법적판단에 있어 인지적 오류와 극복방안

이종엽 ( Lee Jong Youp ) 사법정책연구원 2020 연구보고서 Vol.2020 No.6

Trials require that judges render judgments under uncertainty because they are asked to reconstruct historical facts using often ambiguous evidence. A study on judgment and decision making conducted by Kahneman et al. in the early 1970s found that humans commit systematic errors depending on heuristics under such uncertainty. Judges, as experts in legal judgments, have embodied schema through legal training and experience, but empirical research has shown that they are vulnerable to cognitive errors due to heuristics and human biases. Therefore, it is critical for judges to adopt strategies to reduce cognitive bias. To this end, it is desirable for judges to have a bottom-up strategy that examines intuitive and deliberate judgments carefully and closely, as well as the evidence, rather than a hypothetical top-down strategy. Furthermore, multiple experiments suggest that, contrary to popular belief, actuarial judgments yield better results than holistic judgments. Judges are affected by various heuristics and cognitive errors, such as framing, loss aversion, probability judgment, illusory correlation, base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, representative heuristic, hindsight bias, anchoring, attribution error, inverse fallacy, availability heuristic, confirmation bias, overconfidence, story model, and egocentric bias, at each stage of case. These stages include: (1) understanding of the facts and recognition of the issues; (2) judgment of the relevance and validity of evidence; (3) judgment of the defendant’s responsibility; (4) information process and judgment; and (5) attempts to resolve a dispute with a settlement. Such judgment errors are normally confirmed by identifying differences between laws of logic and normative standards for probability theory, etc. In particular, in sensitivity to probability theory, specifically, misunderstanding the difference between base rate neglect and false intuition about randomness may directly lead to the false evaluation of evidence. Also, because a trial has the underlying binary nature of plaintiff-defendant, acceptance- rejection, and guilt-innocence, trials are subject to representative heuristics that judge a category according to the similarity or representativeness of the object being judged. Numerical information, such as a claim amount or the demand of a sentence suggested during a trial, also serves as an anchoring for the judgments of judges. This is a result caused by biased access to information that matches the anchor and, therefore, judges try to adjust from the anchor to a reasonable target value, but this adjustment is always insufficient. An orderly, logical argument that can be easily understood in a trial appears plausible depending on the availability heuristic, which might be irrelevant to the validity of the evidence. Courts are particularly vulnerable to hindsight bias because they ordinarily determine responsibility for incidents after the fact. Since the hindsight bias reflects a human's intrinsic cognitive disposition, the bias can be minimized by an objective behavioral criteria as a reference point of judgment rather than intuitive judgment based on the past point of view. In a criminal judgment, the probability that the accused is guilty when there is evidence of guilt and the probability that such evidence exists on the premise that the accused is guilty are easily confused, which is the result of the influence of inverse fallacy. However, since there are so many examples where the probability values of P(H|D) and P(D|H) are extremely different, this not only yields a representational probabilistic error, but also has a great impact on the quality of actual judgment. The confirmation bias refers to the tendency to selectively seek only evidence corroborating the hypothesis rather than disproving it. The confirmation bias therefore makes judges treat contradictory evidence as an exception rather than as a question of the accuracy of the hypothesis and exclude contradictory evidence from the explanation or evaluate discriminatorily by applying rigorous examination to evidence that contradicts the hypothesis. Debiasing from such cognitive error is crucial to restoring confidence in trials. However, many empirical studies show that the recognition or warning of the possibility of cognitive bias or the cognitive effort to avoid bias does not reduce errors. It is important not to overlook the importance of debiasing because the motivation for accurate judgment or the recognition of Heuristics and Biases enable judges to know when heuristics shouldn't be used, and education and training about debiasing makes it possible to use debiasing strategies. Among debiasing methods, important strategies that are known to be effective include the use of “think the opposite” and linear models, and the adoption of outside views. In particular, think the opposite can extend a hypothesis sample to opposite alternatives that are “unrelated” to the original hypothesis, which helps to form a more representative hypothesis. Since trials are designed to reduce bias, the adversary system, cross-examination, the principle of written indictment only, the exclusion of character evidence, the principle of ex post facto prohibition, and the recognition of limited admissibility of forensic evidence may suggest that such debiasing strategies have been institutionally accepted. It is a mandatory duty for judges to know the content of cognitive errors and make an effort to think objectively and reason deliberately to reach an accurate judgment. However, since simply knowing the content and cause of cognitive errors has limits in preventing biases, judges must adopt the correct cognitive strategies and judgment tools―an important goal for the study of legal judgment and decision making.

광고공시정보의 제시형태와 잠재적 결과에 대한 정교화성향이 금융소비자의 의사결정에 미치는 영향에 관한 실험연구

이태준(Tae Jun Lee),윤태웅(Tai Woong Yun) 한국광고홍보학회 2013 한국광고홍보학보 Vol.15 No.3

글로벌 경제위기 이후 금융산업 전반에 혼란과 어려움이 지속되면서 소비자의 금융활동과 경제생활에 나타난 여러 가지 폐단과 문제점을 해결하고자, 자유주의적 개입주의(Libertarian Paternalism)에 입각하여 각종 금융광고와 마케팅 활동에 다양한 외부의 개입(External Intervention)이 시행되고 있다. 그 일환으로 금융지식과 경험이 부족한 일반 소비자들이 금융상품과 서비스에 대한 광고정보를 보다 쉽고 편리하게 처리하고, 합리적인 의사결정을 내릴 수 있도록 금융광고에 의무적으로 공시정보(Disclosure Information)를 사용해야 한다. 본 연구에서는 금융광고에 필수적으로 사용해야 하는 공시정보의 제시형태(Presentation Format)와 잠재적 결과에 대한 정교화성향(Elaboration on Potential Outcome)의 영향에 따라 금융소비자가 어떠한 의사결정을 하는 가를 실험연구로 알아보았다. 특히 최근 소비자연구와 행동경제학 연구에서 우려해 온 소비자의 판단의 어림법(Judgmental Heuristic)이 나타나는 가를 알아보기 위해, 금융광고에 사용된 공시정보의 제시형태와 잠재적 결과에 대한 정교화성향에 따라 소비자가 의사결정을 하는 데 심사숙고형 휴리스틱(Thoughtfulness Heuristic)에 의존하는지를 살펴보았다. 본 연구는 공시정보의 메시지 특성과 소비자 개인적 특성 간의 상호작용으로 인하여 소비자가 금융상품에 대해서 착각(Illusion of Knowing)에 기인하여 판단을 내릴 수 있음을 보여 주었다. 본 연구를 통해 기존의 소비자 심리학, 행동경제학 연구에서 다루지 않았던 이론적 함의를 도출하였고, 동시에 금융광고를 통해 금융지식(Financial Literacy)과 소비자복지(Consumer Welfare)에 기여할 수 있는 정보적 개입(Informational Intervention)의 정책적, 실무적 방안을 논하였다. The current research aims to extend our knowledge of the effects of disclosure information format used in financial services advertising and individual tendency to engage in predecision outcome elaboration in consumer`s information processing and decision making. Given there is continuing concern that many financial consumers are affected by judgmental heuristic that can lead to irrational cognitive forces and suboptimal economic behavior, of important interest is to know whether consumers who engage in predecision outcome elaboration are influenced by thoughtfulness heuristic (i.e., the mere perception of elaboration creates individual evaluation and judgment of object) when exposed to mandated disclosure information in financial services advertisements. Findings show that consumers can produce anomaly in financial decision making as a function of information format and individual characteristic by indicating that even consumers with a strong tendency of elaboration on potential outcome are likely to fall prey to the effects of thoughtfulness heuristic. The authors discuss the managerial, public policy, and research implications for the design, presentation, and communication of financial products in terms of financial literacy and welfare.

일반논문 : 후쿠시마 원전사고에 대한 한국민의 위험판단 과정에 대한 분석: 휴리스틱-체계적 모형(HSM)에서 정보수신자의 관여와 능력의 역할을 중심으로

김서용 ( Seo Yong Kim ),유연재 ( Yeon Jae Ryu ) 고려대학교 정부학연구소 2014 정부학연구 Vol.20 No.3

후쿠시마 원전사고 발생과 이로 인한 지각된 위험의 증가는 한국민의 태도변화를 유도 하였으며, 이는 원자력관련 정책에 대한 새로운 변화를 요구하고 있다. 이와 같은 후쿠 시마 원전사고에 대한 위험판단의 중요성에도 불구하고 어떤 과정과 변수를 통해 위험 판단이 이루어지는지에 대한 실증분석이 부족하였다. 이와 같은 문제의식을 바탕으로 본 연구는 설득 및 태도변화에 대한 이론적 모형인 HSM(Heuristic-Systematic Model)을 이용하여 후쿠시마 원전 사고 이후 원전에 대한 한국민의 위험판단 과정(메시지 등→체 계적, 휴리스틱 처리→위험지각)에서 판단의 핵심인 수신자의 관여와 능력의 조절기능에 대한 분석을 실시하였다. 분석결과를 보면 첫째, ‘메시지 등→체계적, 휴리스틱 처리’ 과정에서 관여만이 조절효과 가 발생하였다. 생생의 효과는 관여가 높을 때, 정확성의 효과는 관여가 낮을 때 휴리스 틱 처리를 유도하였다. 둘째, ‘체계적, 휴리스틱 처리→위험지각’에서 관여와 능력이 높은 경우 체계적 처리에서 더 높게 위험을 지각하였다. Fukushima nuclear accidents changed Koreans’ attitude toward nuclear energy by increasing the risk perception about it. Moreover, such changes are bringing out the turn in energy policy. However, there were very few studies which examine the risk jugdement process. Under this context, our study analyzed the risk judgement process based on HSM (Heuristic-Systematic Information-processing Model). In particular, we focused on receiver’s involvement and ability which might intervene the risk jugdement process. The anslysis shows first, only involvement intervene the process between antecedents and systematic/heuristic process. In case of heuristic process, the vividness’s effect occurred only in case of high involvement and exactness did in low involvement. Second, between systematic/ heuristic process and risk perception, the involvement and ability increased the risk perception in case of systemic processing.

제한성 합리성과 적응적 사고

이상하 ( Sang Ha Lee ),김명식 ( Myung Sik Kim ),윤석주 ( Suk Joo Yoon ),정병훈 ( Byung Hoon Jeong ),조선희 ( Seon Hee Jo ),최홍수 ( Hong Soo Choe ) 한국과학철학회 2005 과학철학 Vol.8 No.2

Ever since the Enlightenment period, judgment, information representation, and actions were believed to be rational in the sense that they are carried out according to the universal rules and principles. It has been a belief that the standard rules that support the rationality of human judgment, reasoning, and decision-making can be restored to the principles of deductive logic or to algorithmic and probabilistic law. Such classical rationality is based on the idea of autonomy of reason that a certain system of knowledge can be established from individualistic viewpoint. The idea of classical rationality ignores the social and cultural origin on a mass level. However, since the 1970s, many inconsistencies have been observed between the rational norm of inference, judgment, decision and the real judgment of human. Especially, the study of cognitive science raised questions about the rationality of human reasoning and actions, by reporting many reasoning errors that failed to follow the logical rules. In these situations, G. Gigerenzer and his colleagues suggest the bounded rationality model. It is an effort to question the very idea of traditional rationality itself, and to figure out a new paradigm or model for rationality. They first reject many kinds of dichotomy-that is, the division of what is logical and psychological, formal and content, theoretical and practical, context of discovery and context of justification, biological and cultural-which serves as the foundation for classical rationality. After the elimination of dichotomy, they pay attention to the adaptive nature that is possessed by our human recognition. According to their study, human reasoning and actions are the result of adaptive thinking. Also, the rationality in the real world is ecological, bounded, social, and heuristic. Currently, bounded rationality is the topic for interdisciplinary study that is being established by the reflection of traditional rationality. The purpose of this essay is to examine the idea of bounded rationality, and to diagnose its potentials and limitations. For this purpose, the discussion in this essay shall develop as follows. First, we will define the idea and history of bounded rationality. Second, we will investigate the organistic relational model of judgment and information representation that the inseparability of judgment and ecological structure implies in bounded rationality. Here, a recognition model will be given based on the organistic relational model. Third, we will discover the clue to solve the problem of misconception by applying the organistic relational model of judgment and information representation to scientific education. Fourth, we will discuss the role of law, rule and norm that are applied to practical problem solving in coherence to bounded rationality. Finally, we will compare the traditional arguments of scientific rationality and the idea of bounded rationality, and indicate the limitations of bounded rationality.

정책실무자들의 판단과 의사결정 : 휴리스틱스와 바이어스(heuristics and biases)

심준섭(Jun-Seop Shim),김민종(Min-Jong Kim) 한국공공관리학회 2006 한국공공관리학보 Vol.20 No.2

정책과정은 정책행위자의 연속적인 판단과 의사결정의 과정이다. 공공정책의 파급효과를 고려할 때 정책실무자들의 판단과 의사결정에 대한 체계적이고 분석적인 연구는 매우 중요하다. 본 연구는 정책실무자의 판단과 의사결정 과정에 어떤 휴리스틱스가 활용되고 있으며 나아가 이것이 체계적인 바이어스를 유발함으로써 어느 정도 합리적 의사결정을 저해하는가를 실증적으로 분석하였다. 연구를 위해 정책형성에서 정책집행에 이르기까지 공공의사결정 과정에 실질적으로 관여하는 중앙부처의 공무원을 대상으로 판단 휴리스틱스를 분석하였다. 휴리스틱스의 측정을 위해 대표성 휴리스틱스, 가용성 휴리스틱스, 고착과 조정 휴리스틱스로 구분하고, 각각을 측정할 수 있는 판단과제인 시나리오를 제작하여 설문도구로 이용하였다. 분석 결과 대표성 휴리스틱스의 경우 사전확률의 무시, 표본크기에 대한 둔감성, 우연사건에 관한 오해, 예측가능성에 대한 착각, 평균으로의 회귀 현상 무시 등의 요인들이 정책실무자의 확률판단에 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 가용성 휴리스틱스의 경우 정책실무자들이 실제 사건의 확률보다는 사례를 떠올리기 쉬운 정도에 따라 사건의 확률을 판단하는 것으로 나타났다. 고착과 조정 휴리스틱스의 경우, 결합사건과 분리사건의 확률을 판단함에 있어서 고착과 불충분한 조정으로 인해 정책실무자의 판단에 바이어스가 초래되는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 정책실무자의 판단과 의사결정과정에 휴리스틱스로 인한 체계적 바이어스가 존재함을 인식하고, 합리적인 선택 및 판단능력을 향상하기 위한 교육훈련의 필요성을 보여준다. It has long been recognized that irrational parts would exist in human decision making process. However, it is unclear to the extent that irrational decisions are made. This study focused on examining bureaucrats' decision making process in the public sector by empirically analyzing whether heuristics and biases can negatively affect their judgment and decision making. ‘Representativeness heuristics’, ‘availability heuristics’, ‘anchoring and adjustment heuristics’, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky(1974, 1973), were adopted to measure systematic biases. For representativeness heuristics, this study found that bureaucrats' judgments were influenced by the insensitivity to prior probability and sample size, the misconception of chance, the insensitivity to predictability, and the misconception of the regression toward the mean. For availability heuristics, the bureaucrats assessed the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. For anchoring and adjustment heuristics, while the probability of conjunctive events was over-estimated, the probability of disjunctive events was under-estimated. These results indicate that systemic biases exist in bureaucrats' decision making process. This study, therefore, implies that training programs and educations are needed to improve rationality in bureaucrats' judgment and decision making.

제한된 합리성의 재해석

윤세준(Se Joon Yoon),채연주(Yeon Joo Chae) 연세대학교 경영연구소 2007 연세경영연구 Vol.44 No.2

심리학의 다른 영역들과는 달리 판단과 의사결정(Judgment and Decision Making; JDM)에 관한 연구에 있어서는 기술적 모델과 규범적 모델이 양립하고 있다. 그런데 JDM 연구의 가장 큰 문제점은 규범적 모델과 기술적 모델 사이의 간극이 매우 크고 심지어 이둘 사이의 관계가 상호 대립적이기까지 하다는 점이다. 즉, 규범적 모델이 제한 받지 않은 절대적 합리성을 가정하는데 반해 기술적 모델을 채택하는 연구들은 인간의 판단과 선택능력에 대해 특별한 가정을 하지 않는다. 하지만 Kahneman과 Tversky의 영향을 받은 기술적 모델의 연구자들은 암묵적 혹은 묵시적으로 인간의 비합리성을 다양한 형태로 드러내는 것에 연구의 초점을 맞추어 왔다. 이 논문은 그 동안의 JDM 연구 흐름에 비추어 볼 때 거의 형용모순(oxymoron)이라고 간주될 수 있는 “규범적 휴리스틱”(normative heuristics)이라는 제목 아래에서 기술적 모델과 규범적 모델 사이의 거리 좁히기가 가능한 것인가 탐색한다. 이를 위해 이 논문은 JDM에 관한 규범적 모델과 기술적 모델이 어떤 역사적 궤적을 그리며 발전해왔는가를 살펴보는 것으로부터 시작한다. 그런 후 기술적 모델과 규범적 모델을 연결시키는 고리의 역할을 하는 ‘제한된 합리성’ 개념을 재해석하고 그 과정에서 도출되는 ‘생태학적 합리성’이라는 개념을 소개한다. 마지막으로 이 논문은 재인 휴리스틱, 최선의 대안 선택하기 휴리스틱 등과 같이 비교적 단순하지만 환경의 구조적 특성과 맞기만 하다면 인간을 현명하게(smart) 만들어 주는 휴리스틱들을 소개하여 생태학적 합리성이라는 개념이 사회과학 연구에 시사하는 바를 논의할 것이다. Unlike many other fields of psychology, the study of judgment and decision making (JDM) must deal with two aspects of human thinking. That is, researchers have to consider not just models of how we normally do think (i.e., descriptive models) but also construct models of how we ought to think (i.e., normative models). Until very recently, the most influential normative model of JDM has been provided by Expected Utility Theory and theorems of the modern probability theory. On the other hand, the most powerful descriptive model was that of Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (and decision heuristics), which also is widely known as the most robust derivative of Herbert A. Simon’s notion of bounded rationality. Historically, these two models developed in parallel but the normative model always specified an ideal standard by which human rationality is evaluated. As a consequence, bounded rationality has been seen either as the attempt to do as well as possible given the demands of the world--the notion of optimization under constraints--or as the suboptimal outcome of the limited cognitive system--the realm of irrationality and cognitive illusions. In this paper we reconsider Simon’s concept of bounded rationality in a new light and try to construct an integrative model which not only accurately represents the actuality of human JDM but at the same time is capable of providing some normative standards of good decision making. For this purpose we will briefly but critically review the historical development of JDM research. Then we will refer to recent theoretical propositions and empirical findings of a German psychologist, Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues. Form their perspective, bounded decision mechanism are not merely the only option available given the constraints of the agent and the external world; less information and heuristic decision making can actually enable greater accuracy than more in some cases. Specifically, we will present detailed examples of how two heuristics inspired by Simon’s ideas on recognition-based processing and satisficing in sequential search lead to more accurate JDM. As a final comment, a few research implications for the study of organizations will be mentioned.

Theories and Research in Clinical Decision Making and Skill Acquisition in Nursing Practice : Clinical Decision Making ; Clinical practice and heuristic reasoning

( A. D. Murdach ) 서울대학교 간호과학연구소 1999 서울대학교 간호과학연구소 학술대회 자료집 Vol.1999 No.1

LOSA Data 품질(Quality)에 영향을 미치는 요소

이경호,이장룡 한국항공운항학회 2023 한국항공운항학회지 Vol.31 No.2

Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) is a well known preventive aviation safety program for Threat and Error management (TEM). High quality LOSA data suitable for safety management is obtained when a flight crew flies at the same level of attention as ordinary flight. Factors contributing to LOSA data quality may include flight crew's understanding on LOSA purpose, observer's career, and characteristics of the organization responsible for LOSA operations. This study explored purposes of TEM and LOSA, as well as their relationship. Previous studies mentioned quality of LOSA data can be influenced by heuristic judgment, hawthorne effect, and priming effect. This study recognized the importance of LOSA data quality to be effectively used for preventive safety management. It was confirmed that the level of understanding on LOSA concept, experience of the observer, and the characteristics of the department in charge of LOSA operation could affect the quality of LOSA data.

금융광고에 사용된 공시정보의 제시형태와 금융소비자의 개인적 특성이 판단의 어림법에 미치는 영향 : 노력 휴리스틱을 중심으로

이태준 한국광고학회 2014 광고학연구 Vol.25 No.1

위험판단의 비합리적 성향

이재신(Jae-Shin Lee),최지영(Ji Young Choi) 한국언론학회 2014 한국언론학보 Vol.58 No.6