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      • KCI등재

        The Development of China’s Rural Private Finance and Regulations of Its Moral Hazard

        용가우 중국지역학회 2022 중국지역연구 Vol.9 No.4

        The endogenous expansion of rural capital demand and the mutual game between rural formal finance and private finance in China have combined to give rise to rural private finance. It is a typical product of institutional changes in the process of marketization in China and belongs to a transitional financial system, which is related to the urban-rural dual economic structure and even the financial dual structure, reflecting the imperfection and imperfection of the financial market. Rural private finance has special advantages in information screening, information supervision and contract execution, but the benefit-seeking feature of this kind finance becomes more obvious. Besides, the current rural financial legal system does not well coordinate with this finance. The mismatch includes the imbalance between the demand and supply of relevant legal regulation as well as the natural conflict between formal financial mechanism, legal system and the endogenous rules in rural society. It is extremely vulnerable to the moral hazard. The moral hazard of rural private finance comes down to the moral uncertainty of financial subjects. This uncertainty may bring losses and damages to other interest subjects which is caused by one side of interest subjects attempting to maximize benefit while neglecting moral obligation and moral responsibility. On a practical level, among moral hazards of rural private finance, speculative and pure moral hazards are the most typical and representative. In the view of information economics, the generation mechanism of these moral hazards stems from the asymmetrical distribution of information between financial subjects, such as between borrowers and lenders, the owners and operators of rural private financial institution, intermediaries and borrowers and lenders, financial supervision authorities and supervisees, etc. Based on this, the guiding concept of legal governance is to guarantee the sound qualification and disciplined behavior of financial subjects, stabilize financial and economic order and promote economic and social equity. It focuses on constructing impeccable competitive structure of rural credit market in which diversified subjects coexist, encouraging the rural financial organization to build the rational and reasonable internal governance and straightening out the right-duty relation between borrowers and lenders. It also focuses on setting up the power and obligations of public authorities in rural private financial market and motivating the financial innovation. On the specific route selection, it is required to establish efficient incentive and restrictive mechanism for managers of rural private financial institutions, delimit the level and boundary of information disclosure, and scientifically position the appropriate supervision of rural private financial market.

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