걸프 위기와 카타르 무슬림 형제단

남옥정(Nam, Ok-Jeong) 명지대학교 중동문제연구소 2020 중동문제연구 Vol.19 No.1

이 논문은 사우디아라비아, 아랍에미리트, 바레인, 이집트 동맹 4개국과 카타르 단교의 직접적 원인인 무슬림 형제단 문제를 통해 걸프위기의 본질을 고찰하고자 한다. 사우디아라비아와 그 동맹국들은 무슬림 형제단처럼 대중화된 정치운동조직을 정권의 위협으로 간주하는 반면, 카타르는 무슬림 형제단과 같은 이슬람주의 운동을 지지함으로써 알 싸니 체제를 강화해왔다. 카타르와 무슬림 형제단은 상호보완적인 관계로 그 연대는 쉽게 파기되기 어렵고, 다른 걸프국가들은 양측의 관계를 외교적 위협의 우선순위로 판단하기 때문에 이의 해결이 선행되지 않는다면 GCC의 블록화는 멈출 수 없을 것이다. This paper aims to explore the essence of the Qatar crisis with the Quartet through the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt regard popular political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the regime, while Qatar has strengthened Al Thani governance by supporting Islamist movement like the Muslim Brotherhood. The relationship between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood is complementary, the solidarity cannot be easily destroyed, and other Gulf States recognize that the relationship poses a serious diplomatic threat to them. So, if this problem is not resolved, the GCC crisis will not end.

현대 이슬람원리주의의 정치세력화와 지하드론 : 이집트 무슬림형제단과 급진주의 조직을 중심으로

최재훈 ( Jae Hoon Choi ) 부산외국어대학교 지중해연구소 2007 지중해지역연구 Vol.9 No.2

Islamic fundamentalism is primarily used in the Western world to describe Islamist groups. It describes the beliefs of traditional Muslims; that they should restrict themselves to literal and conservative interpretations of their sacred texts, the Qur`an and Hadith. By extension, fundamentalism may include a variety of religious movements and groups in Muslim communities which may be entirely apolitical. In this process, Islamic fundamental movement has become a political movement, and some groups turned radical by construing the concept of Jihad in its own way. The first modern Islamic fundamental group was the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt involved in a wide range of activities from community services to mainstream political activism. Modern Islamist terrorist groups are often inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the prototype of the later Islamist groups. Jihad (Arabic: □□□□ jihad) is an Islamic term, from the Arabic root j-h-d (to exert utmost effort, to strive, struggle), which connotes a wide range of meanings: anything from an inward spiritual struggle to attain perfect faith to a political or military struggle to further the Islamic cause. The meaning of "Islamic cause" is, of course, open to interpretation. Mainstream Muslims consider jihad to be the most misunderstood aspect of their religion by non-Muslims. The legitimacy of the goals and methods used by the various Islamic movements who adopt the terminology of jihad is often brought into question, usually by moderate and liberal Muslims. The term is frequently mistranslated into English as a "holy war"; however, the concept of jihad encompasses more than just warfare, and a more accurate translation probably would be "holy struggle", "righteous struggle" or "holy endeavour". The denotation is of a challenging or difficult, (frequently)opposed effort, made either in accomplishment or resistance. A person who engages in any form of jihad is called a "mujahid", meaning "striver" or "struggler". This term is most often used to mean a person who engages in fighting, but, for example a Muslim struggling to memorize the Qur`an is called a mujahid. Jihad, a biased interpretation is sometimes used to describe militant Islamic groups, including Islamic terrorism. After the September 11th attacks, whatever the accomplishment of Islamic Fundamental movements as a social and political movement, only its violent activities are known in the West. We must distinguish strictly Islamic fundamental movement from Islamic radicalism and Islamic terrorism.

사우디와 카타르의 역내 리더십 경쟁과 협력

홍미정(Hong, Mi-jung) 명지대학교 중동문제연구소 2014 중동문제연구 Vol.13 No.2

This article examines the important political changes in the Middle East since the Arab Uprising of 2011, as it relates the Competition and Cooperation for Regional Leadership between Saudi and Qatar with aspects of Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood as being the regional political entities with the most relevance. To do this, at first, this article analyzes the characteristics and differences between the stubborn “Oil Wahabism” of Saudi Arabia and the flexible “Gas Wahabism” of Qatar. Second, it analyzes and compares the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood Al Saud Royal Family and the Muslim Brotherhood Al Thani Royal Family while focusing on the transnational characteristic of Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, it analyzes the Regional Politics of Saudi and Qatar with a special focus on Egypt and Syria.

사우디아라비아의 무슬림형제단 - 정치개혁을 요구하는 알 사흐와 -

홍미정 명지대학교(서울캠퍼스) 중동문제연구소 2018 중동문제연구 Vol.17 No.4

This article analyzes the formation and development of the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood, which has emerged as the most threatening opposition to the Saudi government, and the changes of the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi government from the 1950s to the present. The first section, ‘The Rising of Muslim Brotherhood as an Important Actor,’ covers the Muslim Brotherhood becoming the core actor of the Islamic Bloc led by Saudi Arabia to counter Nasser’s Pan-Arab Socialist Bloc in 1950s-1960s. The second section, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Leading Education,’ analyzes the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in playing an important role in the educational system, including universities, since the 1960s. The third section, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Sahwa, calling for the Political Reform,’ analyzes the political reform movements which Al-Sahwa has done since Iraq’s invasion of Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Finally, ‘The Crackdown of Saudi Government on Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Sahwa,’ analyzes the Saudi anti-terrorism law which brands the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

요르단 무슬림 형제단의 정치적 성공과 위기요인 분석

송상현 ( Sang Hyun Song ) 부산외국어대학교 지중해연구소 2015 지중해지역연구 Vol.17 No.3

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the movement in Jordan has successively promoted its agenda and message in the Jordanian society. At the beginning of the movement, its conservative Islamic ideals were well matched with the political needs of the Hashemites to check potentially political opponents. As the Muslim Brotherhood effectively provided support for the sovereignty of the monarchy whenever the regime encountered political challenges, it could benefit from the limited political system by acquiring the privilege to operate various organizations, which could provide a wide range of support for local people. Under the circumstances of mutual benefits between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, it effectively expanded its power in the Jordanian society. However, the deterioration of relations between Jordan regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, self-inflicted wounds, and the changing dynamic of local Islamist politics in recent years has caused its erosion of political influence over the local peopl.

팔레스타인 이슬람운동의 현황과 전망

유왕종 한국이슬람학회 2003 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.13 No.2

The Islamic religious movement in Palestine is not how to confront Zionist barbarities; it is rather to ensure that the second Intifada (appropriately named the al-Aqsa Intifada) does not suffer the same fate as the first Intifada(1987-1993). Then, the sacrifices of the Palestinians were bartered away in Oslo, culminating in the infamous accords signed on the White House lawn in September 1993. The PLO, which had played little part in the first Intifada were imposed upon the Palestinian people to do the Zionists' and the Americans' dirty work. The al-Aqsa Intifada is proof that the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike, have utterly rejected the Oslo accords in the only way possible: by staging massive protests with their bare hands. There can be only one state - a Palestinian Islamic State - in the land called Palestine. There is no room for two states there, especially a racist state. Similarly, Muslims are the only ones who have demonstrated that when they rule the land (for more than 1300 years so far), the holy places of all religions are respected. The Christians have never had any complaints against Muslims, despite vandalism by the Crusaders in the holy land in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Jews have found refuge with Muslims whenever they wanted to escape persecution in Europe. Thus Muslims are the only true inheritors of the divine mission who have respected the religious sentiments and places of all peoples. The rise of Islamic movement among Palestinians may be attributed to a number of factors. The first factor is the loss of Palestine in 1948. The establishment of a Jewish state in its place is perceived by Islamic movements as an encroachment on Muslim land. Israel is considered an alien body in the heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds, and a spearhead of Western hegemony. The second factor is the 1967 defeat of the Arab states by Israel. This defeat and the subsequent Israeli occupation of the remainder of Palestine and other Arab land have forced Palestinians and other Arabs to acknowledge their weakness. The third factor is the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. This is perhaps the most important factor in the rise of Islamic movement in general, and in Palestine in particular. The revolution restored confidence in Islam as a viable alternative to secularism and provided Muslims in other countries with a model to emulate. The fourth factor is the decline of the PLO(Palestine Liberation Organization) that began in the late 1970s. This decline was a function of several setbacks suffered by the PLO, which prevented the organization from winning the independence for Palestine to which it had committed itself and that had inspired its widespread acceptance. The PLO's consequent evolution from ideological purity to political pragmatism created an ideological vacuum that was soon filled by Islam, the only available alternative. The fifth is the Palestinian popular uprising(the Intifada) of 1987. This, clearly, was the most important factor in the growth of Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism. The Intifada defined the content of Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism as nationalist and political, projecting it as a movement whose primary objectives, as illustrated by the charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement(HAMAS), were resistance to Israeli occupation and liberation of Palestine. The prominent and effective participation of the Islamic movement in the Intifada created significant popular support, and it emerged as a serious rival to the PLO, challenging its political program and contending with it for the leadership of Palestinian society. The sixth factor is Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on September 28, 2000. This visit became the pretext for instigating large scale demonstrations, the start of the al-Aqsa infifada. Therein lies the dilemma of the people of Palestine. They are the ones making the sacrifices, as they have done for more than 50 years under a brutal occupation, and others have come to steal the fruits of their labour. As the al-Aqsa Intifada goes on, with its daily mounting death-toll, the Islamic movement in Palestine as well as outside needs to be clear about its position. First and foremost is the question of the future geographical boundaries of the state of Palestine. There can be no compromise on the question that the entire area of Palestine belongs to the Palestinian people. Hamas is considered the most influential of the Palestinian fundamentalist groups. It is known for its extensive following, particularly compared to that of the other two groups, and for its military wing, Kata'ib Izz al-Din al-Qassam (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades). The Islamic Jihad is narrowly based and more action oriented than the other two groups, focusing on violent acts of resistance to Israeli occupation. . . . The Palestinian Muslim fundamentalists have opposed the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the Oslo Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, and subsequent Palestinian-Israeli agreements; they have also refused to participate in the Palestinian Authority, which was (first) established in Gaza and Jericho.

이집트 무슬림 형제단 역사를 토대로 바라본 권위주의 정권하에서 야권 세력의 생존을 위한 정치적 투쟁, 성공 그리고 실패

안소연 한국외국어대학교(글로벌캠퍼스) 중동연구소 2022 중동연구 Vol.41 No.2

There have been many studies regarding the Muslim Brotherhood(MB). However, many studies analyze the MB in terms of political Islam or Islamic movement. Given that MB was the main opposition group for the authoritarian regime in Egypt, this study examines the changes in political strategy and attitudes of the MB in response to the dynamics of political oppression and co-optation of Egyptian governments. In the early years, the MB was anti system group situated against the established political order. However, they have gradually become more politically mainstream. In 1980s, slight openness to the MB from the Egyptian regime, caused the MB to see democracy to be compatible with its notion of slow Islamization. Thus, they sought to establish electoral alliances with various groups in order to gain political authority. Given the regime’s changing attitudes towards the MB, the group became flexible in its outlook. Ultimately, they made unprecedented opportunity for legal and free participation in the politics through Egyptian uprising in 2011. However, they missed their ‘golden opportunity’ to achieve strong There have been many studies regarding the Muslim Brotherhood(MB). However, many studies analyze the MB in terms of political Islam or Islamic movement. Given that MB was the main opposition group for the authoritarian regime in Egypt, this study examines the changes in political strategy and attitudes of the MB in response to the dynamics of political oppression and co-optation of Egyptian governments. In the early years, the MB was anti system group situated against the established political order. However, they have gradually become more politically mainstream. In 1980s, slight openness to the MB from the Egyptian regime, caused the MB to see democracy to be compatible with its notion of slow Islamization. Thus, they sought to establish electoral alliances with various groups in order to gain political authority. Given the regime’s changing attitudes towards the MB, the group became flexible in its outlook. Ultimately, they made unprecedented opportunity for legal and free participation in the politics through Egyptian uprising in 2011. However, they missed their ‘golden opportunity’ to achieve strong

이집트 자유정의당(FJP)의 등장과 이슬람주의 정당의 미래

황병하 ( Byung Ha Hwang ) 한국이슬람학회 2012 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.22 No.2

This paper is intended to research the advent of Free & Justice Party(FJP) and the future of Islamic party in Egypt. As we know well, in Egypt Hosni Mubarak reigned more than 30 years. During this period, the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood had prohibited. However, after the fall of Mubarak regime, their political activity has allowed, and finally their political party established. This means new political horizon has come true in Egypt. For achieving the purpose of this paper, chapter Ⅱ described the background of appearance of FJP, and its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood(al-Ikhwan). In chapter Ⅲ, the major political lines of FJP was described. They included the economical programs to promote the daily life, the methods to solve the social problems, the way to compromise the religious conflicts, the way to unite the multi-racial society, the programs to improve the peoples` welfare, and the development of culture & media. In chapter Ⅳ, the FJP`s future political direction was presented. It is expected the activities and ideas of FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood will influence the future of Egyptian politics and situation of the Middle East. In chapter Ⅴ, the political position of FJP in the future was described. It is estimated that FJP will win the next Egyptian elections, and the Egyptian people will request FJP to stabilize the Egyptian economy, to accomplish democracy and freedom, to create new job opportunities, and to try to achieve the peace of the Middle East. In chapter Ⅵ, the result of the 1st round of the Majlis election in November 2011 and the future of the elections of Egypt were presented. According to the results of the 1st round, the Islamic parties, especially FJP, won the election(43%). This means the victory of the Islamic parties in Egypt, and the possibility of appearance of ideological conflicts between the political parties in the future.

이슬람급진주의와 지하드의 글로벌화

최재훈 ( Jae Hun Choi ) 한국이슬람학회 2010 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.20 No.1

The term, ``Islamic fundamentalism`` is primarily used in the Western world to describe Islamist groups. It describes the beliefs of traditional Muslims; that they should restrict themselves to literal and conservative interpretations of their sacred texts, the Qur`an and Hadith. By extension, fundamentalism may include a variety of religious movements and groups in Muslim communities which may be entirely apolitical. As with adherents of other fundamentalist movements, Islamic fundamentalists hold that the problems of the world stem from secular influences. Further, the path to peace and justice in this world lies in a return to the original message of the faith, combined with a scrupulous rejection of all Bid`ah(innovation) and perceived anti-Islamic traditions. While there have historically been many non-violent Muslim fundamentalists, one Western connotation of the term fundamentalism is the assertion of views through violence or oppression, rather than persuasion. Islamic fundamentalism and especially Islamism is becoming more and more in conflict with the secular, democratic state, based upon the widely supported Universal Rights. In terms of secular states, the ultimate goal of fundamentalist movements is the overthrowing of secular governments and the implementation of theocratic government. From the twentieth century to the present day, there have been rising tensions between secularized states and growing fundamentalist movements, as well as varied instances of compromises. In this process, Islamic fundamental movement has become a political movement, and some groups turned radical by construing the concept of Jihad in its own way. Modern Islamist terrorist groups are often inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the prototype of the later Islamist groups. Some Islamist terrorist groups, notably Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda have employed suicide bombers as a weapon of choice. Their use of suicide bombers occurs in spite of Islamic strictures against suicide and condemnation of suicide bombings by Muslim religious authorities not affiliated with terrorist groups. The term is frequently mistranslated into English as a "holy war"; however, the concept of jihad encompasses more than just warfare, and a more accurate translation probably would be "holy struggle", "righteous struggle" or "holy endeavour". The denotation is of a challenging or difficult, (frequently)opposed effort, made either in accomplishment or resistance. A person who engages in any form of jihad is called a "mujahid", meaning "striver" or "struggler". This term is most often used to mean a person who engages in fighting, but, for example a Muslim struggling to memorize the Qur`an is called a mujahid. Jihad, a biased interpretation is sometimes used to describe militant Islamic groups, including Islamist terrorism.

이집트 무슬림형제단(MB)의 미래에 대한 고찰

황병하(Hwang, Byung-Ha) 한국중동학회 2015 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.36 No.2

To investigate the current social strife, polarization, and violence in Egypt, it is necessary to explore on the confrontation between the Military-based secularism and Muslim Brotherhood(MB)-based Islamism. It means the potential for Islamist integration and the regime's ability to achieve political stability greatly depends on the MB's current situation and its future. The MB has been in crisis after the ouster of Mursi on July 3, 2013, regime's bloody crackdown in Raba'a, and regime's designation the MB as a terrorist organization. To overcome this crisis, the MB has changed its structure, ideology, and leadership. In the process of its changes, there happened internal conflicts between old generation and new generation. Youth members are now assuming a more active role in the MB, calling for revolutionary action against the regime. It means the internal conflicts between them are on the use of violence against the regime. The moderates and old leadership are worrying about youth members' joining radical groups like the Islamic State(IS), and hoping to use peaceful non-violent method. The youth members including members of Raba'a Islamist Youth and new leadership are calling for revolutionary action using violence against regime's bloody crackdown. Under these circumstances, the MB's future will be one of three possibilities. They are reconciliation with the regime, fragmentation into factions, and eradication by the regime. In spite of Mursi's overthrow, the MB remains an important role in Egypt. So it is needed the MB must recognize the failures of current protest, change the structure, withdraw from politics, and rethink its future for the future of Egypt's Islam and political Islam.