정당재정의 헌법적 통제 : 독일의 경험을 중심으로

송석윤(Song Seog-Yun) 성신여자대학교 법학연구소 2003 성신법학 Vol.- No.2

국민적 기본 컨센서스와 헌법재판소

송석윤(역)(Seog Yun Song),크리스티안 슈타르크(Christian Starck) 세계헌법학회 한국학회 2001 世界憲法硏究 Vol.6 No.-

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분단 60년의 법적 조명 ; 선거운동 규제입법의 연원 -1925년 일본 보통선거법의 성립과 한국 분단체제에의 유입-

송석윤 ( Seog Yun Song ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2005 서울대학교 法學 Vol.46 No.4

정당해산심판의 실체적 요건 -정당해산심판제도의 좌표와 관련하여-

송석윤 ( Seog Yun Song ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2010 서울대학교 法學 Vol.51 No.1

Nach Art. 8 Abs. 4 der koreanischen Verfassung konnen die politischen Parteien verboten werden, wenn ihr Zweck bzw. Verhalten gegen die demokratische Grundordnung ist. Da diese Tatbestandsvoraussetzungen hoch abstrakt sind, scheint es notig, den heutigen Standpunkt der Institution des Parteiverbots zu begreifen. Fur diesen Zweck werden die Lehre von `militant democracy` von Karl Loewenstein, der Hintergrund der Einfuhrung des Parteiverbots in die koreanische Verfassung von 1960 und die Richtlinien der Venice Commission analysiert. Daraus ergibt sich, dass sich die Grundtendenz an die Starkung des Parteischutzes richtet. Fur die Auslegung der Tatbestandsvoraussetzungen des Parteiverbots ware der Satz: Keine Freiheit den Feinden der Freiheit zu einfach. Vielmehr ist eine restriktive Auslegung geboten, die auf dem Grundsatz der Grundrechtsbeschrankung einschließlich des Verhaltnismaßigkeitsprinzips basiert. Der Zweck der politischen Parteien sollte in bezug auf die objektive Intensitat sowie auf ihr Verhalten interpretiert werden. Die demokratische Grundordnung sollte als Garantie der Freiheit und Demokratie, d.h. des hochsten Kerngehalts der Verfassungsordnung aufgefasst werden. Die Institution des Parteiverbots sollte daruber hinaus nicht nur verfassungsrechtlich, sondern auch verfassungspolitisch verstanden werden.

바이마르헌법과 경제민주화

송석윤(Seog-Yun Song) 한국헌법학회 2013 憲法學硏究 Vol.19 No.2

다른 서구산업사회에서처럼 독일에서도 산업혁명과 함께 아동노동 등 적지 않은 사회문제가 발생하였다. 19세말의 경제위기를 겪으면서 독일의 경제정책은 국가개입주의로 전환하게 된다. 제1차 세계대전에서의 패배와 11월 혁명을 경험하면서 제정된 바이마르헌법은 국가조합주의적 경제질서가 아니라 노사의 사회적 동반관계에 기반하는 경제질서를 지향하는 대타협을 기초로 시대적 요구를 반영하였다. 바이마르헌법은 기본권조항에서 경제생활과 관련된 기본권을 별도로 규정하였다. 동헌법 제151조는 "경제생활의 질서는 만인의 인간다운 생활의 보장을 목적으로 하는 정의의 원칙에 합당해야 한다"라고 선언하면서 경제질서, 노동질서 및 사회질서를 규율하였다. 특히 제165조의 평의회조항은 피라미드구조로 조직되는 노동자평의회와 경제평의회를 도입했는데 그중 직장평의회제도는 노동자의 공동결정권을 보장하는 제도로 정착되었다. 바이마르공화국에서는 실업보험제도와 노동법원제도가 도입되는 등 사회법의 영역에서 커다란 진전이 있었으며 경제법에 대한 논의도 활발하였다. 이러한 배경 속에서 경제민주주의 내지 경제민주화에 대한 논의가 진행되었다. 이러한 논의는 주로 바이마르공화국 민주헌정의 중심세력이던 사회민주당과 노동조합에 의해 주도되었다. 1928년 나프탈리는 경제민주주의를 "경제관계의 민주화를 통한 정치적 민주주의의 심화"라고 정의하였다. 경제민주화는 궁극적으로 경제민주주의를 지향하면서 국가기구, 노동관계, 교육제도 등에서 점진적 제도개혁을 추구하는 것을 의미했다. 1930년을 전후한 시점에서는 경제헌법에 대한 다양한 관점에서의 논의가 진행되었지만 그 개념에 대한 합의에는 이르지 못하였다. 바이마르헌법의 경제조항에 대해서는 형식적 타협에 머물렀다는 비판이 제기되지만 현대 산업사회에서 각기 다른 이데올로기에 기초한 다양한 입장들을 적절하게 조정하여 상호 접근시킨 결과로 평가하는 것이 타당하다. 바이마르헌법 제정시의 기본문제는 헌법의 체계정합성과 현실적합성 사이에서 적절한 균형점을 찾는 것이었다. 바이마르헌정사로부터 입헌민주주의 정치질서에 대한 사회적 합의의 중요성과 경제문제에 대한 실용적 접근의 필요성을 배우게 된다. 바이마르공화국에서 경제헌법에 대한 논의는 정치와 경제의 관계 속에서 헌법의 역할을 모색하는 과정이었다. The Industrial Revolution has seen many social problems like child labor not only in other western industrial societies but also in Germany. The economic crisis in the late 19th century has turned the economic policies of Germany into the interventionism. The Weimar Constitution, which were enacted upon the defeat of Germany in World War Ⅰ and the German Revolution, mirrors the spirit of the times, based on a grand compromise intended for the social partnership of labor and management, not for the state corporatism. It prescribes the basic rights concerning the economic life in its part on the basic rights and the obligations of Germans. Article 151 of the Constitution reads, "the economy has to be organized based on the principles of justice, with the goal of achieving life in dignity for everyone." Article 165, the council-clause, especially introduces pyramid-structured workers' and economic councils. Workers' Councils, among others, has institutionalized the right of codetermination of workers. The Weimar Republic has seen a great progress in the area of social law while it introduces unemployment insurances and labor courts. The discussions concerning economic law were also lively. Again this backdrop, the ones on the economic democracy or democratization have started. These were mainly led by the Social Democratic Party, central force in the constitutional democracy of the Weimar Republic, and labor unions. In 1928, Naphtali defined economic democracy as "the development of political democracy through the democratization of the economic relations." The multifaceted discussions around 1930 concerning the economic constitution did not see the consensus on the term. Although it is often criticized as a formal compromise, the economic clause of the Weimar Constitution may properly be valued as the result of efforts to adjust different positions based on varied ideologies and narrow the gap between them. The basic issue while enacting the Weimar Constitution was to strike balance between the consistency and the practicality of the constitution. The significance of the social agreement on the political order of constitutional democracy and the necessity of a practical approach to economic issues can be learned from the constitutional history of the Weimar Republic. The discussions about the economic constitution in the Weimar Republic were the process of assigning a role to the constitution in the politico-economic context.

한국에서의 헌법제정과 헌법개정: 6월헌법의 제1차 개정과 관련하여

송석윤 ( Seog Yun Song ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2010 서울대학교 法學 Vol.51 No.3

The main purpose of constitution making and constitutional amendment in the constitutional history of modern Korea has been the extension of the president`s term in office. As the new regimes without democratic legitimacy called themselves according to the ordinal number of republics, so were the names given to the constitutions in the same way. This practice of naming constitutions has become seldom with democratization. We can understand the Korean constitutional history as process of overcoming authoritarian system, so it seems legitimate to give two democratic constitutions of 1960 and of 1987 special names of April-Constitution and June-Constitution. The June-Constitution of 1987 is the first constitution with stability and normative power, though it was a result of constitutional amendment through the procedure prescribed in constitution. It seems, therefore, possible that the new constitution made in the system transition can be seen as constitution making in spite of the procedural way of constitutional amendment. So long as a new constitution in the future doesn`t destroy the fundamental basis of constitutional democracy it will be only an amendment of June-Constitution. The object of the ongoing discussion about the constitutional amendment encompasses almost all areas of the constitutional law. But the focus and the main political drive of the discussion lies in the form of government. None of the classical form of government like presidential, parliamentary and hybrid system can in itself promise a success. The more important thing is the question, whether the political culture is mature enough and the governmental form matches the political culture. Parliament which Functions well and is willing to compromise, democratic and stable party system and the consensus on the form of government belong to the political culture. It is doubtful, if a constitutional amendment of the governmental form could strengthen theses preconditions. A model example of the constitutional amendment without factual constraints was the revision of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999 which came to a conclusion after 34 year long debate.

송현 백충현 교수 정년기념호 : 논문 ; 프로이센 헌법갈등 연구

송석윤 ( Seog Yun Song ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2004 서울대학교 法學 Vol.45 No.3

군민공치와 입헌군주제헌법 -비교헌정사적 연구-

송석윤 ( Seog Yun Song ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2012 서울대학교 法學 Vol.53 No.1

Monarchial constitutionalism was known as the most desirable political form among competing western constitutional orders during the enlightenment period of Korea. Since the constitutions of the monarchial constitutionalism take various forms, this paper, after analyzing a series of constitutions from constitutional monarchies - France, Belgium, German states and Japan - , classifies them into two types: the popular sovereignty type and the monarchial sovereignty type. The monarchial sovereignty type is based on the monarchial principle. The French Charter of 1814, the Bavarian Constitution of 1818 and the Meiji Constitution of Japan (1889) which was strongly influenced by German constitutions and their conservative constitutional theories, belong to this type. According to the conservative interpretation, the Prussian Constitution of 1850 was categorized to this group. In any case, since all constitutions of the monarchial constitutionalism have a structure of competition between the monarch and the parliament, it remains controversial whether the monarchial principle can be a decisive factor. On the other hand, the tradition of the monarchial sovereignty type has come to be closely correlated with the development of a strong executive bureaucracy. As a result, it is associated with a comparatively weak civil society and parliament. Efforts need to be expended to overcome the potential problems arising from this traditional structure.

경제민주화와 헌법질서

송석윤 ( Song Seog-yun ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2017 서울대학교 法學 Vol.58 No.1

South Korean economy has shown remarkable growth. However, the consequence of compressed development forces governments to reconsider their role for economic democratization as the society needs to address various and simultaneous challenges. During the early stage of constitutionalism, the western nations made immense efforts to secure preconditions for individual economic freedom and creativity. Legal institutions guaranteeing the economic freedom, the public education system and infrastructure like transportation, communication, finance etc. belonged to the typical examples. Since the beginning of the 20th century the socio-economic problems in the industrial society have actively been addressed and managed by the constitution and the constitutional theory. South Korean constitutions have certainly provided for diverse constitutional provisions from the first constitution of 1948 because the importance of socioeconomic democracy as well as that of political democracy was recognized. Concurrently, the governments endeavored to build personal and material infrastructure although the country was in very poor conditions. This resulted in the rapid economic growth and the political democratization. As the concern has increased due to social polarization largely caused by socio-economic segregation, the function of social infrastructure like public education and housing should be improved and strengthened. Moreover, pertinent social security system in the aging society and coping plan against the structural unemployment should be prepared. This paper suggests that the discussion of the constitutional theory on the economic order should be pragmatic in accordance with the characteristic of the regulatory objective.

번역 ; 헌법과 사회변동 -헌법해석 방법론에 대한 몇 가지 생각-

송석윤(역) ( Song Seog Yun ),( Dieter Grimm ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2001 서울대학교 法學 Vol.42 No.3