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      • KCI등재

        A Comparative Study on Tunisian Government"s Religious Policies and their Limits

        Choe Young-Chol(최영철) 한국중동학회 2005 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.26 No.1

          본 논문은 1956년 튀니지 독립이후 시행된 튀니지 정부의 종교정책과 이슬람에 관련된 제도적인 개혁, 그리고 튀니지 이슬람운동의 부상과정을 개관하고 이러한 튀니지 정부의 종교정책과 그 한계에 대하여 고찰하였다. 또한 중동국가 민주화 가능성 및 국가와 종교간의 상관관계에 대한 기존 서구 학자들의 부정적인 시각을 비판적인 관점에서 검토하였다. 이를 위해 본 연구에서는 요르단, 팔레스타인, 이스라엘, 레바논, 쿠웨이트 등 중동 국가 및 한국 대학생들의 정치ㆍ경제ㆍ사회ㆍ종교적인 태도에 대한 설문조사결과에 대한 비교 분석을 바탕으로 경험적이며 실증적인 연구를 수행하였다.<BR>  튀니지 독립과 현대 튀니지 국가건설에 크게 기여했으며, 1956년부터 1987년까지 튀니지를 통치했던 부르기바(Bourguiba) 대통령은 신분법개정을 통한 여성의 지위향상, 자이투나 이슬람대학교의 국립화 등 급진적인 서구 지향적, 세속주의적인 종교ㆍ사회 개혁과 이러한 개혁의 제도화를 시도하였다. 1987년 집권하여 2005년 현재까지 튀니지를 통치하고 있는 벤 알리(Ben Ali) 현대통령은 부르기바 전대통령의 과도한 세속주의적인 정책을 완화하고 튀니지의 아랍ㆍ이슬람적인 전통을 좀 더 강조하고 있지만, 일반적으로 부르기바 대통령의 서구지향적, 세속주의적 정책의 기본 기조를 유지하고 있다.<BR>  그러나 중동과 튀니지 대학생들에 대한 설문조사분석의 결과는 튀니지 정부의 이러한 급진적인 세속주의적 종교ㆍ사회정책에도 불구하고 튀니지 대학생들이 중동의 다른 이슬람국가 대학생들에 비해 더 세속화되거나 덜 종교적이지 않음을 보여주었다. 이는 부르기바 및 벤 알리 대통령의 서구지향적, 세속주의적인 정책들이 튀니지 국민들의 종교생활과 이슬람적, 종교적인 태도의 변화에 큰 영향을 미치지 못했음을 보여주는 것이다. 또한 튀니지 대학생들은 이슬람이 중동정치발전의 장애요인이라는 서구 학자들의 주장과는 반대로 튀니지의 경우 이슬람이 사회ㆍ경제적인 발전과 정치발전을 방해하는 요인이 아니라는 응답이 절대 다수를 차지하였다.<BR>  따라서 튀니지의 종교와 국가 간의 관계 그리고 이슬람과 정치발전에 대한 긍정적인 관계에 대한 본 연구는 이라크와 팔레스타인에서의 성공적인 선거 실시, 이집트와 사우디 아라비아, 쿠웨이트 등 중동에서의 정치적인 변화의 조짐과 함께 중동국가의 민주화에 대한 긍정적인 전망을 강화시키는 데 기여할 것으로 보인다.

      • KCI등재

        이슬람과 정치발전: 아랍 22국에 대한 사례연구

        최영철(Choe Young-Chol) 한국중동학회 2004 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.24 No.2

          Many scholars in the study of political development and democratization have claimed that the political under-development in Muslim countries is due to Islam"s incompatibility with democracy. It is also generally accepted that there is a positive association between economic development and democracy whether in Western advanced democracies or in predominantly Muslim societies. And leading scholars in the field have asserted that there is a positive linear relationship between the two.<BR>  This study attempts to challenge this thesis, reviewing current studies and examining determinants of political regime in Muslim countries basing upon the study of M. Steven Fish. And then I examine the relationship between economic development and democracy in 22 Arab-Muslim countries. I classify the 22 Arab countries into four groups according to their level of economic development (GDP per capita) and compare the variable with their Freedom House scores which are evaluated according to the extent of political liberties and civil rights, and the Polity scores by the Marshall and Jaggers" Polity Project.<BR>  Contrary to the widely accepted theory of a positive linear relationship between economic development and democracy, I found that there is a negative relationship between the two in the 22 Arab countries: higher economic development is associated to worse Freedom House scores and Polity scores. Economically richer countries have worse FH and Polity scores.<BR>  I also investigated the orientations of the Arab-Muslims toward political developments in the Levantine states (Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine), Kuwait and Iraq, basing upon the research surveys and opinion polls by the 21th century Middle Eastern and Islamic civilization project, sponsored by the Korea Research Foundation, a Kuwaiti scholar (Antoun Rahma) and Gallop Organization. I found that there is a strong aspiration for democracy in the Arab-Muslim countries. A clear majority of the Arab-Muslims want their parliamentary system to be more developed and their political rights and civil liberty to be strengthened and widened. However they preferred the union of religion and state to the separation, and supported an Islamic political system to the Western secular one.

      • KCI등재

        이븐 칼둔의 정치변동이론과 현대 중동정치 연구에의 함의

        최영철(Choe, Young-Chol) 한국중동학회 2010 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.30 No.3

        The fourteenth Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, in his Muqaddimah(Introduction to History), explained political change and the rise and fall of dynasties as a function of the interactions among positive and/or negative factors for the political changes such as asabiyah (social cohesion or group feeling), religion, military might, financial capability(tax revenues), political leadership, corruption, and injustice This study analyzes the Ibn Khaldun's political change theory, and examines the factors, which contribute to the political changes This study also reviews the cases of the application of Ibn Khaldun's political change theory to political changes in the modern Middle East by contemporary scholars And then we examine the developmental processes of Hamas, a Palestinian radical Islamic movement, and its evolution into a political party which succeeded in entering into Palestinian mainstream institutional politics with the Ibn Khaldun's political change theory In the concluding chapter, it examines the implication of Ibn Khaldun's political change theory in studies of contemporary political change in the Middle East and finds its applicability in that studies

      • KCI등재
      • KCI등재

        이슬람형법과 사형제도: 이란과 사우디아라비아를 중심으로

        최영철(Choe, Young-Chol) 한국중동학회 2016 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.37 No.2

        This study analyses the Islamic penal laws and death penalty focusing on Saudi Arabia and Iran. It reviews the development and legislative processes of the Islamic penal laws in Saudi Arabia and Iran. And then it examines the codification of Islamic Sharia Laws into the positive penal laws of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have carried out the highest number of death penalty execution in the Middle East during the period between 2007 and 2014. The numbers of execution by the two countries during the period, recorded by Amnesty International, was 2,591 in Iran and 670 in Saudi Arabia (the average number of each year was 324 in Iran and 84 in Saudi Arabia). In 1912, Iran introduced a Western and secular penal law system and had maintained that system until the Islamic revolution in 1979. After the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini initiated the codification of Islamic Sharia Laws into positive penal laws. In contrast to the case of Iranian penal codes, Saudi Arabia has not codified Islamic Sharia Laws into positive penal laws. As a result, Sharia is the main source of Saudi penal laws which comprises three categories: Hudud, Qisas and Tazir. The Hudud crimes of Saudi Arabia are, for example, including theft, robbery, blasphemy, apostasy, adultery, sodomy, and fornication. The fact is that the conservative Wahhabism and the jurisprudence of the Hanbali School have become the main sources of the Saudi religious and judicial sectors. With the combination of these conservative religious doctrines and the Saudi monarchic system, Saudi Arabian penal laws have become Islamized with an extreme literal interpretation of the Sharia Laws. As a result, the number of death penalty executions in Saudi Arabia has been also rapidly increased.

      • KCI등재

        사우디아라비아의 왕권 승계:

        최영철(Choe Young Chol) 한국중동학회 2018 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.39 No.1

        On June 21, 2017, Saudi Arabia s King Salman has appointed his son, Mohammed bin Salman, as heir. This decision was endorsed by 31 out of 34 members of the Allegiance Council. It was an unconventional succession of kingship in modern Saudi Arabia since 1953, because the throne had been passed not linearly from father to son, but laterally from brother to brother until now. King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, had designed his posthumous succession plan since the early 1920s. Saud, Faisal, and Khalid, among the princes with the qualities of a ruler, were preferred candidates for the Saudi kingship successions. In 1926, he appointed Saud and Faisal to the governors of the Najd and Hijaz provinces, respectively. And he also appointed Saud as his crown prince. In March 1964, about 70 princes resolved to remove King Saud s rights, wrote a petition for this resolution, and submitted it to Saud. By the end of 1964, leading senior princes decided to dethrone the kingship of Saud, and petitioned it to Ulamah and Majlis al-Wukala. They approved their petition to hand over power from Saud to the crown prince Faisal. On November 2, 1964, Saud was dethroned. This study analyses the 1964 Saudi Kingship succession process from Saud to Faisal, examining the factors which had contributed to the succession. It also deals with the power struggle between Saud and Faisal which had lead to the 1964 Saudi Kingship succession in 1964.

      • KCI등재

        사우디아라비아의 왕권승계 연구(1953-2020): 이븐 칼둔의 정치변동이론을 통한 분석

        최영철 ( Choe Young-chol ) 한국외국어대학교 중동연구소 2021 중동연구 Vol.39 No.3

        On June 21, 2017, Saudi Arabia's King Salman appointed his son, Muhammad bin Salman, as crown prince. This decision has two implications for the succession of the Saudi throne. First, the succession mechanism has been changed to primogeniture succession. The Saudi line of succession has been from brother to brother among the sons of King Abdulaziz which lasted over the past 50 years. Second, it is the generational change of Saudi rulers. He is challenging the old order while appointing a new generation of princes to key positions of the state. The decision on the succession in Saudi Arabia to the throne had been made without serious conflict within the royal family because it had been generally collegial, following consultations among senior royal family members. There was an ongoing struggle for power within the royal family. Still, its leaders feared that this would threaten the survival of the al-Saud dynasty. Therefore a system of checks and balances had been formed and operated by the power centers within the royal family which had limited an excessive ruler’s power. Since Muhammad bin Salman came to power in 2015, he has ordered a series of unprecedented purges without formal charges or any legal process, rounding up the opposition and using coercive means. The most senior second-generation princes and government ministers were removed from office including the former Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, who has been sacked and put under house arrest. Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman is the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia and controls all economic, political, social and foreign relations. He is seeking to radically restructure the Saudi economy and society with the ambitious program of ‘Vision 2030’. He has traits of “ambition, vision, ego, youth, risk tolerance, insight, and ruthlessness” (Byman and Pollack 2019, 9), some combination of which can affect his ultimate succession to the throne. This study was started from the critical mind that a framework for analysis is needed to the study of the Saudi kingship succession in the context of the intellectual tradition and political culture of the Arab monarchical regime in the Arabian Peninsula. To overcome this problem, this study examines the political change theory of Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), the greatest Arab scholar, and analyzes the cases of the kingship succession in Saudi Arabia by applying his political change theory.

      • KCI등재

        중동 무슬림 국가의 형법과 종교 자유권

        최영철(Choe, Young-Chol) 한국중동학회 2017 韓國 中東 學會 論叢 Vol.38 No.2

        This study analyses Islamic penal laws and the right to religious freedom focusing on 24 Middle East Muslim countries. It reviews the codified penal codes of the Middle East Muslim countries that criminalize apostasy and blasphemy. We found that apostasy is punishable by penal law and/or family law in 20 Middle East Muslim countries, representing the absolute majority out of the 24 Muslim countries. Twenty-three Muslim countries in that area, except Djibouti only, punish blasphemy as a crime. The actual punishment for apostasy and blasphemy in those countries varies from country to country. Some Middle Eastern Muslim countries classify apostasy as a Hudud crime and is punishable by death penalty. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Sudan belong to this category. In Tunisia, however, the Constitution prohibits punishment for apostasy as well as punishment for apostasy outside the judicial system. The restrictions on religious freedom in the Muslim countries of the Middle East are more severe and oppressive than in other parts of Europe and Asia. Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia have high levels of restrictions on religious freedom. Restrictions on religious freedom from 2007 to 2016 have worsened until the Arab uprising in 2011. Still in some countries, including Saudi Arabia, there are signs of improvement on religious freedom.

      • KCI등재

        2001년 이후 미국의 대 이라크 정책

        최영철(Choe, Young-Chol) 한국이슬람학회 2016 한국이슬람학회논총 Vol.26 No.1

        This paper attempts to deal with the correlations between the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and petroleum resources in Iraq. It focuses on the US Bush administration's real intentions for the 2003 invasion such as the control of petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf area in general, and the control of huge amount of Iraqi crude oil resources in particular. The author argues that there were several factors that drove the United States into the Iraq war. First, the Bush administration sought to restructure the political and military order and to strengthen its uncontested hegemonic power in the Middle East after the 9/11 by disarming Saddam Hussein. Second, the Bush administration wanted to control Iraqi crude oil resources and maintain a steady supply of oil to the world capitalist economy including that of the US, Europe, Japan and China. Especially, its purpose was not to directly control the Iraqi crude oil resources; however, to improve the accessibility of international oil companies, both of private and national, to the Iraqi crude oil resources. Third, a group of the American 'neo-conservatists was a driving force which had succeeded to convince the Bush administration's policy-makers on the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. This study also analyzes the inter-relationships between international oil companies and both of the American and British administrations with respect to the Iraqi crude oil resources and its oil industry.

      • KCI등재

        걸프지역 석유자원과 제2차 걸프전쟁(1990-1991)

        최영철 ( Young Chol Choe ) 한국외국어대학교 중동연구소 2013 중동연구 Vol.32 No.2

        This paper analyzes the correlations between the intervention of the United States in the second Gulf War (1990-1991) and petroleum resources in the Gulf. This study reviews prior literatures on the subject of the causes and policy objectives of the United States in the second Gulf War and other related studies on the war. In chapter three, the author discusses the history of struggles for the petroleum resources in the Gulf among the Global super powers since the early 20th century. And, in chapter four, the author analyzes the policy objectives of the United States in the Gulf in general and in Iraq in particular focusing on the meaning of the Gulf petroleum resources for the United States and the geopolitical importance of the area. In chapter five, the author examines the origins and consequences of the second Gulf War (1990-1991) and the factors that drove the United States into the war. In conclusion, the author argues that the most important factors for the U. S. involvement in the conflict were the petroleum resources in the Gulf and the geopolitical importance of the area for the United States.

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