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Canil Canil,Bruce Rosser 사람과세계경영학회 2007 Global Business and Finance Review Vol.12 No.1
This paper introduces a new rationale for toeholds: to benefit from a lower bid premium through waiting to bid, contingent on rivals not emerging. An intending bidder has an incentive to acquire a toehold without bidding when the likelihood of a rival bid is low. If the toehold does not attract a rival bid, the toehold subsequently bids first at a lower premium than by bidding coincident with the toehold purchase. But if a rival bid is triggered, the toeholder can sellout to the rival or bid second. As the likelihood of a bidding contest increases the option of bid deferral is less valuable. We employ a standard risk neutral valuation procedure to determine whether a bid should optimally be coincident with a toehold purchase or deferred. We document (i) negative deferred bidder abnormal returns at bid when the higher than expected bid premium is revealed, and (ii) significantly higher bidder abnormal returns at toehold and lower bid premiums for optimally deferring bidders relative to non-optimally deferring bidders.
THE BEFORE-/AFTER-INTEREST CHOICE IN THE MEASURE OF SEGMENT EARNINGS
Jean Canil,Bruce Rosser People&Global Business Association 2004 Global Business and Finance Review Vol.9 No.1
Before harmonization of Accounting Standards, Australian companies were observed to report segment earnings either before or after interest. Firms reporting segment earnings after interest are hypothesized to have had higher debt levels, multiple lenders and less related segments than firms reporting segment earnings on an EBIT basis. Supporting evidence is documented. It is concluded that a uniform measure of segment earnings as prescribed by IAS 14 and corresponding country-specific Standards inhibits firms with high debt levels from signaling their prospects in order to lower borrowing costs.
A TEST OF A MANDATED ACCOUNTING CHANGE: CONSOLIDATION STANDARD AASB 1024
Jean Canil,Bruce Rosser People&Global Business Association 2005 Global Business and Finance Review Vol.10 No.1
Corporate disinvestments and liquidations of 'controlled associates' are found to have coincided with the introduction of the amended Australian consolidation Standard AASB 1024 which mandated consolidation of controlled associate assets and liabilities that had previously been excluded from group financial statements. Reporting higher-than-expected group debt is argued to be costly in the presence of information asymmetry. Strong evidence is found that firms reducing equity ownership in or liquidating many of their controlled associates exhibited lower net-of market returns relative to firms that did not. From this we infer the former firms faced higher disclosure costs.
FINANCIAL RISK HEDGING, BORROWING AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
Jean Canil,Bruce Rosser People&Global Business Association 2005 Global Business and Finance Review Vol.10 No.2
In this paper we provide new evidence on the relation between hedging, debt financing and capital expenditure. Specifically, we analyze the size and timing of debt visits and capital expenditures in relation to a given year's hedging activity. Our results suggest hedging activity is more positively related to new borrowings than leverage, but unrelated to same-period capital expenditure. The first result is consistent with an external financing motivation but the second implies factors other than underinvestment drive hedging policy.
Jean Canil,Bruce Rosser People&Global Business Association 2007 Global Business and Finance Review Vol.12 No.1
This paper introduces a new rationale for toeholds: to benefit from a lower bid premium through waiting to bid, contingent on rivals not emerging. An intending bidder has an incentive to acquire a toehold without bidding when the likelihood of a rival bid is low. If the toehold does not attract a rival bid, the toeholder subsequently bids first at a lower premium than by bidding coincident with the toehold purchase. But if a rival hid is triggered, the toeholder can sellout to the rival or hid second. As the likelihood of a bidding contest increases the option of bid deferral is less valuable. We employ a standard risk neutral valuation procedure to determine whether a bid should optimally be coincident with a toehold purchase or deferred. We document (i) negative deferred bidder abnormal returns at bid when the higher than expected bid premium is revealed, and (ii) significantly higher bidder abnormal returns at toehold and lower bid premiums for optimally deferring bidders relative to non-optimally deferring bidders.