WTO 분쟁해결제도에서의 교차보복 : 제도상 문제점 및 적용사례 분석

안덕근;이효영 법무부 2010 통상법률 Vol.- No.92

세계무역기구(WTO) 분쟁해결제도는 분쟁사안이 발생한 해당 산업이나 협정은 물론이고 필요한 경우 여타 협정의 영역으로까지 확대될 수 있는 교차보복(crossretaliation)을 허용하고 있다. 이는 상품교역에 국한된 GATT 체제하에서의 보복조치가 GATT 협정 내에서만 허용되었던 점에 비해 WTO 분쟁해결제도의 주요한 특징 중 하나이다. 또한 WTO 체제하에서는 분쟁 승소국에 의한 무역보복조치의 시행이 현실화되어 있으며, 교차보복의 승인 사례도 증가하고 있는 실정이다. 보복조치의 시행에 대한 WTO 규정은 분쟁해결양해(DSU) 제22조에 규정되어 있다. 이 중 제22.3조는 보복조치의 시행과 관련한 일반적 원칙을 규정하고 있는데, 이에 의하면 제소국은 WTO 협정의무 위반 판정을 받은 것과 동일한 산업부문에 대해 보복조치를 부과하여야 하나, 동일한 산업부문에서의 보복조치 부과가 실행가능하거나 효과적이지 못한 경우에는 동일 협정상 여타 산업부문에 보복조치(산업간 교차보복)를 부과할 수 있다. 이에 더하여 추가적으로 "관련 상황이 심각한 경우"에는 여타의 대상협정상 보복조치(협정간 교차보복)를 허용하고 있다. 교차보복제도와 관련하여 가장 현저하게 부각되는 법적인 문제점은 TRIPS 협정상의 교차보복 규정이다. 협정 간에 교차보복이 허용됨으로써 WTO 회원국은 상품, 서비스 교역 및 지적재산권 보호와 관련되는 회원국 간의 양허에 대해 허용된 보복수준한도 내에서 사실상 자유롭게 보복조치를 취할 수 있다. 이에 따라 시장접근에 관한 양허를 다루는 상품 및 서비스 협정들과는 다르게 TRIPS 협정의 경우 사인(private parties)들의 지적재산권에 대한 권리를 보장하는 협정이므로 보복조치의 법적인 효과가 매우 다르게 나타나는 문제점이 야기된다. 이 뿐 아니라, TRIPS 협정상의 보복조치는 정상적인 상황에서는 보장되어야 하는 지적재산권의 직접적인 훼손 문제, 제3국에게 야기하는 경제적 손실 문제, 지적재산권 보호 침해 수준의 보복조치 계산 문제 등이 제기 될 수 있다. 이와 마찬가지로 GATS 협정상 교차보복을 추구하게 될 경우에도 법적인 문제점들이 발생하는데, 관세를 통한 일원적인 형태의 시장접근을 다루는 GATT와는 다르게 GATS의 경우 시장접근에 관한 내용은 구체적 약속에 해당하므로, GATS 협정상 무역보복조치 역시 구체적 약속이 제시된 사항에 대해서만 적용되므로 보복조치의 형태에 대한 제약이 부과된다고 볼 수 있다. 또한 서비스 교역은 다양한 교역방식을 포괄하므로 무역보복조치가 여타 법규들과 상충하는 문제를 초래할 수 있다. 현재까지 WTO 분쟁해결기구가 공식적으로 교차보복을 승인한 사례는 세 건으로, EC-바나나(EC-Bananas III), 미국-도박서비스(U.S.-Gambling Services) 및 미국-고지대면화(U.S.-Upland Cotton) 분쟁 중재사례가 있다. 주요 법적 쟁점과 관련하여 판정이 거듭되어 가면서 법규정의 해석에 대한 논리가 보다 정교하게 발전되는 부분도 있으나, 도리어 기존의 해석과 상반되는 판정도 제시됨으로써 향후 중재판정에 난제를 제시하는 부분도 있다. 이러한 문제점은 현재 상소기구 절차를 원용할 수 없는 분쟁해결절차의 구조상 결국 학계에서의 논의를 통해 적절한 해석상 지침과 방향을 설정해 나가야 할 것이다. The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system authorizes cross-retaliation under which the impact of disputed issues can extend not only to the pertaining industry or Agreement but, if necessary, to other covered Agreements as well. Such is one of the key features of the WTO dispute settlement system, comparable to the GATT system under which retaliation was limited only to goods trade. Furthermore, under the current WTO system, winning parties are indeed engaging in trade retaliatory measures against responding parties, while the number of cases where cross-retaliation has been authorized is on the rise. The WTO provision regulating cross retaliation is DSU Article 22. According to Article 22.3 of the DSU, which provides for the general principles and procedures on the implementation of compensation and suspension of concessions, while complaining parties should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which a violation has been found, if deemed not practicable or effective to suspend concessions with respect to the same sector(s), the party can seek retaliation under other covered agreements ('cross-sector retaliation'). In addition to that, if the party considers that the "circumstances are serious enough", it may seek retaliation under another covered agreement ('cross-agreement retaliation'). One of the most striking legal problems with regard to cross-retaliation concerns is the suspension of concessions under the TRIPS Agreement. With the authorization of cross-agreement retaliation, WTO members are now practically able to suspend their commitments against reneging countries within the range of authorized suspensions on goods, services trade and intellectual property protection. As a result, since the TRIPS Agreement provides for the rights of intellectual property, unlike the GATT or GATS which covers market access concessions, the legal impact of retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement can turn out quite differently. Furthermore, retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement may raise issues with regard to the direct impairment of IPR, which under normal circumstances need be preserved, economic losses to third parties, and the difficulty of calculating the appropriate level of suspensions regarding intellectual property. Up to now, there have been three cases in which cross-retaliation has been authorized: EC-Bananas III, U.S.-Gambling Services and U.S.-Upland Cotton. With regard to major legal issues, it seems that the series of arbitration panels have been able to develop more elaborate legalistic approaches, while on the other hand, there has been disagreeing positions among arbitration panels on the same issues. Such intricacies are bound to complicate future arbitration rulings, and will become subject to academic discussions regarding the guidelines and directions for the proper interpretation approaches since arbitration decisions cannot be appealed under the current dispute settlement system.

WTO 분쟁해결제도에서의 교차보복

안덕근(AHN DUKGEUN),이효영 법무부 국제법무정책과 2010 통상법률 Vol.- No.92

The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system authorizes cross-retaliation under which the impact of disputed issues can extend not only to the pertaining industry or Agreement but, if necessary, to other covered Agreements as well. Such is one of the key features of the WTO dispute settlement system, comparable to the GATT system under which retaliation was limited only to goods trade. Furthermore, under the current WTO system, winning parties are indeed engaging in trade retaliatory measures against responding parties, while the number of cases where cross-retaliation has been authorized is on the rise. The WTO provision regulating cross retaliation is DSU Article 22. According to Article 22.3 of the DSU, which provides for the general principles and procedures on the implementation of compensation and suspension of concessions, while complaining parties should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which a violation has been found, if deemed not practicable or effective to suspend concessions with respect to the same sector(s), the party can seek retaliation under other covered agreements ('cross-sector retaliation'). In addition to that, if the party considers that the “circumstances are serious enough”, it may seek retaliation under another covered agreement (‘cross-agreement retaliation’). One of the most striking legal problems with regard to cross-retaliation concerns is the suspension of concessions under the TRIPS Agreement. With the authorization of cross-agreement retaliation, WTO members are now practically able to suspend their commitments against reneging countries within the range of authorized suspensions on goods, services trade and intellectual property protection. As a result, since the TRIPS Agreement provides for the rights of intellectual property, unlike the GATT or GATS which covers market access concessions, the legal impact of retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement can turn out quite differently. Furthermore, retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement may raise issues with regard to the direct impairment of IPR, which under normal circumstances need be preserved, economic losses to third parties, and the difficulty of calculating the appropriate level of suspensions regarding intellectual property. Up to now, there have been three cases in which cross-retaliation has been authorized: EC-Bananas III, U.S.-Gambling Services and U.S.-Upland Cotton. With regard to major legal issues, it seems that the series of arbitration panels have been able to develop more elaborate legalistic approaches, while on the other hand, there has been disagreeing positions among arbitration panels on the same issues. Such intricacies are bound to complicate future arbitration rulings, and will become subject to academic discussions regarding the guidelines and directions for the proper interpretation approaches since arbitration decisions cannot be appealed under the current dispute settlement system.