New Russian Policy towards East Asia Under Medvedev’s Presidency

바실리 미카예프 (사) 한국전략문제연구소 2008 전략연구 Vol.- No.43

The conceptual philosophy of power-transition process in Russia from Putin to Medvedev is continuity of policy. It is more related to domestic policy where Putin, on the eve of his resignation, succeeded in introducing a three-year budget plan and a number of long-term economic, energy and social programs. Nevertheless, the philosophy of policy-continuity will cover Russian foreign diplomacy as well. In regard to East Asia, it means that Medvedev will have to follow Putin’s course on, slowly but truly, paying more attention to the region. However, as Putin failed to present a comprehensive strategy of Russia–East Asia relationship, Medvedev will have to do this job by himself. A few more factors will push Medvedev to introduce diplomacy innovations towards East Asia. Firstly, as new President, Medvedev will have to say his own word in Russian policy, including the foreign policy. Russian and international communities are expecting that Medvedev will make Russian domestic policy more liberal and Russian foreign policy – more cooperative towards the USA and Western countries. Secondly, economic and political situation in East Asia is developing very quickly presenting to Russia new risks, challenges and opportunities to which new Russian President will have to respond in one way or another. Russia will have to adjust its policy to rapid rise of China and to look for opportunities how to enter East Asian energy market and how to use East Asian economic integration potential in order to develop Russian depopulated and low-developed Far Eastern regions. Thirdly, the APEC Summit in 2012 will take place in Russia (Vladivostok) – pushing Russian leaders to think over what new ideas of regional development and integration Russia could have worked out. In one of his pre-elections’ speeches, Medvedev stressed the importance of Russia’s “multi-vector diplomacy”, including the West, East Asia, as well as, Africa, Latin America, etc. However, it will not be an easy job. The problem, which Medvedev succeeds from Putin, is that Russia, in its national development strategy, is barely implementing the East Asian factor. Although Russia has stepped up its military and political presence in East Asia, it has not yet gained the required levels of influence in the region; it fails to take into account the geopolitical changes there, while it views the changing situation in a simplified, outdated way: through the prism of its rivalry with the United States. In the economic realm, despite Russia’s energy companies’ increased interest in East Asia, the major changes taking place in the region’s economy have not yet prompted the Russian government to include East Asia in a list of strategic goals for the Russian economy. Russia does not take into account its geo-economic position as a bridge between the European and East Asian integration zones. Russia’s economic strategy lacks “spatial economic thinking” that would enable it to see the problems of the depressive regions in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East in a cross-national, “natural,” geo-economic context, rather than within the narrow framework of state borders. Also lacking is a “two-vector” development model that would allow for the orientation of the Russian economy, extended in space, toward parallel integrative interaction with the European Union and East Asia. By 2020, these shortcomings in Russia’s vision of its place in the East Asian region may result in missed economic gains, not to mention political troubles. Irrespective of Moscow’s reaction, East Asia’s dynamic and intricate development will objectively have an increasing influence on the development of Russia. This will affect, first of all, its East Siberian and Far Eastern regions, causing Russia, under new President Medvedev, not only to adapt to challenges and opportunities coming from East Asia, but also to look for mechanisms to influence the region in a way advan... The conceptual philosophy of power-transition process in Russia from Putin to Medvedev is continuity of policy. It is more related to domestic policy where Putin, on the eve of his resignation, succeeded in introducing a three-year budget plan and a number of long-term economic, energy and social programs. Nevertheless, the philosophy of policy-continuity will cover Russian foreign diplomacy as well. In regard to East Asia, it means that Medvedev will have to follow Putin’s course on, slowly but truly, paying more attention to the region. However, as Putin failed to present a comprehensive strategy of Russia–East Asia relationship, Medvedev will have to do this job by himself. A few more factors will push Medvedev to introduce diplomacy innovations towards East Asia. Firstly, as new President, Medvedev will have to say his own word in Russian policy, including the foreign policy. Russian and international communities are expecting that Medvedev will make Russian domestic policy more liberal and Russian foreign policy – more cooperative towards the USA and Western countries. Secondly, economic and political situation in East Asia is developing very quickly presenting to Russia new risks, challenges and opportunities to which new Russian President will have to respond in one way or another. Russia will have to adjust its policy to rapid rise of China and to look for opportunities how to enter East Asian energy market and how to use East Asian economic integration potential in order to develop Russian depopulated and low-developed Far Eastern regions. Thirdly, the APEC Summit in 2012 will take place in Russia (Vladivostok) – pushing Russian leaders to think over what new ideas of regional development and integration Russia could have worked out. In one of his pre-elections’ speeches, Medvedev stressed the importance of Russia’s “multi-vector diplomacy”, including the West, East Asia, as well as, Africa, Latin America, etc. However, it will not be an easy job. The problem, which Medvedev succeeds from Putin, is that Russia, in its national development strategy, is barely implementing the East Asian factor. Although Russia has stepped up its military and political presence in East Asia, it has not yet gained the required levels of influence in the region; it fails to take into account the geopolitical changes there, while it views the changing situation in a simplified, outdated way: through the prism of its rivalry with the United States. In the economic realm, despite Russia’s energy companies’ increased interest in East Asia, the major changes taking place in the region’s economy have not yet prompted the Russian government to include East Asia in a list of strategic goals for the Russian economy. Russia does not take into account its geo-economic position as a bridge between the European and East Asian integration zones. Russia’s economic strategy lacks “spatial economic thinking” that would enable it to see the problems of the depressive regions in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East in a cross-national, “natural,” geo-economic context, rather than within the narrow framework of state borders. Also lacking is a “two-vector” development model that would allow for the orientation of the Russian economy, extended in space, toward parallel integrative interaction with the European Union and East Asia. By 2020, these shortcomings in Russia’s vision of its place in the East Asian region may result in missed economic gains, not to mention political troubles. Irrespective of Moscow’s reaction, East Asia’s dynamic and intricate development will objectively have an increasing influence on the development of Russia. This will affect, first of all, its East Siberian and Far Eastern regions, causing Russia, under new President Medvedev, not only to adapt to challenges and opportunities coming from East Asia, but also to look for mechanisms to influence the region in a way advantageous t...

The North-South Korean Basic Agreement of 1992 and Russia-North Korea Relations

바실리 미카예프 신아시아연구소 2010 신아세아 Vol.17 No.1

The paper deals with two issues: The author’s approach to the Basic Agreement and analysis of Russia – North Korea relations. The author defends two points. First, the central problem in evaluating of the meaning of the Basic Agreement is that the previous conceptual basis for the Agreement – “One country – two systems” – was meaningful only in the Cold War period. The logic behind its existence was provided by the geopolitical rivalry between the USSR and the US. Nowadays the world is totally different as the market democracy has proved to be much more viable vis-à-vis the administrative command system. Under these circumstances, a completely new formula for the inter-Korean dialogue should be elaborated: Two countries (until the unification) – one system as a vital prerequisite for any kind of progress. Second, Medvedev’s policy towards North Korea seems to be tougher than it was before. Medvedev clearly expressed his vision that “nuclear North Korea is absolutely unacceptable” after the North Korean nuclear test in 2009. The Russian military, on the eve of the North’s missile test, clearly said that they “will do their best in order to protect Russian territory from accidental missile attack”. Last August, Russian chief of staff Gen. Makarov said officially that Russia “deployed antimissile C-400 complex in the Far East in order to prevent North Korean attack”.