[일본 근현대] 일본근현대사 연구의 동향

崔碩莞 역사학회 2010 역사학보 Vol.0 No.207

일본정부와 청일전쟁 개전 과정 - 열강의 간섭과 일본의 교섭 무산 전략 -

최석완 일본사학회 2009 일본역사연구 Vol.29 No.-

Japanese government decided to plunge into the Sino-Japanese War at the Cabinet conference held on June 21st and 22nd, 1894. However, Japanese government could not but suspend the policy pushing an early outbreak of the war because the serious intervention of Russia and England was begun. Ito Hirobumi(伊藤博文) and Mutsu Munemitsu(陸奥宗光) made a plan to overcome their interventions. That was the strategy that broke the will of Chinese government to attend the negotiation table with Japan and blocked the intervention of the Western Powers by raising the demand level related with the reform of Korean government. Russia demanded an early withdrawal of Japanese troops, but Japanese government rejected it firmly. Japanese government had an optimistic view that England and Russia would hold each other in check. On the other hand, Japanese government assumed a stance of moderation as if it accepted the intervention of England. Because Japanese government thought that England would not agree to a new Japan-England treaty, if it did not accept that intervention. Japanese government putting emphasis on diplomatic negotiations pushed a passive war. However, Otori Keisuke(大鳥圭介) insisted that an early armed provocation against China was needed to exclude the intervention of the Western Powers. Meanwhile, Otori carried out the strategy of Japanese government by compelling Korean government to accept a proposal about the reform of Korean domestic politics and by drawing up a decisive measure(乙案) to prepare for its rejection. However, the conflicts between Japanese government and Otori were solved after about July 10th. The intervention of Russia was weakened. And there was no room for the intervention of England because of Chinese very firm attitude demanding an early withdrawal of Japanese troops. As a situation was changed, Japanese government hastened the Sino-Japanese War. Japanese government sent a diplomatic note of breaking off its relationship with China and came back to an active war policy. Though the intervention of the Western Powers resumed after that, it could not interrupt the Japanese government's step toward the Sino-Japanese War.

일본정부와 조선 내정의 개혁안 (1894.6)

최석완 일본사학회 2005 일본역사연구 Vol.21 No.-

[Astract]Japanese Government's Proposal for Reforming the Korean Government The aim of this paper is to examine Japan's East Asia policy from the late May to the middle of June in 1894. On the 30th of May the Japanese government made it clear that it would send its troops to Korea if China decided to send its forces to Korea. The dispatch was expected to suppress the Donghak forces and secure Japan's exclusive control over Korea by carrying out the reform of Korean internal affairs. On the second day of June, however, the Japanese government decided to send its troops to Korea immediately even if the dispatch of Chinese forces was not yet decided. Again it moved back and reached the conclusion that it would send its troops only as a response to the Chinese provocation of war. Consul Odori was summoned and it decide to send its troops led by Oshima to Korea. At first Odori opposed the entry of Japanese forces into Seoul, but later he dropped his moderate position toward China as Japan discarded its cooperative stance with China on the thirteenth day of June. A few days later Japan carried out the forced reform of the Korean government by itself. The Japanese move amounted to an official declaration of war against China. Ito Hirobumi, Mutsu Munemitsu and the military played a major role in carrying out Japan's East Asia Policy. My research shows that three major players shared a goal of making Korea Japan's protectorate and cooperated with each other in their efforts to find ways to suppress peasants' rebellion and intervene in the Korean internal affairs. This fact raises serious doubts about the previous views that Ito who favored the cooperation with China suppressed successfully the hard-line policy of Mutsu and the military, the Japanese government simply followed the military hard-liners, or the Japanese government was driven to war against China by the public opinion.

일본정부의 청일전쟁 개전 정책과 그 성격

최석완 일본사학회 2018 일본역사연구 Vol.47 No.-

This study analyzed the characteristics of the outbreak policy of the Sino-Japanese War that the Japanese government implemented in July 1894. The following summarizes the results. There were various conflicts over the issues of starting the war with the Qing Dynasty within the Japanese government. However, it was not the conflict between the passive outbreak group and the active outbreak group. Rather, it was the conflict between the conditional active outbreak group who claimed that Japan should start the war if the Qing Dynasty reinforces its army to the Joseon Dynasty, and the active outbreak group who asserted that Japan should start the war, irrespective of the reinforcement. The former group of people includes Meiji Tenno(明治天皇), and the latter includes Mutsu Munemitsu(陸奥宗光) and the military. In fact, Ito Hirobumi(伊藤博文) supported Mutsu’s position. There has been no evidence showing if Mutsu, the military, Otori Keisuke(大鳥圭介), and Oshima Yoshimasa(大島義昌) acted arbitrarily on their own authority to convert the passive outbreak to active outbreak policy. It was a “limited arbitrariness” which was acted within the scope of the outbreak policy pushed by Japanese government. “Samae 32(サメ 32號)”(July 19) was an attack order which commands to start the war if the Qing Dynasty reinforces its army. This signified that the conditional active outbreak policy, which came into the scene during the establishment of “the second negotiation refusal(第2次 絶交書)” that Japan informed to the Qing on July 12, was confirmed as an official policy. Meanwhile, a period extending from early June to late July was the process of crystallizing the establishment of exclusive protection rights to the Joseon Dynasty into the purpose of the Sino-Japanese War. Taken together, the recent new theory, which defines the Sino-Japanese War as an accidental one, cannot be supported.

근대 일본의 동아시아 정책에 대한 재검토 : 1880-1890년대를 중심으로 Concentrating on the years form 1880 to 1890

최석완 이화사학연구소 2002 梨花史學硏究 Vol.0 No.29

청일전쟁 개전 시기의 『동경일일신문(東京日日新聞)』

최석완 동국대학교 일본학연구소 2014 일본학 Vol.38 No.-

本論文は、日本政府による開戦外交が展開されていた一八九四年六月初から、七月末までの日本言論の性格と役割を検討したものである。特に、日本政府の機関紙的存在として知られている 『東京日日新聞』の社説の論調を中心として、その性格の変化や政府の政策との相互関連の構造などを究明したものである。その結果は、大体つぎのようにまとめることができる。第二章では、社説による朝鮮現状維持論の性格を分析した。その過程のなかで、日清戦争を回避しようとする姿勢や、朝鮮の中立国化をはかり、またそれによって朝鮮の独立体制を守ろうとする社説の態度などが浮かび上がった。このような姿勢と、開戦への道を歩んでいた日本政府の強硬論との間には、格差が存在したといえる。第三章では、朝鮮内政改革論が登場して定着していく過程を検討した。社説は、朝鮮内政改革案に対する清国の拒絶をきっかけに、日本政府の対清強硬論に急速に近づいていった。また、早期開戦を主張する国内の世論を牽制することによって、日本政府が開戦外交を主導的に展開していくことができるように、側面で支援する役割を果たした。第四章では、朝鮮に派遣された日本軍の性格を、単なる派遣軍から長期駐屯を前提にした治安維持軍として位置づけることによって、治安の維持を朝鮮政策の目的として定着していく過程を確認した。また、日本政府の構想を越える大規模の日清戦争を想定することによって、政府の開戦政策に一定の圧力として作用した部分もあったことを明らかにした。最後に第五章では、日本が単独で朝鮮を保護する主体になることの正当化をはかるため、その間、展開してきた天津条約に対する歪曲を基盤とし、清国の宗主権を否定したことを指摘した。あわせて列強からの支持を引き出すため、日清戦争が不可避であることを対外的に訴えることに出たことを究明した。社説は、朝鮮政策の目的や天津条約の意味に対する持続的な歪曲を通じ、朝鮮の内政改革を妨害する清国を文明の敵と看做す論理を作り出した。また、日本が内政改革を担当することは、文明国としてだけではなく、東アジアの伝統的な国際秩序から見ても正当であるとの観点を構築した。その過程で、朝鮮に対する保護権だけでなく、近代的宗主権の獲得をも追求した。社説の観点から見れば、日清戦争は、このような日本の権益を鞏固にするため、通り抜けなければならない過程であったといえよう。

일본정부의 청일 개전 정책―제1차 개전 기도와 좌절―

최석완 중국근현대사학회 2007 중국근현대사연구 Vol.33 No.-

임오군란・청프전쟁・갑신정변과 일본 언론 ― 미래 국가 구상과 청일전쟁 논리의 형성

최석완 일본사학회 2023 일본역사연구 Vol.62 No.-

임오군란 직후 등장한 대외 강경론에는 청일전쟁을 선동하는 시사신보(時事新報) 도 있었지만, 대부분은 조선의 폭도를 신속히 진압하는 것에 초점을 맞추었다. 반면 동경일일신문(東京日日新聞) 등은 대외 강경론을 비판했는데, 이것은 일본의 국력 부족과 조선이 서구 열강과의 조약 체제에 편입된 사실을 중시했기 때문이다. 한편 일본 언론은 청국의 조선 속방론 강화에 맞서, 조선 독립론을 관철하기 위한 다양한 방안을 제시했다. 시사신보 는 청국의 조선 속방론 강화를 침략으로 규정해 비판했고, 동경일일신문 등은 열국 회의를 통해 청국의 조선 속방론을 부정하는 방안을 모색했다. 일본 언론은 열국 간의 세력 균형 속에서 조선의 독립을 유지하는 가운데, 조선에 대한 일본의 영향력을 확대하는 것이, 일본의 독립을 보전할 수 있는 효율적 방안이라고 판단했다. 청프전쟁은 이런 일본 언론의 대외론에 변화를 초래했다. 청프전쟁이 발발하자 일본 언론은 서구 열강의 식민지 정략을 적극 수용했다. 그것이 일본의 독립을 보전하고 서구 열강에 의한 청국 분할 경쟁에 참여할 수 있는 길이라고 확신했다. 팽창 지향적 근대 문명국의 건설이라는 미래 국가 구상이 명확해진 것이다. 갑신정변은 일본 언론이 그런 미래 국가 구상을 실현할 수 있는 현실적 수단으로 청일전쟁에 주목하는 계기가 되었다. 시사신보 등의 대외 강경론은 청일전쟁에서 승리해 조선 속방론을 부정하고 아시아의 맹주로 인정받게 된다면, 열강과의 불평등조약을 개정할 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 청국 분할 경쟁에도 참여할 수 있을 것으로 전망했다. 반면 조야신문(朝野新聞) 은 승리를 확신하지 못했고, 동경횡빈매일신문(東京横浜毎日新聞) 은 청일전쟁이 일본의 국제 지위 상승에 큰 역할을 할 것으로 보지 않았다. 그러나 이런 대외 온건론의 태도가 곧 청프전쟁 이후 확고해진 대외 팽창주의로부터의 이탈을 의미하는 것은 아니었다. 임오군란, 청프전쟁, 갑신정변을 거치면서 일본 언론은 점차 대외 팽창주의를 강화하는 경향을 보였다. 그리고 그 과정에서, 청일전쟁은 근대 문명국의 대열에 진입하기 위한 현실적 수단이 될 수 있고, 조선과 일본의 독립을 위태롭게 만드는 조선 속방론은 반드시 제거되어야 하며, 청국 분할 경쟁에 참여할 수 있는 국력의 확보가 시급하다는 점에 대해 공감대를 형성하게 되었다. After the outbreak of the Imo Mutiny, Japanese media was divided into hardliners and moderates. Among the hardliners, there were voices like Jiji Shimpo (時事新報) that incited the Sino–Japanese War, but the majority of hardliners focused on dispatching the military to quickly suppress Korean rioters. On the other hand, moderates displayed a cautious attitude towards sending troops to Korea. Meanwhile, Japanese media proposed various measures to block Qing's influence on Korea and preserve Korea's independent status. Jiji Shimpo criticized Qing's efforts to strengthen its suzerainty over Korea as an act of aggression, while Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun (東京日日新聞) aimed to cooperate with Western powers to abolish Qing's suzerainty over Korea. The war between Qing and France stimulated Japan's expansionism. When the war broke out, Japanese media actively embraced the colonial strategies of Western powers. They were convinced that this was the way to preserve Japan's independence and to participate in the competition for dividing Qing's territories by Western powers. After the outbreak of the Gapsin Coup, hardliners such as Jiji Shimpo incited war with Qing. They believed that a victory in that war would not only make treaty revisions with Western powers possible but also allow Japan to participate in the competition for dividing Qing's territories by Western powers. On the other hand, advocates of moderation showed a cautious attitude toward a war with Qing. Choya Shimbun (朝野新聞) was not confident in the victory in that war, and Tokyo Yokohama Mainichi Shimbun (東京横浜毎日新聞) was skeptical about its effects. Meanwhile, Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun criticized hardliners who ignored the procedures of international law. However, these advocates of moderation, like the hardliners, did not deviate from the strong expansionism that had solidified after the Sino–French War. During this period, Japanese media formed a consensus that a war with Qing was inevitable in order to enter the ranks of modern civilized nations. They were also convinced that removing Qing's suzerainty over Korea was a way to prevent Russian aggression against Korea and, ultimately, to safeguard Japan's independence. At this time, Japanese media gradually strengthened its expansionist stance in foreign affairs.

日本政府의 동아시아질서 재편정책과 淸日戰爭

崔碩莞 동양사학회 1999 東洋史學硏究 Vol.65 No.-

명치전기, 明治前期 일본정부, 日本政府의 청국, 淸國 인식, 認識과 정책론, 政策論

최석완 한국일본근대학회 2007 일본근대학연구 Vol.0 No.17

明治前期には、多樣な形の對淸政策論が現れた。その背景には、西歐化·文明化の側面で、日本が淸國よりも優越であるとの認識が存在した。優越感は、蔑視感につながり、それはまた、淸國の將來に對する否定的な展望を産み出した。日本政府は、淸國に對し、西歐の勢力に對抗しうる、强いパ―トナシップを期待していなかった。むしろ、淸に對する優越感を東アジアの現實政治のなかで、具體化させようとした。つまり日本は、朝鮮から淸國の勢力を追い出すことによって、日本の政治的な優位を確立しようとした。それだけでなく、條約改正を通じて、西歐列强との對等な國際的地位を確保した後、近い將來、予想される列强による淸國領土に對する分割競爭に、直接參加するための準備を急いだ。日淸協調論とか、朝鮮中立化論などは、淸國の勢力を排除するための戰略に過ぎなかった。