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김상용 교수 정년 기념 민법 제201조~제203조 점유자,회복자 관계와 부당이득반환청구권과의 관계
백태승 ( Tae Seung Paik ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2015 法學硏究 Vol.25 No.1
In returning his object in possession to the person of losses, the person of unjust enrichment returning that object under Article 748 of Civil Act with unjust enrichment, and returning it under Article 201 of Civil Act with the right to demand real rights differ in scope. In this case, the person of unjust enrichment represents both the person enriched and the possessor. The scope of return in terms of unjust enrichment under Article 748 of Civil Act in particular is wider than the scope of liability of the possessor under Article 201 or Article 203. In other words, it is more favorable for the person of losses to claim for the return of the original object under unjust enrichment than to claim for the return of the object in possession under the right to demand real rights. It is because in the case of the person enriched in good faith, he is not liable to return the fruits under Article 201 of Civil Act, and liable to return such fruits only to the extent that he is still enriched under Article 748, while in the case of the person enriched in bad faith, he is liable to return the fruits under Article 201 hereafter, and on top of that he shall return the benefits received by him together with interest, and if there has been any damage, he shall be bound also to make compensation. According to the commonly accepted view, the return of the original object is governed under Article 201 or Article 203, and the return of value is governed under the Principle of Unjust Enrichment at all times, but the precedents take a different view. Meanwhile, according to the theory of unjust enrichment that discusses different types of unjust enrichment, Article 201 hereafter may apply in the case of infringement of unjust enrichment, but whether to consider this as a special regulation in terms of unjust enrichment regulation and give priority in the application of this regulation are still in debate. Article 201 or Article 203 had been historically retroactive to the Roman Statute, and was codified in the Civil Codes of various European countries. The greatest purpose of the enactment of Article 201 of Civil Act is to protect the possessor in good faith. And because of this purpose, even the precedents make judgments on whether it is deemed that he is in good faith after assuming that the possessor in good faith is given priority in the application of Article 201 at all times in the case of unjust enrichment of infringement. Article 201 in particular acknowledges the acquisition of the fruits of the possessor in good faith; so even in the case where he is still being enriched, he is released from the duty to return. As stated earlier, the question of why it is necessary to approve the preferential treatment for the possessor in good faith has been posed for many years. Although Article 201 or Article 203 collides with the law of unjust enrichment, it has been applied through interpretation without any satisfactory solution in solving this problem of collision. Therefore, in order to solve the problem of the collision of these two laws, it is advisable to narrow down the concept of good faith into good faith and negligence without fault, while specifying the scope of return of the negligent possessor in good faith that the scope of return is entitled only to the possessor still being enriched. In other words, exceptions under Article 748(1) are allowed for the possessor in good faith - and who is negligent without fault - to acquire all of the fruits irrespective of whether the possessor is still being enriched. However, the possessor in good faith but with negligence shall return such benefits only to the extent that he is still enriched. On the other hand, the possessor in bad faith who acknowledges that he has no rights to acquire the fruits or to receive benefits shall return the acquired fruits, and it is necessary to specifically express that the possessor in bad faith shall return the value of the fruits when the fruits are damaged or have not been acquired due to his negligence. Meanwhile, if the object in possession is destroyed or damaged by some causes attributable to the possessor, it will be reasonable to allow only the possessor in good faith who is negligent without fault to return to the extent that he is still enriched in order to balance with Article 201 of Civil Act. (Civil Act in this abstract refers to Civil Act of South Korea.)
판례평석 : 현저하게 고율로 정해진 이자 약정의 효력 및 이미 지급된 초과이자의 반환청구권 -대상: 대법원 2007. 2. 15 선고 2004다50426 전원합의체판결-
백태승 ( Tae Seung Paik ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2007 法學硏究 Vol.17 No.4
Sobald das Gesetz uber Zinshohe im Jahr 1998 abgeschaffen wurd, ist in Korea eins Wucherzins z.B. jahrlich uber 300% sogar 1000% ublich geworden. Mangels allgemeiner gesetzlicher Regelungen hat die Rechtswissenschaft versucht, auf die Falle des Wucherzinses gemass §103 oder §104 KBGB zu bewaltigen. Der KOGH(koreanischer oberster Gerichtshof) vom 15. 2. 2007 hat mit Recht beim Wucherdahren beurteilt, dass der Wucherzins gemass §103 KBGB sittenwidrig sei, indem dem Bewurcherten den Anspruch auf Ruckzahlung angenommen wurde. Auf Wucherzins gemass §746 S.2 KBGB ist nach der Rechtsprechung anzuwenden, weil der Bewucherte nicht ``gleichfalls`` gegen die guten Sitten verstossen hat. Beim Wucherzins hat der KOGH betont die Wirtschaftslage der Parteien fur die Vorraussetzung der Sittenwidrigkeit. Es ware also verfehlt. uber eine bestimmte Zinshohe voweg zu sagen, sie mache einen Dahrensvertrag sittenwidrig. Erst der Vergleich mit dem jeweils markublichen Zinssatz sowie Vertragsrisiko der Parteien kann ein Urteil uber die Sittenwidrigkeit tragen. Beide Tendenzen, dh. sowohl die Aufrechterhaltung der nur fur eine gewisse Zeit gesperrten Ruckforderungsmoglichkeit bezuglich des Kapitals als auch die Verpflichtung des Dahrensnehmers, den gultigen Zinssatz leisten mussen, was das KOGH vertreten hat, sind rechtspolitisch gut vertetbar. Nach dieser Rechtsprechung vom KOGH ist das Gesetz uber Zinshohe, das erst am 29.6. 2007 in Kraft getreten ist, wiederum neu geschaffen worden.
백태승 ( Tae Seung Paik ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2011 法學硏究 Vol.21 No.3
Die Arbeit behandelt die neuen Vertragstypen unter dem Gesichtspunk der Rechtsprechung in Korea. Die im arbeitsteiligen EntwicklungsprozesB von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft entstandenen verkehrstypischen, aber nicht kodifizietren Vertrage sind uberaus zahlreich. Die neuen vertragstypischen, gesetzlich nicht kodifidzierten Vertragsformen sind jedoch nicht gleichbedeutend mit den modernen Vertragstypen. Nach der kurzen Auflisting der wichtigsten in der Rechtsprechung sog. neuen Vertragstypen kann zunachst festgestellt werden, daB auch sie durchaus zu den Innominatsvertragen gehoren. Auch sie vom koreanischen Schuldvertragsrecht nicht als Vertragstypen eigenstandig benannt und erfaBt. Das bedeutet: die neuen Vertragstypen sind zwar verkehrstypische Vertrage, aber normative nicht in Ihrer Typizitat vom Gesetzgeber aufgegriffene Vertrage. Die vorstehende Charakterisierung hat zugleich deutlich werden lassen, daB die neuen Vertragtypen unterer Rechtsordnung vielfaltigen Problemstoff bieten. Fur die neuen Vertragstypen, die bereits als Teilmenge der nicht gesetzlich kodifizierten Vertrage erkannt worden sind, folgt aus den vorstehenden Uberlegungen, daB sich im Einzelfall durchaus als bloBe Modifikation eines normativen Schuldvertagstypes: Z.B Reisevertrag, Maklervertrag, Arztvertrag.