한국의 재래식 억제전략 발전 방안

김재엽(金宰燁)(KIM Jae Yeop),김종하(金鍾夏)(KIM Jong Ha) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2011 신아세아 Vol.18 No.2

재래식 억제전략이란 “외부세력의 군사적 적대행위를 예방하기 위해 핵무기 이외의, 일반적인 무기체계들로 구성되는 군사력에 의존하는 억제전략의 한 종류”다. 핵무기의 압도적인 파괴ㆍ실상효과를 통한 보복능력에 중점을 두는 핵 억제전략과는 달리, 재래식 억제전략은 재래식 무기 중심의 거부ㆍ방어능력을 통해 ‘공격에 대한 방어의 우위’를 외부세력에게 확신시켜 전쟁 억제를 달성하는 것이 특징이다. 냉전(冷戰) 이래 억제전략에 관한 연구, 논의는 핵 억제전략을 중심으로 진행되어 왔다. 그러나 1970년대 이후 상호확증파괴를 통한 핵무기 보유국들 사이의 핵 전력균형이 현실화되면서 핵무기의 억제 효과에 대한 의문이 제기되었다. 그 결과 1980년대에는 전쟁 억제에서 재래식군사력의 역할, 가치가 새롭게 주목받기 시작했다. 특히 첨단 전자ㆍ정보기술의 적용을 통해 등장한 광역 정보수집 자산, 장거리 정밀유도무기는 핵무기보다 신뢰성 높은 전쟁 억제수단으로서의 가능성을 입증해냈다. 그동안 한국의 재래식 억제전략은 북한에 의한 전면전쟁 위협에 대비하기 위한 것이었다. 하지만 이러한 전략은 기습 및 국지도발, 대량살상무기를 비롯한 북한의 비전통적 위협에 취약성을 노출시키고 있다. 이에 따라 한국은 다차원적인 군사위협에 대하여 억제, 승리를 함께 달성하기 위해 미국과의 핵우산 공약뿐만 아니라 재래식 억제전략을 강화, 발전시켜야 할 필요성이 절실하다. 먼저 한국은 ‘전술적 섬멸,’ ‘전략적 마비’ 개념에 입각한 보다 적극적인 억제전략을 채택해야 한다. 그리고 이를 뒷받침할 수 있도록 기습, 침투 대응능력과 비핵(非核) 전략무기의 확보에 군사력 건설의 우선순위를 두어야 할 것이다. Conventional deterrence relies on conventional(non-nuclear) military forces to prevent and dissuade enemy’s hostile military action. Unlike nuclear deterrence, which emphasizes capability for punishment through mass destruction of nuclear weapon, conventional deterrence pursues convincing enemy the defender’s superiority to the aggressor by capability for defense and denial based on conventional military forces. During the Cold War, studies on deterrence strategy have been dominated by nuclear deterrence. Since 1970s, however, the realization of Mutual Assured Destruction(MAD) among nuclear powers raised a serious question to the credibility of nuclear deterrence. As a result, in 1980s, the role and value of conventional deterrence began to be re-evaluated. Moreover the rise of Reconnaissance & Surveillance assets and long-range Precision-Guided Munition(PGM), based on highly developed electronic & information technology, are proved to be more credible deterrent than nuclear weapon. Korea’s conventional deterrence has focused on deterring full-scale invasion of North Korea. But the current strategy exposed a hugh vulnerability to North Korea’s untraditional military threats such as localized provocation and Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD). Therefore it is necessary for Korea to improve and enhance conventional deterrence against North Korea’s multi-dimensional military threats, as well as bolster nuclear umbrella commitment from U.S. Above all, Korea needs to accept more active conventional deterrence strategy based on ‘tactical annihilation’ and ‘strategic paralysis’ concept. Additionally, capability to counter surprise attack & infiltration, and non-nuclear strategic weapons should take higher priority in Korea’s military build-up.

탈북여성의 생활사건스트레스와 우울에 관한 연구 -외상경험의 조절효과-

김재엽 ( Jae Yeop Kim ),류원정 ( Won Jung Ryu ),김지민 ( Ji Min Kim ) 한국가족사회복지학회 2014 한국가족복지학 Vol.46 No.-

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effects of trauma in the process from North Korea on the life event stress - depression relationship of North Korean refugee women in south korea. we survey with self-report questionnaires for 200 refugee women, conduct descriptive and regression analysis. Crucial findings are the following. almost half of North Korean refugee women have depression. Especially, many of them have stress of economic difficulties, health-related problems, marital conflict. This verification of model demonstrated that there are significant moderating effect of traumatic events on daily life stress and depression of refugee women. After immigrating to South Korea, the effect of daily stress events on depression is stronger for refugee women who have traumatic events in the process from North Korea than refugee women who never before. The researchers give practical suggestions. Mental health services, sustainable case managements are needed for North korea refugee women suffering from stress of family life , social life and traumatic events in the process from North Korea.

회색지대 분쟁 대응을 위한 준(준(準))군사 세력의 기능: 동아시아 해양 분쟁에서 해양경찰의 역할을 중심으로

김재엽 ( Kim Jae-yeop ) 한국군사학회 2024 군사논단 Vol.118 No.0

Gray zone conflicts intends to exercise coercive influences and to deny chances for effective countermeasures of counterparts; by frequent and repeated politico-military disputes at a level lower than major war. Recent conflicts by China, which can be witnessed in major maritime areas in East Asia, also show similar characteristics. It is noteworthy that China's counterparts like Japan and Southeastern Asian countries are responding by bolstering the strength of coast guards. Because it shows the utility of paramilitary forces, including coast guard, to deal with gray zone conflicts by controlling political and diplomatic risks in the process of resolving disputes. Korea also needs to put in a substantial deal of efforts in strengthening coast guard to counter possible maritime gray zone conflicts.

합동우주작전에 기여하기 위한 육군의 우주작전 수행 방안

김재엽 ( Kim¸ Jae-yeop ) 한국접경지역통일학회 2023 접경지역통일연구 Vol.7 No.1

Since the former Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the world's first satellite, on October 4, 1957, which brought a drastic change in the relationship between space and mankind, space has become an essential area for national security and prosperity. Today, the method of war has gone beyond simply receiving the help of space assets, and has reached a level where war cannot be carried out without space assets. In addition, with the rapid increase in the use of space in the private sector in the newsface era, a new task is being given to the military to protect national assets in the space domain. In response to these changes, countries around the world are competitively developing defense space power. Great powers such as the United States and China recognize the space domain as one of the battlefield areas and specify the achievement of space hegemony as a defense policy. In line with changes in the surrounding security environment, the Korean military is also required to develop its defense space power quickly. The Korean military's joint space operation categories include space situation awareness (SSA), ground control system operation, satellite communication, information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), location, navigation, and time (PNT), space asset protection, space threat removal, and space transport. In order to meet the concept of joint space operations, the Army's space operations should be operated simultaneously and integrally within eight categories of joint space operations to maximize the effect of power performance. Many people agree that space power is one of the key forces that will determine victory or defeat in the future battlefield. Entering the news face era, barriers to entry into space development are decreasing, and the 4th Industrial Revolution technologies are further intelligent and advanced space power. The South Korean military must also prepare from now on in order to respond timely and effectively to the space threats to space.

한반도 군사안보와 핵(核)전략 -북한 핵무장 위협에의 대응을 중심으로-

김재엽 ( Jae Yeop Kim ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2016 국방연구 Vol.59 No.2

핵전략은 핵무기가 제공하는 압도적인 파괴, 살상 능력을 바탕으로 공격적, 혹은 방어적인정치·군사적 목적의 달성을 추구한다. 핵무기의 사용을 위협, 실행하는 방식을 기준으로 볼 때,핵전략은 다음의 3가지 유형으로 분류될 수 있다. 첫째, 군사 분쟁을 자국의 의도대로 해결하는데 필요한 외부 개입, 지원을 유도하기 위해, 핵무기의 사용 잠재력을 앞세우는 ‘과시’ 전략이다.둘째, 적의 핵 공격에 대응하여 치명적인 핵 보복을 실행하는 ‘확증보복’ 전략이다. 그리고 셋째,핵무기의 공격적인 운용을 통해 정치·군사적인 우위를 달성하는 ‘선제적 확전’ 전략이다.북한은 ‘군사력에 의한 한반도 공산화’라는 현상타파적인 목적을 뒷받침하고, 한국과 미국에대한 재래식 군사력의 질적 열세를 만회하기 위하여, 핵무기의 선제 사용을 포함한 공격적인핵전략을 추구할 것으로 평가된다. 특히 북한의 핵무장 능력이 양적, 질적으로 강화될수록, 그가능성은 더욱 높아질 것이다.이에 대응하여 한국은 핵무기의 선제 불(不)사용 원칙을 기반으로, 북한의 정치·군사 지도부와핵무장 능력을 겨냥하는 확증보복 전략을 통해 북한의 핵무장 위협을 억지, 분쇄할 수 있어야한다. 그리고 한국의 핵전략이 평·전시에 그 유효성을 보장받을 수 있도록, 미국에 의한 핵우산공약의 제도적·물리적인 실효성을 강화, 발전시켜야 할 것이다. Nuclear strategy aims to achieve either offensive or defensive politico-military goals byexercising nuclear weapon``s overwhelming power of mass destruction. In accordance withthe ways to threaten and employ the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy can bedivided into the following three categories. Firstly, "catalytic" strategy shows off potentialsfor using nuclear weapons to resolve military conflicts on favorable terms by attractingsupport, aid, and intervention from allies and international community. Secondly, "assuredretaliation" strategy carries out a lethal nuclear counter-attack only in response to enemy``snuclear strike. And thirdly, "asymmetric escalation" strategy pursues a politico-militarysuperiority by resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in an offensive manner.In order to support Pyongyang regime``s long-time ambition of "conquering KoreanPeninsula by military force", which is totally against peace and security in this region, andovercome qualitative inferiority on conventional military power to Republic of Korea(ROK) and the United States, it is highly probable that North Korea will adopt anoffensive nuclear strategy which includes the possibility of nuclear first use. Especially, asNorth Korea is strengthening its nuclear armament capabilities in terms of both quantityand quality, the chances for North Korea to adopt an offensive nuclear strategy will growmuch higher.Therefore it is necessary for ROK to deter and defeat North Korea``s nuclear armamentthreat by adopting an assured retaliation strategy, based on the nuclear no-first-use (NFU)doctrine, targeting Pyongyang``s politico-military leadership and nuclear arsenal. And ROKalso needs to enhance and bolster effectiveness of nuclear umbrella commitment, offeredby the United States, institutionally and practically, so that ROK``s nuclear strategy can beguaranteed its validity at both peacetime and wartime.

냉전 후기 유럽의 중거리 핵전력(INF) 경쟁과 한국 안보에 대한 함의

김재엽(Kim, Jae-Yeop) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2016 군사 Vol.- No.101

During the 1970s-1980s, the late period of the Cold War, Europe had witnessed a deployment race of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), represented by SS-20 ballistic missile of Soviet Union and Gryphon ground-launched cruise missile, Pershing-Ⅱ ballistic missile of the United States (U.S), while politico-military tension was heightening in the region. The conflict was set out as the situation of Western Europe weakened credibility of U.S nuclear umbrella for the region due to the nuclear parity between U.S and Soviet Union, followed by the deployment of SS-20 which could put Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet Union"s unilateral military superiority. Dual-Track Decision of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy U.S INF at Western Europe contributed to not only restore regional nuclear force balance against Soviet Union, but also offered a leverage, in terms of both diplomatic and military aspects, at nuclear arms control negotiation with Soviet Union, which had ultimately concluded in the dismantlement of INF from both U.S and Soviet Union. As concerns on the growing nuclear armament capabilities of North Korea are disputable agenda among public opinion in Republic of Korea (ROK), the voice of demanding ROK"s nuclear armament by indigenous nuclear program and re-deployment of U.S short-range nuclear weapons has been gaining a widespread support. It is noteworthy that supporters of ROK"s nuclear armament, especially the idea of U.S short-range nuclear weapons re-deployment, is putting up the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s to justify their claims. Despite a superficial resemblance, however, the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s shows many differences from current security environment of the Korean Peninsular. As a result, it will be a huge fallacy to justify ROK"s nuclear armament, including U.S short-range nuclear weapons re-deployment, by putting up the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s. As long as U.S maintains both capabilities and willingness for keeping nuclear umbrella commitment, ROK should not give up efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular, supported by enhanced defense capabilities and diplomatic cooperation with the international community.

‘전쟁 이외의 전략 도전’으로서 중국의 삼전(三戰) : 특징과 사례, 그리고 한반도 안보에의 시사점

김재엽(Kim Jae Yeop) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2022 신아세아 Vol.29 No.1

‘전쟁 이외의 전략 도전’은 간접전략의 특징을 상당 부분 나타낸다. 여기에는 ① 현상타파를 지향하는 강제 성격의 정치·외교적인 영향력 행사, ② 장기간의 시간과 점진적인 노력을 통한 실행, ③ 비(非)군사 부문의 국력 요소, 수단을 앞세운 상대방의 행동과 의지, 의사결정 과정에의 강압적 영향력 행사, 그리고 ④ 군사력의 간접적인 동원을 배합시킨 기정사실화의 추구 등이 포함된다. 중국이 동아시아의 주변 국가들을 상대로 수행하는 심리, 여론, 법률 등 3개 분야의 삼전(三戰)도 그 연장선상에 있다. 2017년 THAAD 배치 당시 한중 양국의 갈등은 중국의 삼전(三戰)이 한국 안보에도 실재적인 위협임을 확인시킨 사례였다. 향후 한국은 중국의 삼전(三戰)에 효과적으로 대응할 수 있는 전략, 역량을 발전시켜 주요 국가이익을 보호하고, 외교 및 안보 정책상의 행동, 의지, 의사결정 과정에 대한 자주성을 보장받을 수 있어야 할 것이다. The concept of a Strategic Challenge Other Than War includes: 1) exercising coercive political and diplomatic influence for revisionist intentions; 2) implementation through enduring and gradual efforts; 3) influencing an adversary s behavior, willingness and decision-making process by non-military elements of national power; and 4) pursuing a fait accompli through the indirect use of military power. China s so-called Three Warfares, focused on the domains of psychology, public opinion, and legal affairs, was used against countries in East Asia is an extension of this. Disputes between Korea and China in 2017 over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system proved that China s Three Warfares has become a substantial threat to the security of Korea. Korea must develop a strategy and the capabilities to effectively deal with challenges posed by China s Three Warfares to protect major national interests and assure the autonomy of behavior, willingness and decision-making process in foreign and national security policy.

중국의 대(對)주변국 군사 분쟁을 통해서 본 ‘적극방어’ 군사전략의 특징, 함의

김재엽(Kim, Jae-yeop) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2018 군사 Vol.- No.106

Since the establishment of communist regime in 1949, China has maintained “active defense” military strategy. China’s active defense strategy was developed from 1) military experiences of Revolutionary War including Sino-Japanese War and Chinese Civil War, led by Chinese Communist Party’s early leadership of Mao Zedong, and 2) China’s unique geopolitical environment. China asserts that its active defense strategy is a military one of defensive character, which uses military power passively only after hostile powers pose threats to its national security. However, the history of China’s military conflicts with its neighboring powers such as Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, India, Soviet Union, and Vietnam, after communist regime was established, shows that China’s active defense strategy includes a number of offensive characteristics; preemptive attack, projecting military power to hostile territory, in pursuit of annihilating hostile troops, unilateral military coercion etc. Therefore, it is important to pay a sharp attention to China’s ongoing development of military power, which can strengthen its capability to carry out active defense strategy more effectively and eventually support China to adopt a more offensive foreign policy doctrine in the future.

한국형 공세방어 전략의 모색

김재엽 ( Jae Yeop Kim ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2013 국방연구 Vol.56 No.2

군사전략이란 ‘국가가 스스로의 이익과 정책 목적을 달성하기 위해 군사력을 배치, 운 용하는 기술’로 정의된다· 보통 군사전략은 공격 전략과 방어 전략으로 나뉜다· 그 가운 데 방어 전략은 전쟁수행 방식의 능동성, 주도권의 행사 여부를 기준으로 다시 수세방어 전략과 공세방어 전략으로 분류될 수 있다· 공세방어 전략은 다음의 4가지 측면에서 수세방어 전략과 차이점을 나타낸다· 첫째, 단순히 적의 침략을 격퇴하는 것뿐만 아니 라, 전후(戰後)의 안보에 유리한 정치·군사적인 최종상태의 달성을 추구한다· 둘째, 전 방과 국경 지역, 혹은 적의 영토에서 주로 전쟁을 수행한다· 셋째, 전쟁 초기부터 방어와 반격을 동시에 수행하여 적의 공격 능력을 신속히 약화·소모시킨다· 그리고 넷째, 단기 전을 선호한다· 한국은 지리적으로 방어를 위한 시·공간적인 여유가 부족하다· 뿐만 아니라 북한의 기습 능력과 대량살상무기, 주변국의 강력한 해·공 군력과 대치하고 있는 상황이다· 대 신 한국은 국력의 총량, 군사기술을 비롯한 군사잠재력에서 북한보다 우위를 차지하고 있다· 이러한 사항들은 한국이 북한, 주변국의 군사 위협에 맞서기 위해 공세방어 전략을 채택해야 할 당위성을 입증하는 근거라고 할 수 있다· 공세방어 전략은 한국이 북한 과의 제한·전면전쟁, 주변국과의 해양관할권 분쟁에 맞서 ‘생존과 번영이 보장되는 승 리’를 달성하기 위한 최적의 선택이 될 것이다· Military strategy is defined as ‘the art of deploying and employing military power to achieve a nation’s own interests and the ends of policy’· Generally, military strategy includes the following two kinds; offense and defense· Additionally, based on the level of activeness and initiative for conducting war, defense strategy is divided into defensive-defense and offensive-defense· Comparing with defensive-defense, offensive-defense strategy shows four characteristics· First, it pursues fulfillment of a favorable politico-military end-state for national security, as well as defeating invasion· Second, it regards the front, borderline, and attacker`s territory as a major battlespace at war· Third, it requires a swift weakening and attrition of attacker`s military power by conducting defense and counterattack simultaneously from the early stage of war· And fourth, it prefers to defeat invasion in a short term· In a geographic aspect, Korea lacks of sufficient time and space to defend its own territory· Furthermore Korea is confronting fearful capabilities for surprise attack, weapons of mass destruction from North Korea, and formidable naval and air force power from neighboring countries· Instead, Korea is prevailing over North Korea in terms of military potential, including overall national power and technologies applied to major weapon systems· These factors offer Korea a reasonable basis to accept offensive-defense strategy to counter military threats from North Korea and neighboring countries· Offensive-defense strategy will enable Korea to achieve ‘a victory with survival and prosperity’ in local/full-scale war against North Korea and potential maritime conflict against neighboring countries·

제4세대 전쟁: 미래전과 한국 안보에 대한 함의

김재엽(KIM Jae Yeop) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2010 신아세아 Vol.17 No.1

지난 1989년 윌리엄 린드가 처음으로 정의한 제4세대 전쟁은 21세기에 등장한 새로운 형태의 비정규ㆍ비대칭 전쟁이라고 할 수 있다. 제4세대 전쟁의 주요 특징으로는 (1) 테러리 즘 집단과 소수민족 해방운동 세력, 반정부 저항단체를 비롯한 비(非)국가 전쟁수행 주체의 부각, (2) 전방과 후방, 전투와 민간분야, 전쟁과 평화의 불확실성 심화, 그리고 (3) 대량살상 무기(WMD)와 자살공격 테러리즘, 사이버전쟁과 같은 비전통적인 전쟁수행 수단의 동원 등 이 있다. 이러한 제4세대 전쟁은 그동안 첨단 정보통신 기술 주도의 군사혁신(RMA) 일색으로 이 루어져 왔던 미래전의 연구, 정책적 대비방향에 큰 영향을 미칠 것으로 기대된다. 한국 역시 북한의 비대칭적 군사 위협 강화, 세계화의 심화 추세에 따른 불특정ㆍ비전통적 안보위협의 증대로 인해 제4세대 전쟁에 대한 취약성이 커지고 있다. 이에 따라 한국의 국방전략ㆍ정책 에서도 제4세대 전쟁의 위협을 반영하기 위한 노력이 요구될 것이다. Fourth Generation War, defined by William S. Lind in 1989, can be described as new kind of irregular ․asymmetric warfare in the 21st Century. Its main characters include (1) diverse actors of war other than sovereign state such as terrorist group, nationalist, insurgency group, etc, (2) blurring of the lines between front and rear , military and civilian , and war and peace , (3) use of unconventional means of fighting like weapons of mass destruction, suicide attack, cyber attack, etc. These factors are expected to impose a great influence to the study and policy on future war, as much as that of the current Revolution on Military Affairs (RMA) led by information technology. At the same time, due to North Korea s recent approach to asymmetric military power and growing untraditional overseas threat followed by deepening globalization, Korea is becoming more vulnerable to the Fourth Generation War. Therefore, it will also be necessary for Korea to develop defense postures based on the concept of Fourth Generation War in the near future.