미적(美的)태도론(態度論)의 성립과 현대 미학의 문제

오병남 한국미학회 1979 美學 Vol.6 No.-

예술의 본질 ; 그 정의는 가능한가

오병남 서울대학교 예술문화연구소 1991 예술문화연구 Vol.1 No.-

現象學과 藝術 : M. Meleau-Ponty에 있어서의 藝術과 制度의 槪念에 이르기까지

吳昞南 서울大學校人文大學 1979 人文論叢 Vol.4 No.-

The first part of this paper is to sketch the main line of what has been called the phenomenologists' aesthetic doctrines. The purpose of such a sketch is not simply to introduce them in chronological order, but to examine their basic assumptions and appropriate phenomenological methods, i.e., the disinterested aesthetic appreciation (M.Geiger), the nature of the aesthetic object as purely intentional object (R. Ingarden), and the imaginative artistic creation (J.P.Sartre). These examinations are intended to show that, however phenomenology has been applied to art, each of them appears to be made as if art could be explained in terms, respectively, of appreciation, work, and creation, and, thus, to be structurally limited. The second part of this paper is, therefore, to suggest the corrective to such misleading and narrowly defined approaches to art. I think it may be suggested not by breaking art into its constituent elements of appreciation, work, and creation, but by considering it as a whole process. If then, art process becomes a communication of some sort and naturally implicates a social hebaviour. That is, art has to be explained in terms of an institutional means of some sort. Here arises a difficulty for the understanding of the conception of art as an institution. This is mainly due to various old assumptioms that art is primarily an individual, imaginative expression, that artist must seperate himself from social controls in order to achieve the aristic autonomy. But these assumptions involve the fundamental mistake to suppose that there is no continuity between the organized responses of individuals and the formal customs of the general society. In order to examine the concept of the continuity I turned to the phenomenology of M.Merleau-Ponty who wrote "phenomenolgy of perception" already prepared in his first work, "the structure of behaviour", dedicated to the metaphysical problem of mind-body interaction. He gives such a wide interpretation to the notion of behaviour as to include the sheer physical reaction, and traces the evolution of human cultural activity through a dialectic of orders-physical, vital, and human-in which varous kinds of from-syncretic, mutable, andsymbolic- are organized in the behaviour of a living organism. The superiority of human behaviour is, however, that the subject may transcend its purely physical and vital nature in the construction of a symbolic situation. And applying his revised gestaltism to the facts of perception, Merleau-Ponty concludes that an essence is but a conventional or arbitrary name tacked on to an already experienced from of behaviour. The first and pre-rational experienced from he calls a primary expression, which he claims may be analyzed and resynthesized in any fashion whatsoever by a human subject in secondary expressions. Therefore, the totality of primary expressions constitutes real human history and forms the subject matter of written history which is also likewise a secondary expression as science and philosophy. Here he links primary expressions with the individual 'parole', that is, individual assimilation of the living `langue', by appealing to Saussure's general theory of linguistics. Thus, for him primary and secondary expressions which may remind us of Croce's distinction of intuitions and concepts interact in such a way to enrich or impoverish the established language. If then, there is no individual activity aside from the insignificant release of tensions within individual organism, just as there are no completely determined examples of socially controlled response. That is, all human activity is more or less individual and at the same time more or less social. The final part of this paper is to indicate that for Merleau-Ponty art assumes its role as a primary expression in this system, and that it is of institutional nature. What follows is then to take into account some problems which issue from this argument. First, we have to analyze the institutional nature of art in such a way as to isolate the special function played by that institution. In a general way this purpose may be stated as the development of novel meanings for Merleau-Ponty and then art must be expounded in the general theory of knowledge for him. This suggests that there is another kind of knowledge, though pre-rational, and that art is likewise a from of cognitive activity as science though diffrent from each other in their nature. I think it is really a philosophical point in question whether such an argument can be supported. But it is significant that, if it will be accepted as having a valid ground, a bright prospect would be promised for the foundation of philosophy of art. In comparision with it, it is worth noting that even the minimum ground has been difficult to be arranged for philosophy of art in Anglo-American philosophy, and that this philosophy has advanced philosophy of art criticism instead, though there is an aesthetician like Virgil C. Aldrich who has tried to work out a philosophical ground for the foundation of philosophy of art with difficulty. Thus, we can now say as follows: art is a watershed, and is offered as a battle field, between two camps of philosophy. Secondly, what I have found interesting is that the notion of art as an institution is also analyzed by G. Dickie, an analytical philosopher who put the definition of art in terms of the art world suggested by A. Danto. Indeed., there are incompatible differences in many respects between Merleau-ponty's and G. Dickie's notion of it, but I think we can easily discern a difference in that, whereas the former tries to expound how art with its institutional nature comes into being, the latter tries to argue for the existence of the art world by describing a considerable amount of information about it. Here we can find a certain relation between both of them. For, if Dickie's conception of the institutional nature of art is based on the existence of the empirical art world and thus a possible ground of it has to be affirmed in any way whatsoever, Merleau-Ponty's explication of art as an institution would be a philosophical ground for, and a point of contact with, that existence of the art world. Thirdly, since the argument that art is an institution implies in itself that it is a communication as a kind of social activity, art may not or can not be isolated from the other institutions of society, i. e., religious, political, and economic. Thus we have to take into account the effects of art upon the society. That is, these effects is not external to the nature of art, but is already implicit in the notion of art as a social institution of the communication of the novel meanings. So, the philosophy of art can be consummated only when it is extended to relate itself to the social psychology of art. I think that this new approach is to be pursued for the solution of the dilemma of contemporary aesthetics.

칸트(I . Kant)미학(美學)의 재평가

오병남 한국미학회 1989 美學 Vol.14 No.-

모던 , 포스트모던 , 컨템포러리

오병남,Danto, Arthur C . 서울대학교 예술문화연구소 1998 예술문화연구 Vol.8 No.-

M. Merleau - Ponty에 있어서의 藝術과 哲學

오병남 한국현상학회 1988 철학과 현상학 연구 Vol.3 No.-

위조품 - 무엇이 나쁜가?

오병남,Lessing, Alfred 서울대학교 예술문화연구소 1993 예술문화연구 Vol.3 No.-

창의성의 개념에 대한 미학적 고찰

오병남 한국건축역사학회 1996 건축역사연구 Vol.5 No.2

B . Croce 에 있어서의 예술(藝術)곧 표현의 의미와 그 미학적 전제에 대한 연구

오병남 한국미학회 1975 美學 Vol.3 No.-

미술사와 미술사론과 미학의 관계에 대한 고찰 : 신라 불상에 대한 본질해명의 문제를 중심으로 Explanation of the Essence of an Image of Buddha in Silla Era

오병남 한국미학회 2001 美學 Vol.30 No.-

The purpose of this paper is to explain aesthetically the essence of an statue of Buddha in Silla era. I select the Principal Statue of Buddha at Sukgulam in Gyungju because it is representative of statues of Buddha in Silla. It is a symbolic icon of Buddha. This is because its sculptor could not see the Buddha in order to make the latter's image. It is evidently different from other statues of Buddha. Then, what is the model of this statue of Buddha? I argue that it is an ideal human image that was longed for by Silla people. The statue of Buddha is a symbol in which buddhist nature and human nature are characteristically and holily harmonized. Because of this, we experience a humanized charitable Buddha through the image on the one hand and a virtuous human sublimated to a Buddha on the other hand. Two things must be presupposed for this conclusion. One is personal aesthetic intuition for the statue of Buddha and the other is aesthetic thought with which such an insight is justified. If personal intuition is not supported by justification, it is a mere subjective impression. I examine H. Wo¨fflin's theory of styles and E. Panofsky's iconology. I find E. Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms a more effective method in explaining the essence of the statue of Buddha. In short, the Principal Statue of Buddha is an expression of a symbolic form in which human nature and buddhist nature are profoundly harmonized.