집행임원제도하의 임원보수 규제방안-미국 경기부양법(Stimulus Bill)상의 임원보수 제한규정을 중심으로-

문상일 한양대학교 법학연구소 2010 법학논총 Vol.27 No.1

In this article, I analyze the executive compensation provision (§ 408-2(3)(6)) under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code, and demonstrate its shortcomings in order to effectively regulate the compensation for executive officers under the proposed executive officer system in Korea. I also introduce the U.S. regulations which has been recently promulgated as a part of TARP to prevent excessive payments to poorly performed executives in U.S. publicly-held corporations, such as EESA, ARRA, and CFA. Among these regulations, my article focuses on the compensation-related provisions under ARRA which is affecting most of the TARP recipients under the U.S. stimulus plan. According to the ARRA, corporations which received a significant taxpayer fund under the TARP, must observe stricter compensation policies mandated under the ARRA, such as prohibition of certain types of compensation -bonuses, retention awards, incentive compensation,golden parachutes and luxury expenditures-, improved compensation committee requirements,Say-on-Pay and compensation clawback. Among these requirements, Say-on-Pay policy has been considered most effective method to curtail excessive executive compensation practices. Specifically, in the wake of recent financial crisis and global economic crisis, the growing public criticism on the incessant upward trend of executive compensation demands more fundamental remedy to curb compensation problems. Recognizing that there are several systemic flaws in current compensation system, such as lack of linkage between compensation and performance,executive’s short-termism, and lack of director’s accountability to shareholders, shareholder activists as well as many politicians have suggested the adoption of Say-on-Pay policies. After a full discussion on the details of the executive compensation provision under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code (§ 408-2(3)(6)), I recommend that the Korean Commercial Code implement more detailed executive compensation provisions regarding compensation setting process and the disclosure of each executive’s detailed payments, not the total amounts paid to all directors and executives. In addition,after adopting a executive officer system in Korea, the Code should also maintain current compensation approval system in which shareholders should approve the compensation plan for directors with binding effect. Without the approval by shareholders, we may confront the same compensation crisis like the U.S. and Eurpope. Finally, I stress in this article that well-established executive compensation system would function as a fundamental basis to improve our corporate governance structure.

2019년 일본 임원보수 공시에 대한 고찰

김환일,김동근 충남대학교 법학연구소 2022 法學硏究 Vol.33 No.3

Recently, Japanese companies have been promoting responses such as disclosure of executive compensation and the establishment of a compensation committee to determine executive compensation for continuous corporate value growth. The purpose of this study is to contribute to some extent in the preparation of improvement plans for executive compensation disclosure by Korean companies by examining the tasks of Japanese executive compensation disclosure through literature research, fact-finding, and case analysis on Japanese executive compensation disclosure. Therefore, in the future, Japanese and Korean companies should not simply imitate advanced countries such as the United States in their disclosure of executive compensation, but should put much effort into establishing a system and policy for rational executive compensation in consideration of company- specific decision-making systems and management policies. To this end, looking at the improvement plan for the disclosure of executive remuneration, first, executive compensation policies and systems should be established. Second, the contents of the executive compensation program should be clearly disclosed. Third, the process of determining individual executive compensation should be transparent. Fourth, the executive compensation system should be diversified, such as performance-linked pay. Fifth, the setting of disclosure clause for executive compensation of 100 million yen or more should be reviewed. Finally, individual initiation of all executives should be introduced. Therefore, it is time for Korea to consider ways to systematically design executive compensation systems and policies in order to strengthen corporate competitiveness by disclosing executive compensation. In that respect, this study gives many implications to Korean companies and expects great development in the future. 최근 일본 기업들은 지속적인 기업가치 성장을 위해 임원보수의 공시 및 임원보수의 결정을 위한 보수위원회의 설치 등의 대응을 추진하여 왔다. 본 연구는 일본 임원보수 공시에 대한 문헌적 연구, 실태조사 및 사례 분석 등을 통한 일본 임원보수 공시의 과제를 고찰함으로써 우리나라 기 업들이 임원보수 공시의 개선방안을 마련함에 있어 다소나마 기여하는데 목적을 두고 있다. 이를 위해 임원보수 공시의 개선방안을 보면 첫째, 글로벌 지배구조 구 축을 위한 임원보수 정책과 제도가 구축되어야 한다. 둘째, 임원보수 프 로그램의 내용이 명확히 공개되어야 한다. 셋째, 개인별 임원보수 결정 과정이 투명해야 한다. 넷째, 임원보수 설계가 경영방침과 적합한 구조를 갖고 있어야 한다. 다섯째, 임원보수 1억엔 이상 공개 조항 설정은 재검토 해야 한다. 마지막으로 임원 전원의 개별 개시가 도입되어야 한다. 따라서 우리나라도 임원보수의 공시가 기업경쟁력 강화를 위해 선진국 처럼 체계적으로 임원보수 제도 및 정책을 설계하는 방안에 대해 검토하 여 보아야할 시점이다. 본 연구는 그런 측면에서 우리나라 기업들에 많은 시사점을 주며, 앞으로 큰 발전을 기대하여 본다.

우리나라 임원보상 공시제도의 문제점 및 개선방안에 관한 연구: 한ㆍ미 비교분석을 중심으로

송기신,송학준 한국회계정책학회 2008 회계와 정책연구 Vol.13 No.3

This research presents problems and improvement methods of disclosure rules and practices for executive compensation by comparing and analyzing the practices in Korea and the United States. In terms of laws, regulations and standard recommendations concerning the disclosure of executive compensation, both countries have been compared and analyzed. Three exemplary firms from both countries have been selected for comparison and analysis. Problems concerning the executive compensation disclosure rules in Korea can be summarized as follows. First of all, philosophy, principles, process of executive compensation and policies for each compensation component are not disclosed adequately. Second, the coverage of executives for disclosure may not fit the needs of information users. Third, the disclosure formats for various compensation components differ from firm to firm making it difficult to compare each other between firms. The weight and mixture of compensation components are not properly disclosed. Fourth, even non-registered executives are required to disclose stock option rewards by individual. However, in the case of cash compensation, only total amount and average amount per person are required to be disclosed for executives and outside directors. The disclosure methods of compensation components are inconsistent making it hard to show the amount of compensation for each executive. Fifth, previous awards, current awards and current exercises of stock option are provided in one table, which can be confusing to the investors. Sixth, Korean GAAP requires firms to provide executive compensation information as footnotes, but it does not provide detailed disclosure guidelines. Therefore, the comparability among firms and time periods might suffer. The improvement methods for those problems are as follows. First of all, philosophy, principles, business performance target, and performance evaluation process for executive compensation and compensation policy for each compensation component such as cash, bonus, stock and stock option should be disclosed in detail. In order to accomplish this goal, the compensation committee composed of independent outside directors must be established within the board of directors. Non-affiliated compensation consultants should also be hired. Second, the coverage of executives for disclosure should be extended to more than 5 highest paid positions including the CEO in order to meet the needs of the information users adequately. Third, in the event that various compensation components are combined, the nature of such composition must be disclosed. A variety of perks such as golf, health club membership, tax gross-up and severance pay must also be included in the disclosure coverage of executive compensation. Fourth, individual executive compensation should be disclosed in order that stockholders will be able to judge whether executive compensation is linked to business performance and whether decisions of the executives are made in such a way that improves long-term shareholder value. Fifth, separate table for previous awards of stock option and realized gain from exercise of stock option needs to be provided. Current awards of stock option need to be provided along with cash compensation, so that investors can understand the current compensation of executives clearly. Sixth, detailed disclosure guidelines for Korean GAAP footnotes of executive compensation need to be made. In order to increase the possibility of comparison between companies and time periods, certain revisions concerning the practical implications need to be made. In the implications section, such elements as the definition of the term "major management", categories of compensation, standard forms and details by category should be included as guidelines. Lastly, firms need to make voluntary disclosure efforts rather than meeting minimal disclosure requirements by the securities law. The results of this research are expected to be... 본 연구에서는 우리나라와 미국의 임원보상에 대한 공시제도 및 공시실태를 비교ㆍ분석함으로써 우리나라 임원보상 공시의 문제점과 개선방안을 제시하였다. 공시제도의 비교ㆍ분석을 함에 있어서는 임원보상에 관한 양국의 법률적인 내용과 모범규준을 활용하였으며, 공시실태의 경우에는 임원보상 관련 공시가 우수하다고 평가되는 기업들을 3개씩 선정하여 분석하였다. 이 결과 우리나라 임원보상에 대한 공시제도의 문제점은 다음과 같이 요약될 수 있다. 첫째, 임원 보상에 대한 철학, 원칙, 보상과정 및 각 보상수단별 보상방침이 공시되지 않고 있다. 둘째, 공시대상 임원의 범위가 정보이용자들의 요구와 부합하지 않을 수도 있다. 셋째, 기업별로 임원보상의 구체적 수단에 대해 공시하는 형태가 달라서 기업간 비교가능성이 감소되고 있으며, 다양한 보상수단을 혼합하여 사용하는 것에 대해서는 공시하고 있지 않다. 넷째, 주식매수선택권에 대해서는 현재 비등기임원까지 개인별로 부여현황을 공시하도록 되어 있는 반면, 현금 보상에 대해서는 상임이사 및 사외이사들의 총액 및 1인당 평균 보상액만 공시하도록 되어 있어서 공시의 일관성이 없고, 임원 개인별로 보상액을 정확하게 파악할 수 없다. 다섯째, ‘주식매수청구권 부여 및 행사표’에는 과거 부여분, 당기 부여분 및 당기 행사분이 혼합하여 제시되고 있어서 투자가들에게 혼동을 일으킬 수 있다. 여섯째, 우리나라의 현행 기업회계기준에서는 임원보상 관련 정보를 주석으로 공시하도록 하고 있으나, 이에 대한 구체적인 실무지침사례를 제시하지 않고 있기 때문에 주석 공시의 기업간, 기간간 비교가능성을 저해할 수 있다.

기업의 임원보수 규제에 관한 고찰

김동근 경북대학교 법학연구원 2012 법학논고 Vol.0 No.38

The regulation of executive compensation is became the hot issue in wake of the global economic depression to cause in the global corporates' collapse such as Enron and WorldCom. The global corporates' collapse was concerned with the defective executive compensation structures and the perverse management incentives. The major developed countries such as the United Stated, the United Kingdom, Germany, EU, and Japan have been enacted several legislations and regulations to resolve the problems. Group of 20 major economies(G-20) also agreed on the financial regulations consolidation in the area occurred the financial crisis and the preparation for the regulation reform model related to the Executive's excessive compensation payment in the financial departments. Therefore, I will examine the legislations and regulations of the several countries, particularly USA and Japan about executives compensation and the disclosure of executive compensation. In 2008-2010, the United Stated Congress had passed Emergency Economic Stablilization Act, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. In 2010, The Financial Services Agency in Japan had announced a new rules to disclose executive compensation individually, set by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act that executives receiving more than 100 million yen in executive compensation should have disclosed their compensation from March 31, 2010. And then I will study on the legislation and regulation system of the executive compensation about the compensation scopes and compensation decision procedure in the related law of Korea. I will compare with the related law of the US, Japan and Korea. Finally, I will be to suggest for the improvement methods of the legislation and the regulation on the executive compensation and the disclosure of executive compensation. 임원보수 규제는 엔론과 월드컴과 같은 글로벌 기업의 도산으로 야긴된 글로벌 경제위기를 극복하는데 있어서 커다란 이슈가 되었다. 글로벌 기업들의 도산은 임원보수 구조와 과도한 경영 인센티브의 결함과 관련되어져 있다. 미국, 영국, 독일, EUl, 그리고 일본과 같은 경제 선진국들은 그러한 문제점들을 해결하기 위해 새로운 입법과 규제들을 제정하여 실시하고 있다. 또한 주요경제 20개 국가들은 재정위기가 발생된 지역내에서 재정규제의 강화와 재정부분에서 지급되는 과도한 임원보수지급과 관련된 규제개혁모델을 마련하는데 동의하였다. 그러므로, 필자는 임원보수와 임원보수공개에 관하여 여러 국가들, 특히 미국과 일본의 입법과 규제를 검토할 것이다. 2008년에서 2010년 사이에, 미국 의회는 긴급 경제안정화법과 미국 경제회복 및 재투자법, 도드-프랭크 월스트리트 개혁 및 소비자보호법을 통과시켰다. 2010년에 일본 금융청은 임원보수가 1억엔 이상 되는 기업원임원은 2010년 3월 31일까지 그들 임원들의 보수를 공개하도록 증권거래법을 개정하고, 그에 따라 금융내용 등의 개시에 관한 내각부령을 발표하였다. 그리고 필자는 우리나라의 법에 의해 규정되고 있는 임원보수 범위 그리고 임원보수결정절차와 같은 임원보수에 과한 법률과 규제에 관하여 살펴볼 것이다. 이를 통해 미국, 일본 그리고 우리나라의 관련 법규와 규정을 비교검토한다. 마지막으로 필자는 임원보수와 임원보수공개에 관한 입법과 규제의 개선방안을 제시할 것이다.

주식회사 이사의 보수는 규제되어야 하는가?

최준선(Choi, June-Sun) 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2010 성균관법학 Vol.22 No.3

Regulating executive compensation is currently became hot issue in the wake of economic depression of recent few years. Expensive executive-compensation packages, particularly at companies that have performed very poorly were blamed widely. In 2008 the US House had passed a bill addressing shareholder votes on executive compensation, called "Say on Pay", which gives a company’s shareholders a typically non-binding (i.e., advisory) vote on the company’s compensation practices. In the Senate, bills were introduced allowing shareholders to vote on severance agreements and CEO pay. Under the current provision of Korean Commercial Code, director compensation must be approved by shareholders in annual shareholder meeting. Therefore Korea need not to introduce "Say on Pay" vote system. However, Regulating executive compensation is a critical but complex task. Although all measures on executive compensation were taken by SEC and other institutions over the last few decades, CEO compensation increased without cease. Regulating executive compensation by increasing disclosure requirements can be an alternative measure. So, the SEC attempted reform in 2006, amending its executive compensation rules to expand the list of executives who must disclose and requiring issuers to outline all components of compensation in a Summary Compensation Table. I think the disclosure regulations adopted by the SEC are a step in the right direction. In Korea, however, the gap of compensation between executives and general employees is not so steep as that of U.S.A. I think the disclosure requirement by financial authority is enough measure for Korean enterprises, although Executive compensation in Korea does not require detailed disclosure regarding each directors or executive officers.

일본 임원보수의 공시 규제에 관한 연구

김환일(Hwan-il Kim) 한국기업법학회 2011 企業法硏究 Vol.25 No.1

Japan has been trying to improve the corporate governance and to reform the disclosure of executive compensation in order to strengthen corporate competitiveness in the progress of globalization. The purpose of this study is to suggest a plan to reform the regulations on executive compensation disclosure in Korean companies through literature study, fact-finding survey and case study on the major status, characteristics and challenges of the Japanese policies and systems on the disclosure of executive compensation. The Financial Services Agency has recently announced a new rules to disclose executive compensation individually, set by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act that executives receiving more than 100 million yen in executive compensation should disclose their compensation from March 31, 2010. Until that time, according to the executive compensation disclosure rules introduced in 2004, the executive compensation had been only disclosed the amount of total executive compensation. In Japan, the main purpose of executive compensation disclosure regulations is to improve the transparency of corporate management and the interest of shareholders rather than to regulate excessive executive compensation, therefore those compensation policies and plans might be expected to be more systematic. Japanese companies should not simply imitate executive compensation system of developed countries but develop their own executive compensation policies and systems by considering a Japanese company-specific decision-making system and the relevance of executive compensation to maintain their operational strengths and business appropriateness. In conclusion, to strengthen corporate competitiveness, the regulations on executive compensation disclosure in Korea should be more systematically developed likewise Japan and other developed countries, and the social dialogue on this issue is expected to take a large step forward.

임원보수공시에 따른 경영자의 차별적 원가전략

우혜진(Wu, Hye Jin),박종국(Park, Jong Kook),홍영은(Hong, Young Eun) 한국관리회계학회 2020 관리회계연구 Vol.20 No.3

[연구목적] 본 연구의 목적은 임원개인별보수공시가 기업의 원가전략에 영향을 미치는지를 살펴보는데 있다. 2013년 5월 28일 자본시장법 개정으로 상장회사들은 2014년부터 5억 이상인 임원 개인별 보수를 공시하여 오고 있다. 이로 인해 주주들은 임원들에게 주어지는 보수가 경영성과와 대비하여 적정한지를 평가할 수 있게 된 반면에 공시의무가 있는 기업에서는 임원보수와 성과간의 연동에 대한 부담이 더욱 커지게 되었다. 따라서 임원개인별보수를 공시하는 기업의 경영자들은 비공시 기업에 비해 성과에 훨씬 더 민감하게 반응할 가능성이 높아 매출액 감소시 보수와 성과를 연동시키고자 유휴자원을 적극적으로 축소시킬 유인도 더 클 것이다. 이에 본 연구에서는 임원개인별보수를 공시하는 기업과 공시하지 않는 기업 간에 원가하방경직성이 차별적으로 나타나는지를 분석하였다. [연구방법] 코스닥 및 거래소 상장기업 자료를 이용하여 임원 개인별 보수 공시 이후 기간은 처음으로 임원 개인별 보수를 공시하기 시작한 2013년~2015년까지와 보수공시 대상 공개범위를 미등기 임원과 직원으로 확대하는 내용을 담은 개정안이 통과된 2016년~2018년까지로 구분하여 회귀분석을 실시하였다. [연구결과] 분석결과, 임원개인별보수 공시기업의 원가하방경직성이 임원개인별보수 비공시 기업의 원가하방경직성보다 더 낮은 것으로 나타났다. [연구의 시사점] 본 연구는 임원개인별보수 공시여부가 경영자의 비용의사결정에도 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 제시하였다는데 의의가 있으며 보수 공시자료를 이용한 투자자들의 의사결정에도 주요한 자료원으로 활용될 수 있을 것으로 기대한다. [Purpose] This study examines whether the impact of disclosure system of executive compaensation on cost strategies. On May 28, 2013, the Capital Markets Act was amended, and publicly traded companies have publicly announced compensation since 2014. This study examines whether the impact of disclosure system of executive compaensation on cost strategies. When the “Law on Capital Market and Financial Investment Corporation” (hereinafter referred to as “Capital Market Law”) was amended in 2013, the details of the manager’s pay exceeding 500 million Won would be made open to the public. As a result, shareholders can evaluate whether executive compensation is appropriate compared to management performance. On the other hand, in companies that are obligated to disclose compensation, the burden on the relation between executive compensation and performance increases. Therefore, executives of companies that disclose executive compensation are more likely to respond sensitively to performance than companies that do not disclose. And thus, when sales are reduced, companies that disclose executive compensation will have a great incentive to reduce idle resources in order to increase the link between compensation and performance. This study analyzed whether the cost stickiness is differentiated between companies that disclose individual executive compensation and those that do not. [Methodology] Using data from listed companies on the KOSDAQ and the KOSPI, The period after the disclose individual executive compensation was divided into 2013-2015 when the disclose individual executive compensation began to be disclosed for the first time, and 2016-2018 when the revision bill was passed, which included the expansion of the scope of disclose individual executive compensation to unregistered executives and employees. [Findings] According to the analysis, the cost stickiness of the companies that disclose individual executive compensation was lower than companies that do not disclose individual executive compensation. [Implications] This study analyzes how management strategies of companies, particularly the cost strategy of leading companies, respond to the disclosure system of executive compensation. This research will help investors make decisions.

2009년 12월 11일 한양대학교 법학연구소 학술대회 : 「주요법 개정의 현황과 문제점」-민법, 형법, 상법, 개정의 쟁점과 관련하여- ; 집행임원제도하의 임원보수 규제방안 -미국 경기부양법(Stimulus Bill)상의 임원보수 제한규정을 중심으로-

문상일 ( Sang Il Moon ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2010 법학논총 Vol.27 No.1

In this article, I analyze the executive compensation provision (§ 408-2(3)(6)) under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code, and demonstrate its shortcomings in order to effectively regulate the compensation for executive officers under the proposed executive officer system in Korea. I also introduce the U.S. regulations which has been recently promulgated as a part of TARP to prevent excessive payments to poorly performed executives in U.S. publicly-held corporations, such as EESA, ARRA, and CFA. Among these regulations, my article focuses on the compensation-related provisions under ARRA which is affecting most of the TARP recipients under the U.S. stimulus plan. According to the ARRA, corporations which received a significant taxpayer fund under the TARP, must observe stricter compensation policies mandated under the ARRA, such as prohibition of certain types of compensation -bonuses, retention awards, incentive compensation, golden parachutes and luxury expenditures-, improved compensation committee requirements, Say-on-Pay and compensation clawback. Among these requirements, Say-on-Pay policy has been considered most effective method to curtail excessive executive compensation practices. Specifically, in the wake of recent financial crisis and global economic crisis, the growing public criticism on the incessant upward trend of executive compensation demands more fundamental remedy to curb compensation problems. Recognizing that there are several systemic flaws in current compensation system, such as lack of linkage between compensation and performance, executive`s short-termism, and lack of director`s accountability to shareholders, shareholder activists as well as many politicians have suggested the adoption of Say-on-Pay policies. After a full discussion on the details of the executive compensation provision under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code (§ 408-2(3)(6)), I recommend that the Korean Commercial Code implement more detailed executive compensation provisions regarding compensation setting process and the disclosure of each executive`s detailed payments, not the total amounts paid to all directors and executives. In addition, after adopting a executive officer system in Korea, the Code should also maintain current compensation approval system in which shareholders should approve the compensation plan for directors with binding effect. Without the approval by shareholders, we may confront the same compensation crisis like the U.S. and Eurpope. Finally, I stress in this article that well-established executive compensation system would function as a fundamental basis to improve our corporate governance structure.

임원의 보상 수준은 기업의 평판에 영향을 미치는가?

임수진,최승욱 한국세무학회 2023 세무와 회계저널 Vol.24 No.4

높은 수준의 보상은 임원으로 하여금 기업의 성과나 평판을 높이도록 유인하는 인센티브로 작용할 수 있으나 이와는 반대로 이들의 기회주의적 행위를 반영하는 것일 수도 있다. 이와 관련하여 선행연구는 전통적으로 재무적 성과에 미치는 영향을 조사하였으나, 비교적 최근의 연구들은 재무적 성과뿐만 아니라 비재무적 성과에도 가치를 두고 보상과의 관련성을 조사하고 있다. 이에 본 연구는 비재무적 성과 중 기업 평판에 초점을 두고 임원 보상과의 관계를 살펴본다. 구체적으로, 본 연구는 임원과 최고경영자(CEO)의 평균적인 보상 수준이나 보상의 합계가 해당 기업의 평판에 미치는 영향에 대해 조사한다. 사업보고서에 공시되기 시작한 등기임원에 대한 개인별 보수 자료를 이용하며, 기업 평판의 대용치는 한국능률협회컨설팅(KMAC) ‘All star 30’과 브랜드스탁(BSTI) ‘100대 브랜드 보유기업’ 자료를 수집하여 활용하였다. 2015년부터 2021년까지 국내 상장기업을 대상으로 분석한 결과, 임원의 보상과 기업 평판 사이에는 유의한 양의 관계가 관찰되었다. 이는 소속 임원들의 평균 보상이나 보상의 총합계를 이용하는 경우에 모두 일관되었다. 이러한 결과는 임원의 보상 수준이 높을수록 기업 평판이 높아지는 것으로 해석된다. 추가분석으로, 보상을 CEO의 것으로 한정하여 조사한 결과 역시 대체로 유사하였다. 또한 KMAC과 BSTI의 선정기업을 각각 별도로 이용한 조사에서도 결과가 일관되었다. 마지막으로, 임원의 보상 수준을 두 그룹으로 구분한 후 성향점수를 산출하여 매칭한 표본에서도 일관된 결과가 관찰되었다. 본 연구는 비재무적 성과지표와 임원의 보상 사이를 검증하는 국내 실증연구가 부족한 상황에서 기업 평판 측정치와 임원 보상 사이 관계를 살펴보았다는 점에서 공헌점이 있다. 본 연구에서 발견한 임원 보상 수준과 기업 평판 사이의 유의한 관계는 자본시장의 이해관계자들과 기업 평판을 평가 및 공시하는 기관에도 시사점을 제공한다. 마지막으로, 본 연구의 결과는 임원 보상을 공시하도록 규제함으로써 공개된 보상 수준이 타당함을 임원 스스로 증명하기 위해 기업 평판 관리를 위한 노력을 기울이는 현상을 반영한 것일 수 있다. 따라서 이는 해당 공시 제도를 적용 및 규제하는 정책기관에도 시사점을 제시할 것으로 기대된다. A high level of compensation can work as an incentive to induce executives to improve a firm’s performance or reputation. On the contrary, it may reflect their opportunistic behavior and rent extraction. In this regard, most of previous studies have investigated the impact of compensation on financial performance, but recent studies have focused on its the relationship with non-financial performance as well. Therefore, based on this research stream, among non-financial performance proxies, this study examines the executive compensation by focusing on firm reputation. Specifically, this study investigates the effect of the average or the sum of executives’compensation levels on the reputation of the firm. The institutional setting in Korea gives a good opportunity to examine executives’ compensations as individual executives’ compensation information began to be disclosed in the annual report since 2013. For the corporate reputation proxies, we use the following two:KMAC’s ‘All star 30’ and BSTI’s ‘100 Top Brand’. As a result of analyzing listed firms from 2015 to 2021, we observe a significant and positive relationship between executive compensation and corporate reputation. The results are consistent in both cases when the average compensation of executives or the total amount of compensation are used. These results are interpreted as the higher the level of compensation of executives leads to the higher corporate reputation. In additional tests, we find that using the CEO compensation reveals the similar results. Moreover, using KMAC and BSTI separately induce the consistent results. Finally, we use propensity score matched sample and document the consistent results. This study contributes in the following ways. First, the relationship between corporate reputation and executive compensation fills gap in literature since there is a lack of empirical findings verifying the impact of executive compensation on non-financial performance indicators. This study also provides implications for institutions that evaluate and disclose corporate reputation. Finally, the disclosure of executive compensation may lead to executives’ efforts to enhance the reputation of the firm and thereby present the validity of the regulation. Therefore, it is expected to provide implications for policy makers who regulate the disclosure system.

자본주의의 변천과 주식회사 이사의 보수

최준선 한국상사법학회 2010 商事法硏究 Vol.29 No.3

Executive compensation has been much discussed in academic circle in Korea and the fights over executives' pay is now undergoing. However,nobody has raised the fundamental questions, the reason why to limit executive compensation, how could the executive compensation of the modern corporation be controlled and who would decide the reasonable compensation? This article overlooked the relations between changes in capitalism and the executive compensation. The capitalism has changed from “owner capitalism” to “managerial capitalism”, and then to “shareholder capitalism” and to “stakeholder capitalism”, and at last to “customer capitalism” in recent years. This article not only draws a contrast between the wide-ranging battles of the 1930s and today's more narrow debates on the executive compensation, but also discusses the current situation in Korea. Most important measures to curb pay are providing in relevant Act new requirements for pay disclosure. In the United States 5 highest compensations including CEO and CFO are subject to disclosure. Still other measures, referred to as “say on pay,” would require that shareholders be permitted to offer at least an advisory opinion on the propriety of compensation packages offered to company management. While these opinions would not be binding, compensation committees could ignore them at their peril. This writer concludes that executive compensation is not an urgent issue to manage in Korea, because executives in Korea usually compensated not so much in compare to executive compensations in other countries. Differences in compensation between executives and employees in Korea also are not so sharp (executive average compensation is 7.5 times higher than that of employee) as that of other countries (475 times higher in United States).