이익기준 경영자 보상이 감사보수 및 감사시간에 미치는 영향:감사위원회 효과를 중심으로

박성욱,김서현 한국세무학회 2023 세무와 회계저널 Vol.24 No.6

Since managers can conduct management activities for their own interests rather than to maximize corporate value, shareholders implement controls such as performance evaluation and compensation to reduce managers’ goal-inconsistent behavior. However, earnings-based compensation granted to these managers can also provide an incentive to act for the manager’s private interests. As a result, it can appear as a material misstatement of the financial statements, and in terms of audit, it can affect the control environment and increase the control risk. In the end, there is a possibility that audit fees and audit hours will increase because external auditors must invest a lot of audit efforts due to increased audit risk when signing an audit contract. Based on this, this study focuses on the granting of earnings-based compensation to managers who are primarily responsible for preparing financial statements, and studies whether the characteristics of the audit committee affect the relationship between earnings-based compensation, audit fees, and audit hours for companies listed on the stock market from 2013 to 2021. According to the empirical analysis results of this study, only audit hours increase for companies with a managers’ earnings-based compensation. This is because granting earnings-based compensation to managers affects the control environment, and the audit effort increases relatively as the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to this control risk increases. In addition, companies with managers’ earnings-based compensation appear to have a lower audit fees per audit hours. This is because auditors invest relatively more audit hours than audit fees to reach a high level of confidence. However, the analysis of the relation between the earnings-based compensation and audit fees and audit hours is not affected by the characteristics of the audit committee, which is divided into whether the audit committee is established, the size of the audit committee, and whether the audit committee includes accounting or financial experts. However, the results of an additional analysis by extending the sample period to 2022 show that companies with managers’ earnings-based compensation increases both audit fees and audit hours, and this relationship appears to be alleviated by the characteristics of the audit committee. Since stock prices can be influenced by common factors in the market rather than the efforts of managers, there may be noise in performance evaluation in the case of stock-based compensation. In contrast, this study is significant in that it analyzes the effects of the manager’s earnings-based compensation based on external auditors’ evaluation of earnings-based compensation granted to managers. 경영자는 자신의 이익을 위한 경영활동을 할 수 있으므로 경영자의 목표불일치 행위를 줄이기 위해 주주는 성과평가 및 보상과 같은 통제장치를 마련하고 있다. 하지만 이러한 경영자에게 부여된 회계이익기준 보상이 경영자의 사적이해를 위한 유인을 제공할 수 있다. 이에 따라 재무제표에 대한 중대한 왜곡표시로 나타날 수 있고 감사측면에서는 통제환경에 영향을 미쳐서 통제위험을 높일 가능성이 있다. 결과적으로 외부감사인은 감사계약 체결 시 증가된 감사위험으로 감사노력을 많이 투입해야 하므로 감사보수와 감사시간이 증가할 가능성이 존재한다. 이를 바탕으로 본 연구는 재무제표를 작성할 일차적인 책임이 있는 경영자에게 회계이익기준 보상이 부여되는 것에 초점을 맞추고, 2013년부터 2021년까지 유가증권시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 이익기준 보상과 감사보수와 감사시간 간의 관계에 감사위원회 특성이 영향을 미치는지 연구한다. 본 연구의 실증분석결과에서는 이익기준 경영자 보상이 존재하는 기업일수록 감사시간이 증가한다. 이는 경영자에게 회계이익기준 보상을 부여하는 것이 통제환경에 영향을 미치고 이러한 통제위험에 의한 재무제표 왜곡 표시위험이 커질수록 감사노력이 상대적으로 증가하기 때문이다. 또한 이익기준 경영자 보상이 존재하는 기업일수록 시간당 보수가 감소하는 것으로 나타난다. 이는 감사인이 더욱 높은 확신수준에 도달하기 위해 상대적으로 감사보수에 비해 감사시간을 더 많이 투입하기 때문으로 판단된다. 한편 이러한 이익기준 경영자 보상과 감사보수 및 감사시간 간의 관계가 감사위원회 설치 여부, 감사위원의 규모, 그리고 감사위원회의 회계나 재무전문가 포함 여부로 구분한 감사위원회 특성에 영향을 받는지 분석한 결과에서는 유의미한 결과가 나타나지 않는다. 하지만 추가적으로 표본기간을 2022년까지 확장하여 분석한 결과에서는 이익기준 경영자 보상이 존재하는 경우 감사보수와 감사시간을 모두 증가시키며, 이러한 관계는 감사위원회의 특성에 의해 완화되는 것으로 나타난다. 한편 주가의 경우 경영자의 노력이 아니라 시장의 공통적인 요인에 영향을 받을 수 있어 스톡옵션 보상의 경우 성과평가에 잡음(noise)이 있을 수 있다. 이와 달리 본 연구는 경영자에게 이익기준 보상이 부여되는 것에 대하여 외부감사인의 평가를 기반으로 경영자의 회계이익기준 보상제도가 갖는 효과를 분석한다는 점에서 의의가 있다.

경영자 보상 형태와 원가 비대칭성

김응길 ( Eung Gil Kim ),이용규 ( Yong Kyu Lee ),한승수 ( Soong Soo Han ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.5

This study investigates the effect of CEO compensation type on asymmetric cost behavior. Accounting earnings help shield managers`` compensation from market-wide variations in equity values. When managers`` compensation is based on accounting earnings, managerial decisions are likely to be sensitive to short term earnings (Lambert & Larcker 1987; Dechow & Sloan 1991; Sloan 1993; Jensen & Murphy 1990; Baber et al. 1996). However, managers with stock option possibly take into account various factors other than earnings and would tend to have a long-term perspective (Brickley et al. 1985; Core and Guay 1999; Hanlon et al. 2003; Ittner 2003). Considering these contrasting aspects, we hypothesize that managerial decision on slack resources is differently affected by the compensation plan depending on whether it is accounting earnings-based (ACP) or stock option-based (MKP). To test our hypothesis, we focus on asymmetric cost behavior which is assumed to be the results of managers`` decision. Related to our study, Lee and Nam (2010) insist that pay-performance relationship affect managers`` decision-making. The authors find the firms with pay-performance relationship show less stickiness than those without it. The result implies that the degree of stickiness is affected by control systems like performance evaluation and compensation which are intended to influence managers`` decision behavior. Our sample comprises the data of Korean listed companies (KOSPI) from 2001 to 2011, which yields the pooled samples of 5,037 firm-year observations. To test cost behavior, we employ regression model of Anderson et al.(2003). We measure earnings-based compensation system by using pay-performance relationship. We use four type of cost - ``Selling, General, and Administrative expense``, ``General Administrative expense``, ``Cost of Goods Sold`` and ``Wage expense``. The empirical findings are as follows. First, when sales decrease, managers with earnings-based compensation are more likely to reduce resources faster than those without one, so alleviating the degree of asymmetric cost behavior. In addition, managers with stock option compensation have the same tendency as with those with earnings-based compensation. However, managers with earnings-based compensation plan show less asymmetric cost behavior than those with stock option-based. Those results are almost robust when we use ``General Administration cost``, ``Cost of Goods Sold`` and ``Wage`` in test model. Above results suggest that managers with earnings-based compensation more quickly and sensitively adjust the slack resources when sales decrease, as managers. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that earnings-based and stock option-based compensation plans can differently affect managerial decisions, more specifically the decision on the disposal of slack resources in the period of decreasing sales. In addition, we also compare managers with stock option-based and owner-managers. We hypothesize that owner-manager reduces committed resources when sales decline in less proportion than when increasing committed resources during sales increase, but firms with employed manager seem to reduce their resources more quickly than in owner-manager firms. The result illustrates that owner-managers with no stock option show most asymmetric cost behavior among managers.

내부감사의 성과보상이 이익조정에 미치는 영향

조정현,김성환 한국회계정책학회 2015 회계와 정책연구 Vol.20 No.5

Internal audit is an essential organization of a company, an organization that has the authority to comprehensively examine all executive decisions. Consequently, it is important for an internal auditor to have the necessary qualifications and autonomy to voice objective views. Yet, compensation of internal auditors includes stock options or linked to the company or executive performance. Such compensation may hinder the check-and-balance between the management, and Flynn and Hills(2008) found that people in general perceive that compensation for an audit board in form of stock options reduces the earnings quality. Bierstaker et al.(2012) reported that compensation scheme of auditors may effect work quality after surveying experienced audit board members on the relationship between compensation and independence. However. the preceding studies do not include the effect of compensation on accounting information, an internal audit output. As a result this paper studies the effect of auditor compensation to earnings management by using auditor compensation of public institutions that disclose details on pay such as base salary and performance compensation. The study indicates negative relationship between earnings management and payment of compensation, the amount, and the compensation to total pay ratio. This result can be understood as the following: compensation increases job loyalty and controls earnings management. However, this study is limited to public institutions and does not include companies in general. As the preceding studies have pointed out, public institutions differ from other companies in ways that they have political issues in management turnover and have external inspection by the Board of Audit and Inspection. Despite the limitation, this paper is meaningful for the quantitative study as it conducted on auditor compensation scheme at the present time when the role of auditor is viewed more important than ever. 회사의 필요기관인 내부감사는 회계분야 외에도 업무의 적법성과 타당성을 비롯하여 경영진의 직무집행에 관한 포괄적 감시권한을 갖고 있다. 그래서 감사는 경영진과 다른 의견을 개진할 수 있도록 전문성과 독립성 확보가 중요하다. 그런데 우리나라 일부 기업들은 감사의 급여 중 일부를 스톡옵션 형태로 지급하거나 기업 또는 경영자의 성과와 연동하여 지급하고 있어 자칫 경영자에 대한 감사의 견제기능이 저하될 우려가 있다. 해외 선행연구에서는 감사위원에 대한 스톡옵션 형태의 성과급 지급이 이익의 질을 떨어뜨릴 것이라고 인식되고 있음을 실험을 통해 확인하였고, 감사위원 대상 설문을 실시하여 감사의 보수구조가 감사의 업무에 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 보고하였다. 그러나 성과급이 감사 활동의 결과물인 회계정보에 어떤 영향을 미치는지에 대해서는 아직 실증 연구 결과가 존재하지 않는다. 따라서 본 연구는 감사의 기본급과 성과급 등 보수에 대한 항목별 상세내역이 공개되어 있는 공공기관 감사의 성과급 자료를 이용해 감사의 성과급이 이익조정에 어떤 영향을 미치는지에 대해 연구하였다. 실증결과, 감사에 대한 성과급 지급여부, 성과급 금액, 총급여에서 성과급이 차지하는 비중과 이익조정 여부가 유의한 음(-)의 관계를 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 감사에 대한 성과급 지급이 감사의 업무 충실도를 높여 이익조정을 억제하는 효과를 발휘하고 있음을 의미한다. 감사의 성과급이 전적으로 경영자의 성과에 연동되지 않고 상급기관, 이사회 등의 평가에 직․간접적으로 영향을 받게 되며 인력 시장에서 자신의 명성이 훼손되는 것에 대한 우려로 인해 나타난 결과라고 유추할 수 있다. 본 연구는 감사의 역할이 중요시 되고 있는 현 시점에서 감사 성과급의 효과를 계량적으로 분석하였다는 측면에서 의미가 있다.

Stock-Based versus Cash Compensation: Does the Correlation between Earnings and Stock Returns Matter?

신재용 서울대학교 경영연구소 2009 Seoul Journal of Business Vol.15 No.1

I empirically examine the role of the correlation between earnings and stock returns in determining the structure of compensation packages for top executives. I develop two competing hypotheses on the relation between the returns-earnings correlation and the structure of executive compensation and empirically test the association between the returns-earnings correlation and use of stock-based pay. The results show that the returns-earnings correlation is positively associated with the use of stock-based compensation, after controlling for other determinants of stock-based compensation such as firm size and firm’s growth opportunities.

Say on Pay and Earnings Management

Jaehyeon Kim,Yongtae Kim,Suil Pae 한국회계정보학회 2018 한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집 Vol.2018 No.2

Using a difference-in-differences research design and exploiting the staggered adoption of Sayon-Pay (SoP) laws across the globe, this study examines the effect of SoP on earnings management. An increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity following SoP adoption provides greater incentives for managers to manage earnings to influence their compensation. A concomitant increase in the scrutiny of executive pay and performance measurements, however, may limit earnings management opportunities. We find that SoP adoption does not affect accrual-based earnings management, but increases real earnings management. These results are robust to alternative fixed effects, alternative samples, alternative model specifications, and additional controls for firm-level governance characteristics. The effect of SoP on earnings management is particularly strong in countries with weaker investor protection or those with strong future time reference in languages. Collectively, our results suggest that the adoption of SoP regulations results in an unintended consequence of increasing real earnings management.

주식기준보상유형이 재무보고의 질에 미치는 영향

최정미,천미림,천샤오리 한국국제회계학회 2023 국제회계연구 Vol.- No.108

[Purpose]The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the relationship between stock-based compensation and financial reporting quality of Chinese listed companies. Specifically we classify stock-based compensation types for managers into stock options and restricted stock units (RSU) and to examine whether the earnings manipulation varies depending on the compensation type. [Methodology]In order to analyze the effect of stock-based compensation on earnings management of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2021, this study conducts OLS analysis using stock-based compensation divided into stock options and restricted stock unit, and measures earnings management both accrual-based earnings management and real activity-based earnings management. [Findings]The granting of stock options did not have a significant effect on accrual-based earnings management, but RSU showed a significant negative relationship with accrual-based earnings management. According to an analysis of the relationship between the type of stock-based compensation and real activity-based earnings management, stock options were not significantly related to real activity-based earnings management, but it was effective in limiting real activity-based earnings management when RSU were granted or both stock option and RSU granted at the same time. [Implications]Summarizing the results, it can be seen that RSU serve as an effective incentive mechanism to improve the quality of transparent financial reporting, suggesting that granting RSU relatively recently introduced in Korea can help mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers and increase corporate value. [연구목적]본 연구는 중국상장기업을 대상으로 경영자에 대한 주식기준보상유형을 스톡옵션과 양도제한조건부주식(RSU: restricted stock unit)으로 구분하고 보상유형에 따라 기업의 이익조정행태가 달라지는지를 실증분석하는데 목적이 있다. [연구방법]본 연구는 2012년부터 2021년까지 중국상장기업을 대상으로 주식기준보상이 이익조정에 미치는 영향을 분석하기 위하여 주식기준보상은 스톡옵션과 양도제한조건부주식으로 구분하고, 이익조정행위는 발생액이익조정과 실제이익조정으로 구분하여 실증분석을 수행하였다. [연구결과]스톡옵션을 부여한 경우 발생액이익조정에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않았으나 양도제한조건부 주식은 발생액이익조정과 유의한 음의 관계를 보여 경영자에게 양도제한조건부주식을 부여한 경우 발생액이익조정이 감소하는 결과를 보고하였다. 경영자보상 유형과 실제이익조정의 관계를 분석한 결과 경영자에게 스톡옵션을 부여한 경우 실제이익조정과 유의한 관계를 갖지 않았으나, 양도제한조건부주식을 부여하거나 스톡옵션과 양도제한조건부주식을 동시에 부여한 경우에는 실제이익조정을 제한하는데 효과적인 것으로 나타났다. [연구의 시사점]결과를 종합해보면 투명한 회계보고와 재무보고의 질을 제고하는데 양도제한조건부주식이 효과적인 인센티브 기재로 작동하는 것을 확인할 수 있으며, 이는 한국에서 비교적 최근 도입된 양도제한조건부주식을 경영자에게 부여하는 것이 주주와 경영자간의 대리인문제를 감소시키고 기업가치를 증대하는데 도움이 될 수 있다는 것을 시사한다.

What is the relationship between executive compensation incentive and earnings management in Listed Companies in China?

( Hu Di ),( Huang Wei Dong ),( Jin Shan Yue ) 한국외국어대학교 중국연구소 2021 中國硏究 Vol.89 No.-

This study investigates the impact of executive compensation incentive on earnings management in Chinese listed companies. From the perspectives of the principal-agent, asymmetric information, and incentive theories, this study examines Chinese A-share, main board-listed companies from 2015 to 2019 for the impact of executive compensation incentive on corporate earnings management, using a multiple linear regression method. The results show that executive monetary compensation has a negative effect on the level of accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management, indicating that executive monetary compensation has an incentive effect and reduces earnings management behavior. However, the executive shareholding ratio has a positive impact on accrual-based earnings management but no significant impact on real earnings management, indicating that equity incentives only affect accrual-based earnings management. The study’s findings enrich the related theories of executive compensation and earnings management and provide useful insights for investors and policymakers of listed companies.

경영자보상과 이익조정간 관계연구

강선아(Sun A Kang),김용식(Yong Shik Kim) 한국경영학회 2014 경영학연구 Vol.43 No.3

Previous research has shown that CEOs have incentives to manage reported earnings in order to maximise their own levels of compensation, which are typically determined by firm performance. The present study examines whether CEO overcompensation reduces earnings management in classic principal?agent settings by investigating the relationships between CEO compensation and upwards and downwards earnings management. We analyse data on Korean-listed firms from a sample period of 2005 to 2007 in order to estimate the levels of CEO overcompensation put forward by previous studies. Discretionary accruals are estimated by the modified Jones model, while we adopt established proxies of real activity-based earnings management. The presented findings show that earnings management significantly declines as CEO overcompensation increases. This negative relationship implies that managers reduce earnings management, when they receive overcompensation. We also find that CEO overcompensation has negative relationships with real earnings management under downwards earnings management and with discretionary accruals under upwards earnings management. These results suggest that that CEO overcompensation positively influences a firm`s long-term value considering when real earnings management could negatively influence on firm value. Our findings therefore suggest that CEOs choose earnings management tools in order to maximise their personal benefits and it has a positive effect by reducing opportunistic behaviour as well as the firm`s long-term risk. The results of this study showed as counterevidence on common criticism about CEO overcompensation and could thus be used as a guideline for future compensation systems.

회계이익의 보상관련성과 원가행태, 그리고 지배구조

권대현 ( Dae Hyun Kwon ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계학연구 Vol.39 No.4

Comprehensive income is defined as the change in equity of a companyduring a period from transactions and other events and circumstances from non-owner sources. It means that all changes in equity as well as operating income over a period except those res

Market’s expectation and fraud liability

Lee, Dong Young,Cheon Chung Soo 한국상업경영학회(구 한국상업교육학회) 2006 상업교육연구 Vol.14 No.-