한국의 對西洋 개국 문제의 재검토 : 韓美 韓英 修交조약 당시 극동의 국제 관계를 중심으로

구대열 梨花女子大學校 法政大學 1983 社會科學論集 Vol.3 No.-

자유주의 열강의 한반도 진출과 그 성격(1870-1910)

구대열 한국사상문화학회 2003 韓國思想과 文化 Vol.21 No.-

中共의 對韓半島 政策

구대열 梨花女子大學校 韓國文化硏究院 1984 主題硏究 Vol.4 No.-

This paper is designed to explain some recent changes in China's policy towards Korea. In the first part, the paper discusses the main factors which determine her Korean policy. First, from the geopolitical perspective, China considers the Korean peninsula to be a lip which protects the teeth (China). This implies that Korea presents a sort of threat to rather than an opportunity for China; and as long as the peninsula remains quiet, it has a low priority in the making of China's foreign policy. In this sense, the main objective of China's policy towards Korea is to maintain the status quo, preventing the outbreaks of any sorts of hostilities in the peninsula. Secondly, this paper argues that the future of Sino-Soviet relations would not be very different from the present state maintaining low-level tension, largely due to long-term strategic and economic policies of the Soviet Union in the Pacific region. This would present a dilemma for China in her relations with north Korea, because Moscow could take advantage of Beijing's penchant to Washington whenever necessary as a means of consolidating its relations with Pyongyang. Thirdly, the rapprochement between China and the United States would remain the main concern for north Korea in the future, and China has to find some ways which could compromise her own interest to deter Soviet expansionism in the region in cooperation with the United States and the necessity of preventing Pyongyang from leaning to Moscow. Fourthly, in order to persue the policy of modernization, the present Chinese leadership wants peaceful international environments and broadens the basis of cooperation with the western powers including the United States and Japen. These policies would certainly contribute to the stablization of the Korean penintula. China also tries to convince the Pyongyang regime the fact that, as China believes her future lies in pragmatism, not in self-reliance under the Mao era, north Korea must come out of self-imposed isolation and open her doors th the western world in order to compete with the economically flourishing south Korea. Fifty and lastly, some historical and cultural aspects such as the renunciation of chauvinistic behaviours on the part of China and the juche ideology of Kim Ilsung should also be counted in the understanding of their mutual relationship. The second part of this paper tries to explain recent relationship between China and north Korea and Beijing's policy towards the Korean peninsula through content analysis of speeches of the leaders of both countries which were made on the occasions of their exchange visits during the last two years. Some findings are as follows. China has felt great constraints over the means political, economic and military to make the Pyongyang regime more conductive to Beijing's policy in the area or at least to prevent her small ally from getting closer to Moscow. This fact has led her to treat north Korea on the basis of traditionally friendly neighbourhood not merely on the basis of socialist solidarity, thus being able to claim that Beijing's relationship with Pyongyang is always above that of Moscow-Pyongyang relationship. Beijing also intends to play a role of mediator between Washington and Pyongyang. This would display her strong support for the causes of the latter on the Korean question and would eventually pave the way for the normalization between Seoul and Beijing. South Korea, which has constitiuted merely a dependent variable to China's relations with the United States and Japan as well as north Korea, has recently attained some capabilities which China could no longer ignore as long as the latter would maintain the present policy of modernization and the opening of her economy to the west. Thus, contacts between Seoul and Beijing has slowly grown from non-political fields in spite of the strenuous efforts of north Korea to stop them. China's policy in this direction seems to have been firmly laid down. China made some successes in leading the Pyongyang regime to open its society to the outside world. During the visit of Kim Ilsung to Beijing in September 1982, serious discussions seem to have taken place over economic policies. At the time, the north Korean leader flatly rejected any notion of economic liberalization but this year Pyongyang proclaimed a law which allows foreign capital investment in the northern half. By this way China believes that her policy of stablization of the Korean peninsula is making a great progress.

다모클레스의 칼? 러일전쟁에 관한 한국의 인식과 대응

구대열 명지대학교 국제한국학연구소 2005 명지대학교 국제한국학연구소 학술대회 Vol.2005 No.1

大韓帝國時代의 국제관계

구대열 梨花女子大學校 韓國文化硏究院 1985 主題硏究 Vol.8 No.-

This paper is designd to explore some elements which can explain the international relations of the Korean empire (1896∼1905). Noting that the diplomatic history of the late Yi dynasty of Korea has been hitherto described in the light of either bilateral relations between Korea and major powers, or rivalries over the Korean peninsula among the powers concerned, this paper tries first to briefly follow policies of the major powers-namely Japan, Russia, Britain and the United States-towards Korea. The conclusion is that as far as foreign relations were concerned Korea virtually lost her independence and was at the mercy of the policies of foreign powers since the termination of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Moreover, Britain and the United States began to define their interest in Korea as non-political; and therefore the fate of Korea was heavily dependent upon the rivalry of Japan and Russia over the peninsula. The second part of this paper tries to discover the perception of the Korean government about her international environment. There existed various channels by which policies of the powers towards Korea were communicated to Seoul government; and in this respect the Koreans could correctly understand the implications of these policies for her future. But the response of the Korean government was short-sighted. The Koreans either ignored the potential threats to the independence of their country or simply looked for another power which could play a role to maintain the balance of power in the peninsula vis-a`-vis the allegedly expansionist power. The last part of the paper discusses the neutralization of Korea. In theory, this scheme could best guarantee, if accepted by the powers, the independence of Korea. But it failed largely due to the incapability of the Korean government to pursue the plan on a long-term basis. Besides, the United States and Britain dissociated themselves from Korea, refraining from committing themselves to Korea politically. Moreover, this scheme was invariably connected with Russian designs on other parts of the far east. When Russia was actively involved in Manchuria, she presented the neutralization of Korea, only attracting the suspicion of the powers. Thus the neutralization plan eventually failed and Korea became the protectorate of Japan when Japan excluded Russia by war from the Korean scene in 1905.

1930년대 한반도를 둘러싼 국제관계

구대열 梨花女子大學校 法政大學 1992 社會科學論集 Vol.12 No.-

1940년대 한반도의 국제관계와 분단

구대열 이화여자대학교 한국문화연구원 1992 韓國文化硏究院 論叢 Vol.61 No.2

This is a study on Korean foreign relations in the 1940s with special emphasis on the division of the country after the liberation from the Japanese colonial rule. As far as Korea was concerned, this period provided a great opportunity for her to free herself from the yoke of an alien rule, as Great Powers in the world politics were directly engaged in World War Ⅱ for which the East Asia and the pacific became part of the major theaters. As a result of Japans defeat in the war, Korea obtained her national liberation, and eventually became independent, with two separated regimes in the south and the north. Of course, the division of the Korean peninsula was the direct result of the post-war policy of Allied Powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union. This paper starts with the question of whether the division was due to the wrongly-conceived policy of the United States which was the driving force behind the contrivance of the so-called trusteeship over Korea(which is considered to have ultimately led to the division) or whether it could be justified with various reasons, taking for instances, as simple reflection of the existing balance of power among the Major Powers in the area after the war, as adherence to the tradition of US policy in East Asia, and as conformation of the view on Korea held by the powers for the past several decades. Tentative conclusions of this paper are as follows: First, although the United States bore the major burden in defeating Japan, she hardly became the sole heir in inheriting the whole estate of the dismantled empire of Japan for the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula made the neighboring Powers, especially China and the Soviet Union, to consider Korea to be vital to their national security. Moreover, the United States, a maritime power, has traditionally pursued a sort of balance of power policy in East Asia, a fact which implies that, although she had emerged as the most powerful nation in the post-war era, she was not willing to fully commit herself to the affairs in the area. The United States was also worried about the Soviet capability to mobilize and to equip Korean Communists in Siberia and about their connection with the sympathizers inside the peninsula, which were far greater than Korean nationalists in China, namely the Korean Provisional government in Chungking. In this connection, the paper argues that the Kuomintang China must share a great part of, if not direct, onus for the division of Korea. It has been generally known that Chiang Kai-shek had supported the independence of Korea in the Cairo declaration (1943) and had helped the Korean nationalists in China on their efforts to fight the Japanese. This fact cannot be disputed. However, Chin was more concerned about reasserting herself in Korea after the war, where she it had traditionally claimed suzerainty. For this reason, China did not envisage Korea becoming indepentent immediately after its liberation from Japan. Taking advantage of her position to provide the United States and Birtain with information about Korea and especially about Korean independence movement in China (which was an important factor in considering what kinds of independence-immediate, dominion status, or trusteeship to bestow in Korea), China gave Allied Powers somewhat unfair information, thus leading them to consider the Korean affairs through the Chinese looking-glass. Some aspects of trusteeship were that it was a modified from of domination in the history of Western colonialism, and that it was closely related to the perception of the Powers on Korean affairs since the opening of the country in the latter part of the last century. The experiences of the Western Powers in Korea were, in short, unpleasant-corruption and maladministration of the government, uninterrupted social disturbances, rivalries and conflicts of Foreign Powers over the peninsula. All these facts testified to their eyes the incompetence of the Korean people to stand alone, while reform polices which the Japanese upheld for their encroachment into Korea greatly impressed the Westerners. This kind of perception on the part of the Western Powers had not changed much during the Japanese colonial period. Thus, when Koreans were thinking of celebration for liberation and independence, the Powers were speedily agreeing on the principle of trusteeship which implied postponement of independence for the time being.

International Politics of Annexation : with special emphasis on the role of Britain and the United States in Korean absorption by Japan

구대열 한서대학교 동양고전연구소 2010 東方學 Vol.18 No.-

This study in the annexation of Korea by Japan deals specifically with the international aspect of Japan’s absorption of the Korean peninsula. Japan imposed its protectorate government after it had defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. However, Japan delayed its action to annex the peninsula for five years. During this period Japan made two agreements with Russia, a measure which clear major obstacles in its way to the final step of annexation. Japan also entered a series of discussion mainly with Great Britain, its ally in East Asian politics, to compromise various demands including tariffs and exteraterritorialty which were suggested by the Western powers when Japan would take the final measure of annexation. These negotiations show the status of Britain as a leading imperial power in East Asia, while the United States was virtually forced to accept the British version in these matters.

韓·日합방과 국제 관계

구대열 梨花女子大學校 法政大學 1990 社會科學論集 Vol.10 No.-

The Failure of Baekje’s Prudential Diplomacy: Revisiting the Samguk sagi from an International Relations Perspective

구대열 한국학중앙연구원 한국학중앙연구원 2010 Korea Journal Vol.50 No.2

This paper is designed to analyze why Baekje, one of the Three Kingdoms in Korea that existed up to the latter part of the seventh century, became the first victim in diplomatic and military struggles among the Three Kingdom, including Goguryeo and Silla. The Samguk sagi (Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms) gives the impression that Baekje, by dint of its geographical location,had pursued the most active and shrewd diplomacy. Located in the southwest of the peninsula, Baekje enjoyed not only easy communication and transactions with China and Japan, but also could put pressure on relatively weak Silla and move to the north when Goguryeo engaged in struggles with Chinese dynasties over the Liao river. However, this paper concludes, from an international relations perspective, that Baekje became the first kingdom to lose its independence due to its clumsy management of alliances, lack of understanding of the foreign policy priority of Chinese dynasties, as well as inconsistent and self-centered diplomacy vis-à-vis China.