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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : David R. Kamerschen (검색결과 6 건)
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Relationship Between Economic Aid-and Economic Development
David R. KAMERSCHEN,John G. DONANDSON,Jr,Charles D. DELORME,Jr. THE INSTITUTE OF EAST AND WEST STUDIES YONSEI UNIV 1989 Global economic review Vol.18 No.1
The major purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between economic aid and economic development measured both in physical output(GDP) and physieal welfare (PQL) terms. A fundamental rationale is to deter-mine whether the negative relationship between aid and development first observed by Criffin and Enos (1970) was robust to newer data and alternative modelling. A sample of six countries has been chosen from different regions of the world. For each country, data have been collected on total official development assistance, real Gross Domestic Product, and the physical quality of life index based on three equally weighted components (life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and literacy rate) Using this data, four different regression equations have been estimated for each country. From the preliminary results discussed in this paper, it appears that a negative economic relationship between economic aid and economic development is not only possible, but actually occurs in certain countries. Of the six countries examined in this paper, only one, the Sudan exhibited positive effects on both welfare (PQL) and output (GDP). In the other countries, official development assistance (ODA) is either completely neutral or ineffective in terms of welfare and output, or the results were mixed between positive and negative coefficients . But one must be very cautious in reaching any strong conclusions on ODA effectiveness because of the fundamental identification problem resulting from the fact that the ODA going to any one nation is very, very small and because there is little variation in ODA across various nations. Thus, it is difficult to infer anything definitive about the potential impact of a substantial infusion of ODA-if it were to be made available. Additional work in this area is essential to a general understanding oft these relationships in question. Different formulations of the same kind of model should be helpful in eliciting additional results. For example, it might be advantageous to reformulate this study using only countries from one region of the world. Applying the model to African countries might be fruitful in that the two African countries in this study demonstrate more impact from development assistance. Another alternative might be the use of cross-sectional or pooled cross-sectional data on a much larger sample of countries. However, the present paucity of data makes this alternative difficult, if not impossible, at the present.
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Pricing Behavior of the Monopolistic and Competitive Firms in the Long Run with Homogeneous Products
Park,Jae-Hee,KAMERSCHEN,David R. THE INSTITUTE OF EAST AND WEST STUDIES YONSEI UNIV 1994 Global economic review Vol.23 No.1
The analysis of a simple short-run model in Kamerschen and Park (1992a) generated three observations about the pricing of monopolistic versus competitive firms. The third is that the competitive firm's incentives to change price are constant and indifferent to different combinations of random shocks. Therefore, to study the difference in the two firm's pricing behavior, it was important to understand why and how the monopolist's incentive varies for different combinations advantage to using a simple model. In the long run, firms in a competitive industry can exit or enter just after the shock, depending on whether the shock is favorable or not. However, this additional consideration does not affect the competitive firm's pricing behavior, if the exit or entry does not incur any costs. The competitive firm's i(i=1,...,n)period 1 price and quantity were p??=c??and q??=(a??-bc??)/n, respectively. If m firms exit from an industry after a cost increase, the decrease in the industry supply of mq??, immediately pushes the competitive price to p??=c₂, and the remaining firms produce the same quantity as in period 1, q??=(a??-bc??)/(n-m)=q??. If, however, m firms enter the industry after a demand increase, that increase in the industry supply, mq??,immediately meets the increased demand at the going price, c??, and each firm in the industry produces the same quantity as in period 1, q??=(a₂-bc??)/(n+m)=q??. As the example shows, the exiting firms with a cost increase make the competitive price adjust upward to the shock, such that the resulting price change of the remaining firms are the same as exit's. However, the entering firms with a demand increase make the competitive price unchanged, so that the incumbent firm's prices stay at their period 1 price as with no entry. The entering or exiting firms play a buffer to the shocks and insulate the incumbent or remaining firms completely from any output effects of the shocks on their price. Therefore, the inclusion of firms' exit and entry, as the additional assumptions, does not change the competitive firms' pricing behavior. This, again, reduces the analytic complication, when the long-run pricing behaviors of the monopolist facing the potential entry are compared with that of the competitive firm. We have to examine only whether the existence of potential entry in monopoly industry affects the monopolist's pricing behavior, or whether the monopolist facing the potential entry limits its price. It is assumed that both the established monopolist and potential entrant are rational economic agents producing homogeneous commodities. Then, we investigate whether the first and second observations of Kamerschen and Park (1992a)still hold true in the long run. In Kamerschen and Park (1992a), time was divided into production periods 1 and 2 by unexpected changes in the firms' marginal costs and/or in the industry demand. Now, time is divided into production periods 2 and 3 by the potential entrant's decision of whether to enter. During these periods 2 and 3, there are no new random shocks. Thus, there is no change in the competitive firms' pricing behavior during the periods. It is the same as that in period 2 of Kamerschen and Park(1992a) because the assumption of exit and entry does not change the competitive firms' pricing behavior. The established firm or incumbent in period 2 faces potential entry, and has a certain belief about the characteristics of the potential entrant, and the potential entrant also has incomplete information(i.e.,prices) about the established firm. In this uncertain situation, the established firm can treat prices as its strategic variables for the deterrence of entry, and so its pricing behavior is different from that in a situation of no potential entry.
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