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미찌시따 나루시게(道下 徳,成, Narushige MICHISHITA) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2009 신아세아 Vol.16 No.3
North Korea is embarking on yet another round of nuclear diplomacy in an attempt to normalize relations with the United States. There are three major diplomatic cards on the negotiating table between North Korea and the United States: the nuclear issue, the missile issue, and the issue of signing a peace treaty or agreement. North Korea announced that it would begin enriching uranium and had decided to build its own light water reactors. This announcement was significant for two reasons. First, it meant North Korea would be willing to negotiate on the program. Second, it highlighted North Korea’s continued interest in a light water reactor. Regarding the missiles, North Korea characterized the Taepo Dong 2 launched in April as a satellite launch vehicle, but remained silent about Scud and No Dong missiles launched in July. It seems to be dividing the missile issue into two parts again: a missile issue and a “satellite” issue. It will likely seek two separate deals on missiles based on such a distinction. Though less visible than nuclear and missile tests, North Korea has already been taking measures to put on the table the issue of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement. At the request of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the General-Officers’ Talks between the United Nations Command and the KPA reconvened in March 2009 for the first time since 2002. The General-Officers’ Talks is the most important administrative body to deal with Armistice-related issues. Even after the missile and nuclear tests, the United States has expressed willingness to engage with North Korea. The United States is willing to address not only nuclear and missile issues, but also signing a peace treaty with North Korea. Japanese security response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development is twofold: improvement in ballistic missile defense (BMD) and civil defense capabilities. However, Japan has yet to find diplomatic means of resolving North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues.
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북한의 핵 미사일 위협에 대한 일본의 군사 외교적 대응
미찌시타 나루시게(道下徳,成)(MICHISHITA Narushige) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2012 신아세아 Vol.19 No.4
In response to nuclear-armed North Korea, Japan has taken extensive non-nuclear military measures in order to cope with the North Korean threat while being less active in using diplomacy. Analysts estimate that North Korea had possessed 33 to 55 kilograms of plutonium enough for 6 to 13 nuclear devices. Two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 proved that North Korea had successfully produced nuclear devices. The only remaining missing link in determining whether North Korea’s nuclear weapons have become usable is in the issue of miniaturization. On this point, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) assessed in 2009 that North Korea “may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.” Capable of covering almost the entire territory of Japan, the medium-range No Dong missile constitutes the most serious threat to the country. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 kilometers with a payload of 700 to 1,200 kilograms and circular error probable(CEP) of 2.5 kilometers. By 2003, North Korea had deployed some 175∼200 No Dong missiles. A more recent report stated that as many as 320 No Dong missiles had been deployed. As a result, North Korea is already capable of attacking Japan with ballistic missiles. Conventional, chemical, or biological weapons can be used. Given the DIA’s estimate of North Korea’s ability to miniaturize the nuclear device, the assessment is that North Korea “may be able to” now use nuclear weapons against Japan. There are three scenarios in which North Korea might actually use missiles against Japan. First, there is a military-diplomatic scenario in which North Korea would launch missiles as a part of its effort to coerce Japan into diplomatic submission. Second, there is a wartime deterrence scenario in which North Korea would use or threaten to attack Japan in order to deter the United States and Japan from assisting South Korea in case of war on the Korean peninsula. Finally, there is a scenario in which desperate North Korean leaders launch all-out attacks against Japan. Japan’s military response to the North Korean threat has three pillars: ballistic missile defense(BMD), civil defense, and extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States. In 2003, the Japanese government made the decision to procure BMD systems. Based on this decision, deployment of BMD units in the Self-Defense Forces(SDF) began in 2007, and the deployment was completed in 2012. Two different systems are being introduced as key components of the Japanese BMD measures. One is the Standard Missile-3(SM-3) Block IA, an upper-tier, mid-course defense system deployed on Aegis destroyers. The other system is Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3(PAC-3), a ground-based, lower-tier, terminal-phase defense system. Of these two systems, the Aegis-based SM-3 is more important than PAC-3 in the sense that the SM-3 has much wider area coverage. The total expenditure of procuring the entire system is approximately 1 trillion yen, or $12.2 billion. Regarding civil defense measures, the Civil Protection Law was enacted in 2004. It stipulated how the national and local governments should implement evacuation and relief operations and take necessary measures in response to armed attacks. In 2005, the Cabinet Secretariat prepared a new warning siren designed specifically for civil defense purposes. Japan has taken steps to maintain and possibly enhance the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The Nuclear Posture Review(NPR) published by the Department of Defense in April 2010, however, announced that the Tomahawk, nuclear-equipped, sea-launched cruise missile(TLAM-N) would be retired. Some Japanese government officials felt betrayed by this since the TLAM-N had long been hailed as the centerpiece of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent provided to Japan.
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