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이규열 한국전략문제연구소 1999 전략연구 Vol.6 No.2
Although almost ren years have passed away since the talks of arms control between two Koreas began, there are very few things we have achieved. And, inter-Korean arms control has gone nowhere. To make a breakthrough in a deadlock in inter-Korean arms control it is necessary to understand the characreristics of arms control on the Korean Peninsula. First, the existing difference between the two Koreas in threat perception limits the scope of common interests and common threats. Consequently, this difference constrains the possibility of arms control which can be looked upon as a way to reduce tension by controlling each one's armed forces. Second, since the main target of arms control is both sides' conventional forces, it is difficult to calculate, compare, and contrast armed forces of the two Koreas. Third, the presence of U.S. forces in Korea makes the inter- Korean arms control difficult and complex since the involvement of the United States in the negotiation is required Fourth, taking the geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula into account, the positions of neighboring countries concerned must be reflected. Finally, the lack of arms control experience between the two Korea makes the inter-Korean arms control more difficult. That is, political reconciliation--one of preconditions for arms control--does not exist on the Korean Peninsula and arms control itself has been abused for political/diplomatic propaganda. To devise realist arms control approach, it is necessary to review North Korea's policy on arms control North Korea has been persistently proposing the followings. a) withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea: b) conclusion of peace treaty between the United States and North Korea: c) reduction of both Korea's troops to 100,000: d) conclusion of non-aggression treaty between the two Koreas: e) stopping of military exercises and training with foreign troops: and f) prohibition of weapons import. Since the late 1980s, North Korean proposals have become more sophisticated by including some confidence-building measures (CBMs). North Korea calls it "comprehensive peace proposal" which is a part of their strategy of unifying Korea--Koryo Confederacy. For North Korea, arms control is a political means toward South Korea, not necessarily a means to stabilize military situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has persistently demanded the withdrawal of USFK from the Korean Peninsula as a precondition for arms control talks between the two Koreas. This means that threat to North Korea's security is coming from the possibility of U.S. involvement, not directly from South Korea's armed forces. Thus, they intend to eliminate the source of threat. Third, North Korean arms control proposal focuses on troop reduction, rather than equipment, to maintain its strategic leverage due to its ability to mobilize huge forces in short notice. South Korea's arms control proposal is quite similar to that of European case: that is, CBMs first, arms limitation second, and finally arms reduction. While South Korean arms control proposal has its own logic and rationale, it lacks validity since it does not take into account the issue of feasibility. To make a progress in arms control on the Korean Peninsula, a set of conditions must be met and South Korea should try to consolidate these conditions. First, since North Korea mainly relies on its military assets in negotiating with South Korea as well as other outside world, North Korea's military leverage must be neutralized. Only when North Korea sees no utility of military tools, or furthermore counterproductive, it can seriously consider arms control as a way of saving itself. Second, under any circumstances, it must not be allowed for North Korea to acquire WMD. If North Korea acquires or enhances its WMD capabilities, it would eliminate possibility of inter-Korean arms control since it would only enhance the utility of military means. Third, if North Korea could not afford high defense burden, it would correspond to the call for arms control Considering all these facts, it is possible to say that as time goes by, the possibility of inter-Korean arms control would increase. But it will take some time. All these mean that while South Korea maintains its position on arms control it must try to develop means and strategies to realize arms control. First of all, it must try to expand the background for arms control: that is, it must try to improve political relations with North Korea on one hand, and it must also enhance military readiness to neutralize North Korea's military leverage. This would enable South Korea to expand its independent scope of management of North Korea. Rather than considering arms control as an end in itself, we must consider arms control as a means to control and manage inter-Korean relations. First, we must do our best efforts to implement the Basic Agreement. More specifically, reopening and regularizing of channels of communication and negotiation must come first. Secondly, we must start with pre-CBMs, rather than intrusive CBMs. Transparency must come first. Along with introductory CBMs, we must emphasize the necessity of verification. "Trust but verify." Regarding North Korea's proposals and attitude, instead of simply denying and ignoring their proposals, flexibility must be respected. That is, rather than one on one match, we can utilize asymmetrical approach with a little more flexibility. Most of all, we must retain the consistency of our proposal The most urgent thing is to correct the stereo-typed approach toward arms control Instead of emphasizing logic and integrity of our own approach, we must take a realistic approach based on the assessment of feasibility of each measure.
낙동강에서 유기오염 및 SS 농도 변화에 따른 DOC 농도 변화의 특성
이규열 ( Kyu Yeol Lee ),김주언 ( Ju Eon Kim ),이권철 ( Kwon Chul Lee ),이경락 ( Kyung Lak Lee ),이인정 ( In Jung Lee ),임태효 ( Tea Hyo Im ) 한국물환경학회 2013 한국물환경학회지 Vol.29 No.4
Temporal increase of SS induces concentrations in various forms of organic matter including BOD, COD, TOC. Consequently, it causes hard to identify sources of water pollution during or after precipitation. The objective of this study is to investigate variations of DOC concentration caused by increase of flow and changes of external factors in river by comparing to SS concentration. In results, monitoring sites (e.g., Banbyeonchen) consisting of hard riverbed showed high correlation between SS and organic matters, except BOD. On the contrary, other sites (e.g., Naesungcheon) where riverbed consists of sand were found in a wide range of annual fluctuation in SS level, whereas these sites showed a narrow range in annual DOC fluctuation. In Gumhogang and Namgang, a lower correlation between SS and other factors was found most likely because of high concentration in organic matter. However, lower annual fluctuation values of DOC were observed in comparison to those of COD and TOC. Similar results were also confirmed in main river sites, Sangju and Mulgeum. In conclusion, DOC concentration is better indicator for monitoring organic matter which cannot be provided by BOD, COD, TOC in the Nakdong river basin.
이규열(Lee, Kyu-Yull),이동찬(Lee, Dong-Chan),이창석(Lee, Chang-Suck),임정규(Lim, Jung-Kyou) 한국부동산학회 2014 不動産學報 Vol.56 No.-
1. 내용 (1) 연구목적 본 연구는 부동산개발, 부동산중개, 부동산감정평가활동을 중심으로 살펴보고 이에 근거하여 부동산권리분석활동의 필요성을 제시하고자 한다. (2) 연구방법 한국의 대표 문헌연구를 통해 부동산권리분석업의 현황과 문제점, 권리분석사 제도의 필요성을 유추하고자 한다. (3) 연구결과 우리나라에는 부동산 권리를 조사하는 공식적이고 독립적인 업이 아직 존재하지 않는다. 자주 발생하는 부동산거래사고의 안전을 위해서 또한 부동산권을 보호하기 위한 초기 단계의 전문직이 필요하다. 2. 결과 부동산 권리분석은 부동산거래의 안전과 국민경제의 발전에 이바지하고 각종 거래사고를 미연에 방지함으로써 부동산과 인간과의 관계개선에 이바지 한다. 또한 분쟁의 소지를 감소시키고, 국민의 재산권 보호와 부동산거래질서 확립에 이바지하기 위해서는 공인된 권리분석사 제도의 수립이 절실히 요구된다.