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      • 租稅特惠制度의 效用性과 問題點

        李英祚 경북대학교 법정대학 1976 法大論叢 Vol.14 No.-

        1. Fiscal policy using taxation is used as an instrument for depression recovery, economic stability, sustained economic growth, and inducement to invest for economic development. In the developing country, all development plans are led by the government. Accordingly it is most important to procure financial resources for execution of development. But often, capital for execution of development plans is not adequately formed, and the government must either provide it or induce private capital to invest. 2. Such is the same in Korea. Since the government has led continuous economic development, a great deal of financial resources has been dependent on governmental savings, and investment of private sector has been withdrawn. Tax preference schemes are considered a means to make easy procurement of investment resources and induce investment of privatese capital. 3. Tax preference is extensively used to increase the inducement to invest, industrial rationalization, appropriate distribution of resources and re-distribution of income. But tax preference in Korea prevents equity in tax apportionment, industrial development and formation of sound industrial foundation. 4. Therefore tax preference schemes in Korea must be limited in scope and be executed choicely to diminish dysfunctions. Also, alternatives such as reserves, accelerated depreciation and investment allowance systems are desired to be used extensively, and then appropriation in the process of tax policy-making is demanded.

      • KCI등재

        다구찌 실험분석에 있어서 일반화선형모형 대 자료변환

        이영조 한국통계학회 1993 응용통계연구 Vol.6 No.2

        최근 다구찌 실험에 대한 관심이 고조되어 일반화 선형모형에서 평균과 분산의 동시모형화가 연구되고 있다. 하나의 자료 변환만으로는 자료분석에 필요한 모든 조건들을 만족시킬 수 없기 때문에 다구찌 품질실험의 자료들을 일반화 선형모형으로 분석하는 것이 바람직하다. 본 논문에서는 이 자료변환법과 일반선형모형을 이용한 분석법을 소개, 비교하고 일반화 선형모형을 다구찌 자료에 적용할 수 있는 GLIM 프로그램을 제시한다. Recent interest in Taguchi's methods have led to developments of joint modelling of the mean and dispersion in generalized linear models. Since a single data transformation cannot produce all the necessary conditions for an analysis, for the analysis of the Taguchi data, the use of the generalized linear models is preferred to a commonly used data transformation method. In this paper, we will illustrate this point and provide GLIM macros to implement the joint modelling of the mean and dispersion in generalized linear models.

      • KCI등재
      • KCI등재

        아르헨티나의 민선정부와 군부

        이영조 서울大學校 스페인中南美硏究所 1993 이베로아메리카硏究 Vol.4 No.-

        In a post-authoritarian society democracy cannot be consolidated without resolving la cuestio'n militar. Particularly in Latin America with a long-standing tradition of military intervention in politics, the question is more pressing than anywhere else. Focusing on the Alfonsi´n administration of Argentina, this paper aims to illustrate how difficult it is and how much politicall skill is necessary even under favorable conditions to achieve the ultimate goal of civilian supremacy over the military. The military question that a new democracy regime has to deal with consists mainly of two problems: the torturer and the praetorian problems. The first concerns whether the human rights violations under the military regime should be punished or forgiven. It is by nature a once-and-for-all problem that is most salient during the transition phase. The second concerns how to keep the military out of politics and how to establish civilian control over the military. This is a persistent problem of the post-transition phase. Civilian control represents a situation in which the military submits to the political authority of the civilians. Thus, there must be no open contestation by the military against the civilian authority. But to achieve this, the prerogatives of the military, which are both the resource and the potential source of the contestation must be curtailed. However, civilian control is hard to establish. The core of the problem is that the civilians generally lack the physical means to compel the military submission. In this respect, civilian supremacy is based ultimately on "cocsent" rather than "coercion." Here lies the dilemma of the civilian government that tries to establish civilian control. The democratic leaders must divest the military of numerous privileges it enjoyed under the authoritarian rule while at the same time they attempt to reduce the perceived threat to corporate interests. The military's willingness to adjust to a reduced role hinges ultimately on the revamped self-perception of its role. The discovery of less politicized norms of professionalism compatible with the democratic order and the modification of antiquated views of national security are prerequisites for subordinate behavior. However, replacement of th highly political outlook by nonpolitical professional ethic requires "immense effort, much time, and some risk." For the professional norms to take root, the government needs to play carrot and stick: it must get rid of potential sources of discontent on the one hand and pursue demilitarization on the other. The necessary reforms include reorienting the military mission from internal security to external security, reducing the size of the military without compromising the defense capability, and guaranteeing status and respect due to professionalism. However, the success of reforms rests not only on the content of reforms. The same reform measures may or may not succeed depending on the way they are implemented. A reform is necessarily attacked by the standpatters and the radicals. To the standpatters, the reform may look too radical. For the radicals, the reform looks footdragging. Thus, a reformer must fight on the two fronts. This is the hardest part of reform-mongering. To overcome these difficulties, Professor Samuel Huntington recommends a combination of the "Fabian strategy" and the "Blitzkrieg tactics". To achieve the goal the reformer must disaggregate the complex issues and thus isolate the opponents from each other and, when the time is ripe, deal with a single issue as quickly as possible no to allow time for them to assemble their forces. In Argentina where democratic transition took the form of "replacement," not "transformation," the civilian government was in a strong position to reshape the civil-military relations. The 'dirty war,' economic failure and the military disaster of the National Reorganization Process government evaporated the credibility of the military and thus strengthened the hands of Alfonsi´n government. The military was so debilitated that its challenge to the civilian authority was virtually precluded. These favorable conditions permitted Alfonsi´n to take a series of measures to diminish the military contestation. He cut the military budget, streamlined the chain of command, and put the military leaders to trial. These measures were useful for house-cleaning but proved far from establishing civilian supremacy. Overall the civilian government and the military are in a state of unstable balance. It was not only because of the content of the reform measures but due more to the way they were executed that the military reforms did not achieve the desired goals. Alfonsi´n government tried to compel the military submission but the result was the paradoxical resuscitation of military defiance. Particularly, Alfonsi´n government committed the blunder of combining the Blitzkrieg strategy and the Fabian tactics, not the way round. By letting the human rights trials drag on, it entangled the "torturer" problem with other reform issues and allowed time for the opponents to gather forces. In addition, by heaping up the budget cuts that threatened the operational capability of the military, denial of proper mission for the military, prosecution of the junior officers without countervailing rewards, it triggered off a widespread resentment among the military personnel. The overlapped issues made virtually all military officers oppose the reform measures for one reason or another, be they involved in the misconduct of the military government or not. It is not difficult to guess why Alfonsi´n combined the Fabian strategy and the Blitzkrieg tactics. He feared that his political capital would exhaust soon and that there would be no more chance. Thus, he tried to solve all the problems at once. However, the attempt to overwhelm the military dropped the military morale and caused widespread resentment and defiance among the officers. To wrap up, the Argentine experience shows that even under favorable conditions it is extremely difficult to establish civilian supremacy over the military, which requires a high degree of political skill and a proper mix of strategy and tactics.

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