirable to translate ‘necessity’ literally into Korean, with its essential meaning being kept in mind. The second section of this paper concerns the historical background and original meaning of ‘necessity’: ‘necessity’ which had been based on the right of self-preservation has been established as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness on one hand, and has, on the other hand, been recognized as one of the restrictive conditions of the exercise of a right of self-defense. ‘Necessity’ as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness is to be, in the same way that it is in case of self-defense, understood as an ‘inevitability’ to the effect that there is no way to secure the existence of a State in the extreme situation in question without infringing a right or interest of other State. In this section, it is emphasized that the interest to protect in the circumstance of ‘necessity’ is an essential interest of a State. In the third section, an examination is made of the use of terms in some principal languages, regarding ‘necessity’. Subsequently, a comparative analysis is performed of ‘necessity’ in domestic law and ‘distress’ and ‘necessity’ in international law, through which it could be clarified that neither distress nor necessity in international law could be placed on the same plane as necessity in domestic law. The present author stresses, in the fourth section, that the Korean term ‘Kin-geup-pi-nan’ is inappropriate for signifying the intrinsic meaning of ‘necessity’ in international law, because the latter has a meaning different from that of necessity in domestic law; all the more so because that, considering the ordinary meaning of that Korean term . which indicates an urgent escape from imminent peril for the protection of an important legal interest, such a situation could be in question not only in ‘necessity’ but also in ‘distress’. In this position, the present author argues that it is desirable to translate literally the ‘necessity’ as ‘Pi-ryo-seong’, with its original meaning not being fringed.

형법 제22조 긴급피난의 성립요건에 관한 연구

김준호 ( Kim Junho ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2018 法學硏究 Vol.28 No.3

Article 22 Section 1 of the Korean Criminal Code prescribes that two requirements are needed for the establishment of necessity. First, the actor’s infringement of rights should be evaluated as ‘an act to avoid’ impending danger, that is, an act of necessity; and second, the act of necessity should be granted as not exceeding the level of infringement, having ‘reasonable grounds’. The judgment of the former is called a requirement for the act of necessity, whilst the latter is usually called a requirement of reasonableness. When an act of a defendant who is confronted with impending danger lacks the requirement of reasonableness, this becomes at least necessity of excess, but if it lacks the requirement for the act of necessity, it is merely a harmful act that does not even lead to necessity of excess. An act of necessity with reasonableness is necessity and an act of necessity that lacks reasonableness is necessity of excess. Both necessity and the necessity of excess are established on the basis that the act of the defendant is included in the ‘act of necessity’, in other words ‘the act to avoid’. If an act is not an act of necessity from the beginning, the premise to consider reasonable grounds disappears and it can become neither necessity nor necessity of excess. According to Article 22 Section 2, necessity of excess is granted with the benefit of reduction or exemption of a sentence according to the judge's discretionary judgment. However, any act that does not fulfill the requirements of act of necessity cannot even be necessity of excess, thus cannot be granted the benefits of reduction or exemption of a sentence. The judgment regarding whether an act comes under the category of the act of necessity is an important gateway in deciding whether or not to grant the defendant an effect of reduction or exemption of a sentence. According to the ruling of the judicial precedents, the following four requirements must be established for the reasonable grounds of Article 22. First, the act of necessity of the defendant must be the only means to protect the rights confronted with impending danger. Second, when exercising necessity, the actor must choose the means that give the lightest damage to the victim. Third, the benefits preserved by act of necessity must be superior to the gains infringed by that. Fourth, the act of necessity must be an appropriate means in terms of social ethics or the spirit of the whole law and order. It is the established ruling of precedents that only if these four are established is the requirement of reasonableness of necessity fulfilled and necessity establishes. However, such ruling of the precedents must be supplemented in one aspect. So far, the precedents have not instructed regarding the requirement of act of necessity rather than reasonable grounds. There is no precedent on how the act can be included in the act of necessity and thus whether it is appropriate to grant at least the effect of reduction or exemption of a sentence. Considering the ruling of the precedents, there is no consideration of areas that need conviction without reduction or exemption of sentence as it is not even included in the act of necessity. To this, of the four requirements, this research proposes locating the content of only means and social ethics to the area of act of necessity. It is misleading to assess as ‘act to avoid’ impending danger only for the reason that it was an act due to impending danger even if the infringement of the defendant is not the only means or even if it contradicts severely social ethics. Suppose that the actor can avoid a danger by simply avoiding the place. If the actor protects one’s rights by intentionally attacking someone, is this ‘act to avoid’ impending danger? Is it appropriate to call infringement of rights that is not the only means an act of necessity? Or if for example, a doctor forcefully collected blood from a healthy person to find rare blood for an emergency surgery, can the doctor assert that one’s act can be considered as necessity or at least necessity of excess? Although apparently inevitable, is it justifiable to provide legal basis regarding discretionary reduction or exemption of sentence concerning acts that contradict social ethics? Such acts are acts to attack the victim and must not be seen as acts to avoid impending danger. The assertion of this research is that such acts cannot be considered as necessity or even necessity of excess as it lacks requirement of act of necessity.

자연 법칙의 물리적 필연성 -암스트롱 전체 체계 내에서의 문제점

김희정 서울대학교 인문학연구원 2011 人文論叢 Vol.65 No.-

Armstrong’s view on a law of nature stands between regularity theory and metaphysical necessity theory. He maintains that a law of nature is necessary on the one hand, and contingent on the other hand. He holds that a law of nature is necessary in the sense that it is beyond regularity. It is meant by ‘contingent’ that it does not hold in all possible worlds. A law of nature in our world may not hold in other possible worlds. In other words, he is defending that a law of nature has a physical necessity. The necessity of a law of nature is said to be required, since there are at least three main difficulties. The view on physical necessity is maintained with Armstrong’s categoricalism on the nature of properties. According to it, properties do not have modality as such, which is externally attributed by a law of nature. I argue, in this paper, that there are problems in his defending of the physical necessity of a law of nature in his system, which ranges over his categoricalism, quidditism, actualism and combinatorialism. My criticism on physical necessitarianism is different from others’ in that it considers the whole system of Armstrong’s views on relevant topics. In the first part, I present what physical necessity means in Armstrong’s theory of laws. In the second part, I point out two main problems of his physical necessitarianism in considering his views on the relevant topic such as the nature of properties, the criterion of existence and possible worlds. In 2.1,I reformulate his arguments and argue that they fail mainly because of his categoricalism. He tries to defend the physical necessity of laws by means of universals. I show that his arguments are circular. In 2.2, I show that he has problems in admitting the physical necessity as primitive. I argue that the view on the physical necessity is not coherent with his views on possible worlds, as well as those on the criterion of existence and the nature of properties.

자연 법칙의 물리적 필연성 -암스트롱의 전체 체계 내에서의 문제점-

김희정 ( Hee Jeong Kim ) 서울대학교 인문학연구원 2011 人文論叢 Vol.65 No.-

Armstrong`s view on a law of nature stands between regularity theory and metaphysical necessity theory. He maintains that a law of nature is necessary on the one hand, and contingent on the other hand. He holds that a law of nature is necessary in the sense that it is beyond regularity. It is meant by ``contingent`` that it does not hold in all possible worlds. A law of nature in our world may not hold in other possible worlds. In other words, he is defending that a law of nature has a physical necessity. The necessity of a law of nature is said to be required, since there are at least three main difficulties. The view on physical necessity is maintained with Armstrong`s categoricalism on the nature of properties. According to it, properties do not have modality as such, which is externally attributed by a law of nature. I argue, in this paper, that there are problems in his defending of the physical necessity of a law of nature in his system, which ranges over his categoricalism, quidditism, actualism and combinatorialism. My criticism on physical necessitarianism is different from others` in that it considers the whole system of Armstrong`s views on relevant topics. In the first part, I present what physical necessity means in Armstrong`s theory of laws. In the second part, I point out two main problems of his physical necessitarianism in considering his views on the relevant topic such as the nature of properties, the criterion of existence and possible worlds. In 2.1, I reformulate his arguments and argue that they fail mainly because of his categoricalism. He tries to defend the physical necessity of laws by means of universals. I show that his arguments are circular. In 2.2, I show that he has problems in admitting the physical necessity as primitive. I argue that the view on the physical necessity is not coherent with his views on possible worlds, as well as those on the criterion of existence and the nature of properties.

논문 : 안셀무스의 『하느님은 왜 인간이 되셨는가』(Cur Deus Homo) 에 나타난 "후행적 필연성"에 관한 연구

강상진 ( Sang Jin Kang ) 한국중세철학회 2012 중세철학 Vol.0 No.18

『하느님은 왜 인간이 되셨는가』 2권에서 안셀무스는 성육신을 통한 구원이 필연적이었다는 1권의 설명이 제기하는 문제들을 다룬다. 신은 자신에게 어울리지 않는 일을 피해야 한다는 필연성에 의해 강제되어 인류를 구원한 것인가? 만약 그렇다면 신이 자신을 위해서 한 일을 위해 신에게 감사해야 할 이유는 무엇인가?안셀무스는 대략 세 단계를 거쳐 이 문제들을 해명한다. 이 문제들에 대한 안셀무스의 대답을 이해하고 답변의 구조를 이해하는 것이 본 논문의 목적이다. 필연성에도 불구하고 감사할 이유가 줄지 않는다는 첫 번째 답변과 필연성 혹은 불가능성이 신의 것이 아니라 피조물의 것으로 분석되어야 한다는 두 번째 답변은 세 번째답변의 중심개념인 후행적 필연성에 이르러 최종적 단계에 이른다. 신과 구원에 대해 얘기되는 모든 필연성은 궁극적으로 아무것도 강제하지 않고 오직 성립하는 사태로부터 따라나올 뿐인 후행적 필연성일 뿐이다. 각 단계의 설명은 다음 단계의 설명을 전제하지 않고도 이해할 수 있지만, 후행적 필연성을 배경으로 할 때 가장 완성된 형태의 답변이 제시됨을 알 수 있다. 후행적 필연성은 성육신을 통한 구원의 필연성 문제에 대한 해명을 완성하는 중심적인 역할을 수행한다. In the second book of Cur Deus Homo, Anselm tackles the questions raised by the necessity of the Incarnation. Is God forced to bring about the salvation of mankind by the necessity of avoiding unfittingness? If this is the case, what gratitude do we owe him for this thing which he is doing for his own sake? Anselm offers three answers and the aim of this paper is to understand each answer and its structure. Anselm`s answers are as follows: 1) Despite the necessity of an act, there is no reason for the diminishing gratitude for the act, 2) The attribution of impossibility and necessity must not be analyzed as attributes of God, but, rather, as those of creatures, and 3) All the necessities about God and his Salvation are ultimately subsequent necessities that effect nothing but are caused by an actuality. The third answer introduces the concept of subsequent necessity (necessitas sequens). Although each answer can be understood individually without presupposing the other answers, each answer can only be comprehensive if it is seen against the backdrop of subsequent necessity. The concept of subsequent necessity, therefore, plays a central role in the Anselmian explanations of the necessity of the Incarnation.

우연과 필연에 대한 칼빈의 인식

김재용 고신대학교 개혁주의학술원 2022 갱신과 부흥 Vol.30 No.-

The concepts of contingency and necessity appearing in Calvin's work can be misunderstood depending on how people understand them. If this is understood in the way of medieval Scholasticism, it is possible to express the view that in necessity there is contingency, and in necessity there is spontaneity and freedom. There are scholars who interpret Calvin's contingency and necessity in this way. However, this thesis examines whether Calvin's contingency and necessity can be read in a scholastic way and whether Calvin affirms or denies contingency. It examines how Calvin recognizes absolute necessity and relative necessity in necessity. It also discusses whether the concept of contingency is included in relative necessity. Since Calvin's recognition of contingency depends on our perception, we can only externally recognize whether there is reality in contingency, or externally recognize it as an insubstantial contingency, but internally, there is God's deep plan and intention. We would like to address what was. Therefore, it is necessary to examine it through his various works and reveal it correctly. This paper deals specifically with how Calvin recognizes contingency and necessity. This paper also examines the claim that Calvin was influenced by medieval Scholasticism. Since Calvin introduced the Scholastic method of study, the content is different from the Middle Ages, but the recognition that there is no difference in the method is discussed. 칼빈의 작품에 등장하는 우연성과 필연성에 대한 개념은 사람이 어떻게 이해하는가에 따라 오해할 수 있는 여지가 있는데, 이를 중세 스콜라학파의 방식으로 이해하면, 필연성 안에 우연성이 있고, 또 필연성 안에 자발성과 자유성이 있다는 견해를 피력할 수 있다. 칼빈의 우연과 필연을 이런 방식으로 해석하는 학자들이 있다. 그러나 본 논문은 칼빈의 우연과 필연을 스콜라방식으로 읽어낼 수 있는가 하는 것과 과연 칼빈이 우연성을 긍정하는가 아니면 부정하는가 하는 것을 살핀다. 필연성에 있어서 절대적 필연과 상대적 필연에 대해 칼빈이 이를 어떻게 인식하고 있는지를 검토한다. 또한 상대적 필연에 우연의 개념이 포함되는지를 논구한다. 칼빈이 우연을 인정하는 것이 우리의 인식에 따라 되므로, 우연에 실체가 존재한다고 보았는지, 아니면, 실체가 없는 우연으로써 외면적으로 인식할 수 있을 뿐, 내면적으로는 하나님의 깊은 계획과 의도가 있는 것이었는지를 다루고자 한다. 따라서 그의 전체 작품을 통해 이를 살펴서 올바르게 밝혀야 하는 필요성이 제기되므로, 본 논문은 칼빈이 우연과 필연을 어떻게 인식하고 있는지를 구체적으로 다룬다. 또한 본 논문은 칼빈이 중세스콜라학파의 영향을 받았다고 주장하는 것에 대해 살핀다. 칼빈이 스콜라학파의 학문방법을 도입하였으므로, 내용은 중세와 다르지만, 방법에는 차이가 없다는 인식을 토론한다.

公用收用의 要件인 ‘公共必要’의 判斷基準과 改憲課題

鄭南哲 한국토지보상법연구회 2018 土地補償法硏究 Vol.18 No.-

헌법 제23조 제3항의 ‘공공필요’ 개념은 수용의 요건 판단에 있어서 매우 중요한 역할을 한다. 재산권의 방어를 핵심으로 하는 존속보장의 관점에서 ‘공공필요’의 개념은 엄격하게 해석해야 한다. 헌법재판소는 ‘공공필요’의 개 념을 종전과 달리 엄격하게 해석하고 있지만, 공익성과 필요성으로 구성된 가분적(可分的) 개념으로 이해하는 것은 타당하지 않다. 공익성과 비례성은 밀접한 관련을 가지며, 비례성은 공용수용의 요건이 아니라 한계 내지 허용 성의 문제이다. 헌법 제23조 제3항의 ‘공공필요’의 개념을 구체화하기 위해서 는 입법론적인 방법과 해석론적인 방법을 모두 모색해야 한다. 입법론적으로 는 수용의 요건과 공공필요의 개념을 개별 법률에서 명확히 규정하도록 해야 한다. 또한 해석론적으로도 공공필요의 개념은 중요한 기본권의 하나인 재산 권을 박탈하는 요건이므로 일반적인 공익이나 공공복리의 개념보다 엄격히 해석하여야 한다. 따라서 헌법 제23조 제3항의 공공필요의 개념을 “특별히 중대한 공익적 필요성”으로 해석하는 것이 타당하다. 사업인정이나 협의취득 등 수용의 절차에 있어서 공익성을 판단할 수 있는 요건이 고려되어야 한다. 사업시행자가 민간기업인 경우 공익사업의 변환에 있어서도 공익성(공공필요 성)의 요건을 충족해야 한다. The concept of “public necessity” in Article 23 (3) of the Constitution plays a very important role in determining the requirements for acceptance. The concept of “public necessity” should be interpreted strictly in terms of continuance guarantee, which is the core of defense of property rights. Although the Constitutional Court interprets the concept of public necessity strictly, it is not reasonable to understand it as a separable concept consisting of public interest and public necessity. Public utility and proportionality are closely related, and proportionality is not a requirement of compulsory expropriation for public necessity, but a limitation or permissibility. To embody the concept of “public necessity” in Article 23 (3) of the Constitution, both legislative and interpreting methods should be sought. Legislation requires that individual laws clearly define the concepts of public necessity and requirement of compulsory expropriation for public necessity. In addition, the concept of public necessity is analytically interpreted more strictly than general public interest or public welfare, since it is a requirement to deprive property rights, which is one of the fundamental rights. It is therefore reasonable to interpret the concept of public necessity in Article 23 (3) of the Constitution as “a particularly significant public interest”. The requirements to judge the public interest in the expropriation process, such as project approval or land acquisition by agreement, should be considered. If the project owner is a private company, the requirement of public interest (public necessity) must be met also in the conversion of public projects.

흄의 인과과학과 자유와 필연의 화해 프로젝트

양선이(Sunny Yang) 한국철학회 2012 哲學 Vol.0 No.113

본 연구에서 나는 흄의 ‘자유와 필연의 화해 프로젝트’를 고찰함으로써 도덕적 책임의 본성과 조건에 관해 해명하고자 한다. 흄은 『인성론』 제2권 〈정념론〉과 『탐구』 제8장에서 자유와 필연의 “화해”를 시도하는데 우리는 이를 이해하기 위해 도덕감을 일으키는 인과적 기제에 대한 그의 설명을 이해해야만 한다. 나는 이러한 맥락에서 흄의 입장을 정확히 이해하기 위해 『인성론』 제1권에서 흄이 제시한 ‘인과에 관한 두 가지 정의’를 분석하는데 착목할 것이다. 흄의 첫 번째 ‘원인’에 관한 정의에 따르면, 인과관계는 규칙성에서 비롯되지만 규칙성 이상의 필연성 개념은 그의 두 번째 정의인 인간의 ‘마음의 추론’, 또는 ‘마음의 결정’에서 비롯된다. 이러한 것을 인간 행위를 설명하는 데 적용하면 다음과 같이 말할 수 있다. 즉 우리는 행위자의 동기와 행위 간의 규칙성을 관찰하면 ‘마음의 추론’ 또는 ‘마음의 결정’을 통해 행위자에게 그에 맞는 성품을 귀속시키고 그와 같은 성품에서 비롯된 행위에 대해 책임을 물을 수 있게 되는 것이다. 이렇게 볼 때 자유와 필연 그리고 도덕적 책임에 관한 흄의 입장은 홉스의 고전적 양립가능론을 보완한 슐릭-에이어-러셀의 그것과 다르다. 왜냐하면 이들은 규칙성 이론에 입각해서 흄의 입장을 ‘약한 결정론’으로 해석하는데, 문제는 어떤 행위자의 동기와 행위 간의 규칙성만으로 그에게 도덕적 책임을 물을 수 없기 때문이다. 흄이 규칙성 이론을 통해 필연성에 관한 전통적 개념에서 ‘강제’의 성격을 제거하였다는 약한 결정론적 해석은, 강제의 함축을 피할 정도로 충분히 약하지만, 자유와 책임에 필수적일 정도로, 다시 말해 행위자에게 도덕적 책임을 물을 수 있을 정도로 충분히 강하지는 않다고 해야 할 것이다. 흄에 따르면 이와 같이 행위자와 행위를 연결시키는 ‘필연성’은 도덕에 필수적이다. 그렇지만, 한편으로 이 필연성이 ‘강제’의 의미를 띄어서는 안 된다. 우리는 어떤 강제된 행위에 대해서도 도덕적 책임을 질 필요가 없다. 강제된 행위는 자유롭지 못한 행위를 의미하며, 이는 자신으로부터 비롯된 행위라고 할 수 없기 때문이다. 따라서 도덕적 책임을 귀속시키기 위해서는 특정 행위가 강제되지는 않았지만, 행위자로부터 산출된(caused) 행위라는 것이 요구된다. 흄은 이와 같이 우리의 행위가 강제되지는 않았지만 행위자로부터 산출된 행위라는 요구를 만족시키기 위해 행위자로부터 산출되었다는 것을 행위자의 지속적 성질 즉 성품에서 비롯되었다고 보고, 이 때 관찰자들은 그 행위와 그 사람이 ‘연결’되어 있다고 ‘믿음’으로써 그 사람에게 승인ㆍ불승인이라는 공감적 반응을 통해 도덕적 책임을 귀속시키는 것이다. My aim in this project is to shed some light on the discussion of moral responsibility by considering Hume’s view on liberty and necessity. To this end, we need to examine the way in which Hume extends the problem of ‘Causal Necessity’ in Book One to the problem of ‘Liberty and Necessity’ in Book Two of the Treatise and Enquiry § VIII. Hume attempts to apply the way of investigating ‘causal necessity’ in physical world in Book One to the way of exploring ‘liberty and necessity’ of the mental world in Book Two of the Treatise. It is worth noting why he discusses the ‘liberty and necessity’ in the context of dealing with his theory of passion. In order to understand this, we need to appreciate Hume’s moral psychology showing us the relation between passion and character-traits or virtue. We focus on the analysis of Hume’s “Two Definitions of Cause” of Book One in the Treatise. According to his first definition, causal relation is derived from regularity, while the necessity above regularity comes from ‘mind’s inference’, or ‘mental determination’ in his second definition. If we apply this definition to the explanation of human action, we can say as follows: once we observe the regularity between motive and action of the agent, we ascribe character-traits having been showing the regularities to the agent in terms of ‘mind’s inference and determination, and require the agent the responsibility for the action derived from the character-traits. In order to appreciate the importance of Hume’s “reconciling project” of liberty and necessity, we need to understand causal mechanism eliciting moral sense. In view of this, Hume’s position of liberty and necessity and moral responsibility quite differs from the classical compatibilism such as the view of Hobbes-Ayer-Schlick. For the classic compatibilists read Hume as a ‘soft-determinism’ based on the regularity theory, but it is difficult to justify ascribing moral responsibility to agent on the basis of the regularity. The interpretation of ‘soft-determinism’ according to which Hume deprives a compulsion of a necessity traditionally understood is too weak to avoid the implication of compulsion, but it is not enough to be strong to attribute the responsibility to the agent. According to Hume, the necessity is essential to a morality in order for the agent and action to be connected. Yet, this necessity, for Hume, should not be compelled us. For we need not be responsible for the forced action. A forced action is not a free action, and it is not an action derived from the agent. Hence, we can attribute a moral responsibility to the agent on the action not caused by compulsion but elicited by agent. In order to satisfy this requirement, Hume finds the fact that an action is caused by an agent’s durable qualities, i.e., character-traits.