http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
- 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
- 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : 안성희(교신저자) ( Sung Hee Ahn ) (검색결과 1 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
-
초도감사보수 할인이 감사품질에 미치는 영향: 감사인 강제교체기업과 자율교체기업의 차이
최종학 ( Jong-hag Choi ),안성희(교신저자) ( Sung Hee Ahn ),황문호(공동저자) ( Mun Ho Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계학연구 Vol.41 No.2
일반적으로 감사인은 신규 감사고객을 유치하는 과정에서 일정의 보수할인을 제공하는 것으로 알려져 있다. 선행연구에 따르면, 이러한 초도감사보수할인은 교체 첫 연도의 감사품질에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 가능성도 존재하는 한편 이들 간에는 유의한 영향관계가 나타나지 않을 가능성도 제기된다. 이에 본 연구는 초도감사보수할인과 감사품질의 관련성이 감사인 교체사유(강제교체 vs. 자율교체)에 따라 달리 나타날 수 있음을 연구가설로 설정하고, 이를 실증적으로 분석하였다. 감사인 강제교체제도가 적용되던 2006년부터 2010년 중 외부감사인을 교체한 1,100개 표본을 분석한 결과, 자율교체 기업에서는 초도감사보수의 할인규모가 클수록 감사품질이 유의하게 하락하는 결과가 발견되었으나, 강제교체 기업에서는 초도감사보수 할인과 감사품질 간에 유의한 관련성이 없었다. 이는 초도감사보수할인과 감사품질과의 관계가 감사인을 교체하는 사유에 따라 다르게 나타날 수 있음을 의미한다. 특히, 자율교체 기업에서는 후임감사인이 non-Big 4인 경우에 초도감사보수할인이 감사품질에 미치는 부정적인 영향이 뚜렷히 나타났는데, 이는 감사의견 구매와 같은 경영자의 기회주의적인 의도가 감사인 교체 의사결정에 반영되어 있음을 시사한다. Prior studies suggests that both frequent auditor switches and long auditor tenure could impair audit quality, through the impairment of auditor expertise and independence, respectively. Although the regulators abolished the 6-year mandatory rotation policy in 2010, it is still debating among politicians and media that the policy should be re-introduced to increase auditor independence. To resolve these conflicting views, Korean regulators adopted 3-year mandatory auditor retention and 6-year mandatory auditor rotation rules in 2003. Under the rules, after auditor change, clients need to hire the same auditor for at least 3 years, but have to change auditor after 6 years of auditor tenure. In this study, we define ‘mandatory auditor change’ as the change after 6 years of auditor tenure, while ‘voluntary auditor change’ as the change that occurred when auditor tenure is 3, 4, or 5 years. Unlike in the U.S. where the potential reasons for auditor change and circumstances surrounding auditor change are publicly reported through Form 8-K report, in Korea, any information that are potentially related to the reasons for auditor change is not disclosed. However, one can guess that there must be some reasons that clients voluntary change auditors before 6th year of maximum auditor tenure. Especially, clients have strong incentive to change auditors for the opinion shopping purpose. In that case, they are going to hire new auditors who are willing to acquiesce to client pressure (Choi and Chung 2015). In such a case, the low-quality auditors are likely to offer initial audit fee discounts. In contrast, it is less likely that mandatory auditor changes are related to opinion shopping motivations of clients, suggesting that the mandatory changes are less likely to lead to poor audit quality even in the case of low-balling. Thus, in this study, we try to examine the association between initial audit engagement year audit fee discount (i.e., low-balling) and audit quality in the auditor change year for voluntary versus mandatory auditor change clients. Through these analyses, we try to shed some lights into the potential reasons of voluntary auditor changes. We collect 1,100 auditor change observations from year 2006 to 2010 for the empirical analyses. It was the period that both mandatory auditor retention and rotation policy was in effect. We remove the observations that auditor was changed due to auditor assignment by Financial Supervisory Service. We also remove the observations from banking and finance industry and non-December fiscal year-end. Among our samples, 732 observations are those with the mandatory changes (after 6 years of auditor tenure) and the remaining 368 observations are those with voluntary changes. We define the low-balling as the case when actual audit fee is lower than estimated normal fee. Additionally, we use the magnitude of discretionary accruals of client firms, estimated by using Kothari et al.’s (2005) method, to proxy for the audit quality. Empirical results are summarized as follows. First, we find that both audit quality and hour of low-balling auditors is lower for the cases of voluntary auditor change. In general, low audit quality combined with smaller audit hour suggest that auditors exert relatively less audit efforts to lower the audit costs. Specifically, we observe that the poor audit quality occurs when success auditor is non-Big 4. However, in contrast to the case of mandatory rotation, we find that the audit quality is not associated with low-balling. We also find that the magnitude of earnings management was not differ between voluntary auditor change samples and mandatory change samples in the year before the auditor change. Thus, audit quality becomes poorer at the year of auditor change for the voluntary change samples when there exist low-balling. These findings can be interpreted as follows. Client firms opt to change incumbent auditors with shorter than 6-year of tenure (before the maximum length of the tenure) due to some specific reasons. For example, the client may fire incumbent auditor and hire new auditor who is likely to acquiesce to the request of the clients. When there exists low-balling, new auditors are not able to provide high-quality audit service due to the lack of enough resources or independence. However, for the mandatory auditor changes, because the changes are not driven by the clients’ incentives to shop for opinion, there is less possibility that even low-balling leads to impaired independence and thus poor audit quality. These findings have several valuable implications. Most importantly, regulators and practitioners need to aware of the potential audit risks of the clients who voluntary change auditors. Regulators may need to consider the disclosures of the reasons for the auditor changes. Investors also need to be watchful for the such firms.
연관 검색어 추천
이 검색어로 많이 본 자료
활용도 높은 자료
