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RISS 인기검색어
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- 저자 : 梁寧祚(Yang, Yong-Jo) (검색결과 18 건)
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측집 : 북한의 남한 점령기 민간인 학살 - 한국정부와 미군(KWC) 조사기록의 비교를 중심으로
양영조 ( Yong Jo Yang ) 이화사학연구소 2013 梨花史學硏究 Vol.0 No.46
The main purpose of this article is to analyze on the South Korean Civilian Massacre by the North Korean Army and the left wings during the North Korean Occupation of South Korea. This paper is aimed to put a valuation on the problematic issues in War Crimes Division in Korea(KWC). This study was conducted with the reference of following documents: NARA, RG 153 Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General Army, International Affairs Division; War Crimes Branch: “Investigation of Atrocities against POW`s in Korea”, 1952-1954, Entry A1 181, Box 891-976, KWC #1~#1848; “interim Historical Report”, 30 June 1953; “Final Historical and Operational Report”, 31. May 1954. Since the outbreak of the Massacre, the existing studies regarding this issue concentrated on elucidating actual conditions of civilian massacre and studies in the region have focused on understanding each regional cases, expected size, and so on. However, it has been challenged to understand entire matters of victims and wrongdoers because the signed confession research throughout the area sampled some regions. Therefore, this study suggests a debate on the three problematic issues in those historical records. I found that those historical records only emphasize the perspectives of the anti-communism while analyzing the massacres. Also they have been recorded without the sufficient and reliable resources. They have only been discussed about the mass slaughter committed by several specific forces which are included with the North Korean government, the police of the North Korean government, and the South Korean communists. We have to recognize other mass slaughters happened in the same region from July 1950 to January 1951. Especially, the mass slaughter of civilians, the murders of people who acted in a way to Anti North Korea happened in the same areas. Thus, I believe that we have to give a definition of other massacres. Most historical records do not demonstrate the reason many people should have been victimized in the massacres. For example, even though they put many pages to describe the massacre, there are few reliable resources in them. As a result of the poor research achievements on the historical records, it is very hard for us to identify what kinds of “military command chains” the massacres had been carried out. Thus, it is still ambiguous to what extent North Korean government involved in those tragedies. I think that the massacres happened during Korean War should be researched from the multidimensional viewpoints by closely relating to political, economical, and social issues. These approaches help us bring objectivity into my research. I also think that if we can make any research with more possible reliability and objectivity, that research would allow us to find the person who were responsible for those mass slaughters, and the reason they happened in the time. This work will help add further studies based on empirical researches that have been conducted until now and define that the massacre occurred independently or the government intervened in the massacre.
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양영조(Yang, Yong-Jo) 인천대학교 인천학연구원 2003 인천학연구 Vol.2 No.1
The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the character of Incheon during the Korean War. Across from the ROK 1st Division stood NKPA divisions. The NKPA 1st and 6th Divisions committed main efforts southward along the Kuhwari - Munsan - Incheon axis and Kaesong - Munsan axis, respectively. On July 4, the NKPA 6th division in Kimpo maneuvered toward Incheon in the morning, spearheaded by six tanks. In the early period of the War, the lack of ROK government refugee control measures resulted in significant confusion and difficulties in controling refugee movement. The U.N. army soldiers were fearful of the possible infiltration of North Korean soldiers who entered the lines in groups disguised as civilians in refugee columns and then attacked the our positions from the rear. The UN forces entered upon a new phase in which they could launch a massive counterattack and at once effect a landing at Incheon. While the JCS gave expressed approval to MacArthur's proposal for an amphibious landing behind the enemy's battle lines, they never committed themselves to MacArthur's landing of Incheon. The UN troops completed their mop up operation in and around Incheon, the city government opened its office to resume its work. The city government also started to restore its function by clearing the litter from destroyed buildings and other public facilities, and thus rapidly restored the public order. Incheon citizens and officials who had returned to the city ahead of others voluntarily joined in cleaning work in the downtown streets, the city was crowded with many others who wandered from place seeking separated family members.
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양영조(Yang, Yong-jo) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2011 군사 Vol.- No.79
This study is on the Jangsa"s Landing Operations right before the Incheon"s Landing Operations during the Korean War. At night on September 12, a Combined Forces of the ROK, US and British troops dared to make a feint amphibious operations in Gunsan, while on the east coast for two consecutive days, on September 14 and 15, UN aircraft hit hard on the Samcheok area, another possible landing area, to divert enemy"s concern on the west. The student volunteer soldiers of the ROK 1st Independent Anti-Guerrilla Battalion led by Capt. Lee Myeong-hum (Later renamed Lee Chong-hun) even practically landed at the beach in Jangsa, south of Pohang, at dawn on September15. Unfortunately, however, as their Landing Ship Dock had run aground because of the typhoon Kezia, they were exposed to enemy troops there. They fought against the enemy on the beach capturing a nearby hill position. But they withdrew suffering heave losses. In brief, the Incheon"s Landing Operations had been in progress under a carefully thought-out deception operations. Operational security measures had been so through that the US Far East Command had not transmitted their reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the right moment and the JCS misunderstood the FEC. This Jangsa"s Landing Operations is analyzed that it was successful in the view they have achieved the operational purpose in spite of many victims of soldiers.
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AntiHBc 단독양성인 검진자에서 혈청 GOT , GPT 치의 변화
김영조(Young Jo Kim),이헌주(Heon Ju Lee),정문관(Moon Kwan Chung),이영현(Young Hyun Lee),양창현(Chang Heon Yang),김종설(Chong Cuhl Kim) 대한소화기학회 1985 대한소화기학회지 Vol.17 No.1
N/A It is well known that Anti HBc may be causative agent of HBU infection and means viral replication. To evaluate the clinical significance of anti-HBc, serum transaminases was checked and screening test for hepatitis B surface antigen(HBsAg), antihody to hepatitis core antigen(anti-HBc) and antibody to hepatitis B surface antigen(anti-HBs) was made by radioimmunoassay technique in 419 consecutive subjects. Both groups were healthy clinically and had neither past history of liver diseases nor other causes that may change the level of serum transaminases. Followings are results of authors observation of present series; 1) The difference in incidence of elevated serum transaminases between control and anti- HBc(+) groups statistically was not significant. 2) The incidence of elevated serum transaminases among male was higher than among female in anti -HBc(+) group. 3) The incidence of elevated serum transaminases tended to be higher as ages progress in both groups. 4) The values of elevated serum transaminases in both groups were generally within the two fold upper normal values.
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유엔의 6.25전쟁 지원과 성격 -신정공세 전후 유엔의 휴전교섭 노력을 중심으로-
양영조,Yang, Yong-Jo 대전대학교 군사연구원 2010 군사학연구 Vol.8 No.-
The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the Untied Nations' efforts for peace on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. The Untied Nation tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the end of 1950. Once the CCF's entry into the war had been confirmed, the war situation moved to a new phase, and the UN forces, which had guided the war in an effort to destroy the NKP A forces, and to punish North Korea, had to set up new guidelines to cope with the new situation. Accordingly, in late November, 1950, the UN forces camp, mainly the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United Nations Command, discussed various options, such as an expansion of the war up to the Chinese territory, a cease fire along the 38th Parallel, or a forced and inevitable evacuation. The Korean delegation to the UN insisted that "the unification of Korea should be achieved only by victory in the war. The Chinese intervention in the war is a Challenge to the UN in the same way as the North Korean invasion. The UN participation in the war was to repulse the invasion. With the same spirit we should drive back the Chinese Communists." The Korean delegation also emphasized to the friendly nations the political objective and will of unification, and that a cease fire at a threshold of unification might return us to the status quo ante bellum, and would be contrary to the Korean nation's desire. At that time, particularly, the US strongly considered the employment of nuclear weapons as one of the new strategies to cope with the Chinese invasion. The international effects of these casual remarks were realized almost at once. The British Prime Minister who had not wanted the expansion of war in the Far East, especially from the view point of the interest of NATO's security, visited Washington. so the conference had a very important meaning for the UN forces' new strategy. On the other hand, at the UN, on the 5th of December, the very day Truman and Attlee agreed to seek a cease-fire under UN auspices, a group of thirteen Asian and Arab states proposed to ask China and North Korea not to cross the 38th Parallel, and sounded out both sides about a cease fire along the 38th Parallel. The United States and the United Kingdom gave their assent, but China and North Korea gave no direct response. The CCF, who were securing the initiative of operation, were not agreeable with the proposal of the UN forces. The Untied Nation has tried to negotiate th peace plan between two sides from the December of 1950 and January of 1951. The Untied Nations' has achieved great results to negotiate for the peace plan on Korean peninsular after CCF's participation in Korean War. It's the results considering both the operation situation and political opinions.
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