경영자 이익예측정보의 시장반응과 그 결정요인

권수영(Soo Young Kwon),고영우(Young Woo Ko),황문호(Mun Ho Hwang) 한국경영학회 2010 經營學硏究 Vol.39 No.4

This study investigates 1) whether management earnings forecasts under Regulation Fair Disclosure convey new information to the market regarding the change in the intrinsic value of the company, 2) how forecast characteristics and earnings qualities affect the magnitude of market reaction to management earnings forecasts, 3) whether the ex post accuracy of management forecasts influences the information content of the management earnings forecasts. Management earnings forecasts are voluntary managerial disclosures that predict earnings prior to the expected reporting day (King et al. 1990). Managers often disclose earnings forecasts to correct information asymmetry problems, which influence their firm's stock price (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). Many studies from 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated that management earnings forecasts indeed have the information content as they influence stock prices in U.S (Patell 1976; Jaggi 1978; Penman 1980; Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Waymire 1984). But, little research has examined the relation between management earnings forecasts and the market reaction in Korea except studies by Sohn (1997) and Han et al. (2000). However, the results from these studies produced conflicting results. One of the main motives for this study is that the information environment of Korean stock market has substantially changed after adopting the Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), which we expect to influence the information content of management forecasts. Regulation FD prohibits companies from disclosing market-sensitive information to selected investors before making it public. This enables investors to access material financial information at the same time, so the market reaction is anticipated to be more reflective around the disclosure day than before. Thus, the first hypothesis of this paper is to revisit the basic question that a good news forecast of manager is associated with an upward price revision and a bad news forecast with a downward revision (H1). Having established that management forecasts have information content, we investigate whether forecast characteristics and earnings qualities affect the magnitude of stock price reactions to management forecasts. Hutton et al. (2003) argue that bad news forecasts are regarded as inherently informative, whereas good news forecasts are considered informative only when accompanied by verifiable forward-looking information. So, we hypothesize that the market reaction to bad news forecasts will be larger than that to good news (H2-1). As for the accuracy of forecast time horizon, the previous studies reported that the management forecasts with shorter time horizon are more accurate than those with longer time horizon (Pownall et al. 1993; Rogers and Stocken 2005) We expect that the forecasts with shorter horizon will have larger market responses to management forecasts than those with longer horizon (H2-2). Bamber and Cheon (1998) suggest that forecasts disclosed to analysts and reporters are more accurate than those through other venue. Based on this, we hypothesize that forecasts through IR or conference call will have higher information content than those through other venue (H2-3). Kasznik (1999) finds the firms with good news have significantly positive discretionary accruals. Gong et al. (2009) show the positive association between accruals and subsequent management earings forecast errors. Based on these studies, we expect that management forecast with higher accruals will have smaller stock price responses (H2-4). Lastly, we hypothesize that management forecasts with higher earnings volatility will have smaller market reactions (H2-5). These three (H2-3, 4, and 5) hypotheses are not specifically tested in the existing research. McNichols (1989) documents that stock prices reflect information beyond management earnings forecasts because investors access some information that managers do not report. Based on this, we additionally investigate whether ex post man

불확실한 기업환경에서 경영자 이익예측과 발생액의 관계

권수영(Soo Young Kwon),최경수(Kyong Soo Choi),김경혜(Kyung Hye Kim) 한국경영학회 2012 經營學硏究 Vol.41 No.2

In this paper, we examine the association between errors in management forecasts of subsequent year earnings and current year accruals. Since a firm is often faced with uncertain operating environment, managers` judgements about their firms` business prospects inevitably involve errors. These errors significantly affect the accruals generation process and earnings prediction, implying that the management forecasts of subsequent year earnings and current year accruals can contain common errors. Thus, we expect that the management earnings forecasts for the subsequent year are more optimistically (pessimistically) biased when current year accruals are relatively high (low). To test our expectation, we collect management earnings forecasts for fiscal years 2002-2009 from Financial Supervisory Service`s Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART). Our results are given as follows. First, consistent with our expectation, we find a positive association between subsequent year management earnings forecasts errors and current year accruals. Second, we show that while this positive association is significant when operating uncertainty or macroeconomic uncertainty is high, it is not significant when operating uncertainty or macroeconomic uncertainty is low. This result supports our conjecture that managers who cope with high uncertain operating or macroeconomic environments make substantial errors in assessing the firm`s business prospects and generating accruals, thus resulting in the positive association between management forecast errors and year accruals. Third, this positive association is significant when the manager`s reporting flexibility is high, but is nonexistent when the manager`s reporting flexibility is low. This finding provides additional evidence to our conjecture that manager`s imperfect assessments of their business prospects, which is reflected in both management earnings forecasts and accruals, induce the positive association between management earnings forecasts errors and accruals. Collectively, these results highly substantiate our argument that the positive association between management earnings forecasts errors and accruals is generated by the manager`s unintentional errors in assessing the firms` business prospects. Meanwhile, one alternative explanation for this positive association is that in order to reap private benefits, managers simultaneously manipulate accruals upward (downward) and predict future earnings optimistically (pessimistically). Thus, in the supplementary analysis, we examine whether the positive association between management earnings forecasts errors and accruals arises from managers` intentional misrepresentation of earnings forecasts and accruals. Our result shows that this positive association is significant when earnings forecasts and accruals likely contain managers` real judgements about firms` business prospects, but is not significant when both earnings forecasts and accruals are likely affected by managers` intentional misrepresentation (errors). Based on this result, it naturally follows that the positive association between management earnings forecasts errors and accruals is virtually generated by managers` unintentional errors, not by the managers intentional errors. In Korea, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the few study which explores the relation between voluntarily disclosed information (management earnings forecasts) and mandated reported information (accruals). We provide the strong evidence that the positive association between management earnings forecasts errors and accruals exists because of managers` unintentional errors in assessing the firms` business prospects. These unintentional errors are definitely different from the managers` intentional errors dealt by most of prior studies. We expect that this might improve our understanding of the informational value of management earnings forecasts, with the corresponding implications for inves

재무분석가의 발생액 구분 능력과 경영자 이익조정과의 관계에 관한 연구

정성환 ( Sung Hwan Jung ),한승수 ( Sam Han ) 한국회계학회 2011 會計學硏究 Vol.36 No.3

본 연구는 재무분석가의 재량적 발생액에 대한 분석 능력이 경영자의 이익조정에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 분석하고자 한다. 재무분석가가 전기 이익의 질을 분석해 내지 못한 채이에 기초하여 당기 이익을 예측할 경우, 이 예측행위는 비효율적이 될 수밖에 없을 것이다. 경영자의 입장에서 재무분석가의 예측정보는 달성 또는 초과달성해야 할 목표치이므로, 낮은분석 능력으로 말미암아 결과적으로 과대 예측된 재무분석가의 이익예측치는 경영자에게 이익조정의 유인으로 작용할 수 있다. 경영자가 전기 이익을 상향 조정했을 때, 재무분석가가 이를 분석해 내지 못하고 전기에 보고된 이익에 고착화되어 당기 이익을 과대 예측한다면 시장의 기대를 충족시키고자 하는 경영자는 당기에도 이익 조정을 시도할 것이다. 이에 본 연구에서는 재무분석가의 재량적 발생액에 대한 분석 능력의 정도가 경영자의 이익조정 행위와 상관관계가 있을 것이며, 이러한 상관관계는 경영자가 시장의 기대를 충족시키고자 하는 동기가 강할수록 증가하리라 예측하였다. 실증분석 결과는 다음과 같이 요약할 수 있다. 재무분석가가 전기의 재량적 발생액을 구분해내지 못하고 결과적으로 당기 이익을 과대 예측하였을 때 경영자의 이익조정 성향이 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 상관관계는 시장의 기대를 충족시키고자 하는 동기가 존재할 때더욱 현저하게 나타났는데 이로써 과대 예측된 재무분석가의 이익예측치가 경영자에게 이익조정 유인으로 작용하고 이 과정에 있어 자본시장의 압력이 매개변수로 작용하고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 또한 추종 재무분석가의 수가 증가할수록 경영자의 이익조정 성향이 증가하는 것으로 나타났는데 이는 추종 재무분석가의 수가 자본시장의 관심의 정도를 대변함으로서 나타난 결과로 해석된다. 본 연구는 재무분석가의 비효율적인 예측행위로 인해 높아진 시장의 기대가 경영자의 이익조정 성향을 높일 수 있음을 밝힘으로써 자본시장에서 재무분석가의 예측행위의 중요성을 확인하였다는 데에 의의가 있다. 재무분석가의 예측정보 유용성을 제고하기 위해서는 제도적 차원에서 공시제도의 정비와 경영자의 자발적 공시를 유도할 수 있는 정보환경의 개선이 이루어져야 할 것으로 보인다. This study investigates whether analysts` forecast efficiency affects managers` earnings management behavior. When analysts fail to understand the implications of discretionary accruals from prior period earnings information, forecasted current period earnings would be less efficient. Since managers have an incentive to meet or beat analysts` forecasts, less efficient analysts` forecasts may lead managers to involve in earnings management. If analysts are fixated on prior period earnings and issue optimistic forecasts, managers are more likely to manage current period earnings by exercising more discretion since they know analysts overestimate the persistence of discretionary accruals. We hypothesize that analysts` inability to understand the implications of discretionary accruals is associated with earnings management behavior. Furthermore, this association is more pronounced when managers have stronger incentives to meet or beat market expectations and when investors` demand for earnings information is greater. Using 3,222 firm-year observations on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period from 2002 to 2009, we divide our sample into four groups based on the magnitude of bias from analysts` annual earnings forecasts and examine whether the degree of earnings management varies over the four groups. we find the following empirical evidence. First, consistent with our prediction, the result shows that managers are likely to exercise more accounting discretion when analysts do not fully understand the persistence of accruals and thus they issue optimistic forecasts. Second, this tendency is more significant when managers face higher market pressure to meet or beat analysts` annual earnings forecasts for more than two consecutive years. In addition, we provide corroborating evidence that managers are more likely to manage earnings when the number of analysts following the firm, another proxy for market pressure, is larger. We perform several robustness checks on the data, including separate analyses for loss firms and profit firms, and find that the results are qualitatively not different. We also consider alternative explanations for our findings such as the possible substitution effect of expectation management through management earings forecasts for manipulating earnings through discretionary accruals and find that the result is largely unchanged. This paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of analysts` ability to understand the information contained in discretionary accruals. When analysts do not fully understand the implications of discretionary accruals, their optimistic forecasts might provide managers incentives to satisfy market expectations by exercising more accounting discretion, especially when managers face high capital market pressures. This result implies that the improvement in the informativeness of analysts` forecasted earnings can be achieved through systematic updates of disclosure policies and better information environment that promotes managers` voluntary disclosures. In closing, we mention some potential caveats of the study. First, while suggestive of the link between market pressure and managers` earnings management behavior, our findings are mainly from "ex-post" measures for managers` reporting incentives. If we can measure managers` "ex-ante" incentives to meet or beat analysts` earnings forecasts, we can better understand the relation between analysts` earnings forecasts and subsequent managers` earnings management behaviors. Second, the documented analysts` earnings forecasts behaviors might not necessarily be due to their inability to understand the implications of discretionary accruals. We cannot rule out the possibility that analysts are "intentionally" ignore the lower persistence of discretionary accruals. If analysts` optimistic earnings forecasts are due to the reasons other than their inability, the interpretation of our empirical results could be different. Future research should identify the way to discern those two possibilities and provide a clearer link to managers` earnings management behaviors.

경영자 예측정보공시와 주가표류현상

이경태 ( Kyung Tae Lee ),이연진 ( Yeon Jin Lee ),최종원 ( Jong Won Choi ) 한국회계학회 2011 會計學硏究 Vol.36 No.4

본 연구는 경영자의 예측정보공시가 이익공시일 이후에 나타나는 주가표류현상에 미치는 영향을 검토한다. 즉 실제 이익이 공시되기 이전에 발표되는 이익에 대한 사전적 정보인경영자의 예측정보가 시장에 공시될 경우에, 자본시장의 투자자들이 이익이 가지는 정보성을 효율적으로 이해하는 데 도움을 받게 되어 주가표류현상이 줄어드는가를 분석한다. 아울러 이러한 영향이 정보불확실성이 큰 기업에서 더욱 뚜렷하게 나타나는가를 살펴본다. 마지막으로 경영자 예측공시의 정확성과 예측기간에 따라 주가표류현상 수준에 차이가 나타나는가를 분석한다. 2004년부터 2008년까지 상장기업을 대상으로 분석한 결과, 경영자가 매출액 예측치를 공시하는 기업은 이익공시일 이후에 주가표류현상의 수준이 줄어드는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 이러한 관계는 정보불확실성이 큰 기업에서 더욱 뚜렷하게 관찰되었다. 경영자 예측공시가 이루어진 기업만을 대상으로 살펴본 결과에서는 경영자의 매출액 예측치와 실제치의 차이가 작고 예측기간이 짧을수록, 즉 예측치의 정확성이 높고 예측시점이 이익공시일에 가까울수록, 주가표류현상 수준이 더 뚜렷하게 줄어드는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 먼저 국내에서 활발치 않은 주가표류현상에 관한 연구를 수행하였다는 점에서 그의의가 있다. 기존의 연구들은 주가표류현상 자체나 원인에 주목한데 반하여 본 연구는 주가표류현상에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 요인으로 경영자 예측정보 공시를 제시하였다. 그리고 예측공시가 주가표류현상을 약화시킨다는 분석결과를 통해 경영자 예측공시의 유용성에 관한 중요한 시사점과 아울러 주가표류현상이 시장비효율성에 기인하고 있음을 보이고 있다. 더욱이이와 같은 영향이 정보불확실성과 같은 기업의 특성 및 경영자 예측치의 속성에 따라서 차이를 보인다는 것을 고려했다는 점에서 본 연구에 추가적 의의가 존재한다. This paper investigates how the voluntary disclosure in the form of management forecasts of future performance affect on Post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). PEAD refers to the phenomenon that stock prices continue to move in the direction of the earnings surprise even after the earnings announcement date. It has been considered as one of the most puzzling market anomalies. Our first research question is that whether PEAD is less pronounced for firm-quarters with management forecasts than for firm-quarters without management forecasts. Management forecast is the voluntary managerial disclosure which predicts the firm`s future performance prior to the reporting date. This has been reported after Regulation Fair Disclosure adopted in 2002. We predict that release of management forecasts of future performance will lessen information asymmetry and uncertainty, and can accelerate investor`s response to the implications of announced earnings for future earnings, thereby reducing PEAD. Further, we examine that the mitigation effect of management forecasts on PEAD is more pronounced for firm-quarters with high information uncertainty companies. High information uncertainty companies refer to the firms whose expected cash flows are less knowable, perhaps due to the nature of their business or operating environment, and prior research contends that these firms are correlated to high drifts. As management forecasts will be regarded as more precious and useful information to investors in high information uncertainty firms, mitigation effect will be stronger in these companies. Next, we investigate whether the mitigation effect of management forecasts on PEAD varies with the accuracy of management forecasts and forecast horizon. To be more accurate, it means that the absolute value between actual earnings and management forecast is less. Horizon refers to the number of calendar days from the management forecast date to the earnings announcement date. Prior research suggest that a longer management forecast horizon corresponds to greater uncertainty faced by managers in forecasting earnings. Thus, the shorter the horizon, the more accurate management`s forecast will be. Our sample consists of 855 firm-years over 2004-2008 period. The findings of the study are as follows: First, consistent with our prediction, observed relation between announced earnings surprises and subsequent abnormal returns are reduced by the issuance of management forecasts. Also, this mitigation effect is prominent in high information uncertainty companies. These findings suggest that management forecasts increase the transparency of firm`s earnings process and provides valuerelevant information to the investors, thereby reducing PEAD. In order to test for the relationship between the mitigation effect and the accuracy of management forecasts and forecast horizon, we used sub-sample of 330 firmquarters which have provided at least one management forecast. We find that the mitigation effect of management forecasts on PEAD is smaller for firm-quarters with forecasts with more accurate and short forecast horizon. As management forecasts are voluntary and unaudited disclosures in which managers have substantial discretion, investors` reaction is different followings to its accuracy and horizon. This study has several contributions. First, by providing empirical evidence on the effectiveness of voluntary disclosures in alleviating the accounting anomaly of PEAD, this study contributes to the literature on both PEAD and voluntary disclosure. Second, our findings suggest that PEAD which occurs from investors` incomplete and delayed response to earnings news can be mitigated by management forecasts. Academic literature offers several explanations for why PEAD occurs and persists. Of all, our results support the view that investors underreact to the information conveyed during earnings announcement, or they process the information only after a delay. Lastly, we also show the evidence that mitigation effect of management forecasts varies with information uncertainty and quality of management forecasts. This can provide direct implications for managers, regulators, and investors.

경영자 예측정보의 연속적 공시행태에 관한 연구 -전기 예측정확성 및 재무분석가의 영향을 중심으로

김경혜 ( Kyung Hye Kim ),최경수 ( Kyong Soo Choi ),황문호 ( Mun Ho Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계학연구 Vol.38 No.3

본 연구는 경영자 예측정보의 연속적 공시행태를 분석한다. 구체적으로, 전기에 공시된 경영자 예측정보의 사후적 정확성 및 재무분석가와의 상호작용이 당기의 예측정보 공시에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 선행연구에 따르면, 경영자의 자발적인 예측정보 공시에는 다양한 경제적 유인이 수반되는 것으로 보고된다. 따라서 예측정보 공시에 따른 기대효익이 크게 예상되면 경영자는 적극적인 공시정책을 취할 것이며, 그렇지 않은 경우라면 소극적인 모습이 나타날 수 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 영향관계에 기초하여 과거에 발표한 경영자 예측정보의 신뢰성이 떨어질수록 당기의 예측정보 공시가능성이 낮아질 것으로 예상한다. 아울러 이러한 경영자의 연속적 공시행태에 있어 재무분석가들이 완충적인 역할을 수행할 것으로 예상한다. 경영자와 재무분석가는 예측정보를 생산하는 주요 주체로서 서로의 예측정보를 긴밀하게 모니터링한다. 따라서 경영자가 재무분석가의 예측정보를 통해서 자신의 예측정확성을 보완할 수 있다고 판단한다면 이를 적극 참조하여 공시에 반영할 것으로 기대되기 때문이다. 본 연구는 2002년부터 2008년까지 공정공시를 통해 발표된 경영자 영업이익 예측치를 대상으로 분석을 수행하였으며, 주요 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 경영자의 전기 예측정확성이 낮을수록 당기 예측정보의 공시가능성이 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 과거 예측정보의 신뢰성이 떨어질수록 당기의 공시에 따른 기대효과가 크지 않을 것으로 예상하여 소극적인 공시활동이 이루어지고 있음을 시사한다. 둘째, 재무분석가의 전기 예측정확성이 경영자보다 우수할수록, 경영자의 전기 예측정확성과 당기 예측정보 공시 간에 나타나는 양(+)의 관계는 유의하게 감소하였으며, 경영자의 예측정확성은 유의하게 개선되는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 경영자의 예측정보 공시 의사결정에 재무분석가 예측정보가 참조되고 있음을 나타내는 한편 재무분석가를 통해 경영자 예측정보의 신뢰성이 향상될 수 있음을 시사하는 결과이다. 본 연구는 경영자의 전기 예측정확성과 당기의 예측정보 공시간에 체계적인 관련성이 있음을 보여줌으로써 경영자의 자발적 공시유인 연구를 확장하고 있다. 아울러 경영자의 예측정보 공시에 재무분석가 예측정보가 유의하게 활용되고 있음을 보여줌으로써 경영자와 재무분석가간의 상호작용을 실증적으로 검증하였다는 점에서 차별적 공헌점이 있는 것으로 판단된다. We examine the manager`s consecutive reporting behavior about the voluntarily disclosed earnings forecast. Specifically, the primary objective of our study is to explore the effect of prior management earnings forecast accuracy and financial analysts on the current management earnings forecasts disclosure probability. First, we examine how the accuracy of prior management earnings forecast influences the disclosure probability of current management earnings forecast. In addition, we investigate how the number of analysts following and analysts` relative earnings forecast accuracy of prior year impact on the relation between prior management earnings forecast accuracy and current management earnings forecasts disclosure probability. In order to perform the empirical analysis, we hand collect management earnings forecasts for fiscal years 2002-2008 from Financial Supervisory Service`s Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART). Our specific results are given as follows. First, this research finds that as the accuracy of prior management earnings forecasts decreases the disclosure probability of current management earnings forecasts also decreases. Extant literatures demonstrate that various economic incentives have an effect on the disclosure policy of voluntarily disclosed earnings forecast. Therefore, if managers expect higher expected benefits of disclosing earnings forecast, he would be inclined to make an earnings forecast. On the other hand, when managers expect lower expected benefits of disclosing earnings forecast, he would not be inclined to make an earnings forecast. In this paper, based on the number of prior researches, we maintain that a relatively large errors of prior management earnings forecasts diminishes the expected benefits of current management earnings forecasts disclosure, which in turn generates a diminution of managers` incentives to provide current management earnings forecasts to the market participants. Therefore, the systematic positive (+) association between prior management earnings forecasts accuracy and current management earnings forecasts disclosure probability is consistent with our expectations. Second, when the analysts` prior relative earnings forecast accuracy are relatively high, the significant positive (+) association between prior management earnings forecasts accuracy and disclosure probability of current management earnings forecasts becomes small. On the contrary, the number of analysts` following of prior year does not affect the systematic positive (+) association between prior management earnings forecasts accuracy and disclosure probability of current management earnings forecasts. These findings indicate that since the manager`s specific ability to forecast a firm`s prospect increases in a relatively short period as the analysts` prior relative earnings forecast accuracy becomes higher, the manager`s incentives to stop management earnings forecast in the current period which is due to prior management earnings forecasts errors decreases. However, since the number of analysts` following of prior year is limited in improving manager`s specific ability to forecast a firm`s prospect, it does not influence the manager`s incentives to stop management earnings forecast in the current period which is due to prior management earnings forecasts errors. This paper, by demonstrating the systematic positive (+) association between prior management earnings forecasts accuracy and current management earnings forecasts disclosure probability, provides a new insight about the manager`s consecutive earnings forecasts disclosure policy. In particular, prior literatures which deal with management earnings forecasts concentrate mainly on the temporary forecasting behavior of managers. On the other hand, our research is discriminated by focusing on the sequential management earnings forecast strategies. As a result, our research might expand the scope of prior literatures which have dealt with manager`s voluntary disclosure policy Also, establishing the fact that the significant positive (+) association between prior management earnings forecasts accuracy and current management earnings forecasts disclosure probability decreases as the analysts` prior relative earnings forecast accuracy increases, this study documents the crucial impact of the analysts` on the manager`s consecutive earings forecasts behavior.

연구논문 : 경영자이익예측공시 유형에 따른 차별적 시장반응과 예측정확성

박근호 ( Keun Ho Park ),정준희 ( Joon Hei Cheung ),정희철 ( Hee Chul Jung ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계저널 Vol.23 No.5

공정공시제도하에서 자발적으로 공시되는 경영자의 이익예측공시는 기업의 주가수익률에 영향을 미치는 주요 이익사건 중 하나로 국내외에서 다양한 각도의 연구가 수행되었다. 국내 언론 및 투자자들에 의한 경영자이익예측공시의 예측정확성에 대한 비판적인 시각이 대두됨에 따라, 감독당국은 이러한 시장의 비판을 해소하기 위하여 경영자이익예측공시에 관한 모범규준을 제정하였다. 하지만 당해 모범규준의 실질적 유용성을 분석한 연구는 전무하다. 이에 본 연구에서는 감독당국의 당해 모범규준의 유용성을 검증하고자 한다. 이를 위해 모범규준 준수에 따른 시장의 반응 및 사후적 예측정확성의 차이를 분석하였다. 본 연구의 실증결과는 다음과 같다. 거래소의 영업실적공시 모범규준을 준수한 기업과 준수하지 않은 기업의 경영자이익예측공시에 대한 시장반응 및 사후적 정확성은 그 차이가 없는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 당해 경영자 이익예측공시 모범규준의 유용성에 의문성을 제기하는 한편 향후시장감독당국의 관련 감독정책의 재검토가 필요함을 시사한다. 본 연구의 공헌도 및 선행연구와의 차별성은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 감독당국이 제시한 경영자이익예측공시 모범규준의 유용성에 대하여 최초로 실증분석을 시도하였다. 이는 경영자 예측공시에 대한 모범규준을 제정한 정책당국의 향후 감독정책운용에 유용한 시사점을 제공해 줄 것으로 기대한다. 둘째, 기존의 경영자 이익예측의 시장반응을 살펴보는 연구에서 경영자의 이익예측공시일이 다른 이익공시사건일과 중복되고 있음을 고려하여 보다 순수한 시장반응을 검토하기 위하여 관련 이익반응의 중복효과의 통제를 시도하였다. 이러한 새로운 연구방법의 시도는 향후 이익사건과 관련된 공정공시의 시장반응연구에 있어 새로운 접근법을 제시하여 줄 것으로 기대한다. Under the Fair Disclosure system, the voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts is one of major accounting events to influence the market response on stock prices, which has been tested by researchers in various ways. Management earnings forecasts, however, have been challenged from local mass media and investors, as some forecasted management earnings significantly deviate from actual earnings numbers. To address the market concern, the Korea Exchange, as a market supervisor, adopted the best practice guideline of the management earnings forecasts. We find that no research has tested the effectiveness of the best practice guideline by the regulator. This motivates us to examine the effectiveness of the best practice guideline. In order to test the effectiveness of the regulatory guideline on the management earnings forecasts, we review whether the compliance of the best practice guideline leads the difference in the market response and the ex-post forecasting accuracy of the management earnings forecast. Our test result shows that the capital market of Korea is indifferent at the compliance of the regulatory best practice guideline of management earnings forecasts. In addition, the market does not show any meaningful difference of the ex-post forecasting accuracy in management earnings forecasts. The outcome implies that market supervisors may need to revisit the supervisory policy of the management earnings forecasts, questioning the effectiveness of the current regulatory regime on the management earnings forecasts. Our research contributes to the literature by providing insights on the policy making of the management earning forecasts. This study also provides insights into the duplication effect of the market response, when the disclosure of the management earnings forecasts coincides with other earnings events. The research method taken in the paper will help a future research to measure the pure market response without the duplication effect.

공정공시를 통하여 이익예측치를 발표한 기업의 이익조정

전영순,천미림 한국세무학회 2009 세무와 회계저널 Vol.10 No.3

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), many firms disclosed important nonpublic information to securities analysts or selected institutional investors, before making public disclosure of the same information. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit at the expense of the general public. Thus, Reg FD was introduced in 2002 to level the playing field and thereby to reduce information asymmetry among market participants. Reg FD requires that when corporate management discloses material nonpublic information to a few privileged market participants, he must make public disclosure of that information. Reg FD specifies types of material information that trigger Reg FD obligations. One of them is forward-looking information about forthcoming earnings. Prior research conducted in the US suggests that firms beating earnings benchmarks enjoy higher returns than those missing the benchmarks. Management earnings forecasts can serve as earnings benchmarks. In addition, managers may face legal actions by shareholders and lose their reputation if they miss their earnings forecasts. Thus, managers in the US have incentives to manage earnings upward to achieve their earnings forecasts. The capital market and legal environment in Korea differ from those in the US. That is, there is no evidence that investors either penalize or take any legal action against managers who miss their forecasts in Korea. Thus, it is an empirical question whether managers who issue earnings forecasts manage earnings upward to meet or beat their forecasts in Korea. This study investigates whether Korean managers who issue earnings forecasts through fair disclosures manage earnings upward to meet or beat their forecasts. The empirical results reveal that in general discretionary accruals of the forecast year are not different from those of other years. However, when pre-managed earnings fall short of management earnings forecasts, firms use income-increasing discretionary accruals. Furthermore, discretionary accruals are positively associated with the difference between management forecasts and pre-managed earnings. These results suggest that even in Korea managers manage earnings upward when pre-managed earnings fall short of their forecasts. Prior research also suggests that strong corporate governance deters managers' income-increasing accounting decisions. However, there is no significant association between corporate governance and earnings management acitivity for our sample firms. 공정공시제도란 기업이 애널리스트나 기관투자가 등 특정인에게 선별적으로 중요한 정보를 제공하고자 하는 경우 모든 시장참가자들이 동 정보를 알 수 있도록 그 특정인에게 제공하기 전에 증권시장을 통해 공시하도록 하는 제도이다. 공정공시의 대상이 되는 정보 중 하나가 매출액, 영업손익, 경상손익 또는 당기순손익 등에 대한 전망치 또는 예측치이다. 미국의 선행연구에 의하면 자발적으로 이익예측치를 발표한 경영자는 해당 예측치가 사후적으로 실현되는 이익에 비해 과대 공시된 것으로 밝혀지면 주식시장에서의 부정적인 주가반응뿐만 아니라 경영자의 평판이 손상될 위험과 법적인 책임까지도 부담할 수 있다. 따라서, 이익예측치를 공시한 경영자는 보고이익이 해당 예측치에 미달하는 것을 피하기 위하여 이익을 상향 조정할 유인을 갖는다. 하지만 우리나라의 경우 경제 환경과 법적 환경이 미국과 달라 경영자가 자신이 과거에 발표한 이익예측치를 달성하지 못하더라도 불이익을 받는지는 분명하지 않다. 따라서, 우리나라에서 자발적으로 이익예측치를 공시한 경영자가 보고이익이 해당 예측치에 미달하는 것을 피하기 위하여 이익을 상향 조정하는지는 실증분석의 대상이다. 이에 본 연구는 공정공시를 통해 이익예측치를 발표한 경영자가 사후적으로 실현되는 이익이 이미 발표된 이익예측치에 미달할 것으로 예상되는 경우 이익을 상향 조정하는지를 검토한다. 실증분석 결과, 공정공시를 통하여 발표한 전망치가 실현되는 연도의 재량적발생액 자체는 기타 연도의 재량적발생액과 유의하게 다르지 않다. 하지만, 전망치가 실현되는 연도만을 대상으로 분석한 결과 이익을 조정하기 전의 이익이 이미 발표된 예측치에 미달할 것으로 예상되는 경우에는 재량적발생액을 이용하여 이익을 상향 조정하는 것으로 나타난다. 또한, 이익조정 전의 이익이 경영자가 이미 발표한 이익예측치에 미달하는 정도가 클수록 재량적발생액은 커진다. 이는 미국과 우리나라의 경제 환경이나 법적 환경이 다르다고 하더라도 우리나라의 경영자 또한 자신이 이미 발표한 이익예측치를 달성하고자 하는 유인을 가짐을 의미한다. 선행연구에 의하면 기업지배구조는 기업의 이익조정을 억제하는 역할을 하는 것으로 보고되었다. 하지만, 본 연구에서는 기업지배구조가 재량적발생액을 이용한 이익의 상향 조정을 억제하지 못하는 것으로 나타난다.

목표이익을 달성하기 위한 법인세비용을 이용한 이익조정

박종일 ( Jong Il Park ),전규안 ( Kyu An Jeon ) 한국회계학회 2009 회계학연구 Vol.34 No.1

법인세비용 계산의 복잡성과 법인세비용 계산시의 시간제약, 미래이익을 추정하는데 있어서의 자의성은 경영자와 감사인 및 주주 사이에 정보불균형을 가져오며, 따라서 경영자가 목표이익을 달성하기 위하여 법인세비용을 마지막 기회로 이용하는 것이 가능하다(Dhaliwal et al. 2004). 본 연구에서는 보고이익을 공시하기 전에 이익조정 전 이익(당기의 연간 세전이익을 이용한 방법과 3분기까지의 주당순이익을 이용하는 방법으로 측정)이 목표이익(3분기 말의 재무분석가의 이익예측치와 전기 주당순이익으로 측정)에 미달된 기업들이 4분기에서 법인세비용을 이용하여 이익조정을 하는가를 알아보았다. 재무분석가의 이익예측치 자료가 이용가능한 2000년부터 2006년까지의 기간을 분석기간으로 하여 금융업을 제외하고 12월결산법인을 대상으로 최종표본 751개 기업-연도 자료를 이용하여 분석하였다. 본 연구의 실증분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, Dhaliwal et al.(2004)의 방법과 동일한 방법을 이용하는 경우에는 3분기말에 발표된 목표이익에 미달한 기업들과 4분기의 법인세비용을 이용한 이익조정 간에는 관계가 없는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 본 연구에서 제안한 방법을 이용하여 분석한 경우에는 목표이익에 미달한 기업들이 3분기까지의 유효법인세율(effective tax rate)보다 4분기의 유효법인세율을 낮추는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 경영자가 법인세비용을 낮추어 이익을 상향조정하는 것을 의미한다. 즉 Dhaliwal et al.(2004)의 방법을 개선하여 본 연구에서 제안된 방법을 이용하여 분석하는 경우에서 Dhaliwal et al.(2004)의 연구에서처럼 3분기에서 목표이익에 미달한 기업들이 4분기의 법인세비용을 이용하여 이익조정을 한다는 결과를 발견하였다. 본 연구에서는 Dhaliwal et al.(2004)에서 이용된 방법보다 개선된 방법으로 측정함으로써 경영자가 목표이익에 미달한 경우 법인세비용을 이용하여 이익조정을 한다는 실증분석결과를 보여주었다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 경영자들이 법인세비용을 이용하여 이익조정을 한다는 본 연구의 결과는 투자자나 채권자, 감독당국 등이 기업(특히 실제 이익을 공시하기 전에 목표이익에 미달한 기업)의 재무제표를 분석할 때 법인세비용에 특히 주의를 기울여야 함을 제안하고 있다는 점에서 의의가 있다. When the complexity of estimating tax expense and the timing of the tax accrual prior to earnings management is considered, Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills (2004) (hereafter DGM) suggest that tax expense is a powerful and underexplored context for studying earnings management. DGM (2004) establish that, relative to firms that beat the forecast, firms which would miss analysts` consensus forecast of annual earnings per share (EPS) are more likely to decrease tax expense to meet or beat the forecast. Therefore, DGM (2004) examine whether firms manage earnings through decreases in effective tax rates (ETRs) between the third and fourth quarters. They assert that changes in ETRs are consistent with earnings management because tax expense is one of the last accounts closed in determining reported earnings. DGM (2004) insist that although many pretax accruals must be posted in the year-end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcement. So, We examine whether firms manage tax expense to reach earnings targets by applying DGM`s methodology and our improved methodology to Korean firms. The sample consists of non-banking firms (751 firm-years) with a December fiscal year-end listed on the Korean Stock Market over 2000-2006. The data on analysts`s forecasts is collected from the Fn-DataGuidePro Database. Therefore, the sample is limited to firms to be able to collect analysts`s forecasts data from Fn-DataGuidePro Database. We collect other firm-specific financial data from KIS-VALUE Ⅱ database. We support the DGM (2004) arguments that tax expense represents an opportunity for firms to earnings management using changes in ETRs. We conduct the different three measure in regard to targets earnings of empirical tests as DGM (2004) to investigate the sensitivity of DGM`s results to research design choices. We use the consensus earnings forecasts and earnings of the previous year as our proxy for targets earnings. Also, we define ETRQ4 - ETRQ1∼Q3 as the change in annual ETR from the accumulated three quarters(from first to third quarter) to fourth quarter and use this as our measure tax expense management. In our hypothesis, we expect ETRQ4 - ETRQ1∼Q3 to be negatively related to how much the firm would have missed the consensus forecast(or targets earnings). We extend DGM (2004) by exploring a plausible additional explanation for third-to-fourth-quarter decreases in ETRs that they acknowledge as a limitation of their study. DGM (2004) use analysts` consensus forecast as targets earnings and current annual pre-tax earnings as unmanaged earnings. But we use analysts` consensus forecast and previous annual earnings as targets earnings and current annual pre-tax earnings and first∼third-quarter earnings as unmanaged earnings. Managers have strong incentives to meet or beat three benchmarks(to avoid losses, earnings decreases, and missing analyst expectation). DGM (2004) focus on a benchmark(to avoid missing analyst expectation), but we consider two benchmarks (to avoid missing analyst expectation and earnings decreases). We don`t consider the benchmark to avoid losses because loss firms have negative ETRs and negative ETRs don`t have economic meaning. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which greater first∼third-to-fourth-quarter ETR reductions are associated to firms that would miss their consensus earnings forecasts(or targets earnings) absent ETR changes relative to firms that would otherwise reach or exceed these income goals. We posit that firms may use from first to third-to-fourth-quarter ETR changes to reduce reported income when earnings are expected to meet or exceed analysts` forecasts. In our empirical tests, in contrast to DGM`s results when we use DGM (2004) methodology, we find no statistically significant association between analysts` consensus forecasts (a proxy for target earnings) and changes in ETRs (last chance earnings management). However, we recalculate two measures as a proxy for missed targets earnings and find the negative association between the first∼thirdto- fourth-quarter ETR changes and missing income goals absent ETR changes. Our study implies that DGM`s methodology is not proper to Korean Stock Market and DGM`s results are sensitive to research design choices. Overall, our results suggest that, for firms that would miss consensus earnings forecasts in the absence of ETR management, the first∼third-to-fourth-quarter ETR changes are associated with greater reductions in ETRs between the first∼ third and fourth quarters. We also find consistent support for the DGM (2004) argument that firms use ETR as a last-chance earnings management technique, having controlled for firms` manipulation of other accounts. These results are robust to the inclusion of other common earnings management variables, including total accruals and deferred taxes. Our research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide information to investors and policy makers about the extent to which reported tax positions are consistent with tax planning and earnings management by investigating whether income tax expense is commonly used to meet or beat earnings targets. Second, consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999), we contribute to earnings management research by focusing on specific accruals, which improves the likelihood of discerning between earnings management and effective tax planning as the reason for decreases in ETRs. Like DGM`s assertion by studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, we think that our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings. Finally by improving DGM`s measure we find that the first∼ third-to-fourth-quarter ETR changes are negatively related to income goals absent ETR changes.

경영자 이익예측과 4분기의 이익조정

고대영 ( Dae Young Ko ),안미강 ( Mi Gang Ahn ),양동재 ( Dong Jae Yang ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계저널 Vol.22 No.3

This paper examines the relationship between management earnings forecast and earnings management in the fourth quarter. We identify that firms with earnings forecast disclosure tend to increase or decrease the fourth quarter earnings for meeting their earnings forecast. When a firm faces poor performance during the first three quarters, it has incentives for inflating fourth-quarter earnings at a target level. We hypothesize that a firm performing poorly in the first three quarters may attempt to increase earnings of the fourth quarter to achieve a desired annual earnings target, while a firm performing well in the first three quarters may attempt to decrease earnings of the fourth quarter to reserve earnings for the future. To test the hypothesis, The sample consists of 2,592 firm-fourth quarters with nonbanking firms and December fiscal year traded over Korea Stock Exchange(KSE) during 2003∼2008. We classify sample firms into two groups based on management earnings forecast. the sample firms are divided on the basis of whether they voluntarily disclose earnings forecast. The firms with earnings forecast disclosure are further classified into two groups. One group is that earnings in the first three quarters exceed management earnings forecast of the same year. the other group is not to meet management earnings forecast. Our results show that the firms with earnings forecast disclosure have higher the mean of absolute discretionary accruals than the control firms(non-disclosure) in the fourth quarter. Also, the result of regression analysis shows that the firms disclosing earnings forecast tend to increase absolute discretionary accruals. These results imply that managers with earnings forecast disclosure have an incentive to actively manage the fourth quarter earnings for their reliability. In the sample with earnings forecast, we suggest that the firms are more likely to increase the fourth quarter earnings when the difference between annual earnings forecast and earnings in the first three quarters is great. These results provide that the firms that fail to achieve earnings forecast manage earnings upward and the firms that exceed earnings forecast manage earnings downward in the fourth quarter. By using quarterly data, this paper has several advantages in detecting earnings management on management earnings forecast. Quarterly data provides a sharper focus on the forecast disclosure, which could increase the likelihood of detecting earnings management. Also, financial statements for interim quarters are often unaudited, allowing greater managerial discretion and requiring less detailed disclosure than annual financial statements. These differences provide managers with greater opportunities to manage earnings and, hence, make detection of earnings management more likely in interim quarters.

경영자 이익예측정보가 미래 이익조정 및 미래 시장기대치 달성에 미치는 영향

김경혜 ( Kyung Hye Kim ),유승원 ( Seung Weon Yoo ),최경수 ( Kyong Soo Choi ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계학연구 Vol.39 No.1

본 연구의 목적은 당기 경영자 이익예측정보의 정확성 및 편의가 차기 이익조정에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 것이다. 아울러, 본 연구는 당기의 경영자 이익예측 정확성과 편의가 차기 시장기대치 달성 가능성에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 검증한다. 본 연구는 2003년 부터 2009년 말까지 공정공시를 통해 발표된 경영자 예측정보 중 영업이익에 대한 예측값을 이용하며, 구체적인 주요 가설 및 실증결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 본 연구는 당기의 경영자 이익예측 오차 또는 낙관적인 편의로 인해 시장의 사후적인 패널티가 가해지면, 경영자는 차기이익을 상향조정하여 자신이 받았던 불이익을 완화시키고자 할 것으로 예상한다. 실증분석 결과, 당기 경영자 이익예측정보의 오차 및 낙관적 편의가 증가할수록, 차기 재량적 발생액과 차기 성과대응 재량적 발생액은 증가함을 발견하였다. 둘째, 본 연구는 당기의 경영자 이익예측 오차 및 낙관적 편의에 따른 차기 이익조정이 차기의 시장기대치 달성 가능성을 높이는 방향으로 이루어지고 있음을 예상한다. 실증분석 결과, 당기경영자 이익예측정보의 정확성이 낮거나 낙관적인 편의가 증가할수록, 차기 이익에 대한 시장기대치를 달성할 가능성은 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 당기 경영자 이익예측정보의 오차 및 편의가 차기 이익조정에 미치는 영향을 분석함으로써, 경영자의 자발적 공시에 대한 시장의 사후적인 제재조치가 미래의 강제공시에 대한 경영자의 의사결정에도 중요한 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 시사점을 제공한다. 특히, 기존 연구는 이러한 사후조치가 향후 경영자 이익예측정보의 질을 효과적으로 높일 수 있는지에 초점을 맞추고 있는 반면, 본 연구는 강제공시 사항인 미래 이익의 질에 미치는 영향을 검토하여 그 차별적 공헌점이 있다. 또한, 당기의 경영자 이익예측 오차 및 낙관적 편의가 차기 이익조정을 야기한다는 사실은 경영자 이익예측정보에 대한 시장의 사후조치가 향후 경영자 이익예측정보의 질적 수준을 향상시키는데 제한적일 수 있다는 간접적인 증거를 제공한다. 구체적으로, 기업의 보고이익과 이익예측치가 함께 조정될 가능성이 높다는 선행연구의 결과에 기반할 때, 당기의 예측 오차와 낙관적 편의에 따른 시장의 사후적인 패널티가 차기 이익조정을 유발할 수 있다는 본 연구의 결과는, 차기의 경영자 이익예측정보 또한 왜곡될 수 있다는 사실을 간접적으로 제시하고 있다. In sum, the objective of this paper is two-fold. First, in this paper, we empirically examine the effect of current management earnings forecast accuracy and bias on next year`s earnings management. Second, we empirically investigate how the current management earnings forecasts accuracy and bias influence the probability of meeting or beating market expectation of following year. In order to properly perform the analysis, we hand collect management earnings forecasts for fiscal years 2003-2009 from Financial Supervisory Service`s Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART). In terms of management earnings forecasts, we focus on the operating earnings mamagement forecasts based on the number of prior literatures. The samples in order to properly examine the hypothesis 1 and 2 turned out to be 491 firm-years and the samples for the purpose of examining hypothesis 3 and 4 are 330 firm-years. Using these samples, our specific results are given as follows. First, we find that as the error or optimistic bias of current management earnings forecast increase discretionary accruals and performance matched discretionary accruals in the next year increase. In this paper, based on the prior studies, we expect that managers have incentives to manage next year`s earnings upward, when market penalties are given for the current inaccurate/optimistically biased management earnings forecast. Therefore, the systematic associations between the accuracy/optimistic bias of current management earnings forecast and next year`s earnings management are consistent with our expectations. Second, as the current management earnings forecast is less accurate or shows more optimistic bias, the probability of meeting or beating market earnings expectation of the following year becomes higher. These results indicate that manager`s income- increasing earnings management of next year which is due to current management earnings forecast error/optimistic bias, is being conducted to increase the probability of meeting or beating market earnings expectation of following year. That is, manager`s future earnings management induced by management earnings forecast error/optimistic bias is being used to enhance the probability of meeting or beating future market earnings expectation. Third, in our robustness analysis, we find that as the error or optimistic bias of current management earnings forecast increase accruals quality in the next year decreases. This result provides more insight in relation to the results of hypothesis 1 and 2. Also we show that the results of hypothesis 3 and 4 do not change even if we change the measurement of market expectation in the next year. This finding corroborates that our result is not driven by specific proxy of market expectation. Lastly, various results we mentioned above are consistent when we control the endogeneity problems. Specifically, we utilize Heckman`s two-stage regression analysis in order to lessen endogeneity issues. The result show that our results are robust after we control the endogeneity effects. This paper, by demonstrating the significant effects of current management earnings forecast accuracy or bias on next year`s earnings management, provides a new insight about the market punishment for the inaccurate or biased management earnings forecast might also influence the manager`s disclosure behavior related to future mandatory disclosure. Especially, the fact that prior researches mainly focus on the evidence whether market penalties for the current management earings forecast improve the future management earnings forecast, stresses our distinct contribution. Second, the relation between the current management earnings forecast errors/ optimistic bias and the next year`s earnings management provides an indirect evidence that the market punishment for the inaccurate or biased management earnings forecast may be limited in improving the quality of future management earnings forecast. More specifically, this is because the fact that market punishment to current management earnings forecast error and optimistic bias induces managers to manage earnings upward implies that next year`s management earnings forecast could also be distorted, given that firm`s reported earings and earnings forecast might be managed concurrently. Third, outside investors might understand better with respect to the information content in next year earnings when they incorporate the fact that current forecast error and optimistic bias affects earnings management of following year. Fourth, establishing the fact that next`s years earnings management due to current manager`s forecast error and optimistic bias increases the probability of meeting or beating market expectation of the next year, market participants may better understand regarding the probability of meeting or beating market expectation. Lastly, notwithstanding the a number of contributions we mentioned above, our sample is confined to firms which disclose the management earnings forecasts. Therefore, our sample size is relatively small in order to generalize the results. Specially, the unsignificant results regarding pessimistic bias may be due to smaller sample size.