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<세종어제서문>의 표기적 특징에 대한 이해와 교육적 접근
이철기 우리말학회 2017 우리말연구 Vol.48 No.-
이 글은 국어사 교육용 자료로 자주 활용되는 <세종어제서문> 의 표기적 특징을 밝히고 그 교육적 활용 방안을 제안하고 있는 논문이 다. 이를 위해 우선, 훈민정음 창제 직후 15세기 국어 표기의 일반적 원 리를 『훈민정음 해례본』의 내용과 관련지어 검토해 보았다. 그리고 어제 서문의 표기를 면밀히 분석하여 일반적 표기 원리를 따른 예와 그렇지 않 은 예를 찾아 제시하였다. 언어에 대한 탐구가 표기의 특징과 한계에 대한 정확한 이해로부터 출 발함을 전제하고, 어제서문의 표기적 특징을 활용하여 한글 창제 직후의 표기 원리뿐만 아니라 오늘날 한글 표기의 원리를 깊이 있게 이해할 수 있는 교육적 활용 방안을 제안하였다.
비핵국가에 대한 '소극적 안보보장' (NSA)에 관한 이론적 고찰 : 그 문제점과 쟁점
이철기 동국대학교 경주대학 1996 東國論集 Vol.15 No.-
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, non-nuclear-weapon States have sought to obtain assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. Special efforts to arrive at security assurances for non -nuclear-weapon States were made during negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Poliferation Treaty(NPT). Many non-nuclear-weapon States have ever since then regarded such assurances as a counterbalance to their forswearing of the nuclear weapons option under the NPT. UN Security Council Resolution 255, adopted on 19 June 1968, recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon States would call for immediate action by the UN Security Council, especially by the nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Council. We call these "positive securitY assurances" (PSA). But these PSAs were not sufficint and real. Non-nuclear-weapon States contended that the nuclear-weapon States should provided also "negative security assurances (NSA)" -- namely commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons non-nuclear-weapon States. All five unclear-weapon States have made individual declarations which can be regarded as legally binding unilateral commitmrnts not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under the conditions spelled out in these declarations. In addition to these unilateral declarations, the five nuclear powers have contracted legal commitments in a reginoal framework; namely under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. But several weakness of the existing assurances have been pointed out. The perceived weaknesses may be summarized as follows. (a) The main weakness is the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under certain conditions, (b) Due to the different conditions set forth by each of the five nuclear powers, it may be difficult for some non-nuclear-weapon States to qualify for all assurances simultaneously. (c) Although, according to international law, unilateral declarations can have a legally binding character, the commitments that the nuclear powers have centerd into could be withdrawn or changed relatively easily. (d) Some of the conditions for NSA, as set forth by the nuclear powers under the existing arrangements, are lacking precision and may thus lend themselves to different interpretations. Therefore the general thrust of efforts to improve the existing arrangements has been to reduce the conditions for assurances or eliminate the conditions: reach a uniformity of scope of the commitments: and put the ANS into a more binding form. In respect of the scope or content of NSA, the most effective way is unconditional NSA to non-nuclear-weapon States. Unconditional NSA was regarded as necessary for achieving a universal non-proliferation regime. And the majority of countries favours the conclution of an international convention containing a common formula of security assurances.