후유장해와 가동능력의 평가 - 대법원 85.9.24 선고, 85다카 449 판결 -

박찬주 한국사법행정학회 1985 사법행정 Vol.26 No.11

인공지능 / CRM : 고객가치(Customer Value) 산정 방법론에 관한 연구

박찬주,박윤선 대한산업공학회 2002 대한산업공학회 추계학술대회논문집 Vol.2002 No.-

다수결원칙의 근거와 가중다수결 근거규정에 대한 축소헌법해석의 당위성

박찬주 헌법재판소 2019 헌법논총 Vol.30 No.-

The social contract theories provide the clues about the decision-making forms such as unanimity, bare majority and qualified majority. The main discussion of this essay is about the unavoidability of constitutional restrictive interpretation of the ground provision on qualified majority i.e., the Article 49 of the Constitution. Without such restrictive interpretation, the qualified majority system inevitably collides with the proposition of 「Parliament cannot bind its successors」. The National Assembly constituted through the general election enjoys the full and intact powers conferred by the Constitution. Such powers cannot be violated even by the prior Assembly. The Article 49 is the ground provision on the qualified majority. Korea is an almost unique country admitting the introduction of qualified majority through the statute laws. Furthermore, the bills scheduled for voting are not confined to the statute bills. A lot of non-statute bills are submitted making use of the said Article. The effect of the predecessor Assembly’s resolution on the non-statute bills has presumably indirect force on the successor Assemblies. If the successor Assemblies do not wish to accommodate the force of the predecessor Assembly’s resolution, they can neglect the force even without adopting opposing resolutions. In this meaning, the force of any resolution reaches only to the end of the Assembly of the day. With the statute bills unrelated to qualified majority, no reference is necessary to the binding force, as the successor Assemblies can amend or repeal the qualified-majority-related bills in accordance with the majority rule. Nevertheless, the binding force of the statute laws concerning qualified majority influences on the successor Assemblies, if we cannot root out the unconstitutionality through restrictive interpretation. Such problem does not arise in the countries the constitutions of which do not admit the introduction of qualified majority. With this construction, even where qualified majority is prescribed by the prior Assembly as necessary for repealing the qualified majority provision, successor Assemblies can repeal by the bare majority. And such repeal should not be the subject of presidential veto. 사회계약이론은 만장일치제, 과반수다수결원칙 및 가중다수결제도에 대한 논의의 단초를 제공하고 있다. 이 글에서의 주된 논의는 가중다수결제도에 대한 축소헌법해석의 당위성이다. 축소해석헌법을 하지 아니하는 경우에는 가중다수결제도는 의회는 자신의 계승자를 구속하지 못한다 라는 명제와 충돌할 수밖에 없다. 총선거를 통하여 새로 구성되는 국회는 임기 내에는 헌법상의 온전한 권한을 가지며 선임국회가 침해할 수 없다. 제정법을 통한 가중다수결제도의 도입을 허용하는 국가는 사실상 우리나라가 유일하다. 가중다수결 근거규정인 헌법 제49조 전문에서는 의결의 대상인 의안을 「법률안」에 국한하지 아니하고 각종 「결의안」을 포함하고 있다. 「법률안」을 제외한 결의안들은 결의의 효력이 결의국회의 계승자인 후임국회에게 미치는 효력은 간접적이다. 후임국회가 결의의 효력을 받아들이고 싶지 아니하는 경우에는 이를 무시하면 되며 반드시 반대결의를 할 필요도 없다. 결의의 효력은 결의를 한 국회에만 미친다. 「법률안」이라고 하더라도 가중다수결과 무관한 경우에는 후임국회에서 통상적인 입법절차에 따라 폐지하면 되기 때문에 구속력을 논할 필요가 없다. 그러나 가중다수결과 관련된 「법률」의 경우에는 「축소헌법해석」을 하여 위헌성을 제거하지 아니하는 한 구속력이 후임국회에도 미친다. 헌법에서 제정법을 통한 가중다수결제도의 도입을 규정하지 아니하는 나라에서는 이런 문제가 발생하지 아니한다. 제정법상의 가중다수결규정의 폐지에 가중다수결을 필요로 한다고 규정하든 아니하든 후임국희는 과반수다수결로 가중다수결규정을 폐지할 수 있고, 대통령의 거부권행사의 대상이 되어서도 아니 된다.

학교 육성회 운영의 활성화

박찬주 대한사립학교장회(구 대한사립중고등학교장회) 1993 私學 Vol.65 No.-

토론종결과 가중다수결

박찬주 대한변호사협회 2012 人權과 正義 : 大韓辯護士協會誌 Vol.- No.428

지난 2012. 5. 29. 임기가 끝난 18대 국회에서 개정된 국회법에서는 filibuster의 허용과 이에대한 토론종결제도를 도입하였는데, 토론종결이 이루어지기 위해서는 재적의원 5분의 3 이상이라는 가중정족수의 찬성을 필요로 하고 있다. 이는 단순과반수의 원칙에서 이탈한 것으로서 미국상원규칙Rule ⅩⅩⅡ의 영향을 받은 것이다. Rule ⅩⅩⅡ에 대하여는 미국헌법학계에서도 위헌논란이 있으며, 위헌론이 보다 우세하다고 할 수 있다. 그렇다면 이러한 위헌논란은 동 Rule ⅩⅩⅡ를 계수한 우리나라 국회법과 관련하여서도 이어질 수 있다. 그러나 우리나라에서 가중정족수제도의 위헌성을 논의하는데 있어서는 대한민국헌법과 미국연방헌법의 규정내용의 차이, 그리고 우리나라에서는 가중정족수제도를 국회법의 개정을 통해 도입하고 있는데비해 미국에서는 상원규칙을 통해 도입하고 있다는 점을 세심하게 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 이러한 관점에서 이 글에서는 먼저 미국에서 Rule ⅩⅩⅡ에 대한 위헌성 논의를 ① 연방헌법에서 단순다수결을 선언하는 규정을 두지 아니하고 있는 것을 어떻게 보아야 할 것인가, ② 연방헌법이 규정하는 이송조항과 의사규칙조항의 성격은 무엇인가, ③ 선임의회가 후임의회의 입법권을 제한하는 의사규칙을 제정할 수있는가, ④ 투표가치 등가성의 원칙이 Rule ⅩⅩⅡ의 위헌성 논의에 어떠한 영향을 미칠 것인가, ⑤ Rule ⅩⅩⅡ이 합헌이라는 점에 대하여 헌법적 관행이 확립되었다고 볼 수 있는가 라는 점으로 세분하여 살펴보고 나아가 우리나라 개정국회법의 위헌성을 논하였다. 필자가 주장하는 주요 논점 가운데 몇 가지는 ① 대한민국헌법 제49조에서는 단순과반수의 원칙을선언하고 있으며 명문으로 단순과반수의 원칙을 선언하지 않고 있는 미국연방헌법과는 다르다는 점,대한민국헌법 제49조에서 규정하는 「법률에 특별한 규정이 없는 한」이라는 부분의 「법률」에는 「국회법」이 포함되지 아니한다는 점, ② 가중다수결제도의 도입은 국회의 입법권을 유명무실하게 할 위험성이 존재한다는 점, ③ Blackstone의 명제, 즉 「후임의회의 권한을 손상시키는 의회의 행위는 구속력을발생시키지 않는다」는 명제는 우리나라에서도 타당하며, 국회법을 통한 가중다수결제도의 도입은 후임국회의 입법권을 제한하기 때문에 허용되지 아니한다는 점, ④ 대한민국헌법 제64조 제1항은 「국회는법률에 저촉되지 아니한 범위 안에서 의사와 내부규율에 관한 규칙을 제정할 수 있다」고 규정하는데,이는 국회가 「의사」와 「내부규율」을 제정함에 있어서 「법률」 특히 「국회법」의 위임이 있어야 하는 것이 아니라 그러한 위임이 없더라도 제정할 수 있으며, 이것이 헌법 제64조 제1항의 취지이다, 따라서가중다수결제도를 국회법을 통해 도입한 것은 헌법 제64조 제1항에도 위반하다는 점등이다. 이러한 주장을 배경으로 필자는 개정국회법의 해당규정의 위헌을 주장하는데, 필자의 주장을 펼침에 있어서 대법원 1971. 6. 22. 선고 70다1010 전원합의체판결의 큰 영향을 받고 있다. The newly repealed National Assembly Act by the 18th Assembly the term of which expired on 29. May 2012 introduces the unlimited debate (filibuster) and cloture institution for ending filibuster. But the Law requires the approval of three-fifth or more of the members of the National Assembly duly chosen and sworn. We call this sort of increased majority as supermajority. The Origin of the Law is Rule ⅩⅩⅡ of US Senate Rule. But, as supermajority rule deviates from simple majority rule, there are heated debates between American constitutional scholars about unconstitutionality of Rule ⅩⅩⅡ and the pro-unconstitutional scholars are getting the better of the debates. Under these circumstances, aupermajority requirement for cloture of the repealed National Assembly Act cannot avoid the debates about it’s unconstitutionality. In debating unconstitutionality of supermajority requirement for cloturet, we must pay close attention to the differences of the provisions between Constitution of the Republic of Korea and Constitution of the United states, and the different style of introduction of cloture institution between Korean Assemly and the US Senate. Korean Assembly introduced it by the statute, but US Senate introduced it by the rule. For these reasons, the writer approaches the unconstitutionality debates of the supermajority requirement as following : the writer itemizes prevailing points between American constitutional scholars at first, and the peculiar characters of the related provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the National Assembly Act compared with the Constitution of the United States and Senate Rule ⅩⅩⅡ as a middle stage, and unconstitutionality of the supermajority requirement. Itemized points of the american unconstitutionality debates are as following : ① How can we approach the attitude of american Constitution which does not enact the rule of majority whether of simple or super? ② How can we define the characters of the Presentment Clause and Rules of Proceeding Clause of the Constitution of the United States? ③ Can the present Senate can make rules of proceeding which can bind the future Senate? ④ Does the rule of equal value of vote have effects on the debates about unconstitutionality of supermajority requirement? ⑤ Can we regard the practices or conventions as being established from constitutional view?Several points among the writer alleges are as following : ① Article 49 of the Constitution of the republic of Korea declares majority rule, and this attitude differs from the Constitution of the United States which does not have ostensible provision, and the notion of 「Act」 forming the part of 「except as otherwise provides for … in Act」 in the Article 49 does not contain National Assembly Act, ② By the introduction of supermajority rule, there exists constant possibility of making the power of National Assembly illusory, ③ The postulate of Blackstone, the act of present legislature injuring the power of future legislature cannot bind the future legislature,1) is appropriate for our National Assembly, ④ The Article 64 (1) provides as 「The National Assembly may establish the rules of its proceedings and internal regulations. Provided, that they are not in conflict with Act.」. But it does not connote that National Assembly shall not make rules without delegation of Act, especially delegation of National Assembly Act. Instead, it connotes that National Assembly may make rules without that sort of delegation provided that they are not in conflict with Act. In this respect, introduction through National Assembly Act contravenes the Article 64(1)of the Constitution. In furthering the writer’s allegations, the writer pays great attention to Full Bench judgment of Supreme Court adjudicated on 22 May, 1971 (case number 70 da 1010).

[기억하고 기록하며] 당신의 기억을 글로 남기세요

박찬주 샘터사 2000 월간 샘터 Vol.31 No.7

위헌결정과 소급효

박찬주 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2011 서울법학 Vol.19 No.1

The main points the writer asserts in this essay are as following. First, the extent of retroactivity conferred by the Supreme Court is considerably broader than that conferred by the Constitutional Court, and such disparity brings about the necessity of admitting the binding force of decision on constitutionality and its indispensable reasonings. Second, the writer points the disparity between the degree of unconstitutionality and the extent of retroactivity. The degree of unconstitutionality of decision on simple unconstitutionality is much powerful compared to that of decision on unconformity to constitution. The main sentence of §47 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act only admits ex-nunc effect (prospective effect) to a decision on simple unconstitutionality, so ex-tunc effect (retroactive effect) is only admitted by the precedents of the Constitutional Court or the Supreme court. But majority scholars and the large part of the precedents assert the newly enacted laws be applied under the name of betterment laws. This approach confers much powerful ex-tunc effect on the decision of unconformity to constitution. For this disparity, the writer asserts that the courts should apply the former laws adjudicated as unconformable instead of newly enacted laws unless adjudicated to apply newly enacted laws in the decision on unconformity to constitution. Third, the Constitutional Court should decide whether the retroactivity is conferred or its extent when conferring retroactivity in the light of the sovereign entity of making Constitution. The main points the writer asserts in this essay are as following. First, the extent of retroactivity conferred by the Supreme Court is considerably broader than that conferred by the Constitutional Court, and such disparity brings about the necessity of admitting the binding force of decision on constitutionality and its indispensable reasonings. Second, the writer points the disparity between the degree of unconstitutionality and the extent of retroactivity. The degree of unconstitutionality of decision on simple unconstitutionality is much powerful compared to that of decision on unconformity to constitution. The main sentence of §47 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act only admits ex-nunc effect (prospective effect) to a decision on simple unconstitutionality, so ex-tunc effect (retroactive effect) is only admitted by the precedents of the Constitutional Court or the Supreme court. But majority scholars and the large part of the precedents assert the newly enacted laws be applied under the name of betterment laws. This approach confers much powerful ex-tunc effect on the decision of unconformity to constitution. For this disparity, the writer asserts that the courts should apply the former laws adjudicated as unconformable instead of newly enacted laws unless adjudicated to apply newly enacted laws in the decision on unconformity to constitution. Third, the Constitutional Court should decide whether the retroactivity is conferred or its extent when conferring retroactivity in the light of the sovereign entity of making Constitution.

교육 개혁과 중등사학 육성

박찬주 대한사립학교장회(구 대한사립중고등학교장회) 1996 私學 Vol.77 No.-

실업교육 활성화와 실업계 고교

박찬주 대한사립학교장회(구 대한사립중고등학교장회) 1998 私學 Vol.85 No.-

기동특성에 따른 ARS 자세 성능향상 기법

박찬주,이상정,Park, Chan-Ju,Lee, Sang-Jeong 한국군사과학기술학회 2008 한국군사과학기술학회지 Vol.11 No.6

The ARS(Attitude Reference System) calculates an attitude of a vehicle using inertial angular rate sensors and acceleration sensors. The attitude error of ARS increases due to the integration of angular rate sensor output. To reduce the attitude error an acceleration of sensor is used similar to leveling method of INS(Inertial Navigation System). When an acceleration of vehicle is increased, it is difficult to calculate the attitude error using acceleration sensor output. In this paper the estimation method of acceleration due to the attitude error only is proposed. Two methods of the attitude calculation depending on vehicle dynamics and the integration method of these two methods are proposed. To verify its performance the monte carlo simulation is performed and shows that it bounds attitude error of ARS to reasonable level.