한국의 부상(浮上)을 어떻게 남북 화해와 연결시킬 것인가? : 한국 공공외교에의 함축성

차두현 ( Du Hyeogn Cha ) 한국세계지역학회 2014 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.32 No.2

한국이 분단국가가 된 이후, 남북관계는 어떤 근본적 변화도 보이지 않아 왔다. 일부에서는 북한의 불안정이 이러한 교착국면의 돌파구가 될 것으로 이야기할 수도 있다. 그러나, 이것은 현재 북한의 정권/체제 내구성을 고려할 때 그렇게 합리적인 선택은 되지 못할 것 같다. 따라서 우리는 북한의 체제 안정요인과 불안요인을 동시에 고려하여 ‘진정한’ 남북 화해를 위한 최적의 답안이 무엇인지를 찾아내야 한다. 북한은 그 동안 (1) 무력적화(1950년대~60년대), (2) 전략 세련화(1970년대~1980년대초), (3) 수세적 전략으로의 전환(1980년대 중반~1990년대), (4) 공세적 수단과 수세적 수단의 탄력적 혼합(1990년대 후반 이후)와 같이 대남전략을 끊임없이 전환해 왔다. 이러한 과정에서, ‘주체사상’과 ‘혁명가계론’에 입각한 정치 이데올로기는 북한의 정권 생존을 강력히 떠받쳐 왔다. 북한주민들의 정치적 민주화와 시장경제체제에 대한 경험의 부족, 오랜 경제적 곤궁으로 인한 나름의 ‘노하우’ 축적, 1990년대 중반 이후 중국과 러시아의 북한에 대한 전략적 가치 판단의 변화 등의 다른 요인들 역시 북한 정권 생존의 원동력이었다. 그러나, 우리는 동시에 북한 경제의 구조적 실패, 왜곡된 당-군 관계, 경제-사회적 변화, 주변국의 정책변화 가능성 등 북한을 미래에 정권/체제 차원의 불안정으로 이끌 수 있는 요인들을 고려해야 한다. 북한의 미래와 관련해서는 포괄적 개혁개방에서 정권/체제 붕괴에 이르는 다양한 시나리오들이 존재한다. 북한 지도층 역시 잠재적 불안정 시나리오들에 대해 잘 알고 있을 것이다. 이러한 이유 때문에, 평양당국은 미국과의 관계정상화를 추구하는 동시에, 한국의 관여정책(engagement policy)가 지니는 침투성을 효과적으로 차단하기 위해 부심해 왔다. 1990년대 후반 이후 평양은 최소한 단중기적으로는 정권 안정과 대한 및 대주변국 정책의 최적화를 염두에 두고 끊임없이 전략을 조정해 왔다. 두 개의 한국 간의 ‘진정한’ 화해를 위해서는 우리는 여전히 한반도에 아직도 뿌리 깊은 불신과 적대감이 존재하고 있음을 받아들여야 한다. 우리는 또한 평양 당국이 아직도 극단적인 정권 불안정성의 가능성에 대해 우려하고 있음도 이해해야 한다. 이러한 점들을 감안하면, 한국은 다양한 공공외교 수단을 동원한 보다 탄력적인 접근을 취할 필요가 있다. 예를 들어, 박근혜 정부는 한국의 화해/통일정책에 대한 지역/국제적 지지를 이끌어내기 위해 한국의 브랜드 이미지를 활용할 필요가 있다. 이러한 맥락에서, 북한 역시 공공외교의 대상이 되어야 할 것이다. 박근혜 정부는 북한 지도층의 정권 안정에 대한 우려를 해소해 줄 필요가 있다. (이러한 관점에서) 한국 정부는 인내심을 가지고 점진적 접근을 취하면서 북한 주민들의 반한 심리를 변화시켜 나가야 한다. 이를 위해서 한국 정부는 우선 국민들의 견해를 취합하고 통합하기 위해서도 노력해야 한다. South-North relation has not shown any fundamental changes and meaningful progress since Korea became a divided country. Some may say that North Korea’s instability and collapse would be a breakthrough. It seems, however, not be so rational choice, given the regime/system durability of North Korea. So, we should find out an optimal answer for ‘real’ South-North reconciliation, considering both of dynamics and potential instability of Pyongyang. North Korea has continuously transformed its strategy toward South Korea: (1) communization by armed forces (1950s~1960s), (2) sophistication of the strategy (1970s~early 1980s), (3) transformation into defensive strategy (mid 1980s~1990s), (4) flexible combination of offense and defense (since late 1990s). During this process, political ideology based on the ‘Juche Idea’ and the ‘Theory of Revolutionary Family’ has strongly contributed to regime survival of North Korea. Other factors, such as lack of experience of North Korean in political democracy and market economy, accumulated ‘know-how’ of people to endure long-standing economic difficulties, reassessment of Russia and China about Pyongyang’s strategic value since mid1990s, also have been dynamics of Pyongyang’s survival. We should, however, also take account of various factors including structural failure of North Korea’s economy, distorted party-military relation, socio-economic changes, the possibility of neighboring countries’ policy change, etc. that could induce regime/system instability in the future. There exist various scenarios on North Korea’s future including comprehensive reform and regime/system collapse. North Korean leadership may well know about the latent scenarios of instability. For this reason, Pyongyang has tried to realize the improvement and the diplomatic normalization with the U.S., struggling to block penetrative effects of engagement policy of Seoul. The North Korean leadership may well know about the latent scenarios of instability. For this reason, Pyongyang has tried to realize the improvement and the diplomatic normalization with the U.S., struggling to block penetrative effects of engagement policy of Seoul. Since late 1990s, Pyongyang began to skillfully adjust its own strategy, aiming at short-/mid-term regime stability and optimization of its policy toward Seoul as well as neighboring countries. For realizing ‘real’ reconciliation between two Koreas, we should accept that there are still deep distrust and hostility in Korean peninsula. We have to understand the fact that Pyongyang still worries about the possibility of extreme regime instability. Given these facts Seoul need to take a more flexible approach through various public diplomacy measures. For example, Park administration can utilize brand-images of South Korea for inducing regional/international support to its reconciliation/unification policy. In this context, North Korea may also be a target of public diplomacy. Park administration needs to alleviate and relax North Korean leadership’s worry about regime security. Seoul should take incremental approaches with patience, transforming anti-South Korea sentiments of North Koreans. For this, the new government must try to aggregate and integrate opinions of the people.

북한의 신년도 외교정책 전망

차두현(Cha Du-Hyeogn) 한국외교협회 2021 계간 외교 Vol.- No.136

북한의 신년도 외교정책 전망

차두현 ( Cha Du-hyeogn ) 한국외교협회 2021 외교 Vol.136 No.0

Pyongyang’s diplomacy has focused on three major strategies Since the establishment of the regime in 1948: ① maintaining cooperative relations with traditional socialist allies such as China and the Soviet Union, ② inducing support from third world countries centered on non-alignment movement, ③ attacking weak points of ROK-U.S. alliance and the Western bloc. Under these three strategies, North Korea has pushed foreign policies that appropriately blends isolation, deception, and ‘calling my way.’ While Pyongyang’s foreign policy in the early and mid Kim Jong-un era, especially from 2012 to 2016, was based on this strategic direction, its efforts were focused on enhancing relations with China and Russia, establishing direct U.S.-North Korea negotiations, and expanding international base centered on EU countries. Pyongyang’s diplomatic efforts, however, were confronted with obstacles in 2017 due to the growing international backlash against the assassination of Kim Jong-nam and its nuclear/missile tests. North Korea’s diplomatic standing reduced, and direct negotiations with the United States were hampered by the inauguration of the Trump administration. China and Russia also disagreed with North Korea’s excessively tough foreign policy. On the contrary, 2018 was a very encouraging year for North Korea. The three summits with South Korea and the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore provided the foundation for North Korea to break away from its image of ‘hermit kingdom’ and to be a ‘normal’ member of the international community. Based on this, it promoted the U.S.-North Korea dialogue and reinforced ties with existing allies, and secured the capacity to focus on managing traditional diplomatic footholds in various regions. But the momentum for Pyongyang’s diplomatic maneuver weakened dramatically in 2019, as the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi ended in a ‘no-deal.’ In addition, North Korea’s diplomacy has fallen into a total crisis as it faces the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Factors that have caused North Korea’s diplomacy to be troubled, especially the sluggish U.S.-North Korea negotiations and the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis are likely to still frustrate North Korea in 2021. To overcome this, Pyongyang will first seek to strengthen triangle cooperation among North Korea, China and Russia, and there is a possibility that Kim Jong-un may visit China and Russia during the first half of 2021. In this case, however, North Korea will maintain vigilance on the risk that strengthening relations with China and Russia would lead to North Korea's political and economic dependency. At the same time, It could target areas of power vacuum in the Middle East, such as Iran and Syria. The provocation against the U.S. is also a fully anticipated scenario, and North Korea may test-fire ICBM/SLBMs introduced at the military parade marking the 75th anniversary of Korean Worker’s Party establishment in 2020. It is also expected that Pyongyang will first try relatively comfortable provocations against the South Korea in the sense that it will sound out the U.S. response before conducting provocative acts against Washington. This policy direction was once again implied by hard-line messages toward Seoul and Washington at the 8th Korean Worker’s Party Congress.

미국 바이든 행정부 시대 미중 전략경쟁과 한국의 선택 연구

김흥규 ( Heungkyu Kim ),이왕휘 ( Wang Hwi Lee ),이승주 ( Seungjoo Lee ),조양현 ( Yanghyeon Jo ),이창주 ( Chang-ju Lee ),이상현 ( Sang Hyun Lee ),정재흥 ( Jae-hung Chung ),부형욱 ( Hyeong-wook Boo ),차두현 ( Du Hyeogn Cha ) 대외경제정책연구원 2021 단행본 Vol.2021 No.0

'선군정치' 시대의 북한 권력구도와 정치변동 가능성 : 김정일 신변이상설에 대한 논쟁을 중심으로

차두현 연세대학교 통일연구원 2008 통일연구 Vol.12 No.2

There has been a debate on Kim Join-Il's disorder since September 9 2008 when he was absent from North Korea's 60th anniversary ceremony. This debate, however, raises more fundamental questions than the possibility of Kim Jong-Il's disorder itself: Could Kim Jong-Il's personal trouble really invite serious political instability in North Korea? What is the implication of 'contingency'-such as implosion and/or explosion-of North Korea? Which political system and power structure would North Korea establish after Kim Jong-Il? First and foremost, It is important to understand that Kim Jong-Il's personal trouble or death is not the trigger of abrupt political change in North Korea by itself, but an accident. Post-Kim Jong II era would involve more possibility of profound political change than current stage, given the characteristic of North Korean politics - unadaptable political system made from long-standing dictatorship, distorted party-military relation under the 'Military-first policy', and sustaining economic difficulty. At the same time, however, the 'Military-first policy' has given a safety belt to North Korea that can prevent the abrupt power vacuum. So the 'contingency' of North Korea needs to be managed as a mid-/1ong-term 'process' rather than short-term accident such as Kim Jong'Il's disorder. We should also review some conventional thoughts on the analysis of North Korean politics: The nonexistence of designated successor amplifies latent risk in North Korea. The future of North Korean political system depends on the personal characteristic of specific political leader. Although the 'Military-first policy' has distorted traditional party-military relations, it has also contributed to institutionalize North Korean political system. By that reason, North Korean might restore political stability in some cases even after Kim Jong-Il's death regardless the specific political leader. It is also important for South Korea to prepare the internationalization of North Korean contingency, If the contingency of North Korea would once break out and the involvement/intervention of neighboring countries and international organizations, It would better to cooperate with them(especially with the U.S.) for sharing information and diplomatic/military resources.