연구 논문(硏究 論文) : 해운업에 있어 부당공동행위에 관한 연구

이정원 ( Jung Won Lee ) 한국해법학회 2012 韓國海法學會誌 Vol.34 No.1

해운법 제29조는 외항화물운송사업자로 하여금 타 외항화물운송사업자와 운임 등 운송조건에 대해 공동행위를 할 수 있도록 규정하고 있다. 그러나 외항화물운송사업자들의 이러한 공동행위는 공정거래법 제19조 제1항이 금지하고 있는 부당공동행위에 해당할 수 있고, 특히 공정거래법 제58조는 사업자 등이 다른 법령에 따라 행하는 정당한 행위에 대해서는 동 법을 적용하지 않는다고 규정하고 있어, 해운법 제29조에 따라 외항화물운송사업자가 행하는 공동행위가 공정거래법 제58조에 따라 공정거래법의 적용제외 사유가 되는지 여부가 문제가 된다. 해운법 제29조와 공정거래법 제58조 및 동 법 제19조를 종합적으로 해석할 경우, 해운법 제29조에 규정된 외항화물운송사업자 간의 공동행위는 공정거래법 제58조가 규정하는 다른 법률에 따라 행하는 행위에 해당한다. 그러나 공정거래법 제58조에 의해 동 법의 적용이 제외되기 위해서는 다른 법률에 따라 행하는 행위가 "정당성"을 갖추어야 하는데, 해운법 제29조 제3항 제3호는 외항화물운송사업자가 타 사업자와 체결한 협약의 내용이 부당하게 운임 등을 인상하여 관련 시장에서의 경쟁을 실질적으로 제한하는 경우에는 허용되지 않는다는 점에서 외항화물운송사업자에 대해 허용되는 공동행위의 한계가 되는 것이다. 해운법 제29조 제3항은 허용되지 않는 공동행위의 요건으로서 부당성과 실질적 경쟁제한성을 명시적으로 규정하고 있는데, 실질적 경쟁제한성이란 일정한 거래분야에서 시장지배력을 형성하는 행위를 말하며, 시장지배력 형성 여부를 판단함에 있어 가장 중요한 요소는 시장점유율이다. 따라서 외항화물운송사업자 등이 체결한 운임 등에 관한 협정으로 인해 관련 시장에서의 시장지배력이 형성 또는 강화되는 경우 이러한 협정은 관련 시장에서의 경쟁을 실질적으로 제한하는 행위로서 위법하다고 볼 수 있으며, 이 때 시장지배력을 판단함에 있어서는 공동행위에 참여한 외항화물운송사업자의 시장점유율이 중요한 판단요소로 작용할 것이다. 한편 실질적 경쟁제한성이 입증된 행위는 부당성이 사실상 추정되겠지만, 해운법 제1조의 입법취지인 이용자 편익의 향상이나 국민경제발전 등에 이바지하는 바가 크거나 해운산업합리화나 불황극복을 위해 필요한 행위로서 그 효율성 증대효과가 큰 경우에는 공동행위로 인한 경쟁제한성과 효율성 증대효과를 비교·형량하여 효율성 증대효과가 경쟁제한성 보다 클 경우에는 예외적으로 부당하지 않다고 볼 것이다. Article 29 of Korean Marine Transportation Act(hereunder, ``KMTA``) stipulates that ocean freighters can make agreement onto the condition of the carriage, for example rate and spaces. However agreement between ocean freighters can infringe Article 19(1) of Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(hereunder, ``KMRFTA``) which forbids cartel between business entities. In the meantime, there is a question whether ocean freighters` agreement on the rate etc. which is allowed by Article 29 of KMTA can be exempted from application of KMRFTA because Article 58 of KMRFTA allows business entities` legitimate acts which are based on other legislations. In conclusion, it is quite certain that agreement between ocean freighters based on Article 29 of KMTA is a legitimate act which is within the scope of Article 58 of KMRFTA. According to Article 29(3) of KMTA, it is required that ocean freighters` agreement should not substantially restrict competition in the relevant market by unjustifiable raise of rate or other means. In this regards, the above said Article functions as a limit for ocean freighters` agreement. As mentioned before, Article 29(3) of KMTA explicitly requires substantial restrict of competition and injustice as conditions for the act which is not permitted under that clause. In writer`s view, substantial restrict of competition means any acts of forming or fortifying dominant position in the relevant markets, and the most important factor for the assessment of dominance is a certain ocean freighter`s market share rate. Therefore when a certain ocean freighter`s dominant power forms or fortifies in the market by the agreement with other ocean freighters, it is likewise that the agreement is an unLawful act that substantially restricts competition in the market. In this context, an ocean freighter`s market share rate would be the most significant factor for the assessment of market dominance. Meanwhile, when it is proved that an act highly restricts competition one can also presume the act is unLawful. However, when we retrospect the main purpose of Article 1 of KMTA,, an agreement which contributes to the improvement of consumers` benefit and development of national economy can be justifiable only when the merits of those acts exceed the de-merits.

약관내용에 대한 사법적 통제의 한계

최병규 ( Byeong-gyu Choi ) 한국경제법학회 2013 경제법연구 Vol.12 No.1

오늘날 대량 소비사회에서는 약관의 역할이 더욱 중요하여 지고 있다. 상거래를 편리하게 해주고 합리적으로 처리할 수 있게 하는 등 순기능 이외에 약관에 의한 소비자피해가 중요한 문제이다. 이에 약관에 대한 내용통제가 중요하다. 그런데 모든 약관의 내용이 다 법원에 의한 통제의 대상이 된다고는 할 수 없다. 자본주의 사회에서는 상품 그 자체와 순수한 가격은 법원이 통제할 사항이 아니라 시장에 맡기는 것이 필요하다. 이러한 측면에서 독일의 구 약관규제법과 현행 민법전(BGB)에서는 법률규정과 상이하거나 법률규정을 보충하는 내용을 합의한 약관에 대해서만 내용통제가 이루어지도록 하고 있다. 그에 따르면 현행 법률상의 규정들의 내용을 순수히 반복하고 있는 약관규정의 내용통제는 배제된다. 또한 핵심적 급부내용을 기술(記述)하는 조항 및 순수한 가격조항은 내용통제에서 제외된다. 내용통제의 과정에서 가격과 핵심적 급여내용의 통제를 행할 수 없을 뿐만 아니라, 약관의 내용통제를 통하여 법률의 규정을 변경해서도 안 된다. 가격, 핵심급여의 내용은 통제할 수 없다는 것은 시장경제원리를 중심에 두고 있다. 법관은 어떠한 가격통제도 할 필요가 없고 또 할 수도 없다는 원리를 독일은 규정하고 있는 것이다. 그런데 자유시장경제 및 3권 분립원칙을 이념으로 하는 우리의 경우에도 법원이 약관의 내용을 통제할 때에 모든 내용을 그 대상으로 삼아서는 아니된다. 즉 자본주의 원리를 고려하여, 또 3권 분립의 원리를 고려하여 일부 사항은 법원에 의한 내용통제의 대상에서 제외하여야 한다. 법률의 제정권한은 국회에 있고 사법부는 국회에서 제정한 법률을 적용하고 시행하는 기관이다. 따라서 약관이 법률 내용을 그대로 담고 있는 경우에는 법원이 내용통제를 하여서는 아니된다. 그것은 국회의 입법권을 침탈하는 것이기 때문이다. 또한 자본주의의 기본원리인 시장경제의 원칙과 사적자치의 입장에서 계약의 핵심급여내용, 급여와 반대급여의 관계로서의 가격 조항, 법규와 일치하는 약관내용은 내용통제의 대상에서 제외하는 것이 필요하다. 약관상에 법적 가치판단의 기준이 내재되지 않은 단순한 사실의 묘사가 있을 경우에는 내용통제의 범위에서 제외하여야 한다. 우리의 경우에는 약관에 대하여 공정거래위윈회의 행정적 통제를 하고 있으나, 그럼에도 불구하고 사후적으로는 결국 법원에서 통제하지 않을 수 없다. 이 때 우리 민법의 기조가 사적자치에 뿌리를 두고 있어, 계약의 핵심적인 내용과 가격은 그 통제의 기준이 존재하지 않는 한 법원에서 내용통제를 하는 대상에서 제외되어야 한다는 원리가 적용되어야 할 것이다. 실제로 우리나라 법원이 내용통제를 하여 무효로 판결하거나 한 것들은 독일에서 전개된 내용통제의 척도에 비추어보면 내용통제의 범위 내에 드는 것들이다. 이러한 점에서 보면 해석론으로도 약관의 내용통제에 일정한 제한을 가하여야 함은 물론이고, 앞으로 장기적으로는 약관규제법 제6조에 독일의 예를 참조하여 하나의 조항을 신설하는 것이 요청된다. Nowadays, the standard contract terms play very important role in mass consumption society. But the control of standard contract terms is also important for the protection of consumer. Germany has enacted the law of control of standard contract terms in the year of 1976. In the process of claim modernization(2002), germany has moved the control of standard contract terms related clauses to civil law. But the material contents of the regulations are identical. Korea has also enacted the law of control of standard contract terms in the year of 1986. Thereby the § 6 is the general control clause. But in modern capitalism society, not all the standard contract terms should be controled by judges. There are exceptions. We can find the exquisite contents about control exceptions in german law and in the academic world. There is also another ground for the exceptions, that is separation of legal, administrative, and judicial powers. In korea the principle is also in constitution regulated. According to these principles, the following contents are out of the control of the judge about standard contract terms: core benefit, compensational relations, price, the same contents with law. We should abide by these principles. In fact, the korean court cases that habe controled the standard contract terms belong to such a control cases. But for the legal clearness, we should adopt one clause in the korean law of control of standard contract terms(§ 6 ③). The author has analysed the legal discussions with this problem. He has done a comparative study especially with germany. He has also suggested reform direction in this field in korea. In the trend of globalization, the discussion of control of standard contract terms goes to similar ways worldwide. There are also some divergence because of the customs and legal traditions of each country. We should try further to get best control model of standard contract terms. Thereby, we should follow up the principles of market economy and separation of legal, administrative, and judicial powers.

해운법상 외항화물운송사업자의 시장지배적 지위남용행위의 규제

이정원 ( Jung Won Lee ) 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2013 홍익법학 Vol.14 No.2

Since it is widely recognized that some favors given to the shipping industries are improper or needless, changing the policies that affect various levels of cooperation among liners is unavoidable. An example of these policies would be the Shipping Conference. Even though a Shipping Conference can be prohibited because it is a violation of the Sherman Act, in the United States, it is permitted for the ship owners to join a Shipping Conference under the regulation of the Federal Maritime Committee (hereafter, the FMC). Additionally, the European Union, EU, recently introduced some competitive policies to control the shipping industry`s policies like the Shipping Conference. Although the Korean government maintains it`s stance on giving some privileges to the shipping industries through antitrust exemptions from the Korean Marine Transportation Act (hereafter, the KMTA), it is doubtful that this will continue due to the external effects on the U.S. and the EU. Since any violations of antitrustlaws in an extra-territory can be regulated by the nations where its effects take place, transactions in Korean markets can be punished in the U.S. or the EU as long as it affects the overseas markets` competition laws. Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community prohibits any abuse of a dominant position within EU. To this regard, European authorities recently abolished a block exemption of the EU Antitrust Law which was applied to the shipping industries. However, due to the lack of provisions in the KMTA and/or the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereafter, the KMRFTA) governing any abuse of the shipowners` dominant position in the market, it is unclear whether abuse of a dominant position will be properly regulated by the above Acts in the Korean shipping market. In the writer`s view, even if there are no provisions governing abuse of a shipowners` dominant position in the KMTA or the KMRFTA, abuse of a dominant position can be regulated first by the KMTA, and the KMRFTA can also be applied additionally. Finally, although the shipowners` abuse of a dominant position can be regulated by the KMTA and/or the KMRFTA, it is problematic, in practice because both the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and the Fair Trade Commission are not specialized in shipping sectors. This phenomenon may eventually result in the vacuum of supervision of the abuse of dominant powers in the shipping sectors. Therefore, it is recommended that an independent authority, which has power to control any abuse of dominant positions in the maritime fields and is analogous to the FMC of the U.S. should be established in Korea.

경쟁정책과 중소기업정책의 조화를 위한 독점규제법의 과제

조혜신 ( Hye Shin Cho ) 한국경쟁법학회 2014 競爭法硏究 Vol.29 No.-

Although competition policy and SMEs policy have overlapping goals and methods, and are capable of being in conflict or harmony, thorough examination of the relation between two policies does not seem to be enough. Considering the realities that the competitiveness of SMEs has not been improved substantially in spite of the quantitative and qualitative development of laws and policies for SMEs, as well as that the difficulties for SMEs in competing with large companies has not been getting better in spite of the enforcement of competition laws and policies, we might assume that those two laws and policies have not been enforced harmoniously with encroaching each other`s effects. If referring to Germany, policy means for protecting and nurturing SMEs ultimately aim to create the best environment for ‘competition’, and try to strengthen the competitive powers of competitors through increasing the level of competition in markets. Also, it is necessary to satisfy the requirement of ‘market conformity’ meaning that all the policy means should not distort competition. Reflecting on the relation between SMEs policy and competition policy, we come to realize that the Korean competition law has several clauses for protecting SMEs, though it does not explicitly aim at it in Article 1. Among them, the important ones are, first, the exemption for cooperatives comprising of small companies in Article 60 and, second, cartel approval for competitiveness of SMEs in 2nd clause of Article 19, both of which are meant to support the competitiveness and countervailing power. However, those two have not been actively utilized so far, and questioned in terms of not only usefulness but also interpretation. Fundamentally, it is doubtful whether the former is proper mean which minimizes the distortion of competition, and it needs to be considered that the latter should be constrained not to restrain competition. Next, the regulations against abuse of market dominant position in Article 3-2 and unfair practice in Article 23, which can be said that they are expected to contribute to protect SMEs through regulating large companies, should be highlighted in that they are the best ways to correct SMEs` disadvantages for now. Furthermore, the assumption of substantial restraint of competition in 4th clause of Article 7 with similar purpose would be useful in protecting SMEs` business area against large companies` aggressive expansion.

美國會社法上 株式買受請求權의 機能

李成雄 한국기업법학회 2001 企業法硏究 Vol.8 No.-

In the modern corporate law, appraisal remedy is one of the most important rights to protect minor shareholders in fundamental changes of a corporation. Korea has developed amendment of act for corporate reorganization or restructuring. Simultaneously, appraisal was expanded to other corporate changes, e.g. diversion merger, stock exchange and transfer. But it has not yet studied that appraisal actually accomplishes what kinds of function to shareholders as investors. In USA, the research for the function or role of the appraisal carve out several times. In USA, the specifics of appraisal differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most state appraisal statutes share several basic features: they confer appraisal rights upon shareholders who object to transaction such as mergers and consolidations, sale of all or substantially all, the corporation's assets and serious charter amendments, such as those altering the purpose for which the corporation is organized; they define fair value as the value of the shares prior to giving effect to the transaction from which the shareholders dissent; and they include a market out that withdraws appraisal rights when the objectors' shares are publicly traded. Traditionally, commentators viewed appraisal rights as necessary to protect shareholders who object to fundamental changes from being forced to invest in new firms against their will. Bayless Manning, however, challenged this traditional view of appraisal, as a remedy necessary to protect shareholders from the effects of fundamental change. He argued that the traditional view of appraisal had to be flawed because appraisal statutes were not broad enough to achieve that goal. Several commentators have taken up Manning's challenge to explain appraisal rights, most notably Fischel, Kanda and Levmore, and Gilson. For the most part, these commentators have argued that appraisal remedy should be viewed as a check on misconduct by managers and controlling shareholders. But their efforts have fallen short for three principal reasons. First, each of more of the basic features of the appraisal remedy. Second, none explains the evolution of the appraisal remedy over time, particularly the introduction and expansion of the market out. Third, none of these theories carves out for appraisal a function that is distinct from that served by other corporate law remedies, such as the shareholder's action for breach of fiduciary duty. Recently, a new theory of appraisal was proposed by Letsou. This theory focuses on the capacity of appraisal rights to reconcile differing shareholder preferences. This new theory has a lot of merits in understanding for the various statutes in USA and behaviors of investment shareholders in the stock market. In value rule of the dissenters' stocks, this theory, however, inconsistent with Weinberger methods that did not conclude pre-transaction price but price with premium due to merger synergy. Despite of it's flaw, this new theory has current events in regard with appraisal's function in the stock market. It may be possible to view the future of appraisal through this new theory.

국민연금 적용제외자의 노동시장 활동과 제도 개선에 대한 함의

우해봉 ( Hae Bong Woo ) 한국사회복지연구회 2010 사회복지연구 Vol.41 No.1

미국 독점금지법의 역외적용

윤용희 ( Yonghee Yoon ) 한국경쟁법학회 2015 競爭法硏究 Vol.32 No.-

Prior to adopting Article 2(2) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (‘MRFTA’) in 2004, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (‘KFTC’) has acknowledged extraterritorial application of the MRFTA to international cartel cases based on the effects doctrine that was established in the U.S. through case law. Thereafter, the KFTC has applied the MRFTA to conduct that occurred outside of Korea based on Article 2(2) of the MRFTA. However, in a 2010 Supreme Court decision of an air cargo international cartel case, fearing that there may be unreasonable consequences due to excessively expansive extraterritorial application of the MRFTA, the Court ruled that the phrase “where a conduct has an effect on the domestic market” set forth in Article 2(2) of the MRFTA should be limited to cases where “the foreign conduct had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the domestic market.” The aforementioned doctrine appears to have been influenced by the extraterritoriality principle under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (‘FTAIA’). Against this backdrop, the KFTC is expected to go to great lengths to explain what is exactly meant by “having a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the domestic market,” or how to assess this requirement. During this process, the KFTC will have to find a rational balance between two conflicting values, i.e., protecting the competitive market in Korea and international comity. One of the practical methods that the KFTC may carry out is to study the “principle concerning the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws” that has been developed on the basis of the effects doctrine, which was founded on case law, and the principle limiting extraterritoriality set forth in the FTAIA, and to discover those that can be applied under the MRFTA. In addition, as a long-term goal, for purposes of providing legal safety to convicts and enhancing the effectiveness of the enforcement of the MRFTA, the KFTC may be well advised to adopt “guidelines on the extraterritorial application of the MRFTA” that conforms to the substance and the level of the “1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations.”

연구논문 : 개별 법률에 의한 공동행위 문제점과 광주권에서 발생한 공동행위에 대한 분석

손용엽 ( Yong Yeop Sohn ) 전남대학교 지역개발연구소 2005 지역개발연구 Vol.37 No.1