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Can—Should—Must We Negotiate with Evil?
Walter C. Clemens, Jr. 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2011 Pacific Focus Vol.26 No.3
How should the United States and its allies deal with regimes that abuse their own people and threaten world order? Are some regimes so evil that it is wrong and unwise to engage with them--even on matters of shared concern? The answer depends not only on the “facts of the case” but also on priorities and frames of reference. Thus, two Soviet citizens, each a Nobel Prize winner, disagreed on whether Western governments should treat the Kremlin as a viable partner in negotiations to control the arms race. . Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn said “yes,” because a regime that oppressed its own people could not be trusted. But Andrei D. Sakharov answered “no,” because the stakes for humanity were so high. Solzhenitsyn put human rights first; Sakharov, the survival of humanity. Today a similar choice confronts Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as they confront leaders in Pyongyang moving to expand their nuclear and missile capabilities. President George W. Bush placed North Korea on an “axis of evil.” He loathed a leader who permitted more than a million of his subject to starve. But even if this repugnance was justified, did it serve U.S. and allied interests to end the dialogues that, in the Clinton years, offered hope of limiting and perhaps terminating the North’s nuclear weapons and missile programs?“We are good and they are bad” is dangerous as an approach to foreign affairs. But it is also wrong and reckless to assume that all actors are equally flawed. Still, if a cruel dictatorship is willing to negotiate security arrangements likely to limit arms competition and make war less likely, democratic governments should engage and seek verifiable arrangements.
What Factors Shape Korea’s Future? Forces and Fortuna versus Ideas and Free Will
Walter C. Clemens Jr. 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2009 Pacific Focus Vol.24 No.2
To assess the prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula we must understand the factors that have contributed to tension and to détente in recent decades. Whatever policy goals we pursue, it would be helpful to know how these factors have operated in the past. The most relevant factors can be analyzed under three headings: material hard power; fortuna, and the intangibles of ideas and free will. This essay reviews examples of how these factors have contributed to conflict and--less often--reduced tensions on the Korean peninsula. No single factor explains the ups and downs in North-South relations and the six-party talks in recent years. No single explanation accounts for developments in the past, but the record shows that ideas and determined individuals have sometimes overcome the thrust of material forces and neutered the vagaries of time and chance. In short, free will has often outweighed both forces and fortuna. Where there is a will (on all sides), paths to mutual gain can sometimes be developed.