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        한 · 중 조세조약상 수익적 소유자

        안경봉(Ahn Kyeong Bong),장월하(Zhang Yuexia) 국민대학교 법학연구소 2011 법학논총 Vol.23 No.2

        UN 모델조약과 OECD모델조약에 따라 1994년 체결된 한·중 조세조약에서는 조세조약 남용을 방지하기 위한 수익적 소유자 개념이 도입되었다. 즉, 수익적 소유자에 한하여 한·중 조세조약 제10조 배당, 제11조 이자 및 제12조 사용료 조항상의 원천지국 제한세율을 향유할 수 있다. 현재는 조세조약을 남용함으로써 양도소득의 원천지국 면세 혜택을 받은 사건이 점점 많아지고 있다. 따라서 수익적 소유자 규정은 배당, 이자, 사용료 조항 이외의 양도소득 조항에도 적용될 수 있는지 검토할 필요가 있다. 한편, 한 · 중조세조약에서는 UN 모델조약과 OECD모델조약처럼 수익적 소유자를 정의하지 않기 때문에 수익적 소유자의 해석이 문제가 된다. 정의하지 않는 용어에 대해 한·중조세조약 제3조 제2항에서 해석 규칙을 규정하고 있지만 이 조항에 따라 수익적 소유자를 해석할 수 없다. 이런 경우에는 조약법에 관한 비엔나 협약에서 규정하는 해석규칙에 의하여 수익적 소유자를 해석하여야 한다. 그러나 비엔나 협약에 따라 수익적 소유자를 해석하는 것은 여전히 어렵다. 다만 수익적 소유자에 대하여 한 · 중 양국내에서 행정규칙을 통한 행정해석 및 판례를 통한 사법해석을 많이 시도하고 있으나 양국간 불일치가 발생할 수 있다. 양국의 해석상 일치하지 않는 불균형을 제거하기 위해서 양국이 각각 행정해석이나 사법해석의 수정을 통해 통일된 해석을 한다든가, 양국간 수익적 소유자의 해석에 있어서 각국에서 발한 행정해석이나 사법해석을 우선적으로 적용할 수 있다는 협의를 할 필요가 있다. The term ‘beneficial owner’ was accepted by the Korea­China tax treaty, which was concluded in 1994, to against treaty shopping, one kind of tax avoidances. That means only beneficial owners who received the income of dividends (Article 10), interests (Article 11) and royalties (Article 12) can enjoy the limited source taxations in the Source State. However, since there have been many cases happened using the term ‘beneficial owner’ to against treaty shopping in other kinds, such as the tax treaty benefit that the Source States could not tax the capital gains, whether the term ‘beneficial owner’ can be introduced into the Korea­China tax treaty to against the treaty shopping that abusing such other tax treaty benefits has become an urgent problem. Although the term ‘beneficial owner’ was introduced into the Korea-China tax treaty, the treaty did not define it. So if two States want to apply the ‘beneficial owner’ rule effectively, they had to interpret it first. The Paragraph 2 of Article 3 in Korea­China tax treaty provides the regulations on how to interpret undefined terms. Unfortunately, because there are no domestic laws of two States involving the term ‘beneficial owner’, it still can be interpreted according to the Paragraph 2 of Article 3. In such cases, the interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) shall be complied. Unfortunately again, it is difficult to interpret the ‘beneficial owner’ according to the VCLT as well. Contrary to the unclear interpretation rules of the VCLT, there are many detailed interpretations made by Korea and China’s tax authorities and courts. What the effectiveness of these interpretations? Shall taxpayers obey such interpretations? And since the interpretations are not totally identical, they will result in imbalance to the taxpayers, what shall two States do to eliminate such unbalanced situation? This paper will give answers to the questions.

      • KCI등재

        중국기업의 한국거래소 상장활성화를 위한 세제지원방안

        안경봉(Ahn Kyeong-Bong),장월하(ZHANG Yuexia) 한국국제조세협회 2012 조세학술논집 Vol.28 No.1

        In order to promote internationalization of Korean financial markets, Korea Exchange (KRX) has been actively advancing the listing of foreign companies, especially Chinese companies, in Korea. This process demands much effort across different domains. In terms of taxation, if investing in the stocks of Korea-listed Chinese companies would cause more tax than investing in the stocks of (Korea-listed) Korean companies, it might discourage investors from doing so. This might consequently discourage Chinese companies from listing in Korea. This paper attempts to propose a solution to this issue, through detailed examinations on the taxation on stock investment incomes (dividends and capital gains) of related countries. Due to the restrictions on direct overseas listing of Chinese companies imposed by the Chinese government, many Chinese companies choose to list overseas indirectly via offshore holding companies which may be treated as Chinese resident companies. When investors invest in the stocks of Chinese companies listed in Korea, the taxation on stock investment incomes of different countries are involved, including those of China, Korea, the countries where the offshore holding companies are established, and the countries of residence of the investors. Since it is virtually impractical to check the taxation of every investor’s country of residence, this paper only focuses on the taxation of China, Korea and the countries where the offshore holding companies are established. This paper finds that compared to investing in the stocks of Korean companies, when investing in the stocks of Korea-listed Chinese companies, investors would incur no more dividend tax, while foreign entities would possibly incur more tax on capital gains because that both China and Korea can claim the capital gains as their source income. This paper thus suggests that Korea excludes capital gains on stocks of Korea-listed foreign companies from the scope of source incomes, based on the following grounds: (i) as the majority of the Korea-listed foreign companies are Chinese companies, this initiative could encourage investors to invest in the stocks of Korea-listed Chinese companies, which as a result would attract more Chinese companies to list in Korea; (ii) although ceding certain taxing right, this initiative will not conflict with the purposes towards which the system of source rules of Korea might be directed; (iii) this initiative will not violate the principle of tax equality; (iv) this initiative supplements the loop-hole in the existing source rules of Korea.

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