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류한수(Lyu, Han-su) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2017 군사 Vol.- No.105
The purpose of this article is to examine the influence exerted by the American military scholars on the adoption by the U.S. Army of the theory of operational art which had been developed in the Soviet Union. We could see that the Russian military theorist Alexander Svechin introduced the innovative concept of operational art in 1920s. The Soviet army was quick to adopt operational art as its official military theory, whereas the U.S. army ignored it for a long time. The latter’s denial of the operational art can be explained by the fact that there was no the massive standing army which could be a basis of operational art and the lack of the experiences of managing the massive army in USA during the peace time. Moreover, the massive conventional forces have been replaced by nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The defeat in the Vietnam War, the massive build-up of the Soviet conventional forces, and the result of the Middle East War in 1973 compelled the U.S. army to think it necessary to adopt an intermediate concept between strategy and tactic, however. Under such circumstances, some American specialists in the Soviet army such as David Glantz and Jacob Kipp began to argue that the U.S. army should not hesitate to adopt the operational-level art which was the part and parcel of the Soviet military theories. Their endeavor prompted the United States Army Command and General Staff College to use the Soviet military literature as textbooks in the School of Advanced Military Studies. At last, the concept of operational art was officially stipulated in the 1986 FM-100/5. Those competent U.S. staff officers who learned the operational-level art by studying the Soviet military theories proceeded to make the efficient plans for the U.S. army’s military campaigns in the Gulf War in 1991. In a nutshell, some excellent Western specialists scrutinized the military theories of the Soviet Army in the Cold War era and contributed to the adoption by the U.S. Army of the operational art developed by the Soviet military theorists. As a result the USA won the Gulf War in 1991.
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한시준 ( Han Seejun ) 단국사학회 2018 史學志 Vol.57 No.-
Kim Hong-il was a Korean, yet participated in Chinese Army for nearly 30 years. He entered Guizhou Military Academy for Army (貴州陸軍講武學校: Guizhou Lujun Jiangwu Xuexiao) in 1919 for military training; since then till he came back to Korea in 1948, he served for Chinese army. For the time, Kim Hong-il participated in the Northern Expedition as a member of National Revolutionary Army (國民革命軍: Guomingemingjun); and during the Sino-Japanese War he fought against the Japanese empire as a commanding officer of Chinese army. His rank reached Brigadier General of Army (陸軍少將), and he passed through Army College (陸軍大學) which was the highest training course in Chinese Army. Besides the period in the early 1920’s in which Kim Hong-il served for Korean National Independence Army in Siberia, most of his military career was in Chinese Army. He started his Chinese Army career in 1926 as a major (小校) in the Eastern Rout Corps (東路軍) General Headquarter of National Revolutionary Army; he, then in sequence, took the posts of the vice-commander of an independent defence regiment in Zhejiang Province, the chief of staff and manager of arsenal of Wusong (吳淞) Fortress in Shanghai, the adjutant general of Army Engineering School in Nanjing, a member of Munition Planning Committee of Chinese Military Committee, the senior staff of Southwestern Government (西南綏靖公署) in Guizhou (貴州), the chief of staff in the 102nd division, the chief of staff of the 19th corps headquarter, the commander of the 19th division under the 19th corps, the chief of staff in the 2nd Army in Guilin (桂林), and the chief of staff of the Korean Liberation Army. After Japanese Empire surrendered, he took the office of the senior staff of the Northeastern Security Headquarter (東北保安司令部) which recovered Manchu area. Kim Hong-il participated in Northern Expedition and Sino-Japanese War as a member of Chinese Army. In 1926, he joined into National Revolutionary Army in Shantou (汕頭) of Guangdong Province, and fought against Warlord Sun Chuanfang in Fujian (福建), Shanghai (上海), and Hangzhou (杭州). Especially, he defeated Sun Chuanfang’s troops in Longtan (龍潭) nearby Nanjing; for this he received a medal from Guomintang Government. Since Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, he as a commanding officer fought several battles against Japanese army. Among them, the Battle of Wanjialing in October of 1938 and the Battle of Shanggao in March of 1941 represents the victories of Kim Hong-il as a commander. He participated in the Battle of Wanjialing as the chief of staff of the 102nd division, and in the Battle of Shanggao as the commanding general of the 19th division. He destroyed Japanese camp by firing mortars in Wanjialing; and he lured Japanese troops into a trap and besieged them in Shanggao. Especially, the Battle of Shanggao was one of China’s great notable victories in the history of Sino-Japanese War, and is known as ‘Shanggao Huizhan (上高會戰)’. Kim Hong-il’s activities should be highlighted as important examples of Chinese-Korean Anti-Japanese Alliance. During the first half of the 20th century, Korea and China shared a common fate fighting against the Japanese Empire, Korean and Chinese peoples allied together in various ways against Japanese army throughout Manchu and Chinese continent. One of the ways is that Koreans participated in Chinese Army in order to fight against the Japanese empire, like the case of Kim Hong-il. Thus, the historical cases in which Korean and Chinese peoples allied together against the Japanese empire should be discovered and researched.
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