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Yves Guéron(Yves Guéron ) 서울대학교 경제연구소 2023 經濟論集 Vol.62 No.1
This paper offers a survey of the recent literature related to the economics of data. In particular, we look at how data can confer market power and facilitate collusion, and consider some of the privacy implications of data ownership.
Yves Guéron 서울대학교 경제연구소 2024 Seoul journal of economics Vol.37 No.1
Killer-Acquisitions - acquisitions in which an acquirer abandons the product development of a target firm after having acquired it - have been a growing concern of policy makers, especially given the high mergers and acquisitions activity of Big Tech. This paper offers a survey on the recent literature on startup acquisition, and what criterions antitrust authorities should pay attention to when evaluating a merger between an incumbent and a startup.
Information Transmission in Revision Games
Yves Gué,ron 서울대학교 경제연구소 2019 Seoul journal of economics Vol.32 No.2
Revision games model a situation in which players can prepare their actions during a pre-play phase. We introduce one-sided incomplete information in two coordination games, one of common interest and one of opposing interest, and study how the pre-play phase affects coordination. We find that in the common interest game, the unique Bayesian equilibrium is such that the informed player will signal the state of the world through her prepared action, unless the pre-play phase is about to finish, in which case she seeks to coordinate with the other player. In the opposing interest game, the equilibrium is similar when the informed player is the one receiving less opportunity to revise her actions. When it is the uninformed player who receives less revision opportunities, we show that it is possible no information is revealed if both players are initially coordinated, but some information must be revealed if they are initially miscoordinated.
Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizon and Imperfect Public Monitoring
Yves Gué,ron 한국유통과학회 2015 KODISA ICBE (International Conference on Business Vol.2015 No.-
We consider a two-player infinitely repeated game with asymptotically finite horizons: discount factors converge to zero over time. The stage-game has a continuum of actions and a unique and interior Nash equilibrium. It is known that when players perfectly observe each oth- ers actions, cooperation can be achieved and equilibrium payoffs will be strictly higher than the stage-game equilibrium payoff. I show that introducing an arbitrarily small amount of smooth noise in the monitoring makes cooperation impossible and players play the static Nash equilibrium of the stage-game forever.
Yves Gué,ron 서울대학교 경제연구소 2020 經濟論集 Vol.59 No.1
Digitization, the process of converting information into a digital format (bits, short for binary digits), has dramatically reduced replication costs, as well as the costs of transmitting information. This survey examines how those important reduction in costs affect economic activity through the lens of incentives, prices and efficiency.