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Shale Horowitz 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2015 Pacific Focus Vol.30 No.1
Since the Soviet Union’s collapse and North Korea’s subsequent deep economic crisis, China’s economic and diplomatic support has been vital to the Northern regime’s survival. Why has China provided this support? In foreign policy-making, China’s post-Deng leaders have increasingly prioritized domestic politics over national interests. This implies that China’s leaders are likely to view the North’s nuclearization, proliferation efforts, and controlled provocations as increasingly beneficial – as long as these activities stop short of triggering all-out war. China’s actions, as opposed to its statements, are consistent with this analysis.
South Korea and Japan since World War II: Between Ideological Discord and Pragmatic Cooperation
Shale Horowitz 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2016 Pacific Focus Vol.31 No.1
Since the end of World War II, relations between South Korea and Japan have gone through significant changes – from distant and hostile in the 1950s, to cooperative and increasingly close through about 2005, to the last decade of serious deterioration. Three frameworks are used to understand change and continuity in South Korea–Japan relations: a realist perspective emphasizing either structural military power relations or “revealed” patterns of military threat; an institutional perspective that emphasizes similarities or differences in political institutions; and an ideological regime-type perspective that includes ideologies as well as institutions as influences on government or leadership preferences. The third framework captures two types of ideological factors that have exerted significant influences on South Korea– Japan relations: the existence of a small range of competitive ideological regime types or government types specifying national ideals and national development roadmaps; and historical legacies of intense conflict, which tend to produce ideological and diversionary frictions that cause conflict to persist or recur. Only the last factor, the history issue, is readily subject to policy control: the best way forward to restore cooperative and stable relations is for South Korean and Japanese leaders to agree informally on truthful and empathetic norms governing historical judgments, and for Japanese political and opinion elites to agree informally to marginalize those that defy such norms.
A Further Note on the Theory of Labor Supply With Wage Rate Uncertainty
Ira Horowitz 서울대학교 경제연구소 1994 Seoul journal of economics Vol.7 No.4
It is demonstrated that Kim's (1994) results on the theory of labor supply with wage rate uncertainty, which rely on mean-preserving spread for comparative-statics analysis, hold equally well and with additional economic intuition, when the process variance is used as the measure of dispersion.
China`s Grand Strategy, the Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Six-Party Talks
( Shale Horowitz ),( Min Ye ) 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2006 Pacific Focus Vol.21 No.23
North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons capability for about two decades. Many diplomatic efforts have been made to convince or cajole the Northern regime to give up this quest - and all have so far failed. Since 2003, a new multilateral approach - the Six-Party Talks involving the Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States - has raised hopes anew. These hopes are based largely on China playing an active role. China has the potential both to guarantee North Korea`s security, and to impose and enforce a denuclearization agreement. We analyze China`s changing grand strategy and its implications for China`s Korea goals and policies. To Deng Xiaoping`s emphasis on China`s national interests, China`s third- and fourth- generation leaders have added a greater reliance on foreign and military policies to maintain domestic political support and legitimacy. This discussion indicates that China is currently more concerned to preserve the North Korean regime and prevent a second Korean War than to eliminate the North`s nuclear capability. Therefore, the Six-Party Talks are unlikely to succeed.
Keeping Instability at Bay: China’s Post-Deng Leaders and the Korean Crisis
Shale Horowitz,Min Ye 한국학술연구원 2008 Korea Observer Vol.39 No.4
Can China be relied upon to pressure North Korea to give up nuclear weapons and weapons-related technology, and to prevent North Korea from cheating on any agreement to do so? We argue that China’s post-Deng leaders are more concerned with domestic political legitimacy and intra-regime rivalries than their predecessors. Therefore, we expect their priorities to be avoiding a second Korean War and preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime. The North Korean nuclear capability and its geopolitical consequences, by contrast, do not appear to pose serious threats. China’s behavior toward the North before and during the Six-Party Talks is consistent with this reasoning. China seems concerned to prevent an economic collapse of the North Korean regime, and to prevent North Korea from miscalculating and acting in a way that will lead to a second Korean War. But, at the same time, China does not seem willing to make the kinds of credible threats that would force the North to denuclearize.