협상이론에 의한 미국의 싱가포르 회담 분석과 함의

박휘락(Park, Hwee Rhak) 한국아시아학회 2019 아시아연구 Vol.22 No.1

본 논문에서는 2018년 6월 12일 싱가포르에서 개최된 미북 정상회담에서 북한의 비핵화와 관련하여 미국이 보였던 협상행태를 협상이론에 근거하여 분석해보고자 한다. 이를 위하여 협상이론 중 적용 가능한 부분을 재정리하여 소개하고, 싱가포르 정상회담의 배경, 경과, 합의사항을 설명하였으며, 그 후 협상목표, 협상전략, 협상의 성공요인 측면에서 미국의 싱가포르 회담을 분석하였다. 분석의 결과 싱가포르 회담에서 미국은 협상 이전에 가졌던 목표라고 할 수 있는 ‘완전하고, 검증가능하며, 불가역적인 비핵화’(CVID)를 달성하지 못함에 따라 성공으로 평가하기는 어렵다. 협상이론 측면에서 분석해볼 때도 미국은 북한의 비핵화 의미를 냉정하게 판독하지 못함으로써 실현 불가능한 목표를 설정하였고, 협상의 전략에서도 조기에 연성협상으로 전환하였으며, 최종대안, 하한선, 시간의 측면에서도 협상이론과 상반되게 조치하였다. 한국은 싱가포르 회담을 반면교사로 삼아서 대북 협상 시 이론에 더욱 충실할 필요가 있고, 북한의 협상기술이 고도화되어 있음을 인정해야하며, 강성입장을 견지하는 가운데 최고의 전문가들을 활용하여 협상에 임해야할 것이다. This paper is written to analyze the Singapore Summit between the US President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-eun using theories on negotiation. For this purpose, it revisits the key elements in negotiation theories, introduces the Summit’s background, details and agreements and analyzes the end game, negotiation strategy, key negotiation elements of the US. As a result, this paper found that the US did not succeed to acquire the CVID (Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement) promise from North Korea at the Singapore Summit. The US set unfeasible endgame as CVID and adopted a soft position negotiation too early. It did not follow the recommendations of negotiation theories in terms of BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement), bottom line and time. South Korea should heed on recommendations of negotiation theories, think out its relevant strategy and tactics to deal with that of North Korea, choose the best negotiation officials and should not be afraid of taking hard position negotiation, when necessary.

The Forgotten Half of South Korea`s Civil-Military Relations Based on Huntington`s Theory: Military Professionalism

( Hwee Rhak Park ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2007 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.12 No.1

Proposals for More Useful Principles of War

( Hwee Rhak Park ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2008 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.13 No.1

Strategy for Defense Reform of South Korea : Change and Fix Strategy versus Set and Change Strategy

Hwee Rhak Park 대한공간정보학회 2008 한국지형공간정보학회 학술대회 Vol.2008 No.12

Reform strategy can be categorized into two general types based on the scope and pace of change. The first one, Change and Fix Strategy, involves an urgency to immediately and aggressively implement changes, making adjustments along the way as necessary. This strategy may either bring about the desired outcome or end up in the wrong direction. The other strategy, Set and Change Strategy, involves the crafting of a perfect reform plan that is implemented through a roadmap for almost perfect preparation. While this strategy can be very prudent and tends to minimize errors, it runs the risk of being discontinued during implementation stage. Even though South Korean military has initiated several reform tries to fix the problems or to adapt to the changing security environment, its past experiences were not satisfactory. The current reform initiative, "Defense Reform 2020," also seems not to have achieved tangible outcomes yet, though more than four years have passed since its inception. If South Korean military really wants to achieve some results out of this reform initiative, it needs to implement more vigorously the programs outlined in Defense Reform Act. It should increase the pace of change by adopting Change and Fix Strategy in light of a few lessons from U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's Transformation and its own failures in the past. While the basic framework for Defense Reform 2020 is to achieve the goals along 15 years in an evolutionary manner, it is not that risky for South Korean military to hasten the implementation of some proven programs.

South Korea’s Failure to Implement “Defense Reform 2020”

Hwee Rhak Park 한국국제정치학회 KJIS 2014 The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.12 No.2

An Analysis and Lessons on South Korea`s Attempt and Postponement of the OPCON Transition from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command

( Hwee Rhak Park ) 한국국방연구원 2015 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.27 No.3

This paper examines the relevance of logics for transferring Operational Control authority (OPCON) from the CFC (ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command) and draws several lessons for South Korea in order not to repeat the same mistakes. For this purpose, it explains the background of OPCON and compares the logics with the reality unfolded so far. The political leaders in the Roh administration pursued transition of OPCON in the name of sovereignty in 2003. However, OPCON authority is nothing but a tool to ensure the unity of command in military operations and it is not regarded as an infringement on sovereignty. The Roh administration promised to strengthen South Korean forces to lead the defense of South Korea through comprehensive defense reform efforts, but failed to accomplish them. Though they expected threats from North Korea would diminish gradually to be favorable to the transition, North Korea appears to have succeeded in developing several nuclear weapons. As a lesson, South Korea should understand that most countries in the world do not consider the delegation of OPCON as an infringement of national sovereignty. South Korea should focus on defense preparedness against the North Korean nuclear threat by making the CFC the key player for the combined nuclear deterrence. In the long run, South Korea should speed up its defense reform efforts in order to take a leading role in the combined defense posture with the U.S. forces and try to reflect people`s yearning for self-reliance. At the same time, the ROK and the United States should try to adopt measures that could ease South Korean people`s demand for self-reliance within the current CFC structure.

The Transfer of Wartime Operational Control in Korea

Hwee Rhak Park 한국국제정치학회 KJIS 2010 The Korean Journal of International Studies Vol.8 No.2

The self-entrapment of rationality in dealing with North Korea

( Hwee Rhak Park ) 한국국방연구원 2008 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.20 No.4

Although South Korea and the democratic countries in the region have tried hard to solve the problems of North Korea for over 55 years, since the end of the Korean War, most approaches in the past seem to have failed. So, it is very necessary to reexamine their approaches toward North Korea before repeating more mistakes in the future. North Korean policymakers probably are not as rational as most people assume. North Korea`s total failure as a state proves that they have accumulated more irrational decisions than rational ones in their management of the country. They failed to choose the best courses of action to achieve their goals. They probably do not have sufficient information, abundant and active flow of information, or freedom of action for rational decisions. Therefore, the policymakers in democratic countries should be cautious not to entrap themselves by assuming that North Korean counterparts also are applying the rational model to decisions. This could be reinforced by two cases―an analysis of the North Korean motives for the axe murder incident at Panmunjeom in 1976 and North Korea`s announcement of the so-called nuclear test in 2006. There is no better way for policymakers in democratic countries than to take more fact-oriented approaches toward their analyses and predictions about a probably irrational North Korea.

South Korean Preparedness for the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Few Steps Behind

( Park Hwee Rhak ) 한국국방연구원 2017 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.29 No.2

This paper reviews the current state of South Korean nuclear preparedness and draws out some necessary tasks for the future. It reviews all available options that a non-nuclear, threatened country should take in response to the level of the nuclear threat. These are a diplomatic approach, a preventive strike, deterrence, defense, civil defense, and negotiations. In conclusion, South Korea has depended too much on diplomatic solutions in the initial periods of the North Korean nuclear weapons development. It did not review defense measures in depth and did not consider the preventive strike option during that period. South Korea procrastinated on its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) construction and did not review the necessity of nuclear civil defense until the present. South Korean nuclear preparedness appears to have many shortcomings. South Korea should expedite and improve its BMD shield as soon as possible. It may need to utilize the preemptive strike capabilities of the United States to provide more money for its BMD. It needs to prepare nuclear blast and/or fall-out shelters by efficiently renovating existing conventional shelters and other underground facilities.

Investigating nuclear-armed North Korea's “strategic” challenge and options for the United States and South Korea

Park Hwee-rhak 한국외국어대학교 국제지역연구센터 2022 International Area Studies Review Vol.25 No.3

This study analyzes the challenge of North Korea, which has managed to have a strategic level of nuclear weapons and suggests a few options for the United States and South Korea to address this challenge. For this purpose, it examines the theoretical backgrounds of the extended deterrence and minimal deterrence strategies, as well as the contrasting perceptions of North Korea's nuclear armament. Then, it analyzes the competition between U.S. extended deterrence and North Korea's minimal deterrence strategy and evaluates a few possible options to deal with the current strategic level of the North Korean nuclear threat. Through its analysis, this study ascertained that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons to make the United States leave South Korea and to reunify Korea on its terms. North Korea adopted a minimal deterrence strategy to counter-deter the U.S. extended deterrence and came to have considerable capabilities to implement the strategy, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and potentially SSBNs. The United States and its allies in Northeast Asia should clearly recognize the opportunity cost of failed denuclearization negotiations and consider more options than strengthening the current U.S. extended deterrence posture. They need to seriously discuss the establishment of another nuclear-sharing system in Northeast Asia and should not exclude the nuclear weapons development option of South Korea.