12세기의 여일교류(麗日交流)와 송상(宋商)

고은미 ( Eun Mi Go ) 수선사학회 2014 史林 Vol.0 No.49

Japanese merchants as well as envoys deployed by Japanese local governments visited Goryeo for maritime trade in the 11st century, the records of which are frequently found in the History of Goryeo. However, the book contains a little content regarding the trade activities during the 12th century, leading to the interpretation that the number of Japanese visits to Goryeo ports dramatically decreased. Meanwhile, in the History of Goryeo, the articles about sea trade between Song Dynasty and Goryeo by Chinese merchants are founded on a nearly annual basis until 1104 and since then such record was written in a sporadic manner. Aside from the History of Goryeo, however, other Goryeo anthologies and Chinese historical materials prove the existence of regular visits by Chinese merchants throughout the Goryeo period. Given the difference between contents of the History of Goryeo and actual traffic of Chinese merchants, the decline in the number of such records in the History of Goryeo could not be considered as the evidence of actual shrinkage of sea traffic between the two countries and it appears more accurate to perceive such decline as a result of selectively recording in the 12th century. The selective recording adopted in the History of Goryeo requires a careful approach to translate a decrease in articles about Japanese merchants`` visits in the 12th century as actual decline in trade between Goryeo and Japan. Therefore, this paper reviews exchanges between Goryeo and Japan in the 12th century with a focus on Chinese merchants who engaged in sea trade with a foothold in Japan. The port of Hakata in Kyushu was the Japanese official trade port governed by the Dazaifu, the Japanese regional government, especially in charge of external affairs. As the Chinese quarters were formed in Hakata in the middle of 11th century, the region severed as the center of overseas trade. Those Chinese merchants who settled down at the quarters were called hakata goshu 博多綱首 meaning Chinese ship owners residing the port of Hakata. They mainly concentrated on trade between Japan and Song Dynasty but were sometimes found to engage in intermediate trade between Goryeo and Japan. It is found that Japan obtained Buddhist scriptures of Goryeo three times during the period from 1097 to 1120; in the first case, a Dazaifu minster sent an envoy to Goryeo while in the two other cases, Chinese merchants brought the Buddhist texts to Japan at the requests of Japanese Buddhist monks who traveled from Nara to Hakata. Transit trade with Goryeo by Chinese merchants dwelling in Japan can be found in as early as the 1070s. In the 11th century, a lot of merchants who did trade with Goryeo lived in the Dazaifu region and some of them are deemed as Chinese merchants. One historical record shows that a figure, assumed as a Chinese merchant in Japan, traveled between Goryeo and Japan even in 1147. This suggests that merchants still continued to trade with Goryeo even in the 12th century although only little record exists in Goryeo historical materials. Those merchants could be seen as an extension of the merchant group who did maritime trade with Goryeo in the 11th century.

淸末(1882-1894년) 漢城 華商組織과 그 位相

김희신(Kim Hee-Sin) 중국근현대사학회 2010 중국근현대사연구 Vol.46 No.-

This study was conducted as a part of research on the history of overseas Chinese, focusing on the diplomatic relationship between Korea and China, in order to see how Chinese in Korea adapted and organized themselves for the changing new society of Chosun. Chen Shu Tang, who was sent as the General Trade Commissioner, ordered Chinese merchants to recommend an director who would be selected to supervise the ground leveling work, and just after the selection, instructed to establish the ‘Chinese Guild’. The Guild was built on April 26 in 1884 on the site of a purchased tile­roofed house to the left of the Commercial Affair Office. As the guild was established for pursing the common goals, namely, the development and unity of the Chinese merchant association, it was the first private office launched mainly be Chinese merchants. Chinese merchants opened the center for discussing public affairs and recommended the representative of the guild. In addition, it collected 0.4% dues from the members’ trades and used it for the operation of the guild, and even boatman(chuan hu) agreed on ‘Regulations on the Guild’ stipulated by Chinese merchants for raising funds for the operation of the guild. This suggests that there were motives for voluntary participation. However, the selection of director, the representative of the guild, was initiated by the role of supervising the ground leveling work for the Incheon settlement, and official seal was paid by the Commercial Affair Office. Furthermore, half of the money for buying the guild building was borrowed by General Commissioner Chen Shu Tang from official funds. Considering these facts, the guild was launched not as a completely private organization but as ‘a semi­governmental’ institution. During the early stage of Chinese settlement, a federation called ‘Chinese guild(Chinese Merchant Center in Hanseong)’ was organized in April, 1884 in order to lay a stable base. From that time on, the number of Chinese merchants increased and their interests were changed, and as a result, the Chinese Merchant Center in Hanseong was divided into the northern and southern centers on December 9, 1885, In October, 1888, Chinese merchants in Seoul were divided gradually into the northern, southern and Guang groups. Each group recommended their own director. Directors during this period included Xiong Ting­han, Zhu Guan­Guang, Lu En-Shao(Chinese Guild), Lu En-Shao, Jiang Yan­Zi, Chen Guang­Run(Northern Group), Yuan Xian­Zhang, Lin Yue­Jiao, Zhang Chuan­Mao(Southern Group), and Dam Yi­shi (Guang Group). In this way, Chinese merchants in the early Chinese society in Korea formed their groups centering on specific localities, and the structure divided into groups was a remarkable phenomenon. However, while complying with the goals of the organization of the ‘Chinese Guild’, the Chinese merchants wanted to form their own group with culturally homogeneous members, separated the organization, and to promote the group’s common goals. This is also probably the reason that they were grouped by locality according to the traditional principle of organization. ‘Overseas Chinese’ in Korea originated from Chinese merchants at the end of the Qing Dynasty. Different from premodern overseas Chinese irrelevant to state power, modern overseas Chinese grew in close connection with state power. Chinese merchants in Seoul were managed strategically by their motherland from the early period of overseas Chinese social organizations. On the other hand, Chinese merchants used state power by complying with the state’s political strategies actively. As each Chinese merchant had to be a member of a group in order to run their business in Korea, the guilds in Seoul naturally became the center of overseas Chinese society. This provided a base for Chinese merchants to grow and surpassed Korean and Japanese merchants in Seoul where competition among Korea, Japan and China was most fierce.

淸末 駐漢城 商務公署와 華商組織

김희신 동북아역사재단 2012 東北亞歷史論叢 Vol.- No.35

Overseas Chinese in Korea originated from Chinese merchants at the end of the Qing Dynasty. As each Chinese merchant had to be a member of a group in order to run their business in Korea, the guilds in Seoul naturally became the center of this overseas Chinese society. In this way, Chinese merchants in the early Chinese society in Korea formed their groups centering on specific localities, and the structure divided into groups was a remarkable phenomenon. However, while complying with the goals of the organization of the Chinese Guild, the Chinese merchants wanted to form their own groups with culturally homogeneous members, separate the organization, and promote the group’s common goals. This is also probably the reason that they were grouped by locality according to the traditional principle of organization. As the guild was established for pursuing common goals, namely,the development and unity of the Chinese merchant association, it was the first private office launched mainly by Chinese merchants. Chinese merchants opened a center for discussing public affairs and recommended the representative of the guild. In addition, they collected 0.4% dues from the members’ trades and used it for the operation of the guild. Even boatmen agreed on the “Regulations on the Guild” stipulated by Chinese merchants for raising funds for the guild’s operation. This suggests that there were motives for voluntary participation. However,the selection of director, the representative of the guild, was initiated by the role of supervising the ground-leveling work for the Incheon settlement, and the official seal was paid for by the Commercial Affairs Office. Furthermore, half of the money for buying the guild building was borrowed by General Commissioner Chen Shutang from official funds. Considering these facts, the guild was launched not as a completely private organization but as “a semi-governmental”institution. Differing from pre-modern overseas Chinese who were irrelevant to state power, modern overseas Chinese grew in close connection with state power. Chinese merchants in Seoul were managed strategically by their homeland from the early period of overseas Chinese social organizations. On the other hand, Chinese merchants used state power by complying with the state’s political strategies actively. This provided a base for Chinese merchants to grow and surpassed Korean and Japanese merchants in Seoul where competition among Korea, Japan,and China was most fierce.

재조선 화교 염상과 조선총독부의 외염 관리

김희신(Kim Hee-sin) 중국근현대사학회 2018 중국근현대사연구 Vol.77 No.-

This study examines the activities of overseas Chinese salt merchants in Joseon, especially after the foreign salt management of Joseon Governor General, how the activities of salt merchant have declined. Looking at the imports of foreign salt by open ports in 1905‐1909, most of the Chinese salt was imported through Incheon and Jinnampo. The volume of import through Busan and Wonsan was very small and almost nothing. In the 1920s, with the increase in Chinese salt consumption in Joseon, it expanded to other commercial ports such as Gunsan, Mokpo, Busan, Wonsan, and Shinuiju. Among them, 16 overseas Chinese merchants" stores selling Chinese salt were found in Incheon, Jinnampo, Gunsan, Mokpo and Shinuiju in 1930. Although there was some variation in the distribution of salt merchants by port, during the decade of the 1920s, Joseon"s overseas Chinese merchants seemed to have maintained their business without any major changes. Overseas Chinese salt merchants from different regions in the country were mainly engaged in consignment sales on behalf of salt boats from China, or by purchasing salt from the Junk(帆船) directly from China, the stores themselves traveled directly to and from China, transporting and selling salt. The process of importing and exporting salt with China"s Junk was subject to taxes with various names. In addition to export and import tariffs, Chinese Consulate in Joseon collected ‘帆船照費’ along with ‘帆船噸捐’ when the Junk arrived. In particular, the income of two items collected from Incheon consulate was used as an expense for ‘Incheon Overseas Chinese Elementary School’ since 1914. In general, Chinese salt imported through open ports was consumed locally by wholesalers and retailers or re‐transferred to various parts of Joseon. Overseas Chinese merchants in Joseon had store nets and customer lists in major commercial areas based on long commercial activities. In addition, they organized a salt‐business organization in each area to study Chinese salt and cope with its related business. This commercial network had important implications for salt demand, market research, information transmission and commodity trading in the Joseon market. Meanwhile, the Joseon Governor General in April 1930 started the management of imported salt in the name of Joseon"s salt industry protection. The monopoly bureau stated that they would basically do things so that the ‘existing salt workers would not be affected as possible as they could,’ according to the circumstances of each region, but it turned out that it was impossible for existing salt workers to maintain their operations. Regardless of the region, the bureau set very low prices, and there was a drastic change in the existing way of commerce. Most of the prospects of overseas Chinese salt merchants were desperate. Thus, the Chinese government tried to reduce the export tax rate of Junk salt considering the situation of salt merchants and to encourage export through cost reduction. In March 1935, there were only four salt handling stores in Incheon left, and all of the overseas Chinese salt merchant"s import sales rights were lost in other areas. The revenue of `帆船照費` and `帆船噸捐’was sharply reduced, adding to the difficulty of the security of the Incheon Overseas Chinese Elementary School, which eventually resulted in a temporary closure in 1932. Of course, the reason why the Overseas Chinese Elementary School was closed can be explained in various aspects. However, the lack of expenses was an important part of determining the operation of the Overseas Chinese Elementary School. Therefore, it is true that the effect of foreign salt control on overseas Chinese society cannot be neglected.

駐朝鮮使館의 화교 실태조사와 관리 ― 청일전쟁 이전 漢城ㆍ仁川을 중심으로 ―

김희신 명청사학회 2010 명청사연구 Vol.0 No.34

This study was conducted as a part of research on the history of policies for Chinese in Chosun, focusing on how China managed Chinese in Chosun in consideration of international environment surrounding Chosun in those days. It was after the conclusion of <Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects> that China tried active management of Chinese in Chosun, which was a strategic region in East Asia. Thus, it sent Qing trade commissioners to open ports including Hanseong so that they would be responsible to protect Chinese merchants. The first Trade Commissioner was Chen Shu Tang, who was succeeded by Yuan Shi Kai as the General Commissioner of Trade. Offices in the open ports and Hanseong where the trade commissioners resided became bases for managing and protecting Chinese merchants. With this, the minimum condition was satisfied for Chinese merchants to run their business in Chosun safely. At the beginning, the offices had limitations in personnel, budget, etc., so they had difficulty in managing Chinese in Chosun. With increase in the number of Chinese merchants, Chinese merchants established their own private organizations called Center and the directors of the organizations were given responsibility to survey and monitor the state of Chinese in Chosun. Particularly in 1889, the Police Office was erected in Hanseong, and it assumed responsibility for management and inspection according to <Regulations for Policing>. Trade between Korea and China was conducted basically based on <Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects>. However, the range of Chinese activities in Chosun went beyond Hanseong and open ports permitted by the regulations. An example was trade with inland areas through the issue of travel document. Travel document was issued in a form approved by the officials of both countries and through the joint sealing by the officials of both countries. In the procedure of the application, issue and return of travel document, the director of each center was involved and stood security and he assumed responsibility to manage the Chinese merchant. Furthermore, illegal acts occurred frequently such as entering an inland area without travel document and opening a shop, smuggling without passing through the open ports, and running business wherever they wanted. Such acts were regulated strictly by punishing the involved director and surety. Chinese officers gave instructions against illegal stay and smuggling continuously, and arrested and deported offenders. Most of previous studies understood the background of such frequent illegal acts as a phenomenon resulting from the trade relation between Chosun and China. In addition, they underestimated the Chinese officers’ series of actions against illegal acts as nominal gestures existing only in official documents. Until the establishment of the offices, however, there had never been such a strict measure to manage Chinese in Chosun. The management of Chinese in Korea was also for protecting them, and while Chinese in Chosen were managed and protected by the Chinese government, Chinese merchants could maintain and expand their power stably in Hanseong and Incheon where they competed with Korean and Japanese merchants. On the other hand, the rampancy of illegal acts was considered to disgrace China as a big country and to damage their image among Korean people. From this viewpoint, the management of Chinese merchants was one of efforts to save the face of China as a big country, and again the issue is returned to the ‘inequality’ problem of <Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects>. It was just and necessary enough for China to trade with Korea and to manage Chinese merchants according to <Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects>. Trade between Korea and China was basically conducted under <Regulations for Maritime and ...

‘訴訟’ 안건을 통해 본 청일전쟁 이후(1895~1899) 韓中關係 연구

이은자(Lee eun-ja) 중국근현대사학회 2008 중국근현대사연구 Vol.38 No.-

The present study examined details on the Korea Chinese relation changed after the Sino Japanese War (1895~1899) through analyzing legal cases between Korea and China. Specifically, for the analysis, the period was divided into the period of 'The Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants' (December 1894~October 1895) and that of 'The Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea' (November 1895~October 1899) based on the legal ground of legal procedure. After the outbreak of the Sino Japanese War, Korea abolished the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects, and established the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants. According to Article 8 of the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants, Korea exercised jurisdiction over Chinese merchants residing in Korea. Later the British Consulate in Korea abolished the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants through conference with the Korean government, and exercised jurisdiction over Chinese Merchants in Korea by Article 3 of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea. According to legal cases that took place during the period of the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants, the Korean government tried Chinese defendants based on the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants in principle. In legal cases during the period of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea, Korea and China (officially Korea and the U.K.) protected their own peoples by the according to defendant's nationality principle of consular jurisdiction and the exercise of the right to observe trials according to provisions on jurisdiction in the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea. This shows a difference from the period of the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects when consular jurisdiction was applied unilaterally to Chinese in Korea. The reality that provisions on jurisdiction in the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea were applied to Chinese in Korea was acknowledged, but although there was no treaty between Korea and China after the Sino Japanese War, public opinion of Korean people criticized the British consul's exercise of jurisdiction over Chinese in Korea. In addition, it was insisted that Chinese' landownership in the concession should not be acknowledged until a new treaty was made.

채무소송으로 본 華商의 商慣行(1906~1910) - 移住空間 漢城을 중심으로 -

손승희 동북아역사재단 2012 東北亞歷史論叢 Vol.- No.36

This study analyzed debt liability suits in the “Documents of the Chinese Diplomatic Office in Korea” (「駐韓使館檔」) of the Chinese Consul Ma Tingliang(馬廷亮). I examined not only the aspects of competition among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean merchants at Hanseong as an immigrant area, but also activities and commercial practices of Chinese merchants. A review of 75 cases of debt liability suits in the “Documents of the Chinese Diplomatic Office in Korea” during Ma Tingliang’s time in office show that the process and the shape of suits differed according to the nationality of the complainant and the nationality of the defendant. In order to know commercial practices at Hanseong, this article mainly analyzed suits regarding a Korean merchant’s payment default. In many cases, payment default and debtor’s runaway happened in business between a Chinese merchant and a Korean merchant. This should be connected with the commodity distribution channels in Hanseong. It was common that the imported/exported goods were dealt through brokers, who did business as a broker or a wholesaler who repaid the value of the commodity later. Naturally, these types of credit-type business of indirect long-term connection between the buyer and the seller may have led to frequent disputes over payment. Chinese merchants who had not been repaid and, moreover, could not chase the escaped debtor tried to get compensation through a colleague(同夥) or a shop manager, or through a broker(經紀), and even through a relative of the debtor. In order to explain these situations, I reviewed how the Hapgua Company(合夥企業), a Chinese company,settled debt. In the Hapgua Company, it was the principle that the profits and the losses of the company shall be shared according to the ratio of shareholding. But when a debtor ran away, the creditor tried to ask the shareholder(s) or their relatives to return instead. At that time there was no concrete rule in the law, and the debt return might be ruled by general practice. In China, the shareholder(s) normally was also responsible for the debt. Thus, naturally, the Chinese merchant tried to get unlimited responsibility for the return of the debt from the business partner or from relatives. Also, in China a jingji , or broker, only performed brokering duties and had no responsibility for debt return. But in Korea, Chinese merchants sometimes requested the jingji to be responsible for the debt owing to the fact that the jingji did the urging of the return of debt and the debt return had been done by the jingji . As briefly described above, the relationship and meaning of the business partner, the employee, the employer, and others were considerably different between Korea and Chinese merchants. It seems that this difference was a major reason for the complexity and difficulties of resolving disputes.

개항기 초상국(招商局)의 한국항로 개척과 한중 해상운송망

김영신 ( Kim¸ Young-sin ) 부경역사연구소 2021 지역과 역사 Vol.- No.48

수입품의 판매가격은 구매력과 직결되어 판로를 좌우한다. 유통과정의 단축과 운임의 절감을 통해 상품 원가를 어느 정도 하락시킬 수 있다. 그러므로 생산지나 집산지에서 직송하는 직무역이 절대적으로 유리하다. 개항 초 공히 중계무역을 통해 한국시장 진출을 노렸던 日商과 華商의 경쟁관계에서 운송망 확충은 무엇보다도 중요하였다. 화상이 단시간에 한국 무역시장에서 힘을 발휘할 수 있었던 것은 한국에서의 정치적, 경제적 세력 확대를 통해 그간 형식에 불과하였던 ‘종주권’을 강화하려는 중국 정부의 정책변화에 힘입은 바가 컸다. 중국 정부의 지원 아래 한중 간 해상운송망이 확충된 것은 화상의 상무진흥에 결정적으로 작용하였다. 한국의 내정과 외교에 깊숙이 개입하였던 袁世凱는 경제세력 확장에도 많은 관심을 기울였다. 그는 재임기간 화상의 정상적인 무역활동은 물론이고 ‘밀무역’까지도 방조하고 조장하는 등 화상의 경제활동에 유무형의 도움을 주었다. 화상의 경제진출지원 방면에서 가장 두드러지는 부분이 초상국 선박의 정기적인 한국운항을 성사시킨 것이다. 上海와 仁川을 잇는 해상운송망 확충은 화상의 무역활동을 이루는 근간이라는 경제적 의미를 지닌다. 한중항로는 운항 후 계속되는 적자에 한 차례 운항이 중단되기도 하였다. 그럼에도 항로를 재개설하고 적자상태에서도 유지한 것은 ‘상국으로서의 체면’을 중시한 李鴻章의 의지가 반영된 것이다. 이는 한중항로 개통과 유지가 정치적 의미까지 가지고 있었음을 보여주는 예이다. The selling price of imported goods is directly related to purchasing power and further decides the market. The product cost can be cut to some degree by shortening the distribution process and reducing freight charges. In that sense, the direct trade, by which goods are directly sent from the production area or the distribution center to the final destination, is absolutely advantageous in terms of price. The most important foundation in building a direct trade system which ensures direct transport of imported goods and direct transaction is the expansion of a transportation network where the distribution bases of goods are connected. In this regard, at the initial stage of overseas trade, the expansion of a transportation network was of the greatest importance in the competitive relationship between Japanese and Chinese merchants who aimed to enter the Korean market through intermediate trade. At the time of initial entry into the Korean market, Chinese merchants, who were late to enter the Korean market compared to Japanese merchants, were in a relatively unfavorable position in the aspect of transportation network. To overcome this challenge, Chénshutang in charge of Chinese trade with Korea actively promoted the operation of Chinese vessels led by the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company to Korea, under the broad support of Lǐ Hóngzhāng. Yuán Shìkǎi, who involved himself deeply in the internal affairs and diplomacy of Korea at that time, paid much attention even to the expansion of economic forces in Korea. During his reign, he gave tangible and intangible assistance in Chinese merchants' economic activities by not only promoting their normal trading activities but even neglecting or encouraging “smuggling”. The most noticeable part in his trading support for Chinese merchants would be that it was made possible for Chinese vessels operated by the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company to regularly navigate to Korean sea routes. The total volume of Korean-Chinese trade between 1883 and 1892 was just 0.01 to 0.25% of that of China's overseas trade during the same period. Korea was of little importance to China in terms of trade advancement. Nevertheless, the Chinese government was active in supporting the economic activities of Chinese merchants in Korea, with an intention of strengthening suzerainty through the improvement of economic strength and, at the same time, countering the Japanese forces. In some ways, the act of pioneering Korean sea routes seemed to stem from several political considerations, but it would certainly be a considerable help for the trading activities of Chinese merchants in Korea. At the end of the 19th century, when railroads were not built yet, the navigation of steamship as a new means of transportation and the regular operation of vessels were the absolute conditions for the development of overseas trade.

戰時期 동아시아 廣東商人 자본의 환류, 1931~1949

강진아(KANG, Jin A) 중국근현대사학회 2013 중국근현대사연구 Vol.58 No.-

This paper discusses the cycle of diffusion and convergence of Cantonese capital, one of the biggest transnational capitals in East Asia in the 20th century and focuses on the trend of its returning to China and greater China during the wartime. At first, Cantonese merchants following the shift of Western trading companies in large numbers migrated from their hometowns-Canton and Pearl River Delta-to Shanghai, a new open port which developed into the biggest metropolitan in East Asian by the end of 19th century and substituted the place of Canton as a leading trade port in China in a short span of time. Shanghai became not only the distribution center for British products in East Asia, but also the center of East Asia interregional trade. The opening of Japan forced by Western powers and the opening of Korea following Japan’s fate gave new chances to Cantonese merchants in Shanghai. Even though Japan and Korea witnessed the same phenomenon that Cantonese merchants occupied the considerable share among early Chinese immigrants, the motivation and the characteristics of the immigrants were different in each region. Western companies took Cantonese compradors to Japan and Cantonese merchants found their own business chances with the expansion of foreign trade in Japan. Mostly, they managed the import trade from China to Japan. On the contrary, Korea saw Cantonese merchants at first in Incheon with the advent of political and military intervention of Qing Empire in 1882. The presence of Qing power in Choseon provided for Chinese business in Korea and boosted a lot the immigration of Cantonese merchants. Accordingly, after the defeat of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, weakened political background made the Cantonese capital lose the economic interest in Choseon, Korea. In spite of that, still many Cantonese merchants kept their business in Korea, because the Sino-Korean trade itself continued to developed and increased by over 10 times until the forced annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. The Real blow on their business came with the tide of protectionism and nationalism in the 1920s. The Japanese home government and the Japanese Government General in Korea respectively adopted to raise the import tax on the silk and linen from China. Especially Korean media agitated nationalistic anti-Chinese sentiments stimulated by the Chinese oppression on Korean immigrants in Manchuria. Relatively high economic status of Korean-Chinese also caused the jealousy among Korean people. The decisive blow was the Wanbaoshan incident and the Mukden incident in 1931. Moreover, the full-scale war between Japan and China broke out in 1937, and Chinese in Japanese territory became the citizen of hostile country, and suspected as potential enemy highly possible to communicate secretly with mainland China. Political enmity drove Cantonese merchants to withdraw from Japan and Korea. However, Cantonese merchants had multiple choices for new settlement. It could be Canton, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore or other Southeast Asia. Multiple alternatives and interregional networks were their great advantages for immigrating capital, compared with Shandong merchants and laborers who maintained majority in the overseas Chinese population in Korea and whose number still kept increasing in Korea during the wartime. At first, most of Cantonese merchants in Japan and Korea returned to Canton or Shanghai as the wartime conditions got worse. However, Cantonese merchants in the mainland increasingly found Hong Kong attractive for a shelter to avoid the impact of war and political struggles. The civil war and the final triumph of Communist Party in the mainland China intensified the trend of capital shift from Shanghai to Hong Kong.

1910-1930년대 식민지 조선 북부 개항장 진남포화교의 실태

이은상 인천대학교 중국학술원 2024 비교중국연구 Vol.5 No.1

이 글에서는 1910-1930년대 식민지 조선 북부 개항장 진남포화교의 실태를 다음 세가지 측면에서 살펴보았다. 첫째, 개항 이후 진남포화교의 상황을 서술하였다. 개항 이전부터 중국 산동, 요녕과 조선 서해안의 황해, 평안도 간 교역이 빈번하였는데, 증남포가 개항되면서 그 교역의 중심지가 되었다. 선행업(船行業)은 개항 이전부터 시작된 오랜 역사를 갖고 있으며 범선으로 수입되는 대표적 물품은 중국산 원염이었다. 둘째, 1920년대 진남포화교의 실태를 검토하였다. 1920년대 전반부 직물도매상, 잡화소매상의 규모는 평양에 훨씬 미치지 못했다. 반면 화교상업의 특징으로 선행객잔상의 존재를 확인할 수 있다. 1920년대 후반부에는 직물잡화업의 경제력이 전반부에 비해 약화되었던 반면, 선행에서 출발한 원염 위탁판매업이 번성하였다. 마지막으로 배화폭동 전후 진남포 화교사회의 변화에 주목하였다. 1930년 4월 조선총독부가 식염 전매령을 시행하면서 선행, 염 위탁판매업은 쇠락하였다. 배화폭동으로 진남포의 물적, 인적 피해는 다른 지역에 비해 상대적으로 적었지만, 직물잡화업은 인근 평양 폭동의 영향으로 타격을 받았다. 화교 수는 급감하였고, 이후에도 회복하지 못했다. 중화상회는 주류 화상의 몰락으로 제 기능을 하지 못했고, 중화상회로부터 분리된 중화농회만이 명목을 유지하였다. 이상에서 진남포 화교사회의 변화는 조선총독부의 식염 전매령 시행으로 시작되었고, 배화폭동을 거치면서 심화되었음을 확인할 수 있다. This paper examines the status of Overseas Chinese in Jinnampo, a northern port city in Colonial Chosun in the 1910s-1930s, from the following three aspects: Firstly, It describes their status after the opening of the port. Trade between China and the western coast of Chosun, had been frequent even before the opening of the port. With the opening of Jinnampo, it became the central hub for this trade. Their junk transportation business has a long history that dates back before the port's opening, and the representative commodity imported by junk was Chinese-produced raw salt. Secondly, It examines their status in the 1920s. In the early 1920s, the scale of textile wholesale and general merchandise retail businesses was not as significant as Overseas Chinese in Pyongyang. On the other hand, a characteristic of Chinese commercial activities was the presence of junk transportation operations. In the late 1920s, the economic power of textile wholesale and general merchandise businesses had weakened compared to the earlier years. In contrast, the entrusted sales of raw salt that originated from the junk transportation operations thrived. Lastly, It focused on the changes in the Chinese community before and after the Anti-Chinese Riots. In April 1930, when the Government-General of Korea implemented the Salt Monopoly Ordinance, the junk transportation business and the entrusted salt sales declined as a result. While the Anti-Chinese Riots resulted in relatively less material and human damage in Jinnampo compared to other city, the wholesale goods business was affected due to the influence of nearby Pyongyang riots. Due to the decline of mainstream Chinese merchant, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was unable to formally elect executives and therefore couldn't function properly. Only the Chinese Farmers' Association, which had separated from it, maintained its nominal existence. In conclusion, the changes in the Chinese community began with the implementation of the Salt Monopoly Ordinance and intensified through the Anti-Chinese Riots.