연구논문 : 하방경직적 원가행태와 내부회계관리제도 검토의견에 관한 연구

조정은(제1저자) ( Jung Eun Cho ),최현정(교신저자) ( Hyun Jung Choi ),장금주(공동저자) ( Geum Joo Jahng ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.6

본 연구는 내부회계관리제도 검토의견이 비대칭적 원가행태에 미치는 영향에 대해 검증하였다. 내부회계관리제도가 효과적으로 운영되지 않으면 내부통제 및 감독 기능의 약화로 인해 재무제표의 신뢰성을 하락시키며 정보비대칭은 증가한다. 또한 자산의 보호 및 부정방지 프로그램이 포함되어 있는 내부회계관리제도에 중요한 문제점이 있을 때 경영자를 감시하고 통제하기 힘들게 되어 대리인 비용이 높아지게 된다. 이에 따라 내부회계관리제도 검토결과 비적절의견을 받은 기업은 경영자가 사적이익 및 효용을 추구하기 위해 매출이 감소함에도 비용을 감축시키지 않음에 따라 하방경직적 원가행태가 더 크게 나타날것으로 예상된다. 실증 분석 결과 첫째, 내부회계관리제도 검토결과 비적절의견을 받은 경우 판매관리비의 하방경직성이 더 크게 나타났다. 둘째, 전기에 비해 검토의견이 개선된 경우 경영자의 기회주의적 의사결정을 효과적으로 통제할 수 있게 됨에 따라 판매관리비의 하방경직성이 완화되었다. 셋째, 최대주주지분율이 높아질수록 내부회계관리제도의 비적절의견이 비대칭적 원가행태에 미치는 영향이 약화되어 최대주주가 대리인 비용을 감소시켜 효과적인 지배구조역할을 수행하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 내부회계관리제도가 효과적으로 운영되지 않을 경우 경영자의 원가관련 의사결정에 영향을 미치게 되고, 이에 따라 비대칭적 원가행태가 나타나는지 검증하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 나아가 우리나라에서 중요한 지배구조 역할을 수행하고 있는 최대주주 지분율 수준에 따라 내부회계관리제도 검토의견이 원가의 비대칭성에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다는 측면에서 공헌점이 있다. This paper examines whether the review on internal accounting control affects asymmetric cost behavior. Ineffective internal control systemweakens monitoring ability for management, thereby decreasing reliability of financial statements and increasing information asymmetry between managers and outside stakeholders. Further, internal accounting control system includes programs to safeguard assets and to prevent from fraud. Material weakness in internal control is likely to trigger agency costs because it is difficult to oversee and control managers. Thus, we predict that firms receiving non-unqualified opinion from internal accounting control review have greater stickiness of selling, general and administrative(SG&A) costs because managers are less likely to reduce their committed resources even though sales decrease for the purpose of pursuing private interests to maximize their own utility. In addition, we examine whether firms that report internal control weakness in the previous year and subsequently receive unqualified opinion in the current year show weaker stickiness of SG&A costs. Since these firms have remediated problems in their internal control system, outside stakeholders are more likely to have stronger monitoring ability to control manager``s opportunistic decision making, resulting in weaker stickiness of SG&A costs. Finally, we investigate whether the impact of internal control weakness on asymmetric cost behavior varies according to the level of largest shareholders`` ownership which serves as an effective corporate governance mechanism. We test our predictions using a sample of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange(KSE) and on the Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation(KOSDAQ) over the period from 2005 to 2010. To measure asymmetric behavior of SG&A costs, we rely on the empirical model developed by Anderson et al.(2003). Our empirical analysis shows the following results. First, we find that the non-unqualified review opinion on internal accounting control increases the cost stickiness. This suggests that problems in internal accounting control system lead to cost management inefficiency. Second, when firms disclose improved review opinion by receiving unqualified opinion in the following year, the cost stickiness is mitigated. This imply that firms that correct previously reported internal controlweakness problems are less likely to present asymmetric cost behavior. Finally, the impact of non-unqualified review opinion on the stickiness of SG&A costs is more pronounced in firms with lower percentage of largest shareholders`` ownership, suggesting that largest shareholders act as an effective governance mechanism by reducing agency costs. This study provides empirical evidence that ineffective internal control system affects managers`` cost-related decision making as it results in greater cost stickiness. Korean firms disclose review opinions on internal control over financial reporting whereas U.S. firms disclose audit opinions. Even though the level of attestation is lower than that reported by U.S. firms, our findings demonstrate the effectiveness of internal accounting control systems in Korea. In addition, this paper contributes to understanding the role of largest shareholders by showing that the impact of non-unqualified review opinion on asymmetric cost behavior is more concentrated in firms with lower percentage of largest shareholders`` ownership.

하방경직적 원가행태와 내부회계관리제도 검토의견에 관한 연구

조정은,최현정,장금주 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.6

This paper examines whether the review on internal accounting control affects asymmetric cost behavior. Ineffective internal control system weakens monitoring ability for management, thereby decreasing reliability of financial statements and increasing information asymmetry between managers and outside stakeholders. Further, internal accounting control system includes programs to safeguard assets and to prevent from fraud. Material weakness in internal control is likely to trigger agency costs because it is difficult to oversee and control managers. Thus, we predict that firms receiving non-unqualified opinion from internal accounting control review have greater stickiness of selling, general and administrative(SG&A) costs because managers are less likely to reduce their committed resources even though sales decrease for the purpose of pursuing private interests to maximize their own utility. In addition, we examine whether firms that report internal control weakness in the previous year and subsequently receive unqualified opinion in the current year show weaker stickiness of SG&A costs. Since these firms have remediated problems in their internal control system, outside stakeholders are more likely to have stronger monitoring ability to control manager’s opportunistic decision making, resulting in weaker stickiness of SG&A costs. Finally, we investigate whether the impact of internal control weakness on asymmetric cost behavior varies according to the level of largest shareholders’ ownership which serves as an effective corporate governance mechanism. We test our predictions using a sample of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange(KSE) and on the Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation(KOSDAQ) over the period from 2005 to 2010. To measure asymmetric behavior of SG&A costs, we rely on the empirical model developed by Anderson et al.(2003). Our empirical analysis shows the following results. First, we find that the non-unqualified review opinion on internal accounting control increases the cost stickiness. This suggests that problems in internal accounting control system lead to cost management inefficiency. Second, when firms disclose improved review opinion by receiving unqualified opinion in the following year, the cost stickiness is mitigated. This imply that firms that correct previously reported internal control weakness problems are less likely to present asymmetric cost behavior. Finally, the impact of non-unqualified review opinion on the stickiness of SG&A costs is more pronounced in firms with lower percentage of largest shareholders’ ownership, suggesting that largest shareholders act as an effective governance mechanism by reducing agency costs. This study provides empirical evidence that ineffective internal control system affects managers’ cost-related decision making as it results in greater cost stickiness. Korean firms disclose review opinions on internal control over financial reporting whereas U.S. firms disclose audit opinions. Even though the level of attestation is lower than that reported by U.S. firms, our findings demonstrate the effectiveness of internal accounting control systems in Korea. In addition, this paper contributes to understanding the role of largest shareholders by showing that the impact of non-unqualified review opinion on asymmetric cost behavior is more concentrated in firms with lower percentage of largest shareholders’ ownership. 본 연구는 내부회계관리제도 검토의견이 비대칭적 원가행태에 미치는 영향에 대해 검증하였다. 내부회계관리제도가 효과적으로 운영되지 않으면 내부통제 및 감독 기능의 약화로 인해 재무제표의 신뢰성을 하락시키며 정보비대칭은 증가한다. 또한 자산의 보호 및 부정방지 프로그램이 포함되어 있는 내부회계관리제도에 중요한 문제점이 있을 때 경영자를 감시하고 통제하기 힘들게 되어 대리인 비용이 높아지게 된다. 이에 따라 내부회계관리제도 검토결과 비적절의견을 받은 기업은 경영자가 사적이익 및 효용을 추구하기 위해 매출이 감소함에도 비용을 감축시키지 않음에 따라 하방경직적 원가행태가 더 크게 나타날 것으로 예상된다. 실증 분석 결과 첫째, 내부회계관리제도 검토결과 비적절의견을 받은 경우 판매관리비의 하방경직성이 더 크게 나타났다. 둘째, 전기에 비해 검토의견이 개선된 경우 경영자의 기회주의적 의사결정을 효과적으로 통제할 수 있게 됨에 따라 판매관리비의 하방경직성이 완화되었다. 셋째, 최대주주지분율이 높아질수록 내부회계관리제도의 비적절의견이 비대칭적 원가행태에 미치는 영향이 약화되어 최대주주가 대리인 비용을 감소시켜 효과적인 지배구조 역할을 수행하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 내부회계관리제도가 효과적으로 운영되지 않을 경우 경영자의 원가관련 의사결정에 영향을 미치게 되고, 이에 따라 비대칭적 원가행태가 나타나는지 검증하였다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 나아가 우리나라에서 중요한 지배구조 역할을 수행하고 있는 최대주주 지분율 수준에 따라 내부회계관리제도 검토의견이 원가의 비대칭성에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다는 측면에서 공헌점이 있다.

A Case Study on Cost Control Based on Value Chain : Focusing on the Case of Chinese FH Dairy Company

Jiang Zhi-Hui(강지혜),Ko Dae-Young(고대영) 한국국제회계학회 2021 국제회계연구 Vol.- No.98

[연구목적] 낙농업에 대한 중국정부의 관련 정책에 따라 낙농기업의 경영환경은 점점 더 복잡해지고 다양해지고 있다. 이러한 경영환경의 변화에 직면한 낙농기업들은 대부분 과거에서부터 해오던 기초적인 원가통제 단계에 머물러 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 가치사슬에 기반한 원가 통제를 낙농기업에 적용하여 이에 대한 개선방법을 사례연구를 통해 제시하고자 한다. [연구방법] 본 사례연구에 대한 내용은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 기존 연구와 이론을 바탕으로 중국 FH 낙농 회사의 원가관리 현황을 분석하여 원가와 예산관리에 대한 문제점을 찾아 낸다. 둘째, 가치 사슬 원가통제를 도입하기 위한 중국FH 낙농기업의 외부 가치사슬과 내부 가치사슬을 각각 분석하여 두 가치사슬의 연결을 통한 부가가치를 모색한다. 마지막으로, 중국FH 낙농기업에 대한 합리적인 개선 방안을 제안한다. [연구결과] 중국 FH기업은 외부 가치사슬의 원가통제를 위해 정보수집, 판매경로 확대, 경쟁적 우위에 대해 관심을 두어야하며, 내부 가치사슬의 원가통제를 위해서는 원가예산시스템의 최적화, 원가통제방법의 개선, 원가통제의 범위 확대가 요구된다. [연구의 시사점] 현재 중국 모든 기업들이 겪고 있는 지속적인 인건비 상승, 원자재 확보의 어려움, 전력부족뿐만 아니라 특히, 유제품 회사의 경우 최근 고비용 시대에 접어들어 기업발전에 큰 장애물이 되고있다. 본 연구의 결과는 효율적인 원가통제를 위한 새로운 접근방법을 제시함으로써 중국 유제품 회사의 합리적인 원가통제 개선 방안을 제공하고 있다. [Purpose] According to the relevant policies of the Chinese government on dairy farming, the business environment of dairy enterprises is becoming more complex and diversified. Most of the dairy companies facing these changes in the business environment remain in the basic cost control stage that they have been doing in the past. Therefore, in this study, cost control based on the value chain is applied to dairy companies and an improvement method is presented through a case study. [Methodology] In this study, we propose a cost control based on the value chain in this way were applied to FH Chinese companies. The contents of this case study are as follows. First, based on existing studies and theories, the cost management status of Chinese FH dairy companies is analyzed to find problems in cost and budget management. Second, we analyze the external and internal value chains of Chinese FH dairy companies to introduce value chain cost control, respectively, and seek added value by linking the two value chains. Finally, we propose a reasonable improvement plan for Chinese FH dairy enterprises. [Findings] In the cost control of the external value chain, it should pay attention to information collection, broaden sales channels and establish competitive advantages. In the cost control of internal value chain, it is necessary to optimize the cost budget system, improve the cost control method and broaden the scope of cost control. [Implications] In addition to the continuous rise in labor costs, difficulties in securing raw materials, and power shortages that all Chinese companies are currently experiencing, dairy companies in particular have recently entered an era of high costs and are becoming a major obstacle to corporate development. As a result, it is necessary to find a new approach for effective cost control of enterprises. In this study, we propose a cost control based on the value chain in this way were applied to FH Chinese companies.

준능동 제어시스템을 이용한 사장교의 진동제어 및 비용효율성 평가

함대기,옥승용,박원석,고현무,박관순 한국지진공학회 2005 한국지진공학회논문집 Vol.9 No.4

다양한 지진 규모 및 주파수 특성을 가지는 지반운동에 대하여 사장교에 장착된 준능동 제어시스템의 제어효과를 분석하고 비용효율성을 평가하였다. Dyke 등에 의하여 제시된 벤치마크 사장교 제어문제에 준능동 제어시스템을 설계하였으며, LQG 최적제어기에 기반한 bi-state 제어방법을 적용하였다. 제어시스템의 비용효율성은 제어시스템을 장착하지 않은 교량의 생애주기 비용에 대한 제어시스템을 장착한 교량의 생애주기비용의 비로서 정의하였으며, 손상비용 규모와 준능동 제어장치의 가격을 매개변수로 하여 그 변화에 따른 비용효율성 평가를 수행하였다. 분석 결과, 제어시스템의 경제적 효율성은 준능동 제어장지의 가격에 크게 민감하지 않은 반면, 손상비용 규모에 따라 민감하게 변화하였다. 또한 중진규모의 연약지반과 강진규모의 견고한 지반에 해당하는 지반운동에 대하여 준능동 제어시스템의 비용효율성이 높은 것으로 평가되었다. This paper presents cost-effectiveness evaluation of semi-active control system for cable-stayed bridge under earthquake excitations with various magnitudes and frequency contents. Semi-active control system, which is operated by using Bi-stale control method on the basis of linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) optimal controller, is designed for the benchmark control problem proposed by Dyke et at. The cost-effectiveness of the proposed control system is defined by the ratio of life-cycle costs between a bridge structure with shock transmission units and a bridge structure with the semi-active control devices. The simulated results show that the damper cost has little influence on the cost-effectiveness of the semi-active control system while the cost-effectiveness is quite sensitive to the damage cost induced by the bridge failure. It is also found that the semi-active control system guarantees relatively high cost-effectiveness for the cable-stayed bridge subject to the ground motions in the regions of moderate seismicity with soft soil condition and strong seismicity with stiff soil condition.

Development of a control algorithm aiming at cost-effective operation of a VRF heating system

Moon, Jin Woo,Yang, Young Kwon,Choi, Eun Ji,Choi, Young Jae,Lee, Kwang-Ho,Kim, Yong-Shik,Park, Bo Rang Elsevier 2019 Applied thermal engineering Vol.149 No.-

<P><B>Abstract</B></P> <P>This study aims to develop a control algorithm that can operate an intermittently working variable refrigerant flow (VRF) heating system in a cost-effective manner. An artificial neural network (ANN) model, which is designed to predict the heating energy cost during the next control cycle, is embedded in the control algorithm. By comparing the predicted energy costs for the different setpoint combinations for the system parameters, such as the air handling unit (AHU) supply air temperature, condensing warm fluid temperature, condensing warm fluid amount, and refrigerant condensing temperature, the control algorithm can determine the most cost-effective setpoints to optimally operate the heating system. Two major processes are conducted—development of the predictive control algorithm in which the ANN model is embedded, and performance tests in terms of prediction accuracy and cost efficiency using computer simulation. Results analysis reveals that the ANN model accurately predicts the energy cost, presenting a low coefficient of variation of the root mean square error value (7.42%) between the simulated and predicted results. In addition, the predictive control algorithm significantly saves on the heating energy cost by as much as 7.93% compared with the conventional heuristic control method. From the results analysis, the ANN model and the control algorithm show the potential for prediction accuracy and cost-effectiveness of the intermittently working VRF heating system.</P> <P><B>Highlights</B></P> <P> <UL> <LI> Cost-effective algorithm was developed for the control of VRF heating system. </LI> <LI> ANN model was embedded in the algorithm to determine the cost-effective operation. </LI> <LI> ANN stably predicted the cost for space heating. </LI> <LI> Proposed algorithm saved the heating cost compared to the conventional method. </LI> </UL> </P>

내부회계관리제도의 취약점과 원가비대칭성

유혜영,김새로나 한국회계정보학회 2015 한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집 Vol.2015 No.2

본 연구는 내부회계관리제도의 취약점 보고가 원가의 하방경직성에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 자신의 효용을 극대화하려는 경영자는 주주와의 관계에 있어 정보비대칭이 존재하는 경우 필요이상으로 기업 규모를 확장시키거나 유휴자원을 보유하려는 유인을 갖는다. 즉, 경영자에게 있어 조직 규모를 축소하거나 자신과 이해관계를 같이하는 종업원을 해고하는 것은 경영자 개인의 위신에 타격을 가져오므로, 경영자는 매출 감소 시에도 잉여자원을 유지함으로써 원가의 하방경직성을 야기한다. 선행연구에서는 기업지배구조와 같은 통제시스템이 대리인문제로 나타난 원가의 하방경직성에 어떠한 영향을 미치는가에 대해 검증해왔다. 본 연구는 선행연구를 확장하여, 대리인 문제에 대한 감시자로서 내부회계관리제도를 고려하였다. 내부회계관리제도가 효과적으로 운영될수록, 경영자의 기회주의적 유인이 제한되어 원가의 하방경직성이 완화될 것이다. 검증결과, 내부회계관리제도의 취약점을 보고한 기업에서 원가가 하방경직적 행태를 보이는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 내부통제가 취약할수록 경영자의 의사결정에 대한 감시가 효과적으로 이루어지지 못한다는 것을 의미한다. 아울러 이러한 하방경직성은 내부회계관리제도의 취약점이 개선된 경우 완화되는 것으로 나타났는데, 해당결과는 내부회계관리제도 취약점 개선의 필요성을 제고한다. 추가분석으로는 Anderson et al.(2003)의 측정치를 사용하여 가설을 재검증한 결과, 기본 분석과 일관된 결과를 확인하였으며, 기업의 이익투명성을 고려한 분석에서는 투명성 수준이 낮은 기업일수록 취약한 내부통제가 원가 하방경직성에 미치는 영향이 큰 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 선행연구를 확장하여 경영자에 의한 원가하방경직성을 통제하는 지배구조로 내부회계관리제도를 고려하였다. 본 연구의 결과는 내부통제의 수준에 따라 대리인문제가 좌우됨을 시사하며, 나아가 취약점의 개선이 추후 원가의 하방경직성에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다는 점에서 추가적 의미가 있다. This paper examines the effect of internal control deficiencies on cost stickiness. According to agency theory, the misalignment of interests between shareholders and managers leads to agency problems. Managers have incentives to engage in activities for their own benefits rather than the benefits of the firm’s shareholders. Managerial empire building refers to managers’ tendencies to grow the firm beyond its optimal size or to maintain unutilized resources with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status and power, that is, empire building managers are likely to decrease costs too slowly when sales go down. Previous study showed that strong corporate governance help bring the degree of cost asymmetry closer to the optimal level(Chen et al. 2012). Our research question examines whether cost stickiness is influenced by a firm’s internal control weakness(ICW). Managers of firms with weak internal control can more readily override the controls and therefore extract private benefits because managerial malfeasance is less likely to be detected without adequate internal control. Using a sample of firms for the period 2005-2011, we find that cost stickiness is greater for firms with ICW firms than for non-ICW firms. This evidence suggests managerial optimal decision making over cost management is facilitated by effective internal controls. We also find that this adverse effect of ICW on cost stickiness disappears after firms remediate previously reported ICW. Overall, the empirical results indicate that effective internal controls act as a governance mechanism that mitigates agency problems. Our study is related to a broader literature that examines the factors that determine the behavior of costs. We contribute to the literature by showing that internal control quality affects managers’ cost management behavior.

A minimum asymptotic mean squared error controller for an IMA(1, 1) noise process with a starting offset, and its resetting design

박창순 한국통계학회 2011 Journal of the Korean Statistical Society Vol.40 No.3

In a discrete-part manufacturing process, the noise is often described by an IMA(1, 1)process and the pure unit delay transfer function is used as the feedback controller to adjust it. The optimal controller for this process is the well-known minimum mean square error (MMSE) controller. The starting level of the IMA(1, 1) model is assumed to be on target when it starts. Considering such an impractical assumption, we adopt the starting offset. Since the starting offset is not observable, the MMSE controller does not exist. An alternative to the MMSE controller is the minimum asymptotic mean square error controller, which makes the long-run mean square error minimum. Another concern in this article is the un-stability of the controller, which may produce high adjustment costs and/or may exceed the physical bounds of the process adjustment. These practical barriers will prevent the controller to adjust the process properly. To avoid this dilemma, a resetting design is proposed. That is, the resetting procedure in use of the controller is to adjust the process according to the controller when it remains within the reset limit, and to reset the process, otherwise. The total cost for the manufacturing process is affected by the off-target cost, the adjustment cost, and the reset cost. Proper values for the reset limit are selected to minimize the average cost per reset interval (ACR) considering various process parameters and cost parameters. A time non-homogeneous Markov chain approach is used for calculating the ACR. The effect of adopting the starting offset is also studied here.

Economic Evaluation of IT Investments for Emergency Management

Taeha Kim,Youngjai Lee 한국데이타베이스학회 2008 Journal of information technology applications & m Vol.15 No.3

In an emergency management case, evaluating the economic value of information technology investments is a challenging problem due to the effects of decision making, uncertainty of disasters, and difficulty of measurements. Risk assessment and recovery process, one of the major functions in emergency management, consists of (1) measurement of damages or losses, (2) recovery planning, (3) reporting and approving budgets, (4) auctioning off recovery projects to constructors, and (5) construction for the recovery. Specifically and of our interest, measurement of damages or losses is often a costly and time-consuming process because the wide range of field surveys should be performed by a limited pool of trained agents. Managers, therefore, have to balance accuracy of the field survey against the total time to complete the survey. Using information technologies to support field survey and reporting has great potential to reduce errors and lowers the cost of the process. However, existing cost benefit analysis framework may be problematic to evaluate and justify the IT investment because the cost benefit analysis often include the long-run benefit of IT that is difficult to quantify and overlook the impact of managerial control upon the investment outcomes. Therefore, we present an alternative cost-centric control model that conservatively quantifies all cost savings to replace benefits in cost benefit analysis and incorporate the managerial control. The model provides a framework to examine how managerial decision making and uncertainty of disaster affect the economic value of IT investments. The current project in Emergency Agency in South Korea is introduced as a case to apply the cost-centric control model. Our work helps managers to better evaluate and justify IT-related investment alternatives in emergency management.

标准成本法与作业成本法融合的研究

徐香?(Xu, Xiang-Lan),金春洙(Kim, Chun-Soo) 한국국제회계학회 2017 국제회계연구 Vol.0 No.75

With the rapid development of science and technology and the popularization of information technology, the production environment and manufacturing processes have changed significantly, enterprises increasingly rely on machines and computer control program. The proportion of direct labor costs in the product cost structure has sharply declined, while the proportion of manufacturing cost has increased substantially. With the change of product cost structure, the focus of cost control is gradually shifted from direct material cost and direct labor cost to the manufacturing cost. In order to adapt to the new manufacturing environment, establishing a scientific cost management system has become an inevitable trend. Although the standard cost method provides a cost basis for cost control and performance evaluation, it is not easy to find out the specific link of the cost variance due to too single manufacturing cost distribution standard. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the basic idea of activity-based costing in the process of setting product standard cost. Based on the activity, the manufacturing cost of the product is allocated by different allocation ratio to ensure the accuracy of product cost accounting. This paper which is based on the standard cost method and activity-based cost method discusses the necessity for the integration of both, and describes its application in Boiler Manufacturing X Co. Ltd. to seek a new cost management model to adapt to the manufacturing environment of modern enterprises. Through the integration of standard cost method and activitybased costing method, the enterprise management goal and the specific production operation are combined to achieve the effective control of product cost.

기업지배구조론에 관한 서설적 고찰

서완석(Wan-Suk Suh) 한국기업법학회 2013 企業法硏究 Vol.27 No.4

The theory of corporate governance has been highly affected by the study of United States corporate governance. Many scholars observed that most large publicly traded corporations had advanced from concentrated, and often family, ownership to widely dispersed ownership lacking a large shareholder existence in order to raise large amounts of capital. The separation of ownership from control was meant to be beneficial because of the diversification effects of dispersed ownership and the specialization of managerial expertise in running the business. The negative aspect of this separation, however, was the apprehension that managers can not always serve the interests of the dispersed owners who were usually beyond their control. Corporate law scholars generally argue that the nature of corporate governance concerns differ based on the ownership structure of firms. While for publicly owned firms with diverse ownership the governance concern is primarily about the agency costs of management in relation to shareholders, for firms with controlling shareholders the fundamental concern that needs to be addressed by governance arrangements is the controlling shareholder’s opportunism. Additionally, in controlled family-owned entities, various family members often serve in executive management or board positions. Thus, minority shareholders of controlled entities are often concerned with self-dealing transactions and other types of expropriation or extraction of wealth by majority stockholders. But minority shareholders usually have limited power to affect the activities of the controlling stockholder through contesting control, voting rights, or pressuring the board of directors. Corporate governance convergence theories have traditionally associated themselves with one of two opposing positions, convergence or divergence. The convergence theories contend that due to the competitive forces of economic efficiency there will be a global convergence in corporate governance rules towards the Anglo-American shareholder oriented model. Divergence theories generally argue that local institutions or culture will cause divergence as opposed to convergence; or, alternatively, at least make convergence unlikely. Especially, Scholars constantly argue that the power of “path dependency” creates an obstacle as jurisdictions prepare themselves to converge toward the shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model. Even if we assume that market forces urge the predominance of the shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model, certain path-dependent forces might serve as strong obstacles in spite of market pressure. This paper describes that the experience in Korea did not support the traditional convergence theories because the borrowing of foreign law in successful economies tends to be highly piecemeal and selective. Company laws do not necessarily converge to more efficient or otherwise normatively superior points, but are influenced by fads and fashions. Corporate governance is the problem of agency costs. These costs occur because the separation of ownership from management creates manager incentives that may be different from those of shareholders. In the corporate setting, the most important agency cost is the cost of monitoring agents by the principal. These costs are not imposed merely through direct monitoring. Rather, monitoring costs also include various mechanisms by the principal “to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.” In Korea, concentration of ownership in public companies are controlled by a single shareholder, and significant corporate wealth in Korea is concentrated among a few families. Thus, it is less likely to have agency cost in those company. Nevertheless, the legal regime of Korean corporate governance mandatorily execute by applying a uniform standard to all listed company. To conclude, this paper propose that Korean corpo