Past, Present, and Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Era

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2022 한국국가전략 Vol.7 No.2

The Republic of Korea (ROK)-US alliance has remained robust and on solid footing for over 70 years. As with other alliances, however, the ROK-US alliance has also experienced its fair share of turbulence stemming from shifts in the regional security environment as well as domestic political change. This paper evaluates such regional and domestic political shifts in the ROK-US alliance in the Indo-Pacific era. The first section of the paper evaluates the ROK-US alliance under President Moon Jae-in with the onset of the US Indo-Pacific strategy initiated by the Trump administration and carried forward by the Biden administration. The second section examines where the alliance stands under the new South Korean government of President Yoon Suk-yeol and what to expect moving forward as South Korea develops its own Indo-Pacific strategy and adopts a tougher stance on North Korea. Although Seoul and Washington find themselves in close strategic alignment as attested by the Yoon-Biden summit in May 2022, three challenges in particular loom ahead which will require close alliance communication and cooperation: 1) China-Russia collusion and its impact on global order; 2) ongoing North Korean provocations and its expanded missile and nuclear capabilities; 3) transition to a comprehensive strategic alliance.

Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Response to North Korean Nuclear Threats and Indo-Pacific Security Challenges

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2023 한국국가전략 Vol.8 No.1

In 2022, several factors including the inauguration of South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol and a major uptick in North Korean military provocations helped improve bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan and boost trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This paper examines newfound opportunities for trilateral cooperation in light of shifting domestic politics, increased external threats, and a growing awareness across the three governments that their national interests are better served by working together within the Indo-Pacific. Although the opportunities for enhanced cooperation are as ripe as ever, several challenges still loom ahead regarding U.S.-Japan-Korea (UJK) trilateral relations and the broader goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Nevertheless, for South Korea, UJK relations remains not only important for addressing North Korean threats, but in providing a major platform for cultivating deeper roots to cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, every effort should be made to strengthen and expand UJK trilateral relations moving forward.

Linkages between North Korean Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific Region

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2023 한국국가전략 Vol.8 No.2

The Biden administration sees integrated deterrence within the broad context of China as the long term “pacing threat” and Russia as an immediate, acute threat. However, there is also increasing recognition that specific security challenges, such as escalated tensions on the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, are not isolated from great power geopolitical competition. This paper examines the degree to which nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is connected to integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. At the heart of this debate is whether and how measures to deter North Korea ranging from strengthening U.S. extended deterrence, to tightening U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation, to developing indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons might affect regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. I argue that in an increasingly networked security architecture, linkages across conflicts will become more apparent. As such, policymakers should identify linkages between integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and consider how strengthening deterrence in one area exacerbates or mitigates deterrence in other conflicts. To better situate North Korean deterrence within a framework of Indo-Pacific deterrence, policymakers should continue developing U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation as a platform for addressing broader Indo-Pacific issues. I also suggest how conflict in the Taiwan Strait carries important implications for the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific (including the U.S.-South Korea alliance) and aggravates tensions on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the need for greater planning and coordination among allies.

한·미·일 연대 제도화와 한반도 및 인도태평양 안보

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2024 한국국가전략 Vol.9 No.1

In a year plagued by ever increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and geopolitical challenges in Europe and now the Middle East, South Korea-Japan rapprochement and the institutionalization of U.S.-Japan-Korea (UJK) trilateral cooperation served as one of the more promising diplomatic developments in 2023. This paper evaluates the recent acceleration of the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral and its implications for the Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific security. The paper is divided into five sections. Section one provides an overview of recent gains made in trilateral cooperation, particularly after the Camp David trilateral summit. Section two analyzes the factors driving trilateral cooperation since 2022. Section three addresses the positive and negative implications of recent developments in trilateral relations on regional and global security dynamics. Section four identifies structural, operational, and domestic challenges facing trilateral cooperation. Section five concludes with policy recommendations for advancing trilateral relations. On August 18, 2023, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) declared an era of trilateral cooperation at Camp David near Washington, D.C. Based on three separate documents-the Camp David Principles, the Camp David Spirit, and the Commitment to Consult-the three countries agreed to boost cooperation that encompasses not only the military domain, but also the economy, technology, and supply chains. Additionally, the three countries further institutionalized trilateral military and economic cooperation by boosting efforts to promote defense and deterrence against North Korea, address threats from China, deliver aid to Ukraine, build resilience against economic coercion, and coordinate supply chain logistics among other issues. Following the Camp David summit, a wide range of views regarding the long-term viability of trilateral cooperation have emerged in light of current domestic obstacles and future geopolitical trends. Some see trilateral cooperation moving toward a quasi-alliance with more binding commitments while others remain skeptical whether it can move beyond the format of a "mini-lateral consultative group.” This paper evaluates the recent acceleration of the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral and its implications for the Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific security. The paper is divided into five sections. Section one provides an overview of recent gains made in trilateral cooperation, particularly after the Camp David trilateral summit. Section two analyzes the factors driving trilateral cooperation since 2022. Section three addresses the positive and negative implications of recent developments in trilateral relations on regional and global security dynamics. Section four identifies structural, operational, and domestic challenges facing trilateral cooperation. Section five concludes with policy recommendations for advancing trilateral relations.

대만해협과 한반도에서의 무력충돌 가능성, 그리고 동맹대응

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2024 한국국가전략 Vol.9 No.2

Crises in Korea and Taiwan have typically been addressed in isolation from one another. However, there is growing recognition that the two flashpoints are increasingly tied to great power geopolitical competition. Although potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait are not directly linked, conflict in one zone carries implications for defense and deterrence in the other and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The networked nature of alliances and the implications of geopolitical conflict across multiple domains requires experts to begin thinking about contingencies in Korea and Taiwan in tandem. This paper assesses the potential linkages between a Korean and Taiwan conflict from the perspective of integrated deterrence. Additionally, it evaluates how the United States and its allies, including South Korea, might respond to conflict on the Taiwan Strait

트럼프 2.0 시대 미국 외교정책: 인도 태평양과한반도에서의 함의

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2025 한국국가전략 Vol.10 No.1

이 논문은 제2기 도널드 트럼프 행정부에서 미국 외교 정책이 인도-태평양 지역과 한반도에 어떤 영향을 미칠지 분석한다. 첫 번째 장은 트럼프 1기 행정부 특징, 트럼프와 그의 인수위에서 한 최근 발언들 및 내각 구성 방식을 바탕으로 트럼프 세계관을 소개한다. 두 번째 장은 트럼프의 인도-태평양 전략과 아시아 동맹 및 기구에 대한 그의 접근 방식이 향후 어떤 모습일지 예측한다. 세 번째 장은 관세, 주한미군, 대북 정책 등 한반도 및 한미 동맹과 관련된 문제를 보다 집중적으로 검토한다. 마지막 장은 한미동맹 안정을 위한 방안을 다음과 같은 내용으로 제시한다. 1) 한반도 및 한미 동맹을 위한 미군의 전략적 유연성에 대한 활발한 논의, 2) 대북정책에 대한 양국 정부의 긴밀한 조율과 협의, 3) 기존 동맹이익을 바탕으로 한 한미일 관계 강화 및 미국 확장억제 및 한국 핵안보를 위한 핵협의 그룹(Nuclear Consultative Group) 유지 This paper examines the potential impacts of Donald Trump's second presidential term on U.S. foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Indo-Pacific region and the Korean Peninsula. The first section offers an overview of the Trumpian worldview drawing on insights from the first Trump administration, recent statements from Trump and his transition team, and his selection of cabinet officials. The second section addresses the most likely trajectory of Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy and his approach toward Asian alliances and institutions. The third section focuses more specifically on issues relevant to the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-South Korea alliance including tariffs, U.S. force presence, and North Korea policy. The final section concludes by offering suggestions for ensuring alliance stability including 1) greater discussion on strategic flexibility of U.S. forces on the Peninsula and the U.S.-ROK alliance; 2) close coordination and consultation between Seoul and Washington on North Korea policy; and 3) building on existing alliance gains including deepening ties between the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral and maintaining the Nuclear Consultative Group as the basis for further discussions on U.S. extended deterrence and South Korea’s nuclear security.