Upādāna와 Karman의 의미를 통한 상호 의존적 관계 고찰 : 중론 제8장 제12게와 제13게를 중심으로

정상교 불교학연구회 2017 불교학연구 Vol.50 No.-

상호 의존적 관계(相依性, pratyayatā)는 중론전체를 관통하는 매우 중요한 개념이자 중관 사상의 근간이라고도 할 수 있다. 특히 제8장 ｢행위와 행위자의 고찰｣은 행위자(kāraka)와 행위(karman)의 상호의존적 관계를 제법에 확장시켜 보여주고 있는데, 확장의 구체적인 예는 제13게의 ‘취(upādāna)의 작용’을 통해 제시된다. 따라서 ‘취의 작용-행위자-행위’ 관계에 대한 명확한 분석은 중론이 주장하는 상의성을 이해하는데 있어 하나의 유용하고 구체적인 모델이 될 것이다. 그런데, 주지하듯이 ‘karman’이라는 단어는 ‘행위’뿐만 아니라 ‘행위 대상(결과)’의 의미를 모두 가지고 있지만, 게송만을 통해서는 그 의미를 정확히 확정짓기 어렵다. 따라서 제8장이 제시하는 상의성에 관한 고찰은 먼저 관련 주석서를 통해 ‘karman’의 의미를 확정짓는 작업에서부터 출발하여야 할 것이다. 이러한 확정이 중요한 이유는, 제8장에서 ‘행위자-행위’의 관계는 상술하였듯이 ‘취(upādāna)’로 확장되기 때문에 ‘karman’의 의미 고찰은, 그 자체로 또한 여러 의미를 갖는 ‘upādāna’의 의미 분석을 연동시키게 된다. 따라서, ‘karman’의 의미 고찰이 선행됨에 의해 ‘upādāna’의 의미가 명확해지고, 이러한 분석이 기반되어야만 제8장이 제시하는 상의성의 이론적 구조가 명확하게 보여질 것이다. 그러나, 선행 연구의 부족과, 소수의 관련 연구들은 ‘karman’의 의미를 명확히 규정하지 않고 있고, 또한 ‘upādāna’의 의미 파악과 연계한 이해를 보여주지 않고 있다. 따라서 필자는, ‘upādāna’와 ‘karman’의 의미 파악에 주목하며 중론 제8장의 해당 게송을 분석하여 상의성을 고찰하려 한다. The meaning of “pratyayatā" (interdependence) is a very important concept that penetrates the whole Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK). Particularly, Chapter 8 shows interdependence of Agent (kāraka) and Act (karman) extending to all beings, and the concrete example of this expansion is Action of “upādāna”. Therefore, a clear analysis of a structure of “Action of upādāna-Agent-Act” could be a useful model to understand “pratyayatā” of the MMK. As is known, however, because the word “karman” means not only Act but also an object, it is difficult to determine the meaning of “karman” accurately through the verses of the MMK. Therefore, the interpretation of “pratyayatā” in Chap. 8 should be begun with determining the meaning of “karman” through commentaries of the MMK. This determination is important because the relationship of Agent-Act in Chap. 8 extends to “upādāna”, and considering the meaning of the “karman” leads to the analysis of the meaning of the “upādāna” which has multiple meanings itself. In other words, since the examination of the meaning of “karman” leads to the analysis of “upādāna”, the precedence of this review makes the theoretical structure of “pratyayatā” more clear. However, previous studies have not clearly defined the meaning of “karman”, and seems to regard “upādāna” as a simple example of expansion. So they do not show a comprehension of both “karman” and “upādāna”. Therefore, I will consider the meaning of "pratyayatā" through the meaning analysis of "upādāna" and "karman" based on the commentary of Chap. 8 of the MMK.

pūrvācārya(先代 軌範師) 再考

권오민 불교학연구회 2008 불교학연구 Vol.20 No.-

As suggested in the title, this thesis aimed to critically examine Hakamaya Noriaki’ns Pūvāāya kōy(考)(Indogaku Bukkyōaku kenkyū34-2), but was really written as a part of the criticism of the discussion developed by Harada Wasō that was adopting it as one of the primary grounds for his own hypothesis about the origin of Sautrātika(“tin fact it is a fictitious sect as Yogāāa”t). Hakamaya said that his thesis was but a working hypothesis for confirming the assumption that “pūvāāya on Abhidharmakośbhā ṣa belongs to Yogāāa.”a Furthermore, he was only interested in the traces on Yogāāa literature, and did not consider its ideal origin or relevance. In the opinion of the writer, his thesis raised a question significantly, but did not present any grounds for settling that all pūvāāyas in 11 places were the masters of Yogāāa, or Asaṅa. Pūvāāya can be the master who has succeeded to teaching or can be a general name. The same is also applied to āāya. However, it is difficult to conclude that a master's doctrine belongs to Yogāāa even though it is traced in the Yogāāabhūi . It is because Sthavira Śīāa also asserted a similar doctrine to it. It is, therefore, a mere conjecture or delusion(?) to literally trace the pūvāāyas and specify that they belong to Yogāāa. Also, it is nothing but taking the dogmatic attitude to say based on the thesis that “the fact that pūvāāya belongs to Yogāāa has become a generally accepted idea in the academic circles”.

Sthitibhāgīya(順住分者)와 Śvalāṅgūlika

권오민 불교학연구회 2011 불교학연구 Vol.30 No.-

『아비달마디파』에서는 ‘貪·瞋·邪見=意業’ 설이 Śvalāṅgūlika(개 꼬리를 가진 자)라는 이상한 이름을 별명으로 갖는 Sthitibhāgīya(順住分者)의 학설로 인용되는데, 이는『 구사론』에서 譬喩者의 설로 인 용되고,『 순정리론』 상에서 ‘行蘊=思’라는 上座 슈리라타(=경량부) 의 학설에서 그 이론적 근거가 확인된다.『 디파』에서의 이 두 명칭 의 의미는 무엇인가?『 디파』만으로는 그 의미를 밝히기 어렵기 때문 에 동일한 성격의 선대문헌인 중현의『 순정리론』을 통해 그 의미를 밝히고자 하였다. 이에 따르면 有爲4相의 개별적 실재성을 부정하는 譬喩者(혹 은 上座宗)는 諸行의 因果相續을 住(sthiti)로 이해하고 이를 가 능하게 하는 힘(功能)을 種子(비유자) 혹은 隨界(상좌)라고 하 였다. 디파카라(Dīpakāra)는 아마도 상좌계통의 비유자 일파를 ‘住 즉 相續(saṃtati 혹은 pravāha)과 관계하는 이’라는 의미에서 ‘Sthitibhāgīya(順住分者)’로 이름하였을 것이다. 또한 비유자/경량부는 과거·미래는 물론이고 유부에서 설정한 다수의 法의 개별적 실재성을 부정함으로써 都無論/壞法論( 『디파』 에서는 Vaitulika이단자/Vaināśika절멸자) 등으로 불린 대승의 空見(空花論)과 매우 가까운 것으로 간주되었다. 이에 따라 디파카라는 개가 걸식할 때 몸은 남의 집에 들어갈지라도 꼬리만은 문밖에 두는 것이 개의 법도라는『 십송율』의 우화에 따라 ‘몸은 이미 空見(대승) 에 가담하였으면서 꼬리만 佛弟子’라는 의미에서 ‘Śvalāṅgūlika(개꼬 리를 가진 자)’라고 이름하였을 것이다. 곧 Sthitibhāgīya와 Śvalāṅgūlika는 그들의 종자상속론이나 대승 과의 유사성에 따라 유부논사들에 의해 불려진 貶稱으로 이해된다. In Abhidhamadīpa , that ‘greed (abhidhyā) etc.=mentalmisconduct (mano-duścarita)’ is quoted as a Sthitibhāgīyas,whose second name is Śvalāṅgūlika’s theory. Vasubanduquoted this in the name of Dārṣṭāntika, and in Nyāyānusāraśāstra , it is confirmed as the sects of Sthavira Śrīlāta (thatis Sautrāntika)’s theory. According to Sthavira, the meaningof the term Sthitibhāgīyas is ‘the one concerned with gradualsuccession through causal relation, so-call pravāha or santati’.And maybe Dīpakāra called Śvalāṅgūlika in the meaning oftheir body belongs to a destroyer of Dharma(壞法論宗) namelyMahāyāna, but their tail to Śākyapūtra Buddhism, like a fableof Dasādhyāyavinaya which illustrate a begging dog step in hisbody in the house, but a tail outside.Thus, if Dārṣṭāntika is the conventional name afterAbhidharmamahāvibhāaṣā śāstra , and Sautrāntika is a selfstyledname of a Sthavira’s sect of Dārṣṭāntika, Sthitibhāgīyaand Śvalāṅgūlika is understood as abused name called bySarvāstivādin according to their succession (santati ) theory orsimilarity with Mahāyāna.

天台智顗의 圓頓止觀에서 方便의 의미

김정희 불교학연구회 2006 불교학연구 Vol.13 No.-

The aim of this paper is to clarify the meaning of Yuan-Tun Chih-Kuan set forth by Chih-i. Yuan-Tun Chih-Kuan is based on the theory of nonduality. This means Yuan-Tun Chih-Kuan cannot be compatible with upāya as expedient means for reaching the real. By the way, Chih-i proposed religious rituals as upāya for Yuan-Tun Chih-Kuan. This is controversial. Having the concerning in this problem, this paper clarified the meaning of upāya from the meaning of miao[妙] The meaning of miao consists of the relative and the absolute. In the relative, miao considers upāya in relation to the real as the expedient means for reaching the real, and denies it. The absolute means that there is nothing which is relative. According to the absolute, miao considers upāya is identical with the real. The absolute miao redefines upāya as the real. If upāya is identicl with the real, upāya can be compatible with Yuan-Tun Chih-Kuan. The meaning of upāya identical with the real is well described in the Lotus Samādhi.

와이쉐시카(Vaiśeṣika) 학파와의 논쟁을 통해 본 경량부 세친(Vasubandhu)의 정신(manas)

황순일 불교학연구회 2006 불교학연구 Vol.15 No.-

There has been a dispute on the character of Vasubandhu when he was writing the Abhiharmakośabhāṣya. Such scholars as Robert Kritzer insisted that he was already influenced by the Yogācārins. There are scholars who regard Vasubandhu working under the name of the Sautrāntikas not as a hīnayāna but as a mahāyāna scholar. Although he can be understood in this say from the some aspects of his writing, there are indications to show he still is in the field of the traditional Buddhist Institution. In this paper I will deal with this problem though his interpretation of mentality (manas), especially in the argument against the Vaiśeṣika school. As you may well aware, there is no difference in their reference in the mind (citta), mentality (manas), and consciousness (vijñāna) within the Northern Buddhist schools, such as the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. However, they become the 8th ālayavijñāna, the 7th manas and the 6th manovijñāna respectively in the depth psychology of the Vijñaptimātra-Yogācārins. While the 8th ālayavijñāna was a fresh concept introduced, the 7th consciousness, manas, was the modification of the existing concept. Thus, how Vasubandhu understood manas could be a kind of yardstick to decide his character during the time of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. The second chapter deals with the general understanding of he mind (citta), mentality (manas), and consciousness (vijñāna) from the scattered passages of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. The third chapter studies the Vaiśeṣika understanding of manas. For them it is the inner faculty to link between faculties and self (ātman) and is the size of an atom. The forth chapter deals with the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika manas seen in the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. In the fifth chapter, I will discuss the later development of the inner faculty (manas) within one of the Hindu philosophical schools, the Mīmāmsa. In the Bhaṭṭa school of the Mīmāmsa, the working of manas between faculties and self (ātman) was reduced to almost nothing.

vijñāna에 관한 논변

이종철 불교학연구회 2000 불교학연구 Vol.1 No.-

In this article, I would like to point out the fact that Vasubandhu not only approached dependent origination from an ontological perspective, but that he also put great importance on its episte- mological dimension having to do with the phenomenology of mind and consciousness, taking care to focus in on how the theory may be applied to the arising of consciousness. This article, keeping in mind the above problematik deals with the unfolding of Vasubandhu's thought in the process of moving from the Abhidharmakośa to the Vyākhyāyukti. This represents an attempt to reconstruct an integral basis for Vasubandhu's discussion of the process of co-arising consciousness and his theory of epistemology, stretching from the time he wrote the Abhidharmakośa all the way down to his later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda inclination period. Through various debates with Indian schools such as the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Vaiyākaraṇa, we can see that Vasubandhu rejects any belief in the existence of an actual self conceived as the “subject responsible for action” or as the “subject of cognition”. According to the basic tenets of Vasubandhu's theory of consciousness ― based on his view that a permanent real self does not exist (anātman) ― in the case of consciousness there does not exist any subject behind it that engages in acts of cognition. There can only be the workings of consciousness which arise constantly dependent on conditions. Focusing on the debates between Vasubandhu and Vaiyākaraṇa, which are introduced in the Abhidharmakośa and the Vyākhyāyukti (Peking ed. 104b2-106b8), this article deals with the problems which were the object of their discussion. In the Appendix, I have enclosed a critical edition of extant Tibetan translations of the Vyākhyāyukti as they appear in the Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone editions.

高麗의 吳越板 『寶篋印經』 수용과 의미

이승혜 불교학연구회 2015 불교학연구 Vol.43 No.-

1007년에 개성 총지사에서 간행된 ��보협인경(寶篋印經)��은 변상도가 있는 현존 최고의 목판인쇄경전으로 학계의 많은 관심을 받았다. 선행연구를 통해 총지사본의 형태와 서지학적 특징, 인쇄사적 의의가 밝혀졌다. 또한 총지사판 ��보협인경��과 오대십국시대 중국의 강남지역에서 번성했던 오월(吳越, 907-978)의 마지막 왕 전홍숙(錢弘俶, 재위 947-978)이 956년, 965년, 975년 세 차례에 걸쳐 간행했던 ��보협인경��과의 밀접한 관련성도 익히 지적됐다. 반면 1007년에 간행된 총지사본 변상도의 도상이 3종의 오월본 중 956년에 간행된 판본과 유사하다는 점은 간과됐다. 그렇다면 동아시아에서 ��보협인경��의 유통과 수용이란 문제에 있어서 양자 간의 유사성이 의미하는 바는 과연 무엇일까? 이 논문의 주요 목적은 두 가지이다. 첫째로, 오월판 ��보협인경��의 간행과 유통을 10세기 동아시아라는 역사적 상황에서 논의하는 것이다. 둘째로, 고려의 오월판 ��보협인경�� 수용을 경전의 공여자인 오월의 입장과 수용자인 고려 조정의 입장을 고려하여 살펴보는 데 있다. 이를 위해 이 논문에서는 먼저 3종의 오월본과 총지사본 변상도를 종합적으로 비교하겠다. 나아가 현재까지 알려진 문헌사료와 고고학적으로 발견된 유물들을 종합적으로 분석할 것이다. 이를 통해 956년에 간행된 오월본만이 고려에 전래되어 수용됐을 가능성을 논증하고, 그 원인을 오월을 둘러싼 10세기 중국의 역사적 상황과 당시 고려의 내부적 상황에서 찾아보겠다. 마지막으로 총지사판 ��보협인경��이 다원적 천하관으로 대표되는 10-11세기의 동아시아 국제질서를 반영한 역사적 산물임을 밝혀 보겠다. The Chongjisa edition of the Baoqieyin Dhāraṇī Sūtra 寶篋印陀羅尼經 (Kr. Bohyeobin gyeong), published in 1007, has received considerable scholarly attention as the oldest extant woodblock printed scripture with a frontispiece. The textual and material features of the Chongjisa edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra have been the subject of many previous studies. Scholars have also pointed out that the Chongjisa edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra bears close affinities with the three Wuyue editions of the same text, each published in the year 956, 965, and 975 under the patronage of Qian Hongchu. Qian Hongchu 錢弘俶 (r. 947-978) was the last king of Wuyue 吳越 (907-978), a kingdom that prospered in the southeast coastal region of China during the political chaos of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to the fact that the frontispiece of the Chongjisa edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra is closest to the first Wuyue edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra in terms of visual composition and iconographical motifs. What do these visual affinities between the Chongjisa and the first Wuyue edition indicate in light of the circulation and reception of the Baoqieyin Dhāraṇī Sūtra in East Asia? The primary objectives of this paper are twofold. First of all, I examine the publication and circulation of the three Wuyue editions of the dhāraṇī sūtra against the political and historical landscape of 10th century China and beyond. Secondly, I delve into the issue of Goryeo court’s reception of Wuyue court’s diplomatic gifts, namely the first Wuyue edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra (d. 956) and the bronze miniature stūpa, by taking the political realities of the two countries' courts into consideration. To this end, I first closely compare the frontispieces of the three Wuyue and Chongjisa edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra, and then proceed to analyze relevant textual and archaeological evidence in their historical context. Through this analysis, I showcase that only the first Wuyue edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra was transmitted to Goryeo, and was served as a model for the patron and carver of the Chongjisa edition. The Chongjisa edition of the dhāraṇī sūtra is, I argue, a historical product of an East Asia of the 10th-11th centuries characterized foremost by multi-state proliferation.

『中論』의 八不과 緣起

이중표 불교학연구회 2009 불교학연구 Vol.22 No.-

용수(龍樹; Nāgārjuna)의 철학에 대한 불교학자들의 이해는 다양하다. 이러한 이해의 차이는 용수 사상의 일면을 기존의 서양철학적관점에서 해석함으로써 비롯된 것이다. 그의 사상을 기존의 서양철학의 틀로 해석하는 것은 바람직하지 않다. 그의 사상은 붓다의 緣起說과 부합하고 있다. 따라서 근본불교의 緣起說을 떠나서 그의 철학을 논하는 것은 억측만을 낳을 뿐이다.용수의 철학에 대한 기존의 이해는 八不에 큰 의미를 두었다.『 中論』의 八不은 붓다의 無記와 같이 실체론에 대한 비판의 의미가 있을 뿐, 구체적인 내용을 갖는 것은 아니다. 붓다가 無記로써 당시의실체론 철학을 비판하고 緣起說을 주장했듯이, 용수는『 中論』에서八不을 통해 붓다의 緣起를 실체론적으로 이해한 아비달마불교를비판했을 뿐이다.용수의 철학과 붓다의 철학은 본질적으로 차이가 없다. 따라서 용수는 자신의 철학을 수립하려 하지 않고, 붓다의 가르침을 바르게 이해할 수 있는 길을 열어 보이는데 주력했다.『 中論』에 부정적인 표현이 많은 것은 부정 그 자체가 용수의 철학이어서가 아니라, 왜곡된이해를 바로잡기 위해서인 것이다.緣起는 불교 특유의 인과율로서, 원인과 결과의 관계가 일방적이고 선형적인 기존의 인과율과는 달리 인과 관계를 상호적으로 본다.붓다는 因果를 상호관계로 보는 緣起說로 모든 존재현상을 설명했다. 용수가 자신의 철학으로 삼고 있는 것은 이와 같은 붓다의 緣起說이다.『 中論』은 우리에게 용수의 철학을 보여주는 것이 아니라 緣起를 바르게 이해할 수 있는 正見을 제시하고 있다. There are many different interpretations for Nāājuna’sphilosophy. Most modern Buddhist scholars interpret his philosophyfrom Western philosophical viewpoints. But his philosophy sharesthe common ground with Buddha’s pratīyasamutpāa (緣起).Therefore, his philosophy has to be understood in terms of thepratīyasamutpāa.Many scholars regard the eight–egation(八不) as the heartof Nāājuna'’s philosophy. The eight–egation of Nāājuna, aswell as Buddha'’s avyāṛa(無記), is not a philosophy but a criticalmethod. Nāājuna only intends to criticize the substantiationof Abhidharma Buddhism in terms of the eight–egation in theMūamadhyamakakāikāNāājuna did not intend to say his own philosophy in theMūamadhyamaka–āikā. He devoted himself to showing the rightway to understand Buddha’s philosophy.Buddha explains all existence by the pratīyasamutpāa .Nāājuna takes this theory itself as his philosophy. WhatNāājuna shows in his Mūamadhyamakakāikā, is not hisphilosophical system but the right viewpoint to understand thepratīyasamutpāa

比丘尼 八敬法에 대한 고찰

이수창(마성) 불교학연구회 2006 불교학연구 Vol.15 No.-

This paper aims at a close examination of the following issues: What was the historical background of the enactment of bhikkhunī's aṭṭha garudhammā?; What significance did it have in its own historical context: and how shall we deal with it in the present age? Bhikkhunī's aṭṭha garudhammā seems to have been enacted by the Buddha himself on the condition that women should be permitted to enter the Buddhist Saṅgha. Aṭṭha garudhammā was clearly stated in pācittiyā of bhikkhunī-sīla as well as in the Vinaya-piṭaka and the Sutta-piṭaka of each the Buddhist sects. This means that aṭṭha garudhammā had already taken effect before the sectarian division of the Buddhist Order. Extant aṭṭha garudhammā however is not believed to be the same as the one first enacted by the Buddha. The contents of Aṭṭha garudhammā in the Vinaya-piṭakas of various Buddhist sects do not completely correspond to each other and some passages are thought to have been inserted in later periods. Buddha thought that women also could reach the arahatta-phala through meditation practice (bhāvanā). On the other hand, he could not but take into consideration some problems that might accompany his decision to allow women to join Saṅgha. He therefore prepared such a regulation as aṭṭha garudhammā. Social systems and regulations of a religious group, as well as those of other social groups, cannot but be designed on the basis of worldly concerns in many respects. One of the concerns is the difference of gender. Although gender difference has nothing to do with the religious truth and ideal of Buddhism, the Buddhist Saṅgha could not disregard it in designing its regulations. Aṭṭha garudhammā was based upon the social and cultural background of India at that time, not upon the ultimate Buddhist truth and ideal. In short, aṭṭha garudhammā was the product of the particular period. The status of women in India was fluctuated with the passage of time. In general, the feminine status was enhanced when Buddhism thrived. When Brahmanism gained power, however, it declined. It cannot be denied that the standing of bhikkhunī in the Buddhist Saṅgha also was greatly affected by the social customs and conventions of each period. Bhikkhunī's aṭṭha garudhammā certainly had some raison d’étre under the conditions of the particular period of its establishment. The situation today is completely different in many respects from those days, especially in regard to public security. Bhikkhunī's aṭṭha garudhammā, however, cannot be simply repealed right now. As aṭṭha garudhammā was clearly expressed in pācittiyā of bhikkhunī-sīla and originated in the ubhato-saṅgha system, aṭṭha garudhammā will still hold good as far as the ubhato-saṅgha system exists in the Buddhist Saṅgha. We should not disregard the fact that aṭṭha garudhammā was established because Bhikkhunī Saṅgha could not survive in itself. Finally, in order to overcome such a cultural practice of sexual discrimination against women as aṭṭha garudhammā, social recognition of women should be improved first of all, for even Buddhist monks and nuns cannot but be influenced by it. If the status of women in the larger society is improved and their roles expand, their status and role in the Buddhist Saṅgha will also be naturally elevated. Premature measures regarding the status of Bhikkhunīs in Saṅgha may lead to conflicts between Bhikkhu and Bhikkhunī, and it will never contribute to the development of Buddhism. It goes without saying that Bhikkhu and Bhikkhunī Saṅghas should maintain a relationship of mutual cooperation.

『석마하연론(釋摩訶衍論)』에서 명과 무명을 밝히는 다섯 가지 문답[五重問答]

김지연 불교학연구회 2017 불교학연구 Vol.51 No.-

『석마하연론(釋摩訶衍論)』은 『대승기신론(大乘起信論)』의 주석서이지만 혜원･원효･법장 등과 다른 독특한 해석을 보이는데, 본고에서 다루는 오중문답(五重問答)도 그 중 하나이다. 이 문답은 일체행자(一切行者)･청정본각(淸淨本覺)･일법계심(一法界心)･삼자일심마하연법(三自一心摩訶衍法)･불이마하연법(不二摩訶衍法)의 명(明)과 무명(無明)을 묻는데, 『석론』은 앞의 네 가지 질문에는 모두 무명이라고 대답하고 마지막 한 가지에 대해서는 침묵한다. 이렇게 답한 이유를 찾기 위해 『석론』 전체에서 오중문답의 다섯 가지 개념들이 나타나는 부분을 찾아 고찰하였다. 『석론』의 오중문답에 대한 연구는 동아시아 불교의 중심이 되는 『기신론』에 기반하여 7~8세기에 나타나는 무명에 대한 이해를 부분적으로 살펴볼 수 있는 기회가 될 것이다. 『석론』은 앞의 네 가지 문답을 아직 깨닫지 못한 분별의 영역에 포함된다고 보아 ‘무명’이라고 답한다. 그러나 오중문답이 무명의 영역인 유각문(有覺門)에서 서술된 것을 통해 답은 이미 ‘무명’으로 정해져 있었음을 알 수 있다. 이로부터 『석론』은 오중문답을 설정하여 ‘명’과 ‘무명’을 구분하기 보다는, 독창적인 무명이해를 나타내려는 의도가 있었다고 보인다. 또한 다섯 번째 문답에서 불이마하연법을 ‘명’이라고 밝히지는 않았지만, 침묵함으로써 무명이 아니라는 사실을 암시한 것이라고 할 수 있다. 『석론』에서 ‘불이마하연법’은 바로 ‘불(佛)’이기 때문이고, 이것은 언어와 사유로는 헤아릴 수 없기 때문이다. 또한 오중문답을 마친 후 바로 무각문(無覺門)을 이어서 서술하는 흐름을 통해서도 가늠해 볼 수 있다. 이와 같이 오중문답에는 불이마하연법 외의 다른 것은 무명이라고 하는 독창적인 무명관과 무명으로써 명인 불이마하연법을 드러내려는 『석론』의 의도가 담겨있다고 판단된다. As the commentary of the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, the Shi moheyan lun (abbreviated as SML) develops different interpretations in many cases from other notes by Huiyuan, Wonhyo, Fazang, etc. The Five-fold Question and Answer is the one of them. It asks whether the five subjects are vidyā or avidyā; the practitioner, the pure original enlightenment, the mind of the single reality realm, the three oneself of one mind of Mahāyāna, non-duality Mahāyāna. The SML answers that the first four are avidyā, but keeps silent about the last. Therefore, I try to research the five subjects of the Five-fold Question and Answer shown in other parts of the SML to find the reason. The SML explains that the first four are avidyā because they still remain in discrimination. Here, it can be suggested that the answers are already decided as avidyā by the fact that the Five-fold Question and Answer is given from the aspect of being-enlightenment which is the realm of avidyā. From this, the intention of the SML is to express the creative understanding of avidyā than to divide the five subjects into vidyā or avidyā. Moreover, by keeping silent about the last question, the SML suggests that the non-duality Mahāyāna is impossible to illustrate with words because it is the Buddha. Briefly, through the Five-fold Question and Answer, the SML tries to show own ingenious view that everything except the non-duality Mahāyāna is avidyā, and to reveal that the non-duality Mahāyāna is vidyā.