How Do Influenced Recalls Have Lower Vehicle Owners’ Correction Rates?

배용균 한국응용경제학회 2022 응용경제 Vol.24 No.3

This paper investigates why influenced recalls have lower consumers’ correction rates. Risk from vehicle defects positively affects correction rates, while recall initiation negatively affects them. Furthermore, the risks directly affect the correction rates and indirectly affect them via recall initiation. For our analysis, we use linear regression and probit models to obtain consistent estimators of interest. We find that recalls with riskier defects raise the correction rates, particularly if the consumer recall notification letter contains an alerting expression such as “death,” whereupon the correction rate increases by 10%. We also find that the government often initiates more hazardous recalls. Those influenced recalls are negatively associated with the correction rate because vehicle owners often delay repairs, or their vehicles’ defects are revealed after a long time.

Ex Post Liability, Ex Ante Safety Regulation, and Impending Product Recalls

배용균 한국산업경제학회 2016 산업경제연구 Vol.29 No.1

This paper investigates how potential defects in automobiles lead to vehicle recalls. Using data on vehicle recalls in the United States in 2014, I identifies how vehicle manufacturers make their recall decisions and what factors they consider to issue recalls. Using both a unique data and an empirical model, this paper finds that manufacturers issue recalls when higher expected liability costs are anticipated. In particular, vehicle manufacturers use information on the damages that have occurred in previous accidents reported to either the regulatory agent or themselves. I also find that the regulatory agent’s investigative actions are positively associated with more recall issuance, which implies that their investigative activities send manufacturers a strong message to correct problems, given that recall issuance is basically voluntary. If there is a model change in a new-year model, then there are more recalls during the first year of sales. This shows that it is inevitable for manufacturers to issue more recalls because more defective parts are found in the process of adopting and introducing new features from facing competition in the automobile market. In conclusion, manufacturers, facing severe competition, issue more recalls to avoid expected liability costs from defects.

Can Primary Seat-Belt Laws in the U.S. Alter Drivers' Behavior? : Synthetic Panel Data Analysis

배용균 한국산업경제학회 2014 산업경제연구 Vol.27 No.2

This paper investigates the offsetting effect theory using individual-level accident data to analyze how drivers respond to seat-belt laws. Using synthetic panel data, I find that drivers are more careful when the laws are enforced more strictly, and that careful driving does not necessarily result in more pedestrian involvement in accidents. I also find that the change in the laws results in an increased number of careful drivers and a decreased number of careless drivers in accidents. The results show that the offsetting effects are weaker than expected or may not exist in accidents, and that the laws are effective in reducing accidental harm on the roads.

Consumer Protection and Product Safety Quality under Market Competition

배용균 한국산업경제학회 2014 산업경제연구 Vol.27 No.3

This paper investigates economic outcomes that occurred when firms facing oligopolistic competition sell potentially risky products. I show that a high safety quality firm can earn greater profits when there are substantial safety quality differences among competitors, because the firm with high product safety quality gains a greater demand for its products. By raising the safety quality, the high-safety firm is able to dominate the market and earn greater profits than the low-safety firm. The profitability of the low-safety firm becomes substantially lower because it loses its market share, even though it reduces its safety level to avoid severe price competition. As a result, the market becomes monopolized and consumer welfare decreases when there is no regulation for product safety. Therefore, the existence of potentially risky products in a market justifies governmental regulation to protect consumers and improve their welfare. The regulation must improve safety in the use of products, and also improve competition through antitrust measures.

Do Foreign Vehicle Manufacturers Delay Recalls? The Case of the Korean Car Market

배용균 한국응용경제학회 2018 응용경제 Vol.20 No.4

This paper investigates vehicle manufacturers' recall decisions, and their determinants in Korea. In particular, it identifies why some manufacturers are slow to issue recalls, while others are quicker. We find that vehicle manufacturers make recall decisions based on the degree of risk, expected liability, and recall costs from defective vehicles. We also find that all foreign manufacturers have longer pre-recall periods in the Korean market. They delay their recalls for about one to four years, compared to Korean manufacturers' faster-recalls. European manufacturers do not show any procrastination in the US market, but do in the Korean one; US manufacturers show the same pattern. Korean exporters do not procrastinate in the US market; however, US exporters do in the Korean one, and Japanese manufacturers have longer pre-recall periods in both markets. The fact that emission-related recalls have longer pre-recall periods than safety-related recalls could be indirect evidence on manufacturers' reluctance in recall issuance whenever possible.

Delaying Vehicle Manufacturers' Recall Decisions- Risk, Vehicle, and Manufacturer Attributes

배용균 한국응용경제학회 2016 응용경제 Vol.18 No.4

This paper investigates the determinants of vehicle manufacturers’ decisions on recall timing. In particular, it identifies why some manufacturers delay in issuing recalls, while others issue them fast. This paper finds that the regulator mandates a recall if the recall is delayed. If recall costs are substantial and the defects are hazardous, then the recall is delayed. We also find that manufacturer and vehicle characteristics affect the timing of recall issuance. In particular, Japanese manufacturers tend to delay their recall issuance compared to U.S. manufacturers. Both Korean and European manufacturers are similar to U.S. manufacturers in deciding the recall timing.

자동차 리콜과 시정행위 : 정보전달 메카니즘을 중심으로

배용균 ( Yong-kyun Bae ) 한국경제통상학회 2016 경제연구 Vol.34 No.4

I investigate how effectively recall information on defective vehicles is transmitted from manufacturers to vehicle owners and whether vehicle owners repair defects when the defects are more serious or not. Using data on vehicle recalls in the United States from 2008 to 2012, I find that the severity of the defect has no statistically significant impact on whether people get their cars fixed or not, but the language of the recall notification letter does. I also find that owners show different corrective patterns, depending on their attitudes to risk. Some owners take their corrective actions quickly, once they know that their cars are recalled, regardless of the information conveyed in owner notification letters. On the other hand, others take their actions at later stages of the recall process according to the contexts of the letters. In this sense, vehicle owners are heterogeneous in dealing with risks. The content of the letters plays an important role in increasing correction rates to certain owners. From this finding, I conclude that information transmission to owners regarding recalls should be more clearly regulated, since some drivers respond to the context of the letters, not the actual risks.

고체산화물 연료전지의 동적 응답성 해석

배용균(Yong Gyun Bae),이상혁(Sang Hyeok Lee),윤경중(Kyung Joong Yoon),이종호(Jong Ho Lee),홍종섭(Jong Sup Hong) 대한기계학회 2018 대한기계학회 춘추학술대회 Vol.2018 No.4

수처리 교반기용 프로펠러의 차원 유동 전산 해석 및 성능 특성 분석

배용균(Y.G. Bae),김대한(D.H. Kim),황승태(S.T. Hwang),문영준(Y.J. Moon) 한국전산유체공학회 2015 한국전산유체공학회지 Vol.20 No.1

In this study, the characteristics of water treatment mixer with various propeller profiles are numerically invesitgated. The computation was conducted by solving the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations on unstructured tetrahedral elements with k-ε turbulence model. It was found that the spreading angle and swirl magnitude of the jet are important factors for the mixer efficiency, since they clearly characterize the propeller and the frontal surface area of the propeller but not so much affected by the skew angle if it exceeds 30 degrees. The case1 and case2 models are found to show the best propeller efficiency. The case2 with low blade angle, however, requires the lowest power input for the same discharge capacity as the case1.

강화된 제품안전규제법 하에서 소비자들의 안전감 변화 -안전벨트법의 사례

배용균 ( Yong Kyun Bae ) 한국소비자학회 2014 소비자학연구 Vol.25 No.3

본 연구논문은 미국의 개별소비자 자료를 이용하여 제품안전 규제가 소비자의 행위에 미치는 영향을 연구 하였다. 소비자들이 잠재적으로 위험성이 있는 제품들을 - 이를테면 자동차 - 소비하는 경우, 부상이나 물적 피해를 겪을 수 있다. 이렇게 예상하지 못한 부상으로부터 소비자를 보호하기 위하여, 규제당국은 흔히 안전벨트법과 같은 규제를 시행하고 있다. 과거의 일부 연구 사례 등에 따르면, 안전규제는 소비자들을 잘 보호하지 못한다고 결론을 맺어 왔다. 예를 들어 상쇄행동이론에 따르면, 안전벨트 법에 의하여 소비자들 (운전자들)이 운전 중에 안전벨트를 매게 되면 소비자 자신들은 이전보다 더 안전해 진다고 믿게 된다. 이러한 믿음에 따라 소비자들은 자신들의 제품을 소비하는 데에 (운전하는 데에) 있어서 덜 조심하게 되고, 이는 오히려 보행자가 포함된 사고들을 더 많이 유발할 수 있게 된다. 이러한 경우, 소비자 보호를 위한 안전벨트 규제는 효과적이지 않게 된다는 것이다. 본 논문은 안전규제가 더 강화되면 소비자들은 제품을 더욱 더 조심해서 사용하게 된다는 점을 밝혀내었다. 소비자들이 운전할 때 보이는 주의행위는 보행자 관련사고와는 아무런 관계가 없음도 동시에 밝혔다. 따라서 본 연구결과는 더 강화된 안전규제가 시행된다고 해서 반드시 소비자들이 상쇄행동을 보이는 것은 아니라는 결론에 도달하였다. 이는 상쇄효과이론의 결론과는 배치된다. 본 연구 결과의 의하면, 안전규제가 완화될 경우, 소비자들은 오히려 더 위험한 상황에 이를 수 있다. 본 논문에 따르면, 현재 한국에서 과거의 안전벨트 법과 같이 현재 소비자들의 선택사항인 에어백이라든지, 다른 안전장치들은 향후 선택사항에서 의무사항으로 가야 한다. 이는 소비자들이 운전 시 상쇄행동을 보이지 않기 때문이다. This paper investigates the effects of safety regulation on consumer behavior, using individuallevel data in the U.S. When consumers use potentially risky products, such as vehicles, they may face injuries or damage. In order to protect consumers from unexpected injuries, regulatory agents often enforce safety regulations, such as seatbelt laws. Some previous papers have argued that safety regulation is ineffective in protecting consumers. For instance, according to the offsetting behavior theory, when consumers wear seatbelt because of the seatbelt law, they may feel more secure. This increased sense of security makes them consume (drive) their cars less carefully, causing more pedestrian-involved accidents. If this increased number of pedestrian-involved accidents were equal or greater than the decreased number of driver- and passenger-involved accidents, seatbelt regulation would be ineffective. Using an example of seatbelt regulation, I find that consumers consume their potentially risky products more carefully when more stringent safety regulation is in effect. I also find that careful consumption (driving) is not associated with accidents involving pedestrians. Thus, the results prove that consumers do not show offsetting behavior in consuming their cars when stronger safety regulation is applied on the roads. This is different from what the offsetting effects imply. This paper suggests that road safety measures in Korea, such as airbags, should be mandatory, not optional, like the Korean seatbelt law.