기업결합규제에서의 구제조치

박병형 ( Byong Hyong Bahk ) 한국산업조직학회 2006 産業組織硏究 Vol.14 No.1

경상논총 : 독일 조합은행의 발전과정과 의미

박병형 ( Byong Hyong Bahk ),정남기 ( Nam Ki Chung ) 한독경상학회 2014 經商論叢 Vol.32 No.3

이 연구에서는 독일의 주요 서민금융기관 중 하나인 조합은행을 Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken을 중심으로 살펴보며, 한국의 유사한 조합형 서민금융기관과 비교분석하였다. 연구의 결론은 독일의 서민형 조합은행과 한국의 서민금융기관은 모두 서민금융기관들이 공통적으로 지니는 특성인 빈곤대처, 지역주의, 평등, 상호부조 등을 성격을 지니고 있다. 차이점은 자발성과 정부의 업무규제 범위인데, 이는 역사적 배경과 역량차이에서 비롯된다. 이러한 차이점으로 인해 결론적으로는 독일의 서민형 조합은행은 대형겸업은행으로 성장하여 서민이 어려울때 우산이 되어 주는 역할을 잘 수행하며 점점 그 비중을 확대하고 있는데 반해, 한국의 서민 금융기관들은 그 역할이 점점 축소되면서 서민과 서민금융기관 상호간 외면하는 현상이 벌어지고 있다. 이에 서민금융기관들이 그 역할을 강화하기 위해서는 정부의 적절한 지원정책이 필요하며, 서민금융기관 스스로도 서민을 위한 우산이 되고자 하는 의지와 노력이 있어야 한다. 특히 서민을 위한 상품개발을 위해 지속적인 노력을 해서 서민을 위한 금융기관이라는 인식을 서민들이 갖도록 하여야 서민금융기관이 그 역할을 제대로 수행할 수 있다. 이 연구의 한계점은 독일의 조합형 서민금융기관과 한국의 서민금융기관을 직접적으로 비교하기에는 양국의 역사와 사회·문화·경제적 체계가 많이 다르다는 것이다. 즉 독일 서민금융시스템의 장점이 한국에서도 장점이 될 수 있다고 말할 수 없다. In dieser Studie wurde deutsche Genossenschaftsbanken analysiert, die wichtigen Finanzinstituten fur Kleinburger in Deutschland sind. Genossenschaftsbanken sind spezialisierte Banken fur bestimmte Gesellschaften und arbeiten zur Vebesserung der Gesellschaften oder ihrer Industriebereichen. Und zur Zeit wird der Marktanteil der Genossenschaftsbanken immer goßer. Es gibt verschiedende Arten der Genossenschaftsbanken in Deutschland wie Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken, die die Kleinburger finanzieren, Sparda-Bank, GLS Bank, Deutsche Apotheker- und Arztebank, PSD Banken usw.. Und Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken arbeitet als Dachorganisation verschiedender Genossenschaftsbanken. Solche Finanzinstituten wie die deutschen Genossenschaftsbanken, die sich im bestimmten Breich konzentrieren konnen, beitragen zur Entwicklung der angehorigen Industrie. Dafur ist das Willen der Regierung wichtig. Zum Beispiel fordert die Bundesregierung GLS Bank, um die Finanzbereich fur Kleinburger anzukurbeln, als scih die GLS Bank fur Mikrodarlehen interessiert haben. Also die Bundesregierung forderte die GLS Bank, um die Finanzbereich fur Kleinburger anzukurbeln. Ein Erfolgsfaktor der Genossenschaftsbanken ist eine starke Bindung unter Gesellschaftern. Im Hintergrund der starken Bindung liegen diverse Finanzdienstleistungen, die zur Festhaltung der Gesellschaftern dienen. Dadurch konnten Genossenschaftsbanken ihren Kundenbasis sichern. Auch die Genossenschaftsbanken haben wie den Wunsch der Regierung im speziellen Bereich sich gut entwickelt, so daß die Kleinbuger und Mittelstands relativ reibunglos finanzieren konnen. Zurzeit sind die Genossenschaftsbanken als Universalbank gewachsen. Dieses PhAnomen ist ganz anders als koreanische Situation, in der die Finanzinstituten fur Kleinburger im GeschAftsbereich stArker als die normalen kommerziellen Banken reguliert sind. Ein anderer Erfolgsfaktor ist, daß die Gesellschaftern die politischen und Wirtschaftlichen Standpunkte ihrer Gesellschaftern igut vertretet haben, damit sie Vertrauen von ihren Kunden kriegen konnten. Wenn die koreanische Regierung auch die Ankurbelung des Finanzbereichs fur Kleinburger mochten, mussen ein Forderungssystem zu den Finanzinstituten fur speziellen Bereich, insbesondere Kleinburger anbauen. Finanzdienstleistung fur Kleinburger begleitet Hochrisiko. Daher braucht eine Risikokompensation, damit die Finanzinstitute fur die Kleinburger arbeiten konnen. In anderer Seite mussen die Finanzinstitute diejenige Finanzprodukte entwickeln, die die finanzielle Nachfrage der Kleinburger befridigen.

일반 논문 : 기업형수퍼마켓 규제와 경쟁정책

박병형 ( Byong Hyong Bahk ) 한국중소기업학회 2012 中小企業硏究 Vol.34 No.1

이 글은 중소사업자 보호가 경쟁정책에서 어떤 경제적 근거를 가질 수 있는지를 검토하고, 이런 시각에서 최근 시행된 기업형수퍼마켓(SSM) 규제에 관해 살펴본다. SSM 규제의 핵심은 진입제한에 있으며 따라서 일견 반경쟁적이다. 경쟁정책은 ``경쟁자가 아니라 경쟁을 보호한다``는 말은 흔히 인용되는 바이지만 경쟁의 장이 항상 이상적으로 평평한 것은 아니다. 경쟁법의 일부는 어떤 기업을 다른 기업의 남용행위로부터 보호하는데 관한 것이다. 오늘날 경쟁정책은 대체로 소비자후생을 추구하고 있는데, 그렇다면 그것은 (준)빠레또기준에 입각하고 있는 것으로 해석될 수 있다. 이런 관점에서 본다면 중소사업자 보호가 전통적인 경쟁정책과 반드시 상충하는 것은 아니라고 하겠다. 즉 SSM 규제는 중소유통업에 대한 진흥 및 지원 정책에 대한 보완수단으로 이해될 수 있을 것이다. SSM 규제의 현황을 간략히 정리하고 이에 관한 다양한 찬반론들을 비판적으로 검토한 다음, 예상되는 정책효과 및 부작용들, 그리고 개선방향 등을 제시하였다. This paper attempts to suggest some economic rationale of protecting small business in competition policy and, in this context, assesses the regulation against SSM (super supermarkets) openings, which has recently been legislated in Korea. Modern competition policy is mostly enforced along the objective of securing consumer welfare. But the competition policy in America or the European Union was born with multiple, and sometimes contradictory, goals. The Sherman Act in America, for instance, was allegedly ``special interest legislation, and the principal protected class was small business.`` And in the European competition law, protection of competitors has been included in its objective, too. Though people seem to routinely remark that competition policy pursues economic efficiencies, it is quite a recent case. It is often necessary to protect ``competitors`` in order to protect ``competition`` or competitive process itself, not least because competition does not always take place in a ``level field.`` Competition in actuality may not always be competition ``on the merit,`` i.e. ``fair`` competition. Competition policy can actively intervene and protect weak, small businesses in some asymmetric market conditions. In this perspective, protection of small business may not necessarily conflict with promotion of consumer welfare as the legitimate goal. It is frequently disputed whether what competition policy is supposed to pursue is consumer welfare or allocative efficiency. This is whether to aim at consumer`s surplus in particular or total surplus (producer`s surplus added) as a whole. Protecting consumer welfare can be interpreted as a (quasi-) Pareto welfare criterion whereas pursuing total surplus implies the Kaldor-Hicks (compensation) criterion. Though there are some persuasive economic cases for the total surplus goal, competition authorities in many countries tend to (at least implicitly) choose the consumer welfare goal in practice. Thus it can be argued that competition policy as usually enforced is based on a Pareto welfare criterion, which means losers should not be entailed or should be adequately compensated for a business action to be allowed or a change to be implemented. Meanwhile, when there is conflict of interests between consumers and producers, there are quite strong cases for the priority of consumers. The case for free trade for instance can also be understood as based on a Pareto criterion in practice, though it corresponds to a Kaldor-Hicks criterion in the literal sense. Whatever disputes it may cause in theory, in practice any policy change might be hard to justify or cannot be realized without some adequate compensation for those thereby harmed. The SSM regulation is a ``business coordination`` scheme to restrict or prohibit store opening by large retail firms in a designated area. The only purpose of the scheme is to protect small incumbent retailers. It is an entry restriction in essence and might cause consumer harm, and is thus prima facie anticompetitive. As with the case for free trade, however, it can be argued that the regulation could only be revoked on the precondition of some compensating measures. Actually a specific, direct compensation toward small retail businesses would be almost impossible to arrange, and the compensation schemes usually take the form of a support or promotion policy. But such indirect compensation schemes tend to be limited in scope or quite ineffective. The SSM regulation may be rationalized as a supplementary measure to those indirect schemes. In sum, the SSM regulation as a business coordination scheme, possibly anticompetitive, can be considered as a practical, temporary device to supplement the required compensation for the damage to small retail business. We need to briefly overview the current state of SSM regulation and the relevant experience of foreign countries. SSM may be roughly defined as a medium-sized supermarket owned and operated by a large retail firm. They have almost quadrupled in number during the recent decade. In early 2010 numerous bills calling for SSM regulation were proposed in the parliament, and the so-called ``twin laws`` were legislated as substantial amendments to the relevant Acts in November 2010. Formally a mandated arbitration procedures as it is, the regulation would very probably work as an entry restriction. Major countries also have similar experience in the conflict between small incumbent retailers and large incoming retail firms. In Europe in particular, entry by large discount retailers has been regulated with a view of protecting small business, apparently in the form of urban planning. Since the 1990s, however, along the market opening trend under the WTO system, direct schemes for small business protection have been abolished or weakened in most developed countries. There have been heated disputes on SSM regulation, and the main points of the pros and cons are summarized and critically reviewed. First, the core case for regulation is the necessity of protecting small business. Whatever is the normative position, any social change may not secure enough support without adequate concern for the underdog in the change. SSM regulation, though anticompetitive in itself, can be taken as a practical, temporary supplement to compensate the damage done to small retailers. Some people worry that local markets will be monopolized by SSMs. But such a result seems a quite remote possibility, and consumer choices could be enlarged rather than curtailed. As for the competitiveness of the retail industry, though it is argued regulation can have a positive effect, that is not so convincing. Entry regulations mostly tend to induce inefficiency and thereby reduce business competitiveness. There is the unconstitutionality issue, too, which looks somewhat far-fetched. Finally, those arguing against regulation fear the bursting of trade conflict, specifically the potential infringement of the GATS provisions. Such a problem may be technically possible, but practically not so plausible given the current situation in many European countries. In concluding remarks, the expected effectiveness and the unintended consequences of regulation are addressed. It is far from clear what consequences SSM regulation as a business coordination scheme will have and how effective it will turn out. Given the present conditions and policy environment, it seems that regulation may not have a significant effect in the long run, which is confirmed by the experience of foreign countries. Potentially serious problems are the uncertainty that regulation inevitably involves and the wrong signals it can transmit to small business in general. And regulation will lead to a perverse result that it effectively protects the incumbent SSMs from the further entry by other SSMs. The scheme needs to be limited temporally as well as spatially. It is advisable for the competition authority to have some role as the advocate for consumer welfare in the business coordination procedure, and try to restrain the potential anticompetitive effect of the regulation. The discussion so far is not only specific to the SSM regulation, but extended to retail markets in general. Changes will incessantly occur and what follows could be viewed as an ongoing restructuring process rather than a problem of conflict from a dichotomous perspective.

브라질 수출가공지역내 중소기업 활성화 방안에 대한 연구

박병형 ( Byong Hyong Bahk ),정남기 ( Namki Chung ) 한국질서경제학회 2014 질서경제저널 Vol.17 No.1

This study surveys the SME sector in Brazil and investigates the Brazilian government policies to support its SMEs. Brazil’s SME sector may not be regarded as well-developed, which is primarily due to heavy taxation and high interest rates as well as weak basis of the manufacturing industry. The Brazilian government, however, started to have interest in SMEs from the 1970’s. And since the 1990’s, it has actively attempted the promotion initiatives for SMEs. Now, it may be said to have the quite extensive system in place to enforce various support polices for SMEs. Though high taxes and tight financial conditions are still barriers to unhindered growth of SMEs, Brazil’s rate of business start-ups is one of the highest in the world. The government must take due care to sustain such start-up fever in the country. It has to keep it in mind that its SMEs are in a relatively disadvantageous position as noted above. Specifically, it has to provide adequate financial support, including tax benefits to the exporting SMEs in EPZ in particular.

企業結合規制에서의 進入條件 분석

박병형 東亞大學校 大學院 2000 大學院論文集 Vol.25 No.-

Entry analysis, though it is one of the most important steps in the enforcement of merger regulation along with the measurement of market concentration, has played a relatively limited role in policy implementation. This is partly due to inadequate understanding about the critical role that entry plays in protecting competitive process in the market. Most significantly, it is crucial to examine entry conditions from the viewpoint of sunk costs in the proposed merger plans. And it should be emphasized that when concluding whether entry is easy or difficult, we have to consider not just the costs of entry investmemt but its expected profitability as well. In many cases, it is not capital requirements or economies of scale but legal, or de facto, government regulations that deters entry investments. This paper discusses the meaning of entry conditions, and provides a systematic framework for entry analysis in practical implementation of merger regulation.

암묵적 담합의 경제이론과 경쟁정책

박병형 한국산업조직학회 1996 産業組織硏究 Vol.4 No.1

構造主義的 競爭政策의 摸索

朴炳亨 東亞大學校 1997 東亞論叢 Vol.34 No.-

This paper argues that structural approaches for competition policy should be resurrected attain policy goals such as pursuit for consumer welfare. Discussing several key factors for the decision about whether to intervene or not, some practical three-step framework for policy action is Effective policy measures are also examined. Basic framework for policy action is: ①determination for policy concern (perpetuation of monopolistic market structure plus excessive level of profit rates and/or significant price differentials between home market and abroad); ②examination into the sources of problems (entry barriers, among others), institutional and behavioral; ③enforcement of practical policy measures.