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Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence in the Japan-US Alliance
( Umemoto Tetsuya ) 한국국방연구원 2000 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.12 No.2
As long as the United States remains vulnerable to an attack with long-range nuclear missiles, Japanese confidence in US extended deterrence would rest on the ability of Tokyo and Washington to (1) maintain a favorable balance in conventional forces most relevant to the defense of Japan, (2) avoid provoking the potential adversary into threatening a nuclear assault against Japan and (3) fasten the bilateral relationship so as to impress the adversary about the possibility of us response with strategic nuclear weapons in case he launched such an assault. Further Japanese cooperation in the US theater missile defense (TMD) program would generally have positive effects as regards the first and third conditions above, although management of the process might be quite challenging. The impact on the second condition would be harder to judge, largely because it is difficult to predict how missile defense in East Asia might affect Chinese nuclear strategy.