강행규범과 국가면제

이성덕(Seong Deog Yi) 중앙법학회 2012 中央法學 Vol.14 No.4

In international law, jus cogens is accepted as rules which override other rules of international law, be they conventional or customary. In this respect, it is problematic whether jus cogens also override the rule of State immunity. As it were, the question is if it is possible to grant State immunity to actions brought against a foreign State before a national court in case where the foreign State violated jus cogens. As to this question, the Italian Corte di Cassazione, Greek Areios Pagos and English House of Lords respectively took different positions. The English court took the view that, on the exception to the State immunity, the English State Immunity Act provides so cleary that the English court whose principal duty is to apply the Act of Parliament should be bound by the terms of the Act. Thus, the English court ruled that State Immunity Act does not have a provision to exclude granting State immunity in case where a foreign State violated jus cogens. And also, the English court decided that there is no conflict between jus cogens and the rule of State immunity based on the assumption that the first is in nature substantial, the second procedural. However, the Greek court decided that an act which violates jus cogens is international crime which cannot benefit from State immunity. The Greek court furthermore said that a foreign State which violated jus cogens waived the benefit of State immunity tacitly. Finally, the Italian court straightforwardly ruled that as jus cogens overrides the rule of State immunity, it is not allowed to grant State immunity to a foreign State which violates jus cogens. In spite of these diverse views on the content of State immunity, ICJ, in the case which was raised by Germany against Italy, endorsed the English view. I presume that the view of ICJ is reflecting the formal legal positivism according to which jus cogens and the rule of State immunity cannot conflict each other, because the one is substantial and the other procedural. But, I would like to argue that if the international community accepts jus cogens, then it is requested to grant full effect to jus cogens, which means that if the rule of State immunity acts as a bar to realize the value which is enshrined in jus cogens, then, the rule of State immunity yield to jus cogens.

강행규범의 보편성

김민서 국민대학교 법학연구소 2022 법학논총 Vol.34 No.3

In this paper, there are two fundamentally raised issues regarding jus cogens of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (the 1969 Convention). One is whether jus cogens of Article 53 and (new) jus cogens of Article 64 are different, and the other is whether jus cogens, and jus cogens ‘of general international law’ are the same. Personally, I have not yet seen Korean or foreign references dealing with these issues. However, this is considered to be an important issue related to the universality of jus cogens, which may affect the ICJ's interpretation and application of jus cogens in the future. These two issues are divided into four: 1) the relationship between Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Convention, 2) jus cogens ‘of 'general international law' and the persistent objector rule, 3) jus cogens ‘of general international law' and the requirements for establishment of jus cogens, 4) the effects of jus cogens and its scope of application. And the conclusions on them are as follows. First, jus cogens of Article 53 of the 1969 Convention and (new) jus cogens of Article 64 are not different. One and the same jus cogens can be both a cause for invalidation for a treaty and a cause for termination of another. In other words, jus cogens acts as a cause for termination of the treaty for the preceding treaty (the treaty before the establishment of some jus cogens) and as a ground for invalidation of the subsequent treaty. This is due to the universality of jus cogens and is supported by Article 71 of the 1969 Convention. Secondly, jus cogens, and jus cogens ‘of general international law’ stipulated in the 1969 Convention are different. However, it cannot be accepted that the exception of the persistent objector rule is applied to jus cogens ‘of general international law’ for this reason. This is because it fundamentally denies the universality of jus cogens that do not allow any deviation. Thirdly, jus cogens ‘of general international law’ is related to the requirements for the establishment of jus cogens. jus cogens is not a new source of international law different from the existing ones of international law, and can ultimately be treated as a customary international law. In this way, customary international law will be divided into customary international law, which has been given the status of jus cogens, and other customary international law. In addition, although jus cogens is universal international law, it can be said that they are established through the process of general international law. In other words, jus cogens ‘of general international law’ can be interpreted as the basis for the norms that are ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole’, which is a prerequisite for the establishment of jus cogens. Fourthly, today theories and precedents have broadly recognized jus cogens. However, it remains to be seen whether the ICJ will broadly recognize the scope of application of jus cogens in practice. This is because the effect of jus cogens stipulated in Article 71 of the 1969 Convention is so strong that it can greatly affect the existing treaty relationship. 이 논문에서 1969년 조약법에 관한 비엔나협약(69년 협약)의 강행규범에대해 근본적으로 제기하는 문제는 두 가지이다. 하나는 제53조의 강행규범과 제64조의 (신)강행규범이 다른가 하는 것이고 다른 하나는 강행규범과일반국제법의 강행규범이 다른가 하는 문제이다. 개인적으로 아직까지 이문제들을 다룬 국내외의 문헌을 본 적은 없다. 그러나 이는 장차 ICJ가 강행규범을 해석하고 적용하는데 영향을 줄 수 있는 강행규범의 보편성과관련된 중요한 문제라고 판단된다. 여기서는 두 가지 문제를 1) 69년 협약 제53조와 제64조의 관계, 2) ‘일반국제법의’ 강행규범과 완강한 반대국가, 3) ‘일반국제법의’ 강행규범과성립요건, 4) 강행규범의 효과와 적용범위라는 네 가지 쟁점으로 나누어다루면서 다음과 같이 결론지었다. 첫째 69년 협약 제53조의 강행규범과 제64조의 (신)강행규범은 다른 것이 아니다. 강행규범은 조약의 무효사유이면서 동시에 종료사유이다. 즉강행규범은 전조약(해당 강행규범이 확립되기 이전의 조약)에 대해서는조약의 종료사유로 작용하고 후조약에 대해서는 조약의 무효사유로 작용한다. 이는 강행규범의 보편성에 기인하며 69년 협약 제71조를 통해 뒷받침된다. 둘째 강행규범과 69년 협약에서 규정한 일반국제법의 강행규범은 다르다. 그러나 이를 이유로 일반국제법의 강행규범에도 완강한 반대국가의 예외가 적용된다는 주장은 받아들일 수 없다. 이는 이탈이 허용되지 않는 강행규범의 보편성을 근본적으로 부정하기 때문이다. 셋째 일반국제법의 강행규범은 강행규범의 성립요건과 연결된다. 이는강행규범이 기존의 국제법의 연원과 다른 전혀 새로운 연원이 아니며 궁극적으로 국제관습법의 한 형태로 해석하는 근거가 될 수 있다. 이렇게 되면 국제관습법은 강행규범의 지위가 인정되는 국제관습법과 그 밖의 국제관습법으로 나누어진다. 또한 강행규범은 보편국제법이지만 일반국제법의과정을 통해 성립된다고 할 수 있다. 즉 ‘일반국제법의’ 강행규범은 강행규범의 성립요건인 ‘전체로서의 국제공동사회가 수락하며 또한 인정하는’ 규범의 근거로 해석할 수 있다. 넷째 오늘날 학설과 판례는 확장적으로 강행규범을 인정한다. 그러나 실제에서 ICJ가 강행규범의 적용범위를 폭넓게 인정할지는 지켜볼 문제이다. 실정법적 측면에서 69년 협약 제71조에 규정한 강행규범의 효과가 너무강력하기 때문이다.

국가면제 인정 여부에 관한 상반된 서울중앙지방법원 판결에 대한 비판적 평가

이성덕 중앙대학교 법학연구원 2023 法學論文集 Vol.47 No.3

In two cases of compensation for damages due to illegal acts filed by comfort women victims against Japan, each bench of a court is making different judgments. While one bench reached a decision on the merit, without allowing the application of State immunity and acknowledging the court's jurisdiction, the other bench ruled, on the premise that international customary law on State immunity still grants State immunity even for acts that violate jus cogens norms, that it cannot exercise jurisdiction. It seems that each country's position on whether to recognize State immunity for such violations of jus cogens norms is different. Of course, the majority of countries and international courts such as the ICJ and the European Court of Human Rights recognize that the current international customary law on State immunity also recognizes State immunity for acts that violate jus cogens norms, and that, since there is no situation of conflict of norms between the superior norm, jus cogens and the lower norm, say, State immunity, it is said that the current international customary law on State immunity should be respected. On the other hand, Supreme Courts of Italy, Greece, Brazil, and a lower court’s bench in Korea deny State immunity for violations of jus cogens norms on somewhat different grounds. It seems that there are cases where the issue is resolved through a conflict of norms, there are cases where the issue is attempted to be resolved within the framework of State immunity norms, and there are also cases where the issue is resolved based on the protection of national Constitutional values. How do we understand these two conflicting positions? In particular, the question is whether to view the position of Italy and others as a violation of the current international customary law on State immunity or as the beginning of a new practice that signals a change in international customary law on State immunity. I think it is necessary to make a judgment in light of the process in which the concept of national sovereignty is changing in today's international society. Although it is questionable whether we have fully reached that point, the clock is moving in a direction where national sovereignty is weakening and the protection of human rights is becoming a more important value in the international community. If so, it is assumed that the attitude of the international community will be established in the direction of excluding State immunity for acts that violate jus cogens. Methods to accommodate such changes include a functional solution that no longer considers the nature of the act violating jus cogens as a sovereign act, a normative solution that resolves the issue by changing the content of international customary law on State immunity, and a method of resolving the issue by acknowledging the normative hierarchy of jus cogens and State immunity.

저작권 제한규정의 강행・임의규정성에 관한 소고

이일호 한국저작권위원회 2019 계간 저작권 Vol.32 No.4

This paper aims at clarifying the nature of copyright limitations/exceptions either as jus cogens or as jus dispositivum. Although copyright law is often understood as a lex specialis in relationship to the civil code, the academic discussion on its specificity is still infrequent, and has been undertaken only incidentally. Likewise, research on the jus cogens and/or jus dispositivum character of copyright limitations has been made to some extent, but overlooked among many academics and practitioners. As a consequence, they are not being developed based on substantially theoretical grounds, especially by getting the understanding of those legal concepts well established in civil law involved in copyright world. In light of this consciousness concerning this problematic, this paper will start from the question how jus cogens and jus dispositivum are understood in the general sense of law, and examine in sequence how the distinction between both terms is being made in civil law. We will then also look at how this distinction could and should affect copyright law, and try to find the right position of jus cogens/dispositivum in the context of copyright law. Furthermore, it will investigate, with a depth, how and to what extent these discussions have been and can be reflected in the development of this area. Based on the reached findings, this paper will analyze the individual positions among copyright scholars regarding the two legal concepts and their role in understanding the copyright limitations and the exhaustion of copyright. When reviewing the trends derived from the analysis, it is able to evaluate them on the basis of how they are theoretically well reasoned. Copyright law is neither far from civil law, nor completely bound up by the principles and theories rooted in civil law. It is necessary to clarify, by means of developing the firm and stable theories, how (in)dependent the copyright law should be. 이 논문은 저작권법상 제한규정이 가지는 강행・임의규정성을 논의하기 위한 것이다. 흔히 저작권법을 민법에 대한 특별법으로 이해하고 있으나, ‘얼마나’ 특별한 특별법인지에 관한 연구는 단편적으로만 이루어지고 있다. 저작권 제한규정의 강행・임의규정성에 관한 연구 역시 다소 발견되기는 하지만, 구체적인 이론적 근거, 특히 민법에서의 강행・임의규정에 대한 이해를 바탕으로 전개되지 않고 있는 것이 현실이다. 본 논문은 이러한 문제의식에 착안하여 강행・임의규정이 법학 일반에서 어떻게 이해되는지에서 출발하여, 민법에서의 강행・임의규정의 구별이 어떻게 전개되고 있는지 살펴보도록 하겠다. 이와 같은 구별이 저작권법에 어떠한 영향을 미치고, 또 저작권법만이 가진 특징은 없는지에 대해 고찰하도록 할 것이다. 특히 이러한 논의가 저작권 제한규정과 배포권에 대해 인정되는 권리소진에 어떠한 형태로 반영되어 왔고, 또 반영될 수 있는지에 대해서도 생각해보도록 하겠다. 이러한 분석을 토대로, 우리 학계가 전개해온 저작권 제한규정의 강행・임의규정성 논의에 대해 보고, 판례의 태도를 검토한다. 이들로부터 어떠한 경향성이 도출될 수 있는지 살피는 한편, 기존의 일반적 논의를 지표로 삼아 비교 및 평가를 시도해볼 것이다. 저작권법은 민법과 동떨어진 영역은 아니지만, 그렇다고 민법의 원칙과 이론에 완전히 구속되는 영역도 아니다. 다만, 독립성을 주장하더라도, 또는 종속성을 주장하더라도 그 근거와 합리성을 명확하게 제시할 필요가 있다.

국제법상 대세적 의무에 관한 연구

박병도 ( Park Byung-do ) 건국대학교 법학연구소 2018 一鑑法學 Vol.0 No.40

국제법에서 대세적 의무는 ‘국제공동체 전체에 대한 국가의 의무’로서, 바로 그 내용의 중요성으로 인하여, 그 이행에 모든 국가가 법적 이익을 갖는 의무를 가리킨다. ‘모두에 대하여’(toward all)라는 의미로 번역되는 라틴어 erga omnes는 “각국이 국제공동체 전체에 대하여 부담하는 의무”를 언급할 때 사용된다. ICJ가 1970년 Barcelona Traction Co.사건에서 대세적 의무라는 표현을 공식적으로 처음 사용한 이후 많은 사례들에서 반복적으로 인용되었다. 대세적 의무 개념의 등장은 국제법 규범체계의 구조 변화 및 발전 방향과 깊은 관련이 있다. 그 동안 지배적이었던 수평적이고 양자적인 국제관계가 다자주의로 옷을 갈아 있고 있다는 점을 보여주는 것이다. 1970년 Barcelona Traction Co.사건 이후 대세적 의무는 실제로 국제법 규범체계의 변화의 원천이 되고 있다. 그럼에도 아직도 그 개념, 기능, 특징 그리고 국제법체계에 미치는 법적 의미 등에 대해서는 여전히 복잡한 논쟁이 진행되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 여전히 모호성이 존재하는 대세적 의무 개념에 대해, 특성과 기능을 고려한 다양한 정의(定義)를 살펴보고, 대세적 의무와 관련한 국제판례들을 검토하고자 한다. 또한 대세적 의무의 이행 문제와 국가책임법과의 관계를 살펴보고자 한다. 그리고 대세적 의무의 발전 방향을 전망해 보고자 한다. In international law, the concept of obligations erga omnes means “the obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole.” In its dictum on the Barcelona Traction case(Belgium v. Spain)(1970), the concept of obligations erga omnes in international law was first articulated by ICJ and has been reiterated on numerous cases. The obligations erga omnes are obligations towards the international community as a whole, with the consequence that each and every member of the international community has a “legal interest” in their observance and consequently a legal entitlement to demand respect for such obligations. According to the judgement in the Barcelona Traction Co. case, all states have legal interests in the protection of the rights involved. This legal interest in fulfillment of the obligations to the international community departs from bilateralism that traditionally characterizes obligations in international law. The judgement in the Barcelona Traction Co. case is stated in regard to obligations erga omnes in the line of reasoning related to jus standi, and this raises the issue of the existence of actio popularis in international law. And the concept of obligations erga omnes closely related to jus cogens. The Barcelona Traction Co. case do not give bases for a pronouncement as the one that the ICJ made on the obligations erga omnes and the impact it produced. The obligations erga omnes concern the enforcement of jus cogens. All jus cogens create obligations erga omnes, but not all obligations erga omnes derive from jus cogens. The obligations erga omnes are virtually coextensive with jus cogens. The ICJ, in its 2012 judgment in the Belgium v. Senegal case, innovated obligations erga omnes partes in much more comprehension than the old meaning. Now and at the future, the new approach of ICJ would be referred and expanded in International law and international human rights law. This article will try to shed some light on obligation erga omnes concept by analysing its meaning in international law, starting from its appearance, consequent development and its position at the present time. In this paper, I examine various definition considering characteristics and functions, and examine the international precedents related to the obligations erga omnes concept. I also analyses the relationship between the implementation of the obligations erga omnes and the State responsibility law. and I want to view the development of the obligations erga omnes.

Communis Opinio and Jus Cogens: A Critical Review on Pro-Torture Law and Policy Argument

Gary Lilienthal,Nehaluddin Ahmad 이준국제법연구원 2017 Journal of East Asia and International Law Vol.10 No.2

The prohibition on torture has attained status as a peremptory norm of general international law. This gives rise to the obligation erga omnes to take action against those who torture. Despite this, most world states routinely conduct torture. Is there really a worldwide prohibition of torture? Argument is framed to demonstrate that the concept of a jus cogens peremptory norm, flowing erga omnes to all nations, is in practice unattainable, preventing any absolute and universal international law prohibition against torture. States cannot declare someone an enemy of all mankind, or bind all other states to that view. Jus cogens is a text writers’ municipal communis opinio, but held administratively to be based in customary international law. Any prohibition against torture appears to remain in municipal customary law form, breaches of which are proved as arguments based on fact, eliminating operation of any absolute peremptory governing norm.

2019년 제71차 회기 유엔 국제법위원회 작업현황과 제74차 유엔총회 제6위원회 논의 결과

박기갑(Park, Ki-Gab) 국제법평론회 2020 국제법평론 Vol.0 No.55

The International Law Commission (ILC or Commission) at its 71st session on 2019 did various works as follows. With regard to the topic “Crimes against humanity”, the Commission adopted, on the second reading, the entire set of draft articles on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, comprising a draft preamble, 15 draft articles and a draft annex, together with commentaries thereto. The Commission recommended to the General Assembly the elaboration of a convention on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity by the General Assembly or by an international conference of plenipotentiaries on the basis of the draft articles. With respect to the topic “Peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)”, the Commission adopted, on the first reading, 23 draft conclusions and a draft annex, together with commentaries thereto. With respect to the topic “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts”, the Commission adopted, on first reading, 28 draft principles, together with commentaries thereto. Governments, international organizations and others relevant entities are requested to submit comments and observations by 1 December 2020. The Commission continued to work on the topics on “Succession of States in respect of State responsibility” and “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction”. As a new topic, the Commission started its consideration on “General principles of law” and “Sea-level rise in relation to international law”. The latter will be discussed by the Study Group chaired by five members. The author considers it is important to pay more attention to the following five points in light of the reactions to the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which reviewed the work of the ILC. First, when and how will the 2nd reading draft articles on “Crimes against humanity” be adopted as an international convention? Secondly, the first reading draft on “Peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)” received more attention from the Member States than the first reading draft on “Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts”. Attention should be paid to its draft conclusion 16, which deals with the legal effects of the decision adopted by the United Nations Security Council which conflicts with jus cogens. Thirdly, attention should be also paid to the topics on “Protection of the atmosphere” and “Provisional application of the treaties” of which the 2nd reading drafts will be adopted in 2020. Fourth, there was a lot of disagreement between Member States regarding the two topics presented as a long-term work program to the United Nations General Assembly this year. The Korean government has also expressed its own position on these two topics. Fifth and lastly, we should be aware that the concerns of Member States regarding the change of working methods of the ILC have been expressed.

우크라이나 전쟁에서 드러난 국제질서와 규범의 대립: 지배의 윤리에서 초월적 규범으로

이유철(Yoochul Lee) 한국국제정치학회 2022 國際政治論叢 Vol.62 No.4

본고의 목적은 국제정치 현실과 국제법, 권력과 규범 간의 긴장을 우크라이나 전쟁을 중심으로 살펴보았다. 특히, 부도덕(im-moral), 비도덕(non-moral), 도덕적으로 대별 되는 전쟁이 갖는 한계를 짚으며, “지배의 윤리”를 고찰해 보았다. 우크라이나 전쟁의 사례의 규범적 검토를 위해 정의전쟁이론, 즉 평화주의, 현실주의와 정의론의 논쟁을 특히, 국제법과 규범을 중심으로 살펴보았는데, 이는 근대주권국가체제의 등장이 전쟁의 규범적 제도화, 즉 국제법 형성에 영향을 미쳤기 때문이다. 주로 우크라이나 전쟁 사례를 위해 검토한 것들은 강행규범으로서 유엔헌장 제 2조 4항, 7항이 대변하는 불가침 원칙과 또다른 대세적 의무로서의 제 1조 2항이 정하는 자결권 원칙에 주목해 보았다. 앞선 분석적 틀은 우크라이나 전쟁에서 나타나는 다양한 형태의 모순을 드러낸다. 권력에 의해 집행되고 해석되는 ‘위계적 국제법(hierarchical international law)‘의 기능과 그 원칙들의 차별적 적용은 도덕적 규범을 통해 폭력의 죄책감을 해방시키는 도구로서의 제도화된 규범을 의미할 뿐이다. 그렇다고 인간의 자연스러운 행위로서의 비도덕적 전쟁을 상정하고, 이 선악이라는 비극의 굴레를 멈추는 것이 합리적인가? 본고는 대안적 접근으로 단초를 무도덕주의(Immoralismus)에서 찾는다. 그리고 이를 통해 지배의 윤리를 해체함으로써 불안정한 대전환 시대에 상정되어야 할 규범은 어떤 형태여야 하는지, 그리고 이를 위한 자유와 공공성의 정치를 시론적 논의의 형태로 전개해 보았다. This article aims to derive a different interpretation of the Ukranian war, examining the tension between power, and norms. It considers the ethics of domination, pointing out the limitations of war conceived as im-moral, non-moral, and moral, and attempt to re-approach to the war based on Immoralismus. For a normative review of the case of the Ukrainian war, this article focuses on j ust war theory, that i s, the debate on pacifism, realism, and j ustice, not focusing on the international relations theories. In particular, international law and norms are mainly considered as the tool of this article, because the emergence of the modern sovereign state system influenced the normative institutionalization of war, i.e., the formation of international law. Primarily reviewed for the war in Ukraine is jus cogens. This study sheds light on the principle of non-aggression in Article 2 (4) and (7) of the UN Charter and the principle of self-determination, another erga omnes by Article 1(2). The previous analytical framework reveals various forms of contradiction in the Ukrainian war. The function of ‘hierarchical international law’ enforced and interpreted by power and the discriminatory application of its principles only signify an institutionalized norm as a tool to liberate the guilt of violence through moral norms for the powerful states. Nevertheless, violence and war cannot be posited as a natural act of human beings and non-morality to stop the war. This article attempts to show the possibility to avoid this dilemma through Immoralismus as an alternative, By this alternative imagination to dismantle the ethics of power, this study attempts to develop how norms should be constituted in the era of unstable transition such as liberation and public politics and post-colonialism.

UN 안전보장이사회 결의와 국제법상의 강행규범

박정원(Park, Jungwon) 한양법학회 2009 漢陽法學 Vol.26 No.-

This paper is primarily concerned with possibility of normative conflicts between the United Nations Security Council resolutions and the peremptory norm of international law, by using the example of political transition process in Iraq. The critical problem of this paper is to establish the extent to which the relevant Security Council resolutions may be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the political power provided to the Security Council under the United Nations Charter. This paper argues that the Security Council resolutions may enjoy political legitimacy to the extent that they are consistent with general principles of international law, including the peremptory norm of international law, Jus Cogens. The transition process in Iraq reflected in Resolution 1546 (2004) was problematic by reference to the right of the Iraqi people to self-determination, creating a normative conflict between the Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter Ⅶ and international peremptory norm of self-determination. Rejecting the views that problematic resolution 1546 (2004) should be regarded as void or that they should command absolute deference, this writer suggests a norm-harmonizing interpretation of the relevant Security Council resolutions in such a manner as to be rendered consistent with Jus Cogens.

외국을 피고로 한 민사재판에서 관할권 면제와 국제법상 강행규범 문제 : 위안부 피해자 손해배상청구 사건에 대한 시사점

주진열(Jin-yul JU) 서울국제법연구원 2019 서울국제법연구 Vol.26 No.2

최근 2019년 5월 서울중앙지방법원은 2016년 일본국을 상대로 제기된 위안부 피해 손해배상청구 사건배상에서 공시송달 방식으로 사건 절차를 개시하고 같은 해 11월 첫 변론을 열었다. 그런데 이 사건에서는 피고가 일본이라는 국가이므로 원고들의 피해 사실 존부와 일본의 배상책임 인정 여부 등에 관한 본안 판단에 앞서, 관할권면제 여부가 선결문제로서 판단되어야 한다. 한국과 일본은 관할권면제에 관한 조약을 체결한 적이 없으므로, 이 사건에서 관할권면제 여부는 국제관습법에 따라 판단해야 한다. 첫 변론에서 원고들이 주장한 ‘구 일본제국에 의한 강제동원’은 상거래 행위로 볼 여지가 없는 권력행위이므로, 국제관습법과 종전 대법원 판례에 의하면 일본에 대한 관할권면제가 인정될 수밖에 없다. 이 사건에서 원고들 소송대리인은 강제동원이 있었다는 전제에서 강제동원은 강행규범에 위반되거나 인도에 반하는 범죄에 해당된다는 등의 이유로 관할권면제가 부인되어야 한다고 주장한 것으로 보인다. 그러나 2012년 국제사법재판소가 독일ㆍ이탈리아 관할권면제 판결에서 확인한 것처럼 국제관습법상 관할권면제는 강행규범 저촉이나 국제범죄 해당 여부를 불문하고 인정되어야 하므로, 이 사건에서 한국 법원이 어떤 이유로든 관할권면제를 부인하면 국제법 위반을 피할 수 없게 된다. 본고는 외국을 피고로 한 손해배상청구 사건에서 문제된 권력행위가 비엔나협약의 강행규범 저촉 또는 국제범죄에 해당되는 경우 관할권면제가 부인되어야 한다는 주장이 타당한지를 살펴보고, 위안부 배상 사건에서 관할권면제가 인정 또는 부인될 경우 원고들의 청구권 문제는 어떤 방식으로 해결될 수 있는지를 검토하였다. This article addressed the problems of jurisdictional immunity and international jus cogens and the case concerning tort claims by the comfort women victims(CWVs) during World War II before the Korean courts. According to customary international law, jurisdictional immunity has nothing to do with jus cogens. Moreover, the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Agreement clearly stipulates: “claims” of Korean nationals against Japanese government and its nationals are completely and finally settled. There is no doubt that the 1965 Agreement is a lump-sum settlement agreement. Accordingly it is the Korean government that bears the responsibility to compensate Korean CWVs’ claims. Indeed, the Korean government has compensated CWVs through special domestic legislations. In addition, in 2015, the Korean government and the Japanese government agreed that CWVs’ individual claims will be finally and completely settled. In order to implement the 2015 agreement, the Japanese government transferred one hundred million yen to the Korean Government. The courts should carefully consider all of these factors in deciding the issue of jurisdictional immunity.