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      • 중국의 평화유지활동 참여 동기와 전망

        임윤갑 ( Yoonkap Lim ) 한국군사학회 2021 군사논단 Vol.107 No.-

        Since the beginning of China’s reform period in the early 1980s, and especially since the mid-1990s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased its participation in a broadening array of multilateral security arrangements. One of the most high-profile aspects of this trend has been the dramatic expansion in deployments of Chinese peacekeepers to United Nations operations. A range of motivations have been identified to explain China’s participation in UN peacekeeping activities, including the desire to be recognized as a responsible global power, to gain operational experience for its own military, and to protect its overseas economic interests. In contrast, little attention has been paid to the particular timing of China’s entrance onto the peacekeeping scene. China’s participation in UN peacekeeping has served its own interests well while providing global public benefits. At the moment, as a significant contributor of both troops and financing, China is uniquely positioned to be a bridge between the perspectives of troop-contributing developing countries and of richer donor countries in the Security Council, thereby lending more legitimacy to UN peacekeeping missions. This will ultimately benefit China’s reputation as a responsible power and facilitate its further peaceful rise. While China has developed a significant stake in U.N. peace operations, therefore, a number of factors ― most obviously concerns about its personnel’s safety and the need to cooperate with other powers in the Security Council ― mean that Beijing has reason to tread carefully in the field. While China has queried some aspects of peace operations, such as their focus on human rights, it has to date refrained from demanding wholesale alterations to U.N. norms to match its ideological preferences. That said, China’s level of engagement in blue helmet missions should not be treated too idealistically as proof of a deep-seated commitment to multilateralism. China’s cautious contribution to peacekeeping looks like a pragmatic attempt to advance its interests through the U.N. system.

      • 유엔의 분쟁 개입과 분쟁 이후의 문제

        임윤갑 ( Yoonkap Lim ) 한국군사학회 2022 군사논단 Vol.112 No.-

        According to a study on the characteristics of a country experiencing ongoing internal strife, the country did not have an easy time getting out of the conflict’s muck. Since a few years ago, they have noticed an increase in external intervention aimed at rebuilding post-conflict and peacebuilding processes in nations like Afghanistan, Columbia, Somalia, and Syria. However we also observed that the dispute recurred in these processes. After the conflict was over, security, development, and humanitarian issues were surely debated. The number of conflicts surged during the cold war era and temporarily ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. The UN Security Council made great efforts to intervene and engage in the conflict, and these efforts helped to significantly limit the number of conflicts for 20 years. However, the Arab Spring and die activities of ISIL caused this trend to reverse. The highest point in terms of conflicts occurred in 2020. The Security Council has banned the use of military force to overthrow governments, and this type of intervention should be distinguished from those made in the aftermath of a conflict. To maintain global peace and security, the UN charter assigns primary responsibility. Although the UN Charter’s chapter VI only gives limited authority to peacefully resolve disputes, it makes dear how Chapter VII engages in military action. However, when the Cold War ended, the UN Security Council continued to take action even though there was little to no indication that domestic conflict was escalating. They saw civil war and human rights violations as threats to global peace and security. In light of this, we should carefully consider the following four factors during the internal conflict transition period. First, the principle should be divided into short-term and long-term interventions since the operational and policy implications can change often before and after a conflict. The transition of conflict will be determined based on how and when it ends, and you will discover the solution as a result Therefore, the intervention starts either in the midst of a fight or after the violence has temporarily stopped. Third, the outcome of the conflict will have significant consequences whether it is resolved militarily or by a peace treaty. The methods of intervention will therefore be chosen in light of the findings.

      • 우크라이나에 대한 푸틴의 전략적 평가 오류

        임윤갑 ( Yoonkap Lim ) 한국군사학회 2023 군사논단 Vol.114 No.-

        Putin has used the intelligence community to effectively control his political opponents at home and abroad. The propensity to actively utilize espionage and information collection means so far has been shown to maximize them by combining traditional means and modem digital means in the cyber age. Indeed, even before Putin’s near-disastrous miscalculation regarding the invasion of Ukraine, it confirmed the long-held truth that a monopoly on information can wield great power. But Putin’s assurances about the assumption of strategic intelligence early in the invasion of Ukraine appear to have revealed many problems. Problems with Putin’s intelligence in the war in Ukraine include: First, Putin’s approach to using information as a political means has resulted in a fundamental error. In other words, Putin focused on using information as a means of punishing dissenting forces or punishing political opponents, which resulted in a failure to properly read the international situation surrounding Russia. Putin made several attempts to break away from the former Soviet politicians, but his use of intelligence was in many ways similar to the way Soviet leaders focused on the problems of the Communist Party rather than external adversaries. Second, although Ukraine’s intelligence failure ultimately falls to Putin as the coordinator of the intelligence system, it also casts doubt on the agency’s ability to provide a dispassionate strategic assessment to political leaders. Putin has increasingly isolated himself, offsetting the flow of information and challenging analysis. It has resulted in self-destruction. This dynamic is related to the leader’s perception of threat in authoritarian regimes, and dictators generally link their own survival to the regime’s survival without any form of retirement or succession plans. Ultimately, the intelligence limitations of the dictatorship were revealed early in the war in Ukraine.

      • 끝날 수 없는 갈등, 이스라엘-하마스 분쟁

        임윤갑 ( Yoonkap Lim ) 한국군사학회 2023 군사논단 Vol.116 No.-

        On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a military operation against the Israel. According to various sources, the plan for this operation prepared at least several months to two years. The depth and scale of Hamas, attack was unprecedented. Experts interpreted it as a response to regional changes and Israel’s growing provocations. It seems that Hamas achieved their short-term goals, preventing and blocking Israel’s Al-Aqsa intrusion and allowing political criminals to be liberated from Israeli prisons, However, It doesn’t seem to reach the ultimate goal to see an end to the relationship with Israel yet. In areas where Israel has a coercive edge, the Palestinians, numbering more than 950, are already killed. With Hamas’ surprising and overwhelming offensive just beginning, it is not dear what the end game is or what can be done to achieve long-term gains. It therefore appears to be a priority for Hamas to take both soldiers and civilians hostage to prevent aggressive retaliation from Israel and later exchange them for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons. Israel has moved on from its initial surprise attack and is launching a fierce offensive against the northern Gaza Strip, where the Hamas leadership is expected to be located. However, as time passes, Palestinian hospital attacks and resulting civilian casualties increase rapidly, and negative public opinion in the international community is rapidly spreading. In fact, even before the attack, Netanyahu’s government was facing domestic turmoil due to judicial reform. Therefore, this war is expected to be another important turning point that will determine Israel’s future. With this Hamas attack, Israel’s recent severe political divisions will disappear for a while. Israel will show a more favorable attitude to gain US support. But there is no politician like Sadat in this war, and even with the best intentions, it is difficult to imagine a diplomatic solution to this crisis. The idea of a US-Israel-Saudi deal will likely disappear in the near future. As Israeli security agencies nervously watch over the dangers of Hezbollah missiles and a second front in the north, the United States has dispatched an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean. This reassures traumatized Israelis and sends a signal that the United States will not remain indifferent to Iranian intervention. However, it appears that it will be difficult for the US foreign policy to avoid criticism for attempting to resolve the problem militarily. During this invasion, the role of the United Nations, the only collective security system in the international community, was difficult to find. The Security Council failed to pass a resolution on the ceasefire and it was eventually transferred to the General Assembly. Regarding the UN, one scholar pointed out the limitations of the UN, saying, The forces that want a peaceful solution are all countries that do not have sufficient influence in the UN.’ As was the case during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UN’s role appears to be being bypassed or gradually diminished. In this situation, Western countries visiting Israel and saying that they will not spare any support for Israel’s right to defense are likely to make a diplomatic solution more difficult.

      • 국제 분쟁과 유엔 평화 활동에서 민간군사기업의 문제

        임윤갑 ( Yoonkap Lim ) 한국군사학회 2024 군사논단 Vol.117 No.-

        As a new form of geopolitical competition in the international community, private military companies(PMCs) have recently entered the conflict, posing new challenges. This new trend is attracting great attention as the Russian-linked private military company 'Wagner Group' intervenes in conflicts in the Central African Republic and Mali, and they are attempting to expand their reach to other regions. However, it is not well known that the Wagner Group is influencing mandates such as 'civilian protection' carried out by UN peacekeeping operations in the field of civil war. In recent civil wars, the use of military supporting for national-level conflicts has been gradually expanding, and ultimately, the UN's efforts to prevent expanding conflict and protecting civilians are becoming more and more modern in the current peacekeeping and security environment. It must be based on an understanding of mercenary operations. In recent civil wars, the use of military power at a private level, including support for national-level conflict, is gradually expanding, ultimately making it difficult for the United Nations to prevent the spread of conflict and protect civilians in conflict areas. Therefore, the current peacekeeping security environment must be premised on an understanding of modern mercenary operations. PMCs are not a panacea for all ethnic, racial and internal conflicts. However, PMCs are increasingly viewed as additional capabilities that can be selectively deployed across the world to realize and shape mandatory peace settlements in modern conflicts. Some argue that the activities of PMCs are legal only because of lack of fidelity to existing definitions of terms at the international level. However, it is an undeniable reality that there is no effective regulation and responsibility for private military companies at the international and national levels. Therefore, a proper supervisory system must be established for PMCs to alleviate domestic and international concerns. Accordingly, States' inaction on the issue of PMCs can have serious consequences for the foundations of state authority. Leaving control of violence to the private sector and shifting the relative importance of state institutions would undermine the authority of the state. This would ultimately reduce the importance of building an army controlled by the State.

      • 아르메니아-아제르바이잔 전쟁

        임윤갑 ( Yoonkap Lim ) 국방대학교 PKO센터 2021 PKO저널 Vol.22 No.-

        Second Clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh on 27th September 2020. United Nations called for immediate ceasefire agreement and two countries finally reached ceasefire agreement mediated by Russia on November. According to the agreement, Armenia turned back occupied Nagorno-Karabakh territory to Azerbaijan. After the 1st Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1994, Azerbaijan thought that her strategic objectives can be achieved by only military operations and she pursued and achieved her objectives by 44 days military operations. After the war, As the result, Azerbaijan recaptured lost territory in Nagorno-Karabakh. The first war was sporadic battles and not fully developed to full-scale war. however, the second war showed post-modern characteristic of the war as well as multi-domain combat operations. At strategic level, Turkey and Russia exposed their critical interests and overt and covert military aids were provided to each countries in order to expand their influence. At tactical level, Azerbaijan destroyed 250 armored vehicles and neutralized Armenian air defense system. Drone, relatively new-introduced weapon system, exercised effectiveness in the moutainous area. This war gave us another opportunity to look back the meaning of national military power and strategy. The war planner generally believed that military balance and potential power is main factors to deter, but it proved that the perception against the war will be the biggest factor to prevent the war. Advantages of quantative and qualitative military power also can not be translated into political calculation. This will be commonsense when we think about the war.

      • 서구의 패권에 대한 푸틴의 2022년 판 도전

        임윤갑 ( Lim Yoonkap ) 국방대학교 PKO센터 2022 PKO저널 Vol.24 No.-

        When NATO tried to expand its influence to the eastward after the cold-war collapse, Russian President Vladimir Putin made blistering remarks against the West in Munich Security Conference issuing warning sign that Russia will not tolerate the West’s behavior. However, Putin’s attitude to keep his own ways with all necessary means drew the West rage and the disparity between the two sides has been widening since then. The West, especially US and EU created the new boundary line along with their diplomatic preference with her hard power, soft power and financial power. They sometimes give pressure by these power in order to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, Putin’s challenge could not be stop by the West and he also tried to pioneered his own ways to resist the West. These situation from 1990s and up to now trembled the relationship between the two side and made overall situation unstable. In the mean time, Ukraine, having faced the threat from Russia since 2014, annexation of Crimea, had a few options to survive either to cooperate with Russia or close to the West. But when the threat from Russia became imminent, Ukraine was inclined to the West, accordingly Russia provoked more aggressively. The end of war is not seen yet, however, if Russia won the war by her definition, there will be lots of loss because of war. On the other hands, The West also will face new order after the war.

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