http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
Unintended Consequences of Leverage Regulation: Evidence from Korea
Natalie Kyung Won Kim,Taejin Jung,이우종,Daniel Yang 한국증권학회 2023 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.52 No.4
During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korean regulators imposed a 200% leverage cap to curb excessive debt and restore economic stability. We examine the real effects and externalities of mandated capital structure changes resulting from this leverage ratio regulation. Our findings indicate that firms that met the leverage requirement experienced a significant decrease in firm risk. However, the effect varied depending on how firms adjusted their capital structure. Firms that chose to issue equity to lower their leverage ratio, as opposed to firms repaying debt, exhibited higher firm risk, lower investment-q sensitivity, and lower profitability in the post-regulation period.
The Role of the Executive Pay Cap: Evidence from Korea
( Sohee Park ),( Natalie Kyung Won Kim ),( Jae Yong Shin ),( Sun-moon Jung ) 한국회계학회 2021 會計學硏究 Vol.46 No.2
Korean firms are required to obtain shareholder approval on their executive pay cap―the maximum possible amount of total compensation for all executives. This paper investigates the efficacy of the executive pay cap requirement by analyzing the determinants and implications of the executive pay cap of Korean firms. We document that the executive pay cap is not a boilerplate figure and is associated with corporate governance and economic factors. We find that the executive pay cap is adjusted according to changes in firm performance and that a significant portion of sample firms revise their executive pay cap downwards. However, we only observe this phenomenon when foreign ownership is high, largest shareholders’ ownership is high, a controlling shareholder is a board member, and the firm is a non-chaebol firm. Thus, we find that the external and internal monitoring mechanisms affect whether the executive pay cap is better aligned with firm performance. Our results also suggest that the executive pay cap is used as an anchor for determining executive compensation. We do not find support for the alternative possibility that firms could signal future firm performance through the executive pay cap.