ABC테크 회계부정에 관한 사례연구

허진숙 ( Jin Suk Heo ),정경철 ( Kyoung Chol Jung ),마희영 ( Hee Young Ma ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.4

1999년 상장된 차량용 고장진단기 제조업체인 ABC테크는 2003년부터 2007년까지의 사업보고서와 재무제표에 대한 금융감독원 감리를 받았다. 그 결과 2008년에 매출채권 과대계상 및 대손충당금 과소계상으로 감리지적을 받고, 과징금과 감사인 지정 2년, 담당임원 해고 및 전·현직 대표이사의 검찰통보조치가 부과되었다. 본 사례에서는 비재무정보와 재무정보의 분석을 통하여 외부정보이용자들이 ABC테크의 부실징후를 사전에 예측할 수 있는지 알아보고자 한다. 이를 위해 신문기사, 사업보고서 등으로부터 회사의 영업환경을 분석하고, 최대주주나 이사의 변경 내역, 특수관계자 간 거래, 법률 위반사항, 내부회계관리제도 검토의견 등을 통해 경영환경의 취약점 및 지배구조의 문제점을 파악한다. 감리기간 전·후를 포함하여 장기간의 재무제표 분석과 재무비율분석으로 경영성과의 추세를 살펴보는 것과 함께, 감사보수와 감사시간, 감사의견, 계속감사기간, 비감사서비스제공 여부 등으로 대략적인 감사품질을 분석하여 회사의 분식위험을 평가한다. 마지막으로 감사인이 입증감사에 이를 충분히 활용하였는지 분석함으로써 감사절차의 문제점을 파악한다. This paper explores an accounting fraud case of ABC Tech. Its frauds were mainly related with overreporting accounts receivables and booking unreasonable accounting estimate for allowance for bad debt. Although these fraud techniques are typical and well known to the auditors, theses fraud schemes were successful for several years. Thus, we investigate how accounting information was manipulated by the company and why these frauds were not discovered through regular internal and external audit procedures. And we discuss whether outside investors could detect these fraudulent manipulation in advance. ABC Tech is a car diagnostic scanner company established in 1990. Its business was successful along with booming of high tech cars with expensive and complex electronic systems and they went public in 1999. But its new multimedia business failure in 2001 made the company hard to maintain the minimum requirement to remain listed. After all, the company manipulated financial statements under financial pressure. First, they report fictitious accounts receivables after receiving money from the customer to inflate its receivables. Second, the company understated the allowance for doubtful accounts to decrease expenses. In 2008, FSS(Financial Supervisory Service)``s inspection revealed that financial statements were manipulated by the company. In this paper, we analyse this fraud case from various points of view. As various information such as financial information, management information and important business environment change etc, is freely available to the public via DART system(Korea``s equivalent to EDGAR), we conduct detailed examinations of the company``s accounting information and business environment analysis. First, we explain the accounting fraud schemes and calculate its effects on financial statements. We also suggest adjusting journal entries and correct financial statements. This procedures reveal the company``s intention to meet the listing requirement. Thus this analysis shows the whole picture of fraud structure and financial consequence of the financial manipulation. Second, the company``s disclosures are thoroughly examined. Especially non-financial disclosures are investigated. They showed typical warning signs that the company might be fraudulent. The company reported unusual related party disclosures and invested in the companies which are not related with their business. And the CEO and CFO were changed without reasonable explanation. They conducted small amount of seasoned public offerings frequently which showed the lack of cash flows. Third, we conduct basic financial ratio analysis. The profitability, solvency, liquidity and stability of the firm are investigated. This procedure shows that the company``s business was getting worse in profitability and solvency. And we find that accounts receivables turn over ratio was dropped sharply. This implies that there might be a problem in the timely collection of accounts receivables. Fourth, we investigate auditors`` audit procedures were reasonable. We obtain a FSS investigation report about the audit firm``s audit procedures related with the company``s fraud. This report shows that auditor``s procedures were not enough to find out the company``s fraud. We also compare the audit hour and audit fee of the company with the average figures of matched firms. As a result, the company``s audit fee was higher than the average but the audit hour was lower than the average. Based on these findings, we try to show how accounting information is useful for investors to detect signs of insolvency in the firm. Especially, accounting information users need to know the limitations of audited reports and financial statements. We believe that this case provides a good example to learn how the accounting fraud works and how to find it.

낙수효과 및 동반성장정책이 대기업 협력사의 이익조정에 미치는 영향

허진숙(Jin Suk Heo),권수영(Soo Young Kwon) 한국경영학회 2017 經營學硏究 Vol.46 No.6

통합보고(Integrated Reporting)의 현황과 기업보고서로의 당면과제 분석 -포스코 사례분석을 중심으로

권수영 ( Soo Young Kwon ),황유선 ( Yoo Sun Hwang ),허진숙 ( Jin Suk Heo ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계저널 Vol.23 No.6

International Integrated Reporting Council(IIRC) released International <IR> Framework on December 2013 for the purpose of providing potentional <IR> preparers with detailed guidelines and methods. In this study, we introduce the framework of International <IR>, explain six capitals and seven content elements, and summarize the papers in the integrated reporting literature. We also review POSCO``s integrated report to understand whether the integrated reporting is feasible and what the issues are in preparation of integrated reporting. Finally, we suggest the following aspects in order for integrated reporting to be settled as a business report: top managements’ commitment and continuous investment in integrated reporting, the balance between value creation and accountability, improvement in measures employed in integrated reporting, clarification of six capitals and seven content elements, assurance and legal liability associated with integrated report, and understanding of primary users`` needs.

로우볼링 결정요인

권수영 ( Soo Young Kwon ),정경철(교신저자) ( Kyoung Chol Jung ),허진숙(공동저자) ( Jin Suk Heo ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계학연구 Vol.41 No.2

본 연구는 감사보수 모형으로 추정한 감사보수 수준보다 20% 이상 낮은 감사보수로 체결한 경우 로우볼링 (low-balling)으로 정의하고 로우볼링의 결정요인을 살펴본다. 국내대형회계법인의 사업보고서상의 원가분석을 통해 20%의 감사보수 할인을 로우볼링의 기준으로 제시하였다. 2003년부터 2014년까지의 초도감사기업을 대상으로 감사인의 산업내집중도, 비감사서비스의 제공여부, 감사인의 산업전문성, 감사인 교체유형, 전임 감사인의 서비스 제공기간, 피감사회사의 수익성과 위험 그리고 감사인의 특정고객에 대한 경제적의존도가 로우볼링 현상을 설명하는지를 분석하였다. 또한 회사의 규모의 차이, 금융위기전후의 시기적 차이, 감사인 교체 유형의 차이가 로우볼링 현상과 관련이 있는지 추가로 분석하였다. 주요 실증분석 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 로우볼링 현상은 피감사회사의 규모가 큰 경우에 더 발생하였다. 둘째, 피감사회사에 대한 경제적 의존도가 높은 경우와 기업의 위험이 높은 경우, 그리고 회사가 감사인을 자주 교체할수록 로우볼링이 덜 발생하였다. 셋째, 감사인의 교체유형이 수평교체보다 상하향교체 시 로우볼링이 더 발생하는 것으로 관찰되었다. 넷째, 감사인의 산업전문성이 로우볼링에 미치는 영향은 로우볼링을 정의하기 위해 사용하는 기준치인 감사보수추정모형 대비감사보수 할인비율에 따라 결과가 달라지는데 이는 산업전문성과 로우볼링의 관계는 비선형관계이기 때문인 것으로 보인다. 다섯째, 감사인의 산업집중도, 비감사서비스의 제공여부, 전임 감사인의 서비스제공기간 그리고 금융위기 전·후 기간 차이는 로우볼링과 유의한 관계가 나타나지 않았다. 로우볼링 결정요인에 대한 이해는 감사수임과 관련하여 감사보수를 책정하고 더 나아가 감사품질 그리고 감사인의 독립성에 시사하는 바가 크다는 점에서 규제당국과 회계사 업계는 물론 정보이용자에게도 유용할 것으로 기대된다. Low-balling is the loss-leading practice of setting audit fees below total current costs during initial audit engagements to better compete for large and prestigious clients (DeAngelo 1981). Legislators, regulators and practitioners have raised concerns about low balling for a long time due to the prevalence of auditors’ initial-year audit fee cutting practices in Korea to obtain new audit engagements. For example, Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Company and Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries Company switched their new auditors in 2014 and paid lower audit fees lower than those they previously paid to old auditors by around 43%. While an auditor incurs a loss in the initial audit engagement due to the discounted audit fees, the auditor may view the client primarily as a future income stream. Thus, the concern is the combination of pricing and tenure where an auditor must retain a client to recoup costs and ultimately achieve profitability. Korean regulatory authorities can designate external auditors for firms with quite low audit fees because of auditor independence concerns. But none of the two companies’ auditors have been designated for the practices of aggressive audit fee cutting. The purpose of this paper is to understand the determinants of low-balling, defined as audit pricing below audit cost in the first-year. Prior research has focused on initial-year audit fee cutting rather than low balling because audit cost data is not available. We analyze annual reports of Big 4 accounting firms in Korea and find that operating income over sales is around 2.91% on average and net income over sales is around 1.36%. We also break labor costs into fixed and variable costs because low-balling decision by auditors can be made based on variable costs. Through these analyses, we assume that the average percentage of contribution margin is around 18%. Based on this estimate, we operationalize low-balling by assuming that low-balling exists if an audit fee is less than the expected audit fee by 20 percent or more. We also employ alternative cutoffs such as 15% and 25% to define low-balling as sensitivity checks. And then, we consider the economic factors of low-balling, such as auditor concentration ratio, auditor industry specialization, auditor turnover, non-audit service fees, auditees’ risk and client importance. Based on panel datasets of audit fee disclosures from 2003 to 2014, our empirical results provide evidence that auditors tend to low-ball if clients are large. This result could be due to the fact that an auditor has no room for audit fee discounts for small clients companies since the auditor still has to follow mandatory audit procedures even for small firms Or an auditor is willing to provide audit fee discounts for large clients since they are in general less riskier than small clients. In contrast, auditors are less likely to low-ball if client importance is high, client business risk is high, or auditor turnover is high. These results show that non-price competition becomes important when a client is important, risky and has high auditor turnover history. We also find that auditors are more likely to low-ball for downward auditor changes, not horizontal changes. Upward auditor changes are related with low-balling when it is only compared to changes from a non-Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor. The effect of auditor’s industry specialization on low-balling decisions depend on the cutoff points employed to define low-balling, indicating that the relationship between auditor specialization and low-balling may not be linear. We do not find evidence on the effects of auditor concentration, non-audit services and previous auditor tenure on low-balling. In additional analyses, we conduct the analyses by splitting the sample based on the type of auditor change. Low-balling is pronounced for the downward auditor change, while low-balling is observed only for the horizontal change between non-big auditors. We also show that the low-balling measures based on the cutoff percentages from prior-year audit fees may lead to the misclassification of low-balling engagements since audit fees can be affected by various factors such as client size, risk, and complexity. Our findings remain unchanged even after controlling the number of CPAs and listed companies and the ratio of the two numbers to ensure that the results of low balling determinants are not driven by the increase in the number of CPAs in Korea. We suggest that understanding low-balling determinants may provide useful information to regulators, practitioners, and financial statement users since low-balling is driven by auditors’ economic incentives, which may eventually affect audit quality.

감사노력이 계속감사기간과 이익의 질의 관계에 미치는 영향

권수영 ( Soo Young Kwon ),기은선 ( Eun Sun Ki ),허진숙 ( Jin Suk Heo ) 한국회계학회 2012 會計學硏究 Vol.37 No.4