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Two-Stage Cournot Oligopolies with Industry-wide Externalities
Koji Okuguchi,Takeshi Yamazaki 서울대학교 경제연구소 1996 Seoul journal of economics Vol.9 No.1
A two-stage Cournot oligopoly with cost functions involving externalities is formulated. A unique subgame perfect Cournot-Nash Equilibrium is proven to exist under a set of reasonable assumptions. The existence proof consists of solving two fixed-point problems for the industry output. The perfect equilibrium is then compared with one-shot Cournot oligopoly equilibrium. The effects of entry are also analyzed. Our result will be illustrated using linear cost and demand functions.
General Analysis of Horizontal Merger
Koji Okuguchi,Takeshi Yamazaki 서울대학교 경제연구소 1994 Seoul journal of economics Vol.7 No.3
A new method of proof is presented for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium in oligopoly with a merged entity and independent firms. The method is then applied to derive price-enhancing effect of an increase in the number of merged firms. On the basis of the existence proof and stability condition, a sufficient condition is derived for an increase in the number of merged firms to be profitable. This condition is illustrated for a simple case of linear demand and identical quadratic cost functions. Finally, a numerical example is given.
A dynamic Model of International Fishing
Szidarovszky, Ferenc,Okuguchi, Koji Seoul National University 2000 Seoul journal of economics Vol.13 No.4
International commercial fishing is examined when the harvesting countries form a coalition, and at each time period the total profit of the coalition is maximized. The fishing activity is combined with population dynamics to derive a special dynamic systems model for the fish stock. A complete description is presented for the number of positive equilibria and for the monotonic and asymptotical properties of the fish stock. The harvesting rates of cooperating and competing countries are compared and it is shown that the fish stock is more stable in the case of cooperation.
An Oligopoly Model of Commercial Fishing
Ferenc Szidarovszky,Koji Okuguchi 서울대학교 경제연구소 1998 Seoul journal of economics Vol.11 No.3
Population dynamics and oligopoly theory are combined to formulate international fishery under imperfect competition. It is assumed that fish harvesting countries behave as oligopolist, but their costs depend on their harvest rates as well as on the total fish stock, which is governed by the biological growth law. e show that the number of nonextlnct equilibria is 0, 1, or 2, and characterize the dynamic behavior of the fish stock in terms of model parameters and initial fish stock level. Finally, We analyze how the steady state equilibrium fish stock is affected by entry of a new fishing country.