完全持株會社의 設立 및 運用

노혁준(Hyeok-Joon Rho) 한국비교사법학회 2004 比較私法 Vol.11 No.1

Many Korean companies including LG Corp., and Pulmuone Corp. have transformed into a holding company structure and others are seriously considering the creation of a holding company, after the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act permits the establishment of a pure holding company in 1999. The Act requires a holding company to own only 30%-50% shares of its subsidiary. Most of American or European holding companies, however, own all of subsidiaries' shares, so that they can control subsidiaries without any interference from minority shareholders. Recently, as the Korean courts emphasize rights of minority shareholders, many Korean companies are interested in a holding company that owns 100% of its subsidiary's share. If there are minor shareholders who are not willing to transfer their shares in a target company, an acquiring company should freeze out minority shareholders to take all of target company's share. Some foreign corporate laws have legal devices to achieve this goal. In Germany, provided that a holding company has 95% or more of its subsidiary's shares and shareholder's meetings of both holding company and its subsidiary approve Eingliederung, a holding company can freeze out minor shareholders under proper compensation. Under the Compusory Acquision in the United Kingdom, a holding company, who has successfully obtained 90% or more of target company's shares through tender offer, can obtain the rest of the shares at the same condition suggested in the tender offer. American corporations are able to take all of their subsidiaries' shares through Triangular Merger or Compulsory Share Exchange etc., as well. Under Korean corporate law, a company("A") who wants to obtain all shares of a target company("B") either directly or by establishing a new company, can use several methods : (i) the Comprehensive Share Exchange which was used in the creation of Dongwon Financial Holdings, and (ii) the mutual Comprehensive Share Transfer which was used in the creation of Shinhan Financial Holdings. If A is seriously concerned about hidden debts behind B, so called two-step transaction is available : First of all, B creates a new company fully owned by B, which succeeds major assets of B and Secondly, A takes over all shares of the new company from B. The possible devices under Korean corporate law, however, are very limited. Therefore, a revision on corporate law concerning holding company establishment, including introduction of Compusory Acquision in the U. K., should be considered. Researches into Corporate Group including holding companies in Korea have been focusing on fair competition issues. Now that many companies became holding companies, more researches on the operation of holding companies are required. Legal issues on the relationship between holding company and its subsidiaries and the conflict among interested parties in holding company or its subsidiaries are left unsolved. Especially, a relationship between a holding company and its subsidiary fully owned by a holding company has very unique aspect, considering the subsidiary, which is a legal entity, can be regarded as a department of the holding company in terms of economics. Minority shareholders of a holding company which owns all shares of its subsidiaries, in my opinion, should be allowed to bring a double derivative suit against directors of subsidiaries. Furthermore, the development of special theories or legislation on legal issues of holding companies, including whether a holding company has legal authority over its fully owned subsidiaries, is necessary.

전자증권법의 상법상 쟁점에 관한 연구

노혁준(Hyeok Joon Rho) 한국비교사법학회 2017 비교사법 Vol.24 No.4

이 글은 권리의 발생, 승계, 행사의 관점에서 전자증권법과 상법의 접점을 검토한 것이다. 전자증권법을 실제 적용하면서 다음 사항을 입법적으로 보완할 필요가 있을 것으로 보인다. 먼저 전자등록법상 등록대상인 ‘주식등’의 범위는 포괄적으로 정할 필요가 있다. 나아가 배제사유와 관련하여 양도성 또는 대체가능성이 없다고 하여 전자등록을 원천적으로 금지할 필요가 있는지 의문이 남는다. 두 번째로 대부분의 주식회사가 전자등록제도를 이용하게 된다면 주주명부제도 및 회사에 대한 대항력 법리는 폐지하여야 한다고 생각된다. 즉 양도합의+이체기재라는 양도의 성립요건을 갖추면 곧 회사에 대항할 수 있는 것으로 보는 것이 간명할 것이다. 세 번째로 전자증권법은 주주의 집단적 확인에 관하여 소유자명세제도(제37조)를, 개별적 확인에 대하여 소유자증명서(제38조), 소유내용통지제도(제40조)를 규정한다. 소유자명세 작성은 통상 발행인의 신청에 따라 이루어지는바 신청사유를 넓게 규정하여도 무방할 것이다. 한편 소유자증명서, 소유내용통지제도는 기존 주주명부제도와 양립하는 것으로 해석되나, 개별적 주주의 지위 확인방식을 위 소유자증명서, 소유내용통지제도로 일원화할 필요가 있다. 소유자증명서 및 소유내용통지의 행사 상대방 내지 수령인은 발행인에 한정하는 것이 간명해보인다. 소유자증명서 및 소유내용통지가 이루어진 경우 수반되는 처분제한등록이 과도한 것은 아닌지 재검토할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로 초과등록분이 해소되기 이전에 이루어지는 주주권 제한이 큰 불이익을 초래하지 않도록 보완되어야 할 것이고, 전자등록주식에 대해 유치권을 행사할 수 있도록 근거조문을 도입할 필요가 있다. Like many other countries the Korean Commercial Code (or KCC) stipulates the importance of physical certificates in share transactions: share certificates show the entitlement of a shareholder and a transfer of shares should be perfected by physical move of share certificates. The dematerialization implies complete abolishment of paper certificates and introduction of pure electronic transaction system. Unlike the traditional scheme, investors may not withdraw paper certificates and issuers may not publish physical certificates. For issuers, complete dematerialization shall reduce the costs associated with printing, safekeeping and issuing certificates ; it enables issuers to easily identify shareholders and simplifies procedures for corporate action such as convening shareholders meeting. In terms of investors, it will eliminate the risk of loss, forgery or theft of certificates. It will give the investors safer and more efficient way to trade shares. The investors may easily prove and exercise their rights. It benefits intermediaries as well. It will streamline and accelerate settlement for trades of shares. Also it will reduce the cost satisfying investor s demands. such as, for document showing his status as shareholder. This paper explores recent legislation for dematerialization in Korea, with special focus upon electronically-registered shares. The new Act on the Electronic Registration of Shares, Bonds, etc. ( Act ) has detailed provisions on the creation, transfer and exercise of rights under the electronic registration system. According to the Act, shares subject to new scheme shall be recorded in books of accounts which are opened and maintained at intermediaries. An intermediary will carry two separate accounts with the Korea Securities Depository ( KSD ) : institutional account, to which shares owned by the intermediary shall be credited; whereas customer account, to which shares it manages for its ultimate investors shall be credited. Eventual goal of materialization is to let all the securities be traded electronically, but for the soft-landing of dematerialization the bill tried incremental change. A publicly-held corporation should use new scheme. Other than that, issuers may choose to deploy this scheme or alternatively to remain in paper-based system. Once the issuer chose to use the new scheme, it will be prohibited from issuing certificates. Under the new bill, book entry is the only way of transferring securities, and no other requirement is necessary. Under new scheme, intermediary and the KSD are only responsible for making book-entry and maintain securities accounts. They have no security interest in the securities they held. The investors have the right to the payment of principal and interest on debt securities and the right to receive dividends, vote etc on equity securities. The change from the pooled ownership to undivided ownership seems to be based upon the idea that the approach of undivided ownership is more simple and protective of ultimate investors. Among various legal issues entailing new system, this paper analyzes the relationship between shareholder and company under the Act. Under the traditional jurisprudence of the KCC, each company should prepare and keep a list of shareholders, a list which shows the eligible shareholders of the company. According to KCC, the transfer of shares shall not be asserted against the company, unless the name and address of the transferee have been registered in the shareholders list. Under the Act, the role of shareholders list shall be maintained: the electronic ledgers (i.e. investor ledger + intermediary ledger) managed by the intermediaries and KSD under the new bill shall not replace the company s shareholders list. One of the main argument of this paper, however, include the abolishment of traditional function by shareholders list: the electronic ledgers may well take core role in recognizing the identification of shareholders.

연구논문 : 금융지주회사의 정보공유 법리

노혁준 ( Hyeok Joon Rho ) 한국금융정보학회 2014 금융정보연구 Vol.3 No.1

금융지주회사는 금융기관의 대형화, 겸업화를 추구하기 위한 금융그룹 운용의 방식이라고 할 수 있다. 금융지주회사 내 회사들간의 협력은 인적 교류, 브랜드 공유를 통해서도 이룰 수 있을 것이나 가장 중요한 것은 금융정보의 공유라고 할 수 있다. 이 글은 이러한 점에 착안하여 금융정보 공유에 관한 해외법제와 금융지주회사법 제48조의2정보공유 특례를 둘러싼 법적 쟁점을 살펴보았다. 금융지주회사법상 정보공유 특례의 해석상 가장 큰 쟁점은 다른 정보보호법제와의 조화 문제이다. 현재 개인정보를 보호하는 법제로서는 일반법으로서의 개인정보 보호법(2011) 이외에 신용정보법(1995), 금융실명제법(1997), 정보통신망법(2001) 등이 있다. 특별법 우선의 원칙에 따를 때 일응 금융지주회사법상 금융정보 공유 특례는 다른 법률에 우선하여 적용된다고 하겠다. 다만 입법목적을 달리하는 경우에는 위 정보공유 특례가 항상 우선 적용되는 것은 아닌바, 예컨대 자본시장법상 정보교류 차단장치(chinese wall)는 이해충돌의 방지를 목적으로 하는 것이므로 금융지주회사법상 정보공유 특례가 있다고 하여 곧바로 위 차단장치의 예외사항으로 볼 수는 없다. 이 글은 나아가 몇 가지 향후 입법적인 개선사항을 제안하고 있다. 첫 번째로 금융정보 공유특례의 도입취지를 고려할 때, 적법한 공유를 활성화할 수 있도록 제도적 보완책이 필요하다. 무상 정보공유에 관한 불확실성을 제거할 수 있도록 관련 조항들을 수정할 필요가 있고, 금융지주회사의 관련법령에 실시간 공유에 관한 조항을 별도로 마련할 필요가 있다. 두 번째로 정보주체의 실질적 보호방안을 보완할 필요가 있다. 적어도 정보 공유에 관련된 내용을 정보주체에게 실효적으로 알릴 수 있는 방식을 제도화할 필요가 있다. 통지의무를 법령에 의하여 부과하고 그 양식도 고객들이 이해하기 쉬운 형태와 내용으로 통일하여야 할 것이다. The Financial Holding Company Act was first introduced in 2000 with the aim to boost the emergence of mega financial groups that comprise banks, insurance companies and securities companies etc. as subsidiaries. In order to maximize the ``synergy`` within a financial group, free flow of information on customers was favored, and therefore, the Act was revised in 2002 to include a special provision for information sharing which is currently placed in the Art. 48-2. According to this provision, affiliate companies under the control of a financial holding company may share the customers`` credit information and other financial information. Thus the financial holding company and its affiliates are exempt from the strict restriction under the Art. 4 of the Act on Real Name Financial Transactions and Guarantee of Secrecy, the Art. 32 & 33 of the Use and Protection of Credit Information Act are exempt. A special provision for financial information sharing in financial groups is found in other countries as well as in Korea. (e.g. Art. 6802(a) of the Gramm_Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 in the U.S.) This paper is to explore some controversial legal issues surrounding this provision and suggest better legislation to serve somewhat conflicting goals: encouraging synergy effects and discouraging infringement on individuals`` information rights. Among other legal issues, the author deals with the priority of application over various financial information-related-legislations. Adopted by a special legislation, the Art. 48-2 of the Financial Holding Company Act has basically top priority over other general provisions. Some provisions in other legislations pursuing other purpose, however, may not be overridden by the Art. 48-2: for example, the anti cross-wall provisions under the Capital Market and Financial Investment Business Act cannot be overridden because those provisions are not to serve for the protection of financial information but the avoidance of conflict of interests. For better regulation, the author suggests that all the affiliates under a financial holding company``s control be treated as those departments of one entity, in terms of information flow, despite separate legal entities. Further, as is shown by foreign legislations, the Art. 48-2 should be revised so that a customer should be notified of the information sharing by the financial institution which transfers the customer``s information to its affiliate companies.

기업구조조정 시 채권자이의절차에 관한 연구

노혁준(Hyeok-Joon RHO) 한국기업법학회 2020 企業法硏究 Vol.34 No.3

상법상 기업구조조정 시 채권자이의절차는 오랜기간 회사실무에 뿌리내려왔다. 이렇듯 일률적 보호절차를 두는 것은 개별약정의 한계 및 채무자 회사의 기업구조조정에 직면한 채권자들의 위험재평가 필요성을 고려할 때 나름의 설득력이 있다. 이 글은 현재 운용되고 있는 상법상 채권자이의 절차를 해외 입법례들과 비교하면서 합리적인 개선방안을 검토하였다. 이 글에 제안하는 주요 입법방향은 아래와 같다. 첫째로 소액채권자에 대하여 소수주주의 그것처럼 개별통지를 축소하는 방향은 적절하지 않다. 대신 상장회사의 채권자 일반에 관하여 개별최고를 폐지하는 방식이 타당할 것이다. 둘째로 분할 시 불법행위 채권자는 권리침해 위험에 노출되어 있으므로 추가 보호책이 마련될 필요가 있다. 즉 채권자가 정당한 사유로 인하여 채권의 발생 또는 채무자를 알지 못한 때에는 연대책임이 분리되지 않는다고 규정하면, 불법행위 채권자, 더 나아가 불측의 피해를 입는 채권자를 구제할 수 있을 것이다. 셋째로 기업구조조정 시 채권자의 과도한 이의권 행사를 제한하여야 할 것이다. 즉 채권자에 손해가 발생할 우려가 없다는 점을 회사가 증명하는 경우 채권자의 이의권이 배제되도록 규정할 필요가 있다. 마지막으로 채권자이의절차의 흠결을 구조조정행위의 사법적 효력과 연동시키는 기존 방식이 타당한지 재고할 필요가 있다. The Korean Commercial Code (“KCC”), unlike the Delaware General Corporation Law, has detailed provisions for protections of creditors facing merger and demerger (i.e. statutory corporate division). Some scholars have been skeptical on those mandatory boilerplate provisions, which may provide either excessive or insufficient protections for creditors. The US legislations, noting the heterogeneous nature of creditors, tend to let the creditors and debtors design their own protection scheme preparing for future M&As. The paper, however, sees the virtue of current provisions, which were originated from the continental Europe and aims to suggest some incremental changes. The major findings of this paper are as follows: First, current personal notices which inform creditors of their rights in the M&A process are excessive and time-consuming. Especially, a creditor of a listed company may easily get access to the M&A information. A disclosure at the official website (e.g. DART operated by the financial supervisory authority) may be sufficient for information delivery. Second, tort victims may not be given appropriate protections through a demerger process. Under the KCC, a divided company is jointly and severally liable with newly established company (which receives assets from the divided company) for any claim antedating the demerger. The liability, however, is separated if some protective prior steps are taken by the divided company. The problem of such liability-severance process is tort victims cannot always secure a guarantee or a pledge. The loophole is serious where the divided company transfers almost all of its good assets but tort victims cannot exercise their claims against newly established company, due to the liability-severance process. This paper suggests that tort victims with just cause not to respond to liability-severance process should not be subject to liability-severance. Third, excessive creditors protection provisions should be revised as well. A creditor should not enjoy a windfall thanks to M&A – under the KCC, an unsecured creditor may become secured creditor, just because the debtor company get through M&A. Only the creditors whose claims face more risks or uncertainty should be eligible for additional protective safeguards. Finally, the legal implications of creditor protection process should be revisited. Most scholars believe that the lack of the process may lead to the nullification of whole M&A deals. However, no M&A has been found null and void just because the creditor protection process is not completed. The delinking of the M&A’s validity and the adequacy of creditor protection process is worth further considerations.

회사분할관련 최근 판례들의 비판적 검토

노혁준 ( Hyeok Joon Rho ) 한국상사판례학회 2012 상사판례연구 Vol.25 No.2

In 1998 the Korean Commercial Code(the KCC) adopted provisions for statutory corporate division (Art. 530-2 to 530-12) and the Korean Supreme Court made important decisions on how to interpret those provisions. The author reviewed five Supreme Court Cases made between 2009 and 2011 (2008da96291, 96307; 2009da95769; 2011da38516; 2008da92336; 2008da74963) from an critical angle. The main points of this paper are as follows: (1) Some cases seems to be mistaken in defining the major elements of statutory corporate division. Under the KCC, the transferee company which succeeds the assets and debts of the transferor company should issues new shares in return. The 2008da96291, 96307 and 2009da95769 allowed the transferor company to pay cash in lieu of new shares which is inappropriate interpretation ignoring the plain meaning of the KCC Art. 530-2 and 530-3. (2) Under the Art. 530-9 KCC, the transferor company and transferee company are jointly and severally liable for the debts owed by the transferee company before the statutory division. In order to limit the joint and several liability, the transferee company should include special provision for separate liability in the division prospectus and notify its intention to ``known creditors.`` The 2011da38516 and 2008da92336 dealt with the notion of know creditors but the Supreme Court acknowledged quite broad range of known creditors which might lead to heavy administrative burdens for the part of transferee company.

기업구조조정과 자기주식의 쟁점 및 입법적 개선방안

노혁준 ( Hyeok-joon Rho ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2018 法學硏究 Vol.28 No.1

Treasury shares tend to be regarded as assets in Korean legal practice. Accordingly companies have preferred to create treasury shares in the process of corporate reorganizations, including statutory merger, comprehensive share transfer and statutory corporate division. This paper is actually based upon author’s prior papers published in 2008 and 2015: while the prior papers focused upon the case of corporate division and the legal implication of treasury shares, this paper explores more extensively how to deal with treasury shares in corporate reorganization. In addition, this paper suggests detailed legislative reform on the Korean Commercial Code. Major findings of this paper are as follows. First of all, the treasury shares should not be subject matter of statutory corporate divisions. The device of corporate division was adopted to promote partial transfer of business undertaking. Separating and transferring its own shares (i.e. treasury shares) have nothing to do with its core function. Further, the transfer of treasury shares through corporate division might result in distortion of control rights because the transferee may exercise voting rights of transferor company. In order to prevent potentially abusive corporate division, the KCC should explicitly ban the use of treasury shares as subject matter of statutory corporate divisions. Secondly, the KCC should also prohibit the issuance of new shares to treasury shares of target company in corporate reorganization. Current practices vary on whether to issue new shares to treasury shares held by merged company, divided company, etc (i.e. target companies). For example, the issuance of new shares to merged company’s treasury shares would end up providing merging company with plenty of treasury shares (of merging company). This paper showed the problem of such practice and argued that a explicit provision banning the issuance in corporate reorganization is required in the KCC. Those major findings, the author believes, could be supported regardless of the general reasoning on what is the legal features of treasury shares.

증권 불공정거래의 새로운 양태와 대응 ― 고빈도거래(HFT)를 중심으로 ―

노혁준 ( Hyeok-joon Rho ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2021 法學硏究 Vol.31 No.1

New Technical developments have changed the practices of capital markets. Among others, the HFT (high frequency trading), usually combined by algorithmic devices, has become commonly used in major capital markets. The HFT may allegedly produce abnormal yield by adopting market-making strategy, (statistical) arbitrage strategy, structural strategy or directional strategy. This paper explores the possible misuse of HFT and examines whether current legal arrangements against insider dealings and market manipulations in Korea are sufficient to block these new challenges. As to the insider dealings, the HFT seems not to cast a bran-new threat. Even though Eric T. Schneiderman pointed to the advent of ‘Insider Trading 2.0’, the basic feature of insider trading continues even in the era of HFT. Additional legislation on insider trading targeted on HFT strategies is not necessary. New type market manipulations deserve more detailed analysis: ① Momentum Ignition means entering of orders likely to start or to exacerbate a trend in order to create an opportunity to have favorable position; ② Layering & Spoofing is a submission of multiple or large orders often away from the touch of one side of the order book, usually removed right after; ③ Ping Order is an entry of small orders in order to assess the level of hidden orders; ④ Quote Stuffing is placing large numbers of orders in order to slow down trading system’s process; ⑤ Smoking is posting of orders to attract other participants, which are then rapidly revised onto less generous terms; ⑥ Electronic Front Running is a strategy that observes a trade take place in the marketplace, so as to rush and buy or sell the underlying stock or future in front of the anticipated forthcoming orders. ①, ②, ④, ⑤ are extended versions of traditional market manipulation. Current capital market law may sufficiently address those misconducts. ③Ping Order and ⑥ Electronic Front Running, however, fall beyond the scope of traditional regime. Do we need further regulations against these two strategies? The Korean government should not be hasty to make them illegal. The prohibition may stifle the progress of technology while it is uncertain whether ping orders or electronic front running impair the capital market’s integrity. This paper suggests some legislative revisions. First the general regulations upon HFT including registration or disclosure are required. Second, the mens rea requirement on market manipulation under the capital market law should be lessened so that more manipulative actions without specific purpose should be captured.

자본시장법상 불공정거래로 인한 부당이득의 법적 문제

노혁준(RHO, Hyeok-Joon) 한국증권법학회 2018 증권법연구 Vol.19 No.1

이 글에서는 증권 불공정거래에서 발생한 부당이득에 관한 법리를 살펴보았다. 증권 불공정거래에 따른 부당이득은 규제위반 행위의 해악성을 나타내는 중요한 지표이므로 이를 행위자에 대한 제재와 어느 정도 결부시키는 것은 당연하다. 다만 우리나라는 이를 양형 등 재량요소가 아닌 법정형 요소로 규정한다는 점에서 특징적이다. 입법적 관점에서 볼 때 법정형 요소로서의 부당이득이라는 잣대는 한편으로는 행위자의 불법성을 제대로 반영하면서도(책임성), 다른 한편으로는 간단명료할 필요가 있다(예측가능성). 이러한 관점에서 볼 때, 부당이득의 산정에 관해 다음 입법적 보완이 필요하다. ① 미공개정보이용에 따른 부당이득인 경우 해당 미공개정보의 공개 이후 일정기간을 특정하여 기간 내 최고(최저)종가 또는 평균종가를 추정 매매단가로 삼을 필요가 있다. ② 시세조종(부정거래 행위도 마찬가지)의 경우, 시세조종기간 내에 증권 매도가 이루어지지 않았다면 시세상승을 위한 시세조종기간 종료 이후 일정한 기간 내지 시점을 특정하여 마찬가지로 추정 매도단가로 삼을 필요가 있다. ③ 제3자를 위한 증권 불공정거래가 이루어진 경우 해당 제3자에게 귀속되는 부분 역시 행위자의 부당이득에 산입되어야 한다. 나아가 이 글에서는 기업인수합병과 유상증자 등에 따른 각종 비전형적 이득을 어떻게 산정할 것인지도 검토하였다. 특히 계열사간 합병을 앞두고 합병당사회사간주가 관리가 이루어지는 경우 이는 자본시장법상 불공정거래로 의율될 가능성이 다분하다. 이 때 전형적인 개별 주식거래로 인한 이득이 아니라 하여 액수미상으로 처리하는 것은 행위의 부정적 파급효과를 고려할 때 타당하지 않다. 예컨대 합병의 경우 불공정한 합병비율로 인한 지배주주 및 합병당사회사의 이익, 주식매수청구권 행사에 따른 매수대금축소에 따른 합병당사회사의 이익 등을 부당이득의 범주에 넣어서 계산해야 할 것이다. The Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act 2007 (“FISCMA”) of Korea regulates major unfair securities trading including insider trading and market manipulation. Profits gained and loss avoided (“PGLA”) through unfair securities trading in Korea, compared to that of other legislations, has unique legal implication: the concept is the firm basis of not only a civil damage claim but also criminal sanction. More specifically, the FISCMA provides statutory range of criminal punishment according to PGLA: for example, the accused is subject to imprisonment for 3 years or more when the PGLA is not less than 0.5 billion KRW while the PGLA of not less than 5 billion KRW subjects him to 5 years or more imprisonment (including lifelong imprisonment). Despite the importance of PGLA, Korean courts and jurisprudence failed to show concrete and trustworthy formula to calculate the amount of PGLA. Given the flexibility of securities markets and difficulties of finding ‘true price’ of a securities (i.e. a price unaffected by unfair trading and reflecting undisclosed information), the courts are faced with the risk of overestimating or underestimating PGLA. This paper analyses current practice in the Korean Supervisory Services and the Korean courts and suggests better device to estimate PGLA. The base line is to achieve two conflicting goals: ① exactness which correctly reflects the wrongdoer’s accountability and ② predictability which provides consistent tool to calculate PGLA with reduced discretion. In order to find ‘true price’ of a securities, the paper notes, a new presumptive provision is required to reasonably obviate the influence of market manipulation and/or properly gauge the value of insider information. Further this paper explores the sophisticated issue of atypical PGLA: gains from M&As under manipulated market price. If PGLA is not proven, the accused is likely to be subject to lighter punishment. This paper shows that PGLA may be found from two aspects: gains by major shareholders who enjoyed better merger ratio; gains by merging company which faces less appraisal burden thanks to oppressed market price. Even before any legislative revision dealing with atypical cases, the PGLA here need to be thoroughly sought.

Law School 도입에 따른 법학교육 제도개편: 일본의 사례를 중심으로

노혁준 ( Hyeok Joon Rho ) 단국대학교 법학연구소 2003 법학논총 Vol.27 No.-

주식회사와 신탁에 관한 비교 고찰

노혁준(Rho, Hyeok Joon) 한국증권법학회 2013 증권법연구 Vol.14 No.2

이 글에서는 기업조직법리가 갖추어야 할 기본적인 속성이 재산분리기능이라는 전제하에 이를 잣대로 주식회사와 사업신탁을 비교, 검토하여 보았다. 어떠한 경우에나 기존의 계약법리나 조합법리에 의하여 현행 주식회사법 및 신탁법상의 재산분리를 달성하기는 어려우므로, 주식회사법과 신탁법이 조직법제로서 독자성을 갖는다는 점에는 큰 의문이 없다. 전형적인 기업조직법제인 주식회사법은 유한책임원칙과 조직격리가 완벽하게 구현되어 있다. 또한 재산분리의 실현시 큰 중요성을 갖는 지분적 권리양도의 자유도 보장되어 있다. 신탁법제는 다양한 스펙트럼을 ‘탄력성’이라는 이름 하에 하나의 법제로 포괄하고 있다. 현재 법령이 부여하고 있는 탄력성을 최대한 활용하는 경우 주식회사에 준하는 재산분리와 지분적 권리양도를 달성할 수 있을 것으로 보인다. 이는 신탁에 특유한 재산분리 문제를 고려하더라도 그러하다. 특히 계속적 기업(going concern)으로서 조직 실체가 유지되기 위해서는, 신탁의 일부 해지?철회가 제한되어야 하고 이는 신탁계약을 통해 달성될 수 있을 것이다. 개정 신탁법의 내용 중 신탁사채 등도 사업신탁의 발전에 도움이 될 것이지만, 재산분리의 관점에서 볼 때 더 의미 있는 것은 신탁법 제62조의 신탁채권의 우선적 지위, 신탁법 제114조 이하의 유한책임신탁, 신탁법 제46조 제4항의 비용상환청구권 등의 제한, 신탁법 제78조 이하의 수익증권발행신탁이다. 이 글에서는 개정 신탁법이 기업조직에 필요한 최소한의 기능을 마련하였다는 것을 논증하였다. 나아가 사업신탁이 주식회사에 비하여 강점을 갖고 있는지 여부와 실제의 활용도 여부는 별도의 논의가 필요한 부분이다. 향후 신탁에 의한 기업조직을 발전시킬 필요성이 있다면 기존의 신탁법과 다른 별도의 단행법률을 만드는 것도 고려할 수 있을 것이다. 비록 조직법제가 갖추어야 할 핵심적인 요소를 개정 신탁법이 구현하고 있다고는 하지만, 신탁을 통하여 기업조직을 형성하려는 당사자들에게 일종의 기본규정(default rule)을 부여한다는 차원에서 볼 때 현재의 신탁법은 그 넓은 스펙트럼과 탄력성으로 인해 오히려 혼선을 가져올 수 있기 때문이다. The trust law has been reviewed in terms of property law or contract law in Korea. Now that the revised trust law of 2011 adopted various provisions similar to corporate law, the trust law can be analyzed from organizational law angle. Is the trust law, following the reform of 2011, able to function as the rule for organizing business entities? As is noted by the seminal paper by professor Henry Hansmann et al, the essential role of organizational law is “asset partitioning,” which is fully realized in corporate law in Korea. This role is essential because without those statutory provisions the asset partitioning would never be possible through mutual negotiation and contract among related parties. In this paper the author raised two questions: (1) does the trust law of 2011 operate as a device for asset partitioning?; and (2) can investors create an entity quivalent to business trust just by using contract law jurisprudence? For the first question, the answer is positive. Especially, the attributes of asset partitioning have been further developed in the new trust law through ① priority of creditors in trust (Art. 62), ② limited liability trust (Art. 114), ③ limitation of indemnification (Art. 46 Sec. 4), ④ certificates of beneficiary interests (Art. 78). For the second question, this paper concludes that contractual arrangements are not appropriate devices to create an entity equivalent to business trust. This paper only covers the comparison between business trust and stock corporation from the perspective of asset partitioning. While two entities have similar asset partitioning function, the issue of whether the business trust under the new trust law may replace the traditional stock corporation should require another discussion. In order to provide the entrepreneurs and investors with more convenient default rules, the legislative authority in favor of a trust with business purpose may consider adopting tailor-made rules or statutes for business trust.