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김동길 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2019 한국과 국제정치 Vol.35 No.3
In the aftermath of the 5th campaign in the May of 1951, the Chinese People's Volunteers was on the verge of complete defeat. Mao Zedong, in turn, decided to stop the Korean War through negotiations even though Kim Il-sung and Iosif Stalin strived to continue the war. While proposing the military demarcation line along the 38th parallel and the withdrawal of foreign military troops as the terms for negotiations, Mao pledged Kim the resumption of military offensive if the counterparts would not accept the terms, trying to win over Kim's opinion. Kim accepted these suggestions and tried to persuade Staline with Mao. In the end, Stalin agreed to their opinion but his main purpose was to buy time for China-North Korea allied forces to reorganize its military, rather than the success of negotiations. After the commencement of negotiations, Beijing tried to make progress by accepting concessions whereas Pyongyang adhered to the original negotiating terms. However the UN's military offense in 1951 severely damaged North Korea, and it led Kim to retreat from the previous conditions about the 38th parallel and withdrawal of foreign troops, advocating for a swift armistice. With the change of Pyongyang's position, the negotiations regained momentum. At this time Moscow sought a breakdown of the negotiations by insisting on the original negotiating terms but failed. By the April of 1952 both sides agreed on all the agendas except the issue of prisoners of war(POW). However, Beijing decided to procrastinate the POW negotiations and conveyed its will to continue the war to Moscow in order to secure strong support for the “First Five-Year Economic Plan” with asking for a massive economic aid plan at the same time. The tradeoff between Stalin and Mao based on their own interests dictated the decision to prolong the war and the Korean War stopped only after the death of Stalin.
중국의 한국전쟁 참전원인 연구 : “국방선(國防線)”의 무혈확장
김동길 한국정치외교사학회 2016 한국정치외교사논총 Vol.37 No.2
The outbreak of the Korean War and the announcement of dispatching the 7th fleet to the Taiwan Strait seriously shook the political and economic foundations of the newly established the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) regime. Therefore, Mao Zedong, taking advantage of North Korea’s ascendancy at the beginning of the war, desired to dispatch troops to assist in a quick North Korean victory. However, Mao’s desire was not realized due to Stalin’s negative attitude. With the landing of UN forces at Incheon in September 1950, the Chinese determination for intervention was gradually weakened, and they even informed Stalin and Kim Il Sung that China would not intervene even being invited. Although under a security threat and Stalin’s pressure, Mao Zedong decided on October 5, 1950 to send troops to Korea, but that decision was cancelled on October 12 due to Stalin’s refusal to provide air cover and weaponry promptly. On the following day, however, Mao Zedong again decided to send troops after Peng Dehuai’s argument that American forces should stop their advance northward at the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The calculation of securing the northern part of North Korea without fighting against the US was a crucial factor in the final calculation. In conclusion, China’s intervention in the Korean War was made out of practical considerstions, with the most profit at the lowest cost. 한국전쟁의 발발과 미국의 제7함대 대만해협 파견 발표는, 신생(新生) 중화인민공화국의 정치- 경제적 기반을 흔들었다. 이에 전쟁이 북한에 유리하게 전개되던 한국전쟁 초기, 마오쩌둥은 미군이 38선을 넘을 경우 파병하겠다는 스탈린과의 약속을 뒤로 하고, 조기 파병을 적극 희망하였지만, 스탈린의 반대로 인해 뜻을 이루지 못하였다. 그러나 유엔군의 인천상륙작전 이후, 중국의 출병 결심은 흔들리기 시작하였으며, 심지어 출병을 보류하고 이를 스탈린과 김일성에게 통보하기까지 하였다. 1950년 10월 5일, 중국은 안보위협과 스탈린의 압력을 내세워 출병을 결정하였으나, 스탈린이 즉각적인 공중엄호 및 무기제공에 난색을 표하자 10월 12일에 참전불가를 다시 결정하고 이를 스탈린에게 통보하였다. 그러나, 다음날 즉 10월 13일, 미군이 평양~원산에서 진격을 멈출 것이라는 펑더화이의 주장에, 마오쩌둥은 파병을 재차 결정하였다. “싸우지 않고 북한 북부지역을 확보”하여, “국방선을 압록강에서 평양 이북지역까지 확대”할 수 있다는 점이 그의 파병 결정에 결정적인 영향을 미쳤다. 중국의 파병은 조선인민군이 동북지방으로 전면 철수하는 것을 방지하여, 동북이 전쟁터가 되는 것을 막고 동북지역에 집중된 기간산업을 보호하는 부수적 효과도 얻을 수 있었다. 중국의 파병은 최소의 대가로 최대의 안보적·경제적 이익을 확보할 수 있는 방안이었으며, 파병결정 과정에서 소위 ‘혁명 확대’의 목적은 없었다.