http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
The European Stability Pact and Feedback Policy Effects
( Jerome Creel ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 (구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 2002 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.17 No.3
With a two-country dynamic model in a monetary union with wealth private behaviors, we study the implications of public debt on monetary and fiscal policies. The model used has Keynesian features in the short run and Wicksellian ones in the long run. We analyse the effects of asymmetric fiscal policies in Euroland and show that such a situation creates two feedback effects which reduce the efficiency of economic policies. First, because of the inability of one government to implement an expansionary fiscal policy, the other government has to substitute for it to reach economic targets. Second, the ECB`s involvement in macroeconomic stabilisation will be exacerbated. The more substantial these effects, the more coordination is needed between European governments and the ECB.
The European Fiscal Compact: A Counterfactual Assessment
( Jerome Creel ),( Paul Hubert ),( Francesco Saracen ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소(구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 2012 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.27 No.4
Faced with the global financial crisis and an increasingly worrisome sovereign-debt crisis, the Eurozone countries are rethinking their fiscal governance. This paper discusses the different reforms and subsequent fiscal rules which have emerged since 2011. It assesses the impact of fiscal rules on the output gap and inflation rate of three representative countries of the Eurozone. By means of a counterfactual, the rules based upon their macroeconomic outcomes are ranked. The new debt reduction rule would certainly lead to lower debt levels, hence to larger fiscal margins for maneuver in the future but, in steep contrast with the golden rule of public finance, it would be very costly to implement as the requirement to enforce a substantial consolidation in the short run would be considerably higher than that of a golden rule and would worsen the output gap and inflation rate. The cap on the cyclically adjusted deficit also leads to unfavorable outcomes whereas the Maastricht status quo, limiting overall public deficit, would be a "second best" behind the golden rule of public finance.