Past, Present, and Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Era

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2022 한국국가전략 Vol.7 No.2

The Republic of Korea (ROK)-US alliance has remained robust and on solid footing for over 70 years. As with other alliances, however, the ROK-US alliance has also experienced its fair share of turbulence stemming from shifts in the regional security environment as well as domestic political change. This paper evaluates such regional and domestic political shifts in the ROK-US alliance in the Indo-Pacific era. The first section of the paper evaluates the ROK-US alliance under President Moon Jae-in with the onset of the US Indo-Pacific strategy initiated by the Trump administration and carried forward by the Biden administration. The second section examines where the alliance stands under the new South Korean government of President Yoon Suk-yeol and what to expect moving forward as South Korea develops its own Indo-Pacific strategy and adopts a tougher stance on North Korea. Although Seoul and Washington find themselves in close strategic alignment as attested by the Yoon-Biden summit in May 2022, three challenges in particular loom ahead which will require close alliance communication and cooperation: 1) China-Russia collusion and its impact on global order; 2) ongoing North Korean provocations and its expanded missile and nuclear capabilities; 3) transition to a comprehensive strategic alliance.

Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Response to North Korean Nuclear Threats and Indo-Pacific Security Challenges

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2023 한국국가전략 Vol.8 No.1

In 2022, several factors including the inauguration of South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol and a major uptick in North Korean military provocations helped improve bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan and boost trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This paper examines newfound opportunities for trilateral cooperation in light of shifting domestic politics, increased external threats, and a growing awareness across the three governments that their national interests are better served by working together within the Indo-Pacific. Although the opportunities for enhanced cooperation are as ripe as ever, several challenges still loom ahead regarding U.S.-Japan-Korea (UJK) trilateral relations and the broader goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Nevertheless, for South Korea, UJK relations remains not only important for addressing North Korean threats, but in providing a major platform for cultivating deeper roots to cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, every effort should be made to strengthen and expand UJK trilateral relations moving forward.

Linkages between North Korean Nuclear Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and Integrated Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific Region

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2023 한국국가전략 Vol.8 No.2

The Biden administration sees integrated deterrence within the broad context of China as the long term “pacing threat” and Russia as an immediate, acute threat. However, there is also increasing recognition that specific security challenges, such as escalated tensions on the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, are not isolated from great power geopolitical competition. This paper examines the degree to which nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is connected to integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. At the heart of this debate is whether and how measures to deter North Korea ranging from strengthening U.S. extended deterrence, to tightening U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation, to developing indigenous South Korean nuclear weapons might affect regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. I argue that in an increasingly networked security architecture, linkages across conflicts will become more apparent. As such, policymakers should identify linkages between integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and consider how strengthening deterrence in one area exacerbates or mitigates deterrence in other conflicts. To better situate North Korean deterrence within a framework of Indo-Pacific deterrence, policymakers should continue developing U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation as a platform for addressing broader Indo-Pacific issues. I also suggest how conflict in the Taiwan Strait carries important implications for the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific (including the U.S.-South Korea alliance) and aggravates tensions on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the need for greater planning and coordination among allies.

한·미·일 연대 제도화와 한반도 및 인도태평양 안보

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2024 한국국가전략 Vol.9 No.1

한반도 긴장이 고조되고 유럽과 중동에서 지정학적 갈등이 계속되는 가운데 한일 화해와 한미일 3국 협력 체제는 2023년 가장 주목할 만한 외교 성과 중 하나라고 할 수 있다. 본 논문은 최근 한미일 3자 협력 가속화와 그것이 한반도와 인도-태평양 안보에 미치는 영향을 평가한다. 각장의 내용은 다음과 같다. 1장은 최근 3자 협력, 특히 캠프 데이비드 한미일 정상회의 이후 성과를 개괄적으로 소개한다. 2장은 2022년 이후 한미일 협력을 견인한 요인을 분석한다. 3장은 3국 관계 발전이 지역 및 글로벌 안보 역학 관계에 미치는 긍정적, 부정적 영향을 평가한다. 4장은 3자 협력이 당면하고 있는 구조적, 운영적, 국내적 도전 과제들을 제시한다. 5장은 3국 관계 발전을 위한 정책을 제안한다. 2023년 8월 18일, 미국, 일본, 대한민국 정상은 워싱턴 D.C. 인근 캠프 데이비드에서 3자 협력 시대를 선언했다. 캠프 데이비드 원칙, 캠프 데이비드 정신, 협의 약속 등 세 가지 문서에 따라 3국은 군사 영역뿐만 아니라 경제, 기술, 공급망을 아우르는 협력을 강화하기로 합의했다. 3국은 북한에 대한 방어 및 억지력 강화, 중국 위협 대응, 우크라이나 원조, 경제 탄압에 대한 회복력 구축, 공급망 조율 등 다양한 현안에에 대해 3국 군사 및 경제 협력도 제도화했다. 하지만 캠프 데이비드 정상 회담 이후, 현재 각국 국내 상황과 미래 지정학적 흐름을 고려할 때 3자 협력이 장기적으로 실행 가능한지에 대한 다양한 견해가 제기되고 있다. 일각에서는 3자 협력이 보다 구속력 있는 약속을 담은 준동맹으로 발전할 것으로 보는 반면, 회의론자들은 3자 협력이 "3자 소협의체" 형식을 넘어설 수 없다고 전망하고 있다. 본 논문은 최근 한미일 3자 협력 제도화와 그것이 한반도와 인도-태평양 안보에 미치는 영향을 평가한다. 각장의 내용은 다음과 같다. 1장은 최근 3자 협력, 특히 캠프 데이비드 한미일 정상회의 이후 성과를 개괄적으로 소개한다. 2장은 2022년 이후 한미일 협력을 견인한 요인을 분석한다. 3장은 3국 관계 발전이 지역 및 글로벌 안보 역학 관계에 미치는 긍정적, 부정적 영향을 평가한다. 4장은 3자 협력이 당면하고 있는 구조적, 운영적, 국내적 도전 과제들을 제시한다. 5장은 3국 관계 발전을 위한 정책을 제안한다. In a year plagued by ever increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and geopolitical challenges in Europe and now the Middle East, South Korea-Japan rapprochement and the institutionalization of U.S.-Japan-Korea (UJK) trilateral cooperation served as one of the more promising diplomatic developments in 2023. This paper evaluates the recent acceleration of the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral and its implications for the Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific security. The paper is divided into five sections. Section one provides an overview of recent gains made in trilateral cooperation, particularly after the Camp David trilateral summit. Section two analyzes the factors driving trilateral cooperation since 2022. Section three addresses the positive and negative implications of recent developments in trilateral relations on regional and global security dynamics. Section four identifies structural, operational, and domestic challenges facing trilateral cooperation. Section five concludes with policy recommendations for advancing trilateral relations. On August 18, 2023, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) declared an era of trilateral cooperation at Camp David near Washington, D.C. Based on three separate documents-the Camp David Principles, the Camp David Spirit, and the Commitment to Consult-the three countries agreed to boost cooperation that encompasses not only the military domain, but also the economy, technology, and supply chains. Additionally, the three countries further institutionalized trilateral military and economic cooperation by boosting efforts to promote defense and deterrence against North Korea, address threats from China, deliver aid to Ukraine, build resilience against economic coercion, and coordinate supply chain logistics among other issues. Following the Camp David summit, a wide range of views regarding the long-term viability of trilateral cooperation have emerged in light of current domestic obstacles and future geopolitical trends. Some see trilateral cooperation moving toward a quasi-alliance with more binding commitments while others remain skeptical whether it can move beyond the format of a "mini-lateral consultative group.” This paper evaluates the recent acceleration of the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral and its implications for the Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific security. The paper is divided into five sections. Section one provides an overview of recent gains made in trilateral cooperation, particularly after the Camp David trilateral summit. Section two analyzes the factors driving trilateral cooperation since 2022. Section three addresses the positive and negative implications of recent developments in trilateral relations on regional and global security dynamics. Section four identifies structural, operational, and domestic challenges facing trilateral cooperation. Section five concludes with policy recommendations for advancing trilateral relations.

대만해협과 한반도에서의 무력충돌 가능성, 그리고 동맹대응

앤드류 여 사단법인 한국국가전략연구원 2024 한국국가전략 Vol.9 No.2

현재까지 한국과 대만 위기는 분리된 주제였다. 하지만 현재 두 지역이 지정학적인 강대국 들간 경쟁과 밀접하게 연관되어 있다는 인식이 더욱 확산되고 있다. 한반도와 대만해협 우발 사태가 직접적으로 연결되어 있지는 않지만, 한 지역 분쟁이 다른 지역 그리고 더 나아가 인도 태평양 지역 방어 및 억지력에 영향을 미치는 것은 사실이다. 동맹 네트워크 특성과 여러 영역에 걸친 지정학적 갈등 가능성을 고려할 때 전문가들은 한국과 대만에서 벌어질 수 있는 우발 사태를 보다 심도있게 고민해야 한다. 이 논문는 통합 억지력 관점에서 한국과 대만 분쟁 연관 가능성을 평가할 것이다. 미국과 한국을 포함한 동맹국들이 대만해협 분쟁에서 어떻게 대응할 수 있는지도 살펴볼 것이다. Crises in Korea and Taiwan have typically been addressed in isolation from one another. However, there is growing recognition that the two flashpoints are increasingly tied to great power geopolitical competition. Although potential contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait are not directly linked, conflict in one zone carries implications for defense and deterrence in the other and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The networked nature of alliances and the implications of geopolitical conflict across multiple domains requires experts to begin thinking about contingencies in Korea and Taiwan in tandem. This paper assesses the potential linkages between a Korean and Taiwan conflict from the perspective of integrated deterrence. Additionally, it evaluates how the United States and its allies, including South Korea, might respond to conflict on the Taiwan Strait